Kathryn E. Spier

Domenico de Sole Professor of Law

Office:	Hauser 302
Assistant:	Susan Norton 617/496-2609
Phone:	617/496-0019
Email:	kspier@law.harvard.edu
Web Page:	personal website

Faculty Directory listing

Bibliography

Shorter Works in Collection

Spier, Kathryn E. "The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation" in The Economics of Evidence, Procedure, and Litigation (Chris W. Sanchirico ed., Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008).

Hay, Bruce L. & Kathryn E. Spier. "Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic Analysis" in The Economics of Evidence, Procedure, and Litigation (Chris W. Sanchirico ed., Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008).

Spier, Kathryn E. "Litigation" in The Handbook of Law and Economics (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, eds., North Holland, 2007).

Spier, Kathryn E. "Economics of Litigation" in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (Blume & Durlauf eds., Palgrave MacMillan, 2008).

Hay, Bruce L. & Kathryn E. Spier. "Settlement of Litigation" in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 442 (Peter Newman ed., MacMillan Reference Limited, 1998).

Spier, Kathryn E. & David E. Weinstein. "Retaliatory Mechanisms for Eliminating Trade Barriers: Aggressive Unilateralism vs. GATT Cooperation" in Imperfect Competition in International Trade (Winston W. Change & Seiichi Katayama eds., Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995).
(Chapter 14)

Spier, Kathryn E. "Defense Procurement: Politics, Management, and Incentives: Discussion" in Incentives in Procurement Contracting 22 (James Leitzel & Jean Tirole eds., Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press, 1993).
(Pew Studies in Economics and Security)

Articles in a Periodical

Spier, Kathryn E. & Albert Choi. "Should Consumers Be Permitted to Waive Products Liability? Product Safety, Private Contracts, and Adverse Selection," 30 Journal of Law, Economics and Organization (forthcoming 2014).
Full text: SSRN

Landeo, Claudia & Kathryn E. Spier. "Exclusive Dealing and Market Foreclosure: Further Experimental Results," 168 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150 (2012).
Full text: SSRN

Landeo, Claudia & Kathryn E. Spier. "Incentives and Contract Frames: Comment," 168 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 83 (2012).
Full text: SSRN

Spier, Kathryn E. "Product Safety, Buybacks and the Post-Sale Duty to Warn," 27 Journal of Law Economics and Organization 515 (2011).
Full text: SSRN

Brooks, Richard, Claudia Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier. "Trigger Happy or Gun Shy? Dissolving Common-Value Partnerships with Texas Shootouts," 41 RAND Journal of Economics 649 (2010).
Full text: SSRN

Posner, Eric A., Kathryn E. Spier & Adrian Vermeule. "Divide and Conquer," 2 Journal of Legal Analysis 417 (2010).
Full text: SSRN

Spier, Kathryn E. & Claudia M. Landeo. "Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities," 99 American Economic Review 1850 (2009).
Full text: SSRN

Spier, Kathryn E. & Yeon-Koo Che. "Strategic Judgment Proofing," 39 RAND Journal of Economics 926 (2008).
Full text: SSRN

Spier, Kathryn E. & Yeon-Koo Che. "Exploiting Plaintiffs Through Settlement: Divide and Conquer," 164 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 4 (2008).
Full text: SSRN

Spier, Kathryn E. & James D. Dana. "Entry Deterrence in a Duopoly Market," Article 19, Berkeley Electronic Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy (2007).

Hay, Bruce L. & Kathryn E. Spier. "Manufacturer Liability for Harm Caused by Consumers to Others," 94 American Economic Review 1700 (2005).
Full text: SSRN

Hua, Xinyu & Kathryn E. Spier. "Information and Externalities in Sequential Litigation," 161 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 215 (2005).
Full text: SSRN

Spier, Kathryn E. "The Use of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Settlement of Litigation," 34 RAND Journal of Economics (2003).
Full text: SSRN

Spier, Kathryn E. "'Tied to the Mast': Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Settlement Contracts," 32 Journal of Legal Studies (2003).

Spier, Kathryn E. & David Dranove. "A Theory of Utilization Review," 2 Contributions to Economic Analysis and Policy (2003).

Spier, Kathryn E. "Settlement with Multiple Plaintiffs: The Role of Insolvency," 18 Journal of Law Economics and Organization 293 (2002).
Full text: SSRN

Shavell, Steven M. & Kathryn E. Spier. "Threats Without Binding Commitment," 2 Topics in Economic Analysis and Policy (2002).

Spier, Kathryn E. & James D. Dana, Jr. "Revenue Sharing and Vertical Control in the Video Rental Market," 49 Journal of Industrial Economics 223 (2001).

Spier, Kathryn E., David Dranove & Laurence Baker. "'Competition' Among Employers Offering 'Health' Insurance," 19 Journal of Health Economics 121 (2000).

Spier, Kathryn E. & Alan Sykes. "Capital Structure, Priority Rules, and the Settlement of Civil Claims," 18 International Review of Law & Economics 187 (1998).

Hay, Bruce L. & Kathryn E. Spier. "Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic Perspective," 26 Journal of Legal Studies 413 (1997).

Spier, Kathryn E. "A Note on the Private Versus Social Incentive to Settle Under a Negligence Rule," 26 Journal of Legal Studies 613 (1997).

Spier, Kathryn E. & Michael Whinston. "On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated Damages for Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers, Reliance, and Renegotiation," 26 RAND Journal of Economics 180 (1995).

Spier, Kathryn E. "Settlement Bargaining and the Design of Damage Awards," 10 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 84 (1994).
Full text: SSRN

Spier, Kathryn E. "Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules," 25 RAND Journal of Economics 197 (1994).

Spier, Kathryn E. & James D. Dana, Jr. "Designing a Private Industry: Government Auctions with Endogenous Market Structure," 53 Journal of Public Economics 127 (1994).

Spier, Kathryn E. "A Note on Joint and Several Liability: Insolvency, Settlement, and Incentives," 23 Journal of Legal Studies 559 (1994).

Spier, Kathryn E. & Enrico Perotti. "Capital Structure as a Bargaining Tool: The Role of Leverage in Contract Renegotiation," 83 American Economic Review 1131 (1993).

Spier, Kathryn E. & James D. Dana, Jr. "Expertise and Contingent Fees: The Role of Asymmetric Information in Attorney Compensation," 9 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 349 (1993).

Spier, Kathryn E. "The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation," 59 Review of Economic Studies 93 (1992).

Spier, Kathryn E. "Incomplete Contracts and Signaling," 23 RAND Journal of Economics 432 (1992).

Working or Discussion Papers

Landeo, Claudia & Kathryn E. Spier. "It Takes Three to Tango: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Stipulated Damages," Working Paper Series (forthcoming).
Full text: SSRN

Rosenberg, David & Kathryn E. Spier. "On Structural Bias in the Litigation of Common Question Claims," John M. Olin Center Faculty Discussion Paper Series, No. 715 (forthcoming).
Full text: WWW

Prescott, JJ, Kathryn E. Spier & Albert Yoon. "Trial AND Settlement: A Study of High-Low Agreements, 9/10," John M. Olin Center Faculty Discussion Paper Series, No. 678 (forthcoming).
Full text: WWW

Dana, Jr., James D. & Kathryn E. Spier. "Bundling and Firm Reputation," John M. Olin Working Paper Series, No. 649 (forthcoming).
Full text: SSRN

Works in Progress

Rosenberg, David & Kathryn E. Spier. Litigants� Incentives to Invest in Separate versus Class Actions (2011).

Kathryn E. Spier

Bibliography

More Information

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