D.1.1.1pr–1: “A law student at the outset of his studies ought first to
know the derivation of the word ius.
Its derivation is from iustitia.
For in terms of Celsus’s elegant definition, the law is the art of goodness
and fairness (ius est ars aequi et
boni).”
D.50.17.202 (Javolenus): “Every definition in civil law is dangerous;
for it is rare for the possibility not to exist of its being overthrown.”
D.1.1.10.pr–2 (Ulpian): Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas
ius suum cuique tribuendi. 1. Iuris praecepta sunt haec: honeste
vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere. 2. Iuris
prudentia est divinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia, iusti atque iniusti
scientia.
Cicero, De legibus “Law is the highest
reason, implanted in Nature, which commands what ought to be done and
forbids the opposite. This reason, when firmly fixed and fully developed in
the human mind, is Law.
princeps legibus solutus, D.1.3.31 (Ulpian,
bk. 13 on the lex Julia et Papia):
“The emperor is not bound by statutes. And though the empress is not freed
from statutes, the emperors, nonetheless, give her the same privileges as
they have themselves.”
Lex de imperio Vespasiani
“(7): And that by whatever laws or plebiscites it has been recoreded that
the deified Augustus or Tiberius <Julius Caesar Augustus> and
<Tiberius> Claudius <Caesar Augustus Germanicus> were not
bound, from these laws and plebiscites Emperor Ceasar Vespasian shall be
exempt; and whatsoever things it was proper for the defied Augustus or
Tiberius <Juluius Ceasar Augustus> or <Tiberius> Caludius
<Ceasar Augustus Germanicus> to do in accordance with any law or
proposed law, it shall be lawful for Emperor Caesar Vespasian Augustus to
do all these things.”
G.1.1 (=D.1.1.9): “All peoples who are governed under laws and customs
observe in part their own special law and in part a law common to all men.
Now that law which each nation has set up as a law unto itself is special
to that particular civitas and is
called ius civile, as being proper
to the particular civil society (civitas).
By contrast, that law which natural reason has established among all human
beings is among all observed in equal measure and is called ius gentium, as being the law which
all nations observe.”
D.1.1.3 (Ulpian): “Jus naturale
is that which nature has taught to all animals; for it is not a law specific
to mankind but is common to all animals—land animals, sea animals, and the
birds as well. Out of this comes the union of man and woman which we call
marriage, and the procreation children, and their rearing. So we can see
that the other animals, wild beasts included, are rightly understood to be
acquainted with this law. 4. Jus
gentium is that which all human peoples observe. That it it not
co-extensive with natural law can be grasped easily, since this latter is
common to all animals whereas ius
gentium is common only to human beings among themselves.”
G.3.194 (p. II.A.68): “The fact that the statute enacts that in such
case there is manifest theft causes some writers to say that theft may be
manifest by statute or in fact: by statute in the case we are now
discussing, in fact in the circumstances previously described. But the
truth is that manifest theft means manifest in fact; for statute can no
mmore turn a thief who is not manifest into a manifest thief than it can
turn into a thief one who is not a thief at all, or into an adulterer or
homicide one who neither the one nor the other. What statute can do is
simply this: it can make a man liable to a penalty as if he committed
theft, adultery, or manslaughter, though he has committed none of these
crimes.”
J.I.3.1.9: “the praetor, following natural equity, gives possession to
[emancipated children] of the deceased merely as children, exactly as if
they had been in his power at the time of his death, and this whether they
are alone or whether they are sui
heredes as well.” JI.3.1.11: “Adoptive [children] are not so well off
as natural children in respect of rights of succession; for by the
indulgence of the praetor the latter retain their rank as children even
after emancipation, although they lose it by the civil law; while the
former, if emancipated, are not assisted even by the praetor. And there is
nothing wrong in their being thus differently treated, because civil
changes can affect rights annexed to a civil title, but not rights annexed
to a natural title, and natural descendants, though on emancipation they
cease to be family heirs, cannot cease to be children or grandchildren;
whereas on the other hand adoptive children are regarded as strangers after
emancipation ... .”
JI.3.1.15–16: “By the ancient law, which favoured the descent through
males,, those grandchildren only were called as sui heredes and preferred to agnates, who were related to the
grandfather in this way ... . But the Emperors would not allow so unnatural
a wrong to endure without sufficient correction ... .”
Later on he refers to “those had in their favour the provisions of the
ancient law as well as natural right ... .”
GI. 3.25: “[T]hese inequities of the law [that an emancipated did not
inherit with a child sui iuris]
of the law have been amended by the Praetor’s Edict.”
GI.1.158: “By capitis deminutio
the tie of agnation is ended, but that of cognation is unaffected, because
considerations of civil law can destroy civil but not natural rights.”
D.38.10.10.4 (Paul): “There is the same difference between agnates and
cognate relatives as there is between a genus and its species; for a person
who is an agnate is also a cognate, but a cognate is not also an agnate
same way; for the one expression [derives from] civil and the other from
natural law.”
D.38.8.2 (?Gaius): “The proconsul, urged by natural equity, promises bonorum possessio to all cognate
relatives called by reason of ties of blood to an estate, even though they
fail at civil law.” [Interpolationn
of the phrase “natural equity” is strongly suspected.]
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