Anu Bradford (formerly Piilola)

[candidate photo]

S.J.D. 2007


Dissertation

Seeking an Optimal Design for an International Antitrust Regime: Understanding Obstacles to Cooperation and Options for Progress

The dissertation provides an explanation for why the many attempts to negotiate a binding international antitrust agreement have thus far failed. With the help of insights developed in game theory, the dissertation redefines the collective action problem surrounding international antitrust cooperation, and challenges the conventional wisdom that the WTO can facilitate an international antitrust agreement through issue linkages. Given the enhanced understanding of the strategic situation underlying international antitrust cooperation, the comparative institutional advantages of the WTO are argued to be impractical, unnecessary and costly. This leads to the conclusion that international antitrust cooperation is more likely to emerge under the auspices of non-binding international regimes.

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