Ziad Raymond Azar

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S.J.D. Candidate

Phone: (202) 276-7318
Office: ILS 454
Status: In Residence
Email: zazar@law.harvard.edu


Dissertation

Some Guidelines for Efficient Bankruptcy and Creditor Rights Reform

Financial crises are exacerbated in the absence of an efficient insolvency system. In the lack of adequate collective proceedings, creditors run on the debtor like depositors run on failing banks and credit recuperation becomes a “first come first served” exercise. Assets value is not maximized and capital is badly encumbered with no clear priority rights. This increases uncertainty. Creditors become more risk averse and the supply of credit is badly affected. In systematic emergencies, the design of the insolvency and creditor rights legal framework is essential. How should an efficient insolvency system be designed? More importantly, is there a universal set of rules and principles that guarantee, if adopted, efficiency and best practice? The objective of the proposed doctoral thesis is to investigate whether such universal rules exist and to provide useful policy guidelines to help reach such an efficient outcome.

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