Lex Dei quam praecepit Dominus ad Moysen


The Lex Dei is a compilation of sources from the Hebrew Bible and Roman law, made probably in the early years of the fourth century. The author was probably a Jew, and the work is important for its quotations from the Roman jurists and for what it tells us about the comparative interests of the compiler.

Pierre Pithou, 1536–1596, humanist, Catholic Gallican, supporter, ultimately, of Henry IV.

Christofle de Thou, 1505–1582, first president of the parlement of Paris, dedicatee

Dedictory epistle

To the most famous and most generous man, Christofle de Thou, knight, first president of the court of the kingdom, and senator of the sacred consistory [perhaps a reference to de Thou’s position as conseiller of the Conseil privé), Pierre Pithou greeting!

There is no single reason why I offer these remains of old authors of the law to you, most generous president, but this one seems particularly just: that it was fitting that these [remains] (which to some may perhaps seem to be brought forth against the interdict of the prince Justinian), be defended by some more holy [i.e., respected.] name against the calumnies and foolishness of most ungracious men, who either pretend [not to know] or in fact do not know that whereas he prohibited comparison and reading aloud in court among his people, we in truth keep the majesty of the Roman laws so courteously that we nonetheless allow them to have no license [i.e., authority] among us except what we concede to their reason and equity, not to their authority and sanction. Whose name, in truth, could be chosen that would be more noble for this defense than yours? Since, finally, under your presidency this purer jurisprudence has been received for the court’s use, and since you so hold and so guide the rudder of our law in that highest tribunal of Gaul, that like that very great man of old, you can not unworthily be called the soma [body] of the Senate [parlement] and, indeed, in some sense, the empsychos nomos [the law in spirit]. And also that you can claim by a certain right that is yours a share in our works, of all of which you are the chief patron, or rather father, when your highest humanity clearly persuades you that the name of goodness is more pleasing to you than the name of power. ... May you therefore receive this gift from a man most dedicated to your virtues, not any great thing, but one nonetheless that may at this time benefit you and through you the public utility, you who will perhaps some time in the future be even more distinguished as a man to whom God has given the spirit of a good citizen, and whom He confirms, increases, instructs, aids, protects out of His singular clemency in every way he can. Fare you well, most generous man. Paris, the Kalends of October,
MDLXXII [i.e., 1 October 1572].

The Return of Emperor and the Horse:

D.2.1.3: Ulpian, Edict, book 1. Imperium is pure or mixed. To have pure imperium is to have the power of the sword to punish the wicked and this is also called potestas. Imperium is mixed where it also carries jurisdiction to grant bonorum possessio. Such jurisdiction also includes the power to appoint a judge.

Azo, Summa Codicis 3.13 (On the jurisdiction of all judges): Does this pure power (merum imperium) pertain only to the prince? And some say that he alone has it. And it is said to be pure in him because he has it without any magistrate over him (sine prelatura aliquius). But certainly exalted magistrates also have pure power if the definition of the law that I have just given is good. For even the governors of provinces have the power of the sword, as [D.1.18.6.8]. Municipal magistrates, however, do not have it, as [(probably) D.2.1.12]. I say, however, that full or most full jurisdiction pertains to the prince alone, but pure power also to other exalted podestà, although on account of this I lost a horse, which was not equitable.

Odofredus, Commentaria in Digestum 2.1.3: Imperium. Here it is customary to ask to whom does pure imperium pertain? … Whence [a story about] the lord Henry the father of Frederick II who was ruling forty years ago: At that time Sir Azo and Sir Lotarius were teaching in this city and the emperor called them to him for a certain business, and while he was riding one day with them, he posed this question: “Gentlemen, tell me to whom pure imperium pertains.” … Sir Lotarius said: “Since Sir Azo wants me to speak first, I tell you that pure imperium pertains to you alone and to none other.” Afterwards the emperor asked Azo, “What will you say?” Sir Azo said, “In our laws it is said that other judges have the power of the sword, but you have [it] by excellence. Nonetheless, other judges have it too, such as governors of provinces [D.1.18.6.8], and much more so other greater [magistrates]. Insofar as you have not revoked the jurisdiction of magistrates, others can exercise pure imperium.” When they had returned to the palace, the lord emperor sent Sir Lotario a horse, and nothing to Sir Azo. …

Bartolus: He distinguishes among merum imperium, mixtum imperium and iurisdiction simplex. The distinction between imperium and iurisdiction simplex is that the former involves discretion, while the latter is mere following of the law. He then creates six different kinds of imperium, based on the amount of power that the holder has. Maximum merum imperium involves the power to declare general law. The other gradations involve the penalties that may be imposed, ranging from capital punishment to small fines. The same gradations are used with mixtum imperium, which roughly corresponds to what we would call civil jurisdiction. Iurisdiction simplex also has six degrees, probably more for symmetry than for logic, because the first degree does not include the power to make general law.

Alciatus, Andreas, 1492–1550, suggests two things: (1) that merum imperium belongs to the prince alone as ius proprietum, thus confirming the opinion of Lotharius, and (2) that the power to make law is unrelated to merum imperium. Now Alciatus does not deny that the prince has the power to make law, but he sharply separates, in a way that probably truer to the Roman texts, legislative from judicial power. Alciatus’s holding raises problems, because he recognized that both in Rome and in his own day there were those
who had criminal jurisdiction by virtue of their office. His answer was, as others had suggested before him, that these people were delegates. He advanced the argument, however, by noting that they were delegates of the law that created their office, not of the prince personally. He also held that they had only a usufructuary right in public power. Public is still not completely separated from private, and reconciliation with reality is difficult, but we’re on our way.

**Dumoulin, Charles**, 1500–1566, “[B]y the *ius commune* and *ius gentium* all jurisdiction of this realm is the king’s since not the least jurisdiction may be exercised unless by him or in his name and authority. No other may have ownership of any jurisdiction or have jurisdiction in his own right or name, unless only a special jurisdiction by the mediate or immediate investiture or concession of the king. And even in the case of any inferior *dominium* by special law, the king remains vested with the recognition of that jurisdiction and its dependence on himself mediately or immediately and with the right of final appeal, from the final sentence of the inferior lords to himself or his judges.” Dumoulin also seems ready to separate the property of public power from the property of the realm. His notion, as it had been in many theorists before him, was that sovereignty was inalienable. When the king granted a castellany to someone, the property in the castle passed irrevocably to the grantee, but when he granted *imperium* along with it, that grant was revocable.

**Govéa (Gouveanus), Antoine de**, 1505–1566, and **Duarenus, Franciscus** (François Douaren), 1509–1559: Both of these writers notice that the Roman sources make a relatively sharp distinction between *imperium* in the sense of command, what we might call executive power, and *iurisdiction*, the power to organize a legal process. They also noted that at least in the formulary procedure, the *officium ius dicentis* was not the same thing as the *officium iudicis*, indeed they were not even exercised by the same person.

**Baron, Éguinaire**, 1495–1550: In addition to the distinction between judicial and extrajudicial power Baron distinguished between judges who have discretionary power and those who do not.

**Bodin on the Emperor and the Horse:**

**Bodin, Jean**, 1530–1596, an almost exact contemporary of Pierre Pithou: His *Six livres de la république* (1576 French, 1586 Latin) is the most important book on political thought between Machiavelli and Hobbes. His theory of *imperium* is sophisticated. Ultimately, however, he sides with Azo, but with a difference. He makes much use of Baron’s distinction between discretionary and non-discretionary judicial power. Like Alciatus, he regards the true rule as being that the magistrate’s power is usufructuary only. He recognizes that in France such power is inheritable, but he regards this as an abuse. In all, he does a remarkable in reconciling his theory with the known facts of both Roman and French public law.

*Six livres de la république* 3.5: [5] And hereof arises a notable question, which is not yet well decided, *viz*.: Whether the power of the sword (which the law calls *merum imperium* or mere power) be proper unto the sovereign prince and inseparable from the sovereignty and that the magistrates have not this *merum imperium* or mere power but only execution thereof, or that such power is also common unto the magistrate to whom the prince has
communicated the same. Which question was disputed between Lothair and Azo, two of the greatest lawyers of their time. And the emperor Henry the seventh [VI] chosen thereof judge, at such time as he was at Bononia, upon the wager of an horse, which he should pay, which was by the judgment of the emperor upon the aforesaid question condemned. Wherein Lothair indeed carried away the honor, howbeit that the greater part and almost all the rest of the famous lawyers then held the opinion of Azo, saying that Lotharius equum tulerat sed Azo aequum (Lothair had carried away the horse, but Azo the right) nevertheless many have since held to the opinion of Lothair, so that the question remains yet (as we have said) undecided, which for all that deserves to be well understood, for the consequence it draws after it, for the better understanding of the force and nature of commanding, and the rights of sovereign majesty. But the difficulty thereof is grown, for that Lothair and Azo neither of them well knew the estate of the Romans, whose laws and ordinances they expounded; neither took regard unto the change in that estate made by the coming in of the emperors. Certain it is, that at the first, after the kings were driven out of the city, none of the Roman magistrates had power of the sword over the citizens; indeed that which much less is, they had not so much power as to condemn any citizen to be whipped or beaten, after the lex Portia published at the request of Cato the tribune of the people 454 years after the foundation of the city [198 B.C.; it made scourging subject to provocatio]. By which law the people took this power, not from the magistrates only, but depriven even itself thereof also, so much as it could, giving the condemned leave for whatsoever fault or offense it were, to void the country and go into exile; and that which more is, there was not any one magistrate which had power to judge a citizen, if once question were but of his honor, or good name, or of any public crime by him committed, for then the hearing thereof was reserved unto the commonalty or common people, but if it concerned the loss of life or of the freedom of a citizen none might then judge thereof but the whole estate of the people in their great assemblies, as was ordained by those laws which they called sacred.

[6] ... But if the state of the commonweal being changed and the power of judgment and of giving of voices being taken from the people, yet for a certain time this manner and form of judicial proceedings continued, even after that the form of the commonweal was changed from a popular estate into a monarchy, as a man may see in the time of Papinian the great lawyer who gave occasion unto Lothair and Azo to make question of the matter in these words by him set down as a maxim: “Whatsoever it is that is given unto magistrates by decree of the senate, by special law, or by constitution of the princes, that is not in their power to commit unto other persons, and therefore (says he) the magistrates do not well in committing that their charge unto others, if it be not in their absence; which is not so (says he) in them that have power, without the limitation of special laws, but only in virtue of their office, which they may commit unto others, albeit that they themselves be present.” And thus much for that which Papinian says, using the words exercitationem publici iudicii [roughly, exercise of criminal jurisdiction], as if he should say, that they which have the sovereign majesty have received unto themselves the power...
Whereof we may then conclude that the great provost and the governors of provinces and generally all such magistrates as have extraordinary authority to judge of capital crimes (whether it be by commission or by virtue of their office) have the power of the sword, that is to say, to judge, to condemn, or acquit, and not the bare execution of the law only, whereunto they are not in this respect bound as are the other magistrates unto whom the law has prescribed what and how they are to judge, leaving unto them the naked execution of the law, without the power of the sword.

[D.1.21.1pr, a very free quotation but accurate in substance. More literally, the text reads: “Any powers specially conferred by statute or senatus consultum or imperial enactment are not transferable by delegation of a jurisdiction. But the competence attached to a magistracy as of right is capable of delegation. Accordingly, magistrates are held to be in the wrong if they delegate their jurisdiction insofar as they are charged with the conduct of a criminal court [publici iudicijii habeant exercitationem] under a statute or a senatus consultum, such as the lex Julia de adulteris and any other like acts. The most powerful proof of this point is that it is expressly envisaged by the lex Julia de vi that anyone to whom its enforcement belongs may delegate that function if he goes away. Accordingly, he may only delegate after the commencement of his absence, since otherwise there would actually be a delegation by someone present in the city. ...” The puzzling provision in the lex Julia de vi may be explained as a special statutory authorization to delegate (which would not exist if the statute had not expressly allowed it) and which is being read narrowly in the light of the general rule.]

[D.49.19.13: “Ulpian, Appeals, Book 1: Nowadays [a judge] who is hearing a criminal case extra ordinem may lawfully pass what sentence he wishes, whether heavier or lighter, provided only that he does not exceed what is reasonable in either direction.”]

[7] And thus much briefly concerning the question between Lothair and Azo, for the fuller and more plentiful declaration whereof it is needful for us yet to search farther. [The Latin employs terms from Ramist logic, making it clear that Bodin means that Lothair and Azo were disputing a subordinate point which can only be clarified by extending it into a general proposition.] Where it is first to be enquired whether the magistrates’ office be proper unto the commonweal or unto the prince or unto the
magistrate himself together with the commonweal? Then whether the power granted unto
the magistrates be proper unto the magistrates in that they are magistrates or else be
proper unto the prince, the execution thereof only belonging unto the magistrates or else
be common unto them both together? Now concerning the first question, there is no
doubt, but that all estates, magistrates, and offices do in properly belong unto the
commonweal (excepting in a lordly monarchy), the bestowing of them resting with them
which have the sovereignty (as we have before said) and cannot by inheritance be
appropriate unto any particular persons, but by the grant of the sovereign and long and
separate consent of the estates, confirmed by a long lawful and just possession. As in this
kingdom, the dukes, marquises, counts and such others as have from the prince the
government of the castles in sundry provinces, and so the command of them, had the
same in ancient time by commission only, to again be revoked at the pleasure of the
sovereign prince, but were afterward by little and little granted unto particular men for
term of their lives and after that unto their heirs male, and in process of time unto females
also, insomuch as that ultimately, through the negligence of princes, sovereign command,
jurisdictions, and powers may lawfully be set to sale, as well as may the lands
themselves, by way of lawful buying and selling, almost in all the empires and kingdoms
of the west, and so are accounted of, as other hereditary goods, which may lawfully be
bought and sold. Wherefore this jurisdiction or authority which for that it seems to be
annexed unto the territory or land (and yet in truth is not) and is therefore called
praediatoria, and is proper unto them which are possessed of such lands, whether it be by
inheritance or by other lawful right and that as unto right and lawful owners thereof, in
giving fealty and homage unto the sovereign prince, or state, from whom all great
commands and jurisdictions flow, and in saving also the sovereign rights of the kingdom
and the right of last appeal.

6 Tooley (p. 92) translates “despotic monarchy,” which probably captures the sense.

Loyseau, Charles, 1564–1627: To him belongs the credit of having so sharply separated
public from private ownership that it is possible for him to tame the inheritance of public
power, which he still regards as an abuse, but as a fact.

HOMOLOGATION OF CUSTOM AND RECEPTION

Homologation of Custom:
1453—Charles VII (ordonnance of Montils les Tours)
1495—coutume of Ponthieu
1509—coutume of Orléans
1510—coutume of Paris
1498–1574—285 coutumiers published
1580—Revised edition of the coutume of Paris
1582—death of Christofle de Thou, first president of the Parlement of Paris and anti-
Romanist

Les grandes ordonnances:
Ordonnace de Villers-Cotterets (Francis I, Poyet, 1539)—general reform particularly in
procedure for gracious acts.
Ordonnance d’Orléans (Charles IX, l’Hôpital, 1561)—inheritance and civil procedure.
Ordonnance de Moulins (Charles IX, l’Hôpital, 1566)—a kind of statute of Frauds.
Ordonnance de Blois (Henry III, 1579)—marriage.
Ordonnance de 1629 (= Code Michaud) (Louis XIII, Michel de Marillac)—extension of feudal tenure.
Ordonnance de 1667 sur la procédure civile (= Code Louis) (Louis XIV, Colbert)—close to a codification.
Ordonnance criminelle (Louis XIV, Colbert, 1670)—less successful but along the same lines.
Ordonnance du commerce (=Code Savary or Code Marchand) (Louis XIV, Colbert and Savary, 1673)—general commercial code.
Ordonnance sur le commerce de mer (=Code de la marine) (Louis XIV, ?Colbert, 1681)—perhaps the most influential beyond the borders of France.
Ordonnance de 1731 sur les donations (Louis XV, D’Aguesseau).
Ordonnance de 1735 sur les testaments (Louis XV, D’Aguesseau).
Ordonnance de 1747 sur les substitutions (Louis XV, D’Aguesseau).
Code civil (Napoléon, 1804).

The Alciateani:
Andreas Alciatus, 1492–1550

Editors of texts:
Jacobus Cujacius (Jacques Cujas), 1522–1590
Pierre Pithou, 1539–1596
Francois Pithou, 1544–1621
Dionysius Godofredus (Denis Godefroy), 1549–1622
Jacobs Godofredus (Jacques Godefroy), 1578–1652

Civilians and commentators:
Éguinaire Baron, 1495–1550, comparativist
Antoine de Govéa (Gouveanus), 1505–1566, historian
François Connan (Connanus), 1508–1551, general classification
Franciscus Duarenus (François Douaren), 1509–1559, systematizer
François Baudouin (Balduinus), 1520–1573, historian and comparativist
Hugo Donellus (Hugh Doneau), 1527–1591, systematizer

Lawyer-Historians and Theorists:
François Hotman, 1524–1590
Jean Bodin, 1530–1596
Étienne Pasquier, 1529–1615

Customary Lawyers:
Charles Dumoulin, 1500–1566, the ‘French Papinian,’ systematizer of the custom of Paris
Guy Coquille, 1523–1603, custom of Nivernais treated comparatively
Antoine Loysel, 1536–1617, maxims arranged according to the Institutes
Louis Charondas Le Caron, 1534–1613, historical inquiry into the custom of Paris
Charles Loyseau, 1566–1627, treatises on specific topics

Later Figures
Jean Domat, 1625–1695
Gabriel Argou, 1640–1703
Joseph Pothier, 1699–1772

**The Titles of the Custom of Paris (1580)**

Tit. 1—On Fiefs (art. 1–72)

Tit. 2—On Quit-rents (*censives*) and seigneurial rights (73–87)

Tit. 3—Which goods are movable and which immovables (88–95)

art. 91. Fish being in a pond or in a ditch is regarded as immovable; but when it is in a shop (*boutique*) or reservoir, it is regarded as a moveable.

Tit. 4—On Plaint in case of seisin and of novelty and simple seisin (91–98)

Tit. 5—On Personal actions and on *hypotheque* (99–112)

Tit. 6—On Prescription (113–128)

Tit. 7—On *retrait lignagier* (129–159)

Tit. 8—Judgments, executions, gages (160–183)

Tit. 9—On Servitutes and reports of juries (184–219)

Tit. 10—Community of goods (220–246)

Tit. 11—On Dower (247–264)

Tit. 12—On Guardianship of nobles and bourgeois (265–271)

Tit. 13—On Gifts and mutual gift (272–288)

Tit. 14—On Testaments and their execution (289–298)

Tit. 15—Of Succession in the direct line and in the collateral (299–344)

Tit. 16—Of Public proclamations [*criées*] (345–362)

**Jean Bodin, A Method for the Easy Understanding of Histories (1566)**

*Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem*, pp. 175–6: And so having compared the arguments of Aristotle, Polybius, Dionysius [of Halicarnassus], and the jurists—with each other and with the universal history of commonwealths—I find the supremacy (*summam*) in a commonwealth consists of five parts. The first and most important is appointing magistrates and assigning each one’s duties; another is ordaining and repealing laws; a third is declaring and terminating war; a fourth is the right of hearing appeals from all magistrates in last resort; and the last is the power of life and death where the law itself has made no provision for flexibility or clemency.