The methods and the politics

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Comparative law as governance

The broad mainstream of comparative law today is careful to distance itself from the work of governance and the choices of political life. Discomfort with politics is common to comparatists who seek knowledge about foreign legal systems more or less for its own sake and those who see themselves as technicians in a project whose political direction has been determined elsewhere. This has not always been true of comparative law and it distinguishes the field from other legal disciplines today. This essay explores the argumentative machinery that generates comparative law's apolitical sensibility and asks whether this practice itself has a politics. I develop some hypotheses about its historical origins and disciplinary specificity and end with some thoughts about its contribution to global governance.¹

A professional discipline might be thought 'to be political' or 'participate in governance' in a variety of ways. Sometimes, disciplines participate actively in ideological debates within the broader society, taking positions we can associate easily with the left, centre or right. Sometimes, they harness their expertise to the interests of one or another social group, so that we identify their work with the interests of workers or industrialists, men or women. Disciplines may take positions on the broad choices governments make, promoting, say, centralization over decentralization or assimilation

¹ This essay builds on ideas I published initially in David Kennedy, 'New Approaches to Comparative Law and International Governance', [1997] Utah L.R. 545.
over cultural diversity. Professions may urge their members to participate in public life, exercising the levers of governmental authority by applying the profession's special knowledge or viewpoint. Some disciplines encourage professionals to experience their work as the ongoing exercise of power, to see themselves making choices framed, but not compelled, by their professional context and expertise.

Comparative law today distances itself from politics and rulership in each of these senses, eschewing identification with ideological positions and social interests, retreating to the academy from public life and from the application of comparative knowledge. The discipline encourages its practitioners not to take positions on issues facing government and to think of their professional work as the exercise of academic good judgement rather than political choice. Comparative law today is about knowing, not doing.

Perhaps the largest comparative-law undertaking now underway - the effort to uncover and describe a 'common core' in European private law under the loose auspices and funding of the European Union - well illustrates the attitudes of many mainstream comparatists toward engagement with the choices involved in governing. Although the European Union has a clear project of harmonization and unification, those involved in the common-core project present themselves as coming to the effort agnostic about the existence or shape of the common core they are exploring. Their work will be objective, descriptive and scientific. In the words of Mauro Bussani, co-founder of the project:

We wish to correct this misleading information; we do not wish to force the actual diverse reality of the law into one single map to attain uniformity [...] This project seeks only to analyse the present complex situation in a reliable way. While we believe that cultural diversity in the law is an asset, we neither wish to take a preservationist approach nor do we wish to push in the direction of uniformity.

Or, later:


3 Bussani, supra, note 2, p. 796. Bussani goes on to differentiate the common-core project from 'any restatement-like enterprise. The latter involves the pursuit of rationality, harmony and reform ideals, whereas the Common Core Project implies the selection of the legal rules and materials best suited for the task. The restatement-like enterprise discards whatever does not fit into its framework. This approach is anathema to an analytical perspective: the very fact that rules and materials exist in a legal system requires that they be taken into consideration in the analysis and become part of the final "map".' ibid.
of policy management. Most legal workers—lawyers, judges, scholars, bureaucrats and activists—now take it for granted that legal work is a practical matter of balancing, negotiating, and managing competing political visions, ideals, and outcomes.

That said, lawyers and legal scholars vary widely in their comfort level with rulership. Some are quite comfortable with the idea that their expertise expresses an ideological commitment, others are not. Some would be offended if accused of preferring one social interest to another, others not. Most are proud to think of their work as a contribution to governance, although few experience the exercise of professional judgement as the making of political choices. Although some legal disciplines embrace the work of governance (think of torts, local government law or any public regulatory field), in other fields (think of property or contracts) rulership remains an acquired taste, even if comfort with the politics of law has long since become the coin of the realm. The many shadings of the word ‘policy’ in legal thought mark a range of professional positions between ‘it’s-all-politics’ and ‘it’s-all-law’. For some, ‘policy argument’ is a limited and regrettable necessity for judges who must sometimes look to legislative intent or social context to complete their interpretive mission. For others, legal ‘policy-making’ by administrators, legislators or judges is a sophisticated and specialized professional practice, drawing on cost-benefit analysis, welfare economics, sociology, psychology and more. For most, the ambition is a law which embraces the politics of reason, progress, welfare maximization and institutional pragmatism while rejecting the politics of bias, passion and ideology.

In my own field of public international law, to take an example, the dominant posture is somewhere in the middle. International lawyers are generally proud of their contribution to the resolution of ‘disputes’ in society, if by this they usually mean the rarefied society of states. The contribution they propose is more often procedural than substantive and they distance their work from disputes about the distributions of wealth or power in society, all but the clearest and most egregious of which seem to happen below the line of national sovereignty and, therefore, outside their normal purview. They understand themselves to have a disciplinary position in broad political debate among right, left and centre positions, but it is a very vague humanist position, cosmopolitan, tolerant, open. They often speak as if they sought engagement with the institutions of government and were confident that the more they were allowed to participate in global governance, the better off the world would be. But they also seem more comfortable advising, criticizing or desiring power than exercising it.

Comparative law today does not share even this ambivalent comfort with rulership. On the contrary, comparatists are sensitive to ‘accusations’ that their work might have anything one could regard as a politics. To my ears, their sensitivity on this point can seem so extreme that it is hard to think of it as fully ingenuous. This is particularly so when one reflects on the history of comparative law. Early comparatists were significant players in the broad methodological assault on law’s seeming parochialism and isolation from political and social life. At the 1900 Paris Congress often thought to have inaugurated the field of comparative law, comparatists shared a professional vision about their contribution to the management of international society and established the comparative profession to pursue it. Looking back, their shared vision seems political in a variety of ways which would be extremely unusual in the field today. Many participated actively as comparatists in public life, indeed, were eager to participate in governmental and academic management. Associating law with the realities of social, economic and political life translated easily into concrete projects associated with ideological positions (generally, but not exclusively, on the left) or with the interest of particular groups (labour, commerce) or nations. They promoted comparative law in the name of quite specific cosmopolitan, internationalist, humanist and socially progressive political visions. They meant comparative law to be applied and harnessed their expertise to broad projects of unification and harmonization of law.

If we jump ahead to the post-1945 period, the aspiration to establish a ‘profession’ has been fulfilled. Post-war comparatists are part of a stable academic profession. Their work differs from their predecessors in two crucial respects: the insistent anti-formalism has been replaced by a sensible methodological pluralism and they have become far less comfortable thinking of their work politically in any of these senses. Indeed, methodological pluralism has become the mark of political detachment and both have come to seem necessary for comparative law to remain a professional endeavour.

It is a puzzle to understand how this came about and what the politics of this professional practice and self-image might be. In most other post-war legal fields, methodological pluralism accompanied pragmatic engagement with policy-making—only the methodologically nimble being able to move easily across the boundaries between science and politics.
If we think of post-war legal intellectuals on a continuum from more to less comfort with policy-making, comparative law offers an opportunity to understand the professional practices of the extreme-discomfort end. Why should comparatists have come to associate professionalization with both methodological pluralism and withdrawal from politics? And can we say anything about the politics of this sort of professional project?

The first part of this essay examines the standard professional activity developed by post-war comparatists – writing articles and books which identify and explain similarities and differences among legal regimes. The common-core project is an excellent example of this work. To pursue this activity with methodological eclecticism and political disengagement is no easy task and the rhetorical machinery which generates the effects of methodological eclecticism and political innocence gives us important clues to the politics of the practice.

For a start, placing this activity at the centre of the field narrowed considerably what it means to be a comparatist, pushing to one side foreign-law experts who did not ‘compare’. Foreign-law specialists, particularly those who studied the diverse legal systems of Asia and Africa, and, increasingly after 1950, specialists in socialist law, found themselves outside the field. So did those using foreign-law knowledge to build international commercial and governmental regimes. So did foreign-law experts interested in law reform, importing or exporting legal rules to solve economic or social problems in the First World or the Third. The law-and-development movement rose and fell outside comparative law. All the more overt political projects of the pre-war period disappeared from the field – at most, we find vague exhortations to a more cosmopolitan and humanist world. In their introduction to comparative law, published in various editions over the last decades, Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz draw the boundaries of the field firmly:

The neighboring areas of legal science which also deal with foreign law, and from which comparative law must be distinguished, are private international law, public international law, legal history, legal ethnology, and finally sociology of law.4

4 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, 3rd ed. transl. by Tony Weir (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 6. Twining replies that ‘there would not be much left if one excluded from a bibliography of comparative law parallel studies, students’ works on particular foreign legal systems or parts thereof, and some of the most respected examples of twentieth century scholarship that involved sustained study of “foreign” legal phenomena or materials from more than one jurisdiction. A clear distinction between the study of foreign law and comparative law cannot be sustained either in theory or in practice’: William Twining,

Significantly, scholars who mobilized foreign-law expertise to participate in the philosophical or methodological debates of the post-war academy were also outside the core comparative activity. Zweigert and Kötz give a sense for this hostility to methodological rumination:

According to Gustav Radbruch, ‘sciences which have to busy themselves with their own methodology are sick sciences’ [citation omitted]. Though generally true, this is not a diagnosis which fits modern comparative law. For one thing, comparatists all over the world are perfectly unembarrassed about their methodology, and see themselves as being still at the experimental stage. For another, there has been very little systematic writing about the methods of comparative law. There are thus no signs of the disease in question.5

Meanwhile, the training and experience to succeed as a professional comparatist – to attain the intuition and judgement needed to compare without falling prey to the false shortcuts of method – seemed to become evermore burdensome, requiring language study, immersion in numerous legal cultures, years of training, intense interdisciplinary knowledge. William Twining laments the fact that ‘serious comparative study is more like a way of life than a method’.6

You put all this together and the comparative law discipline, properly so called, became an ever-narrower place after 1950. By 1998, Twining could propose the ‘bold hypothesis’ that ‘few experienced comparatists compare – and for good reasons’.7 If it were not for resources poured into the field by the common-core effort and related projects, it might be hard to find much well-done comparative-law work – although there would be no shortage of calls for such work, descriptions of its virtues and comment on its regrettable absence. Post-war comparatists seemed determined to

5 Zweigert and Kötz, supra, note 4, p. 33.
6 Twining, supra, note 4, p. 57, where he comments in these terms on Max Rheinstein’s famous advice for beginners on how to prepare for a career in comparative law (see Max Rheinstein, ‘Comparative Law – Its Functions, Methods and Uses’, [1968] 22 Arkansas L.R. 415): ‘It was quite simple and is easily summarised: first, master your own system of law; second, acquire genuine familiarity with one of the principal systems belonging to another family. This will involve systematic study for at least two years in the relevant country and mastery of at least one foreign language, preferably more. Do not focus merely on the rules of the foreign system; you must also study the mentality and basic concepts and techniques as well as the machinery of justice and the procedural context. “Try to forget that you have ever studied law” and study the local culture on its own terms. If possible, obtain some practical experience of that system in operation. After that one may be ready to start to compare.’
7 Twining, supra, note 4, p. 47.
establish a professional practice more earnest and boring than many of them could actually stand to pursue.

The second part of the essay places today’s eclectic and disengaged posture against the background of earlier more overtly political and methodologically assertive comparative work.8 The no-method method and the no-politics politics of comparative law arose together after 1945 and came to dominate the discipline’s mainstream over the next generation as comparative law routinized itself in the North American and European legal academies. It is hard to see how the post-war aspiration to professionalize became associated with disengagement from method and politics or settled on so difficult and sterile a professional activity. This was in many ways an odd development. Exactly as anti-formalism – a fighting faith for pre-war comparatists – became mainstream common sense, post-war comparatists retreated from political assertiveness and reinterpreted the method as an eclectic muddle.

More historical work would be necessary to figure this out, although it had something to do with the move to the United States, something to do with the Cold War. Methodological eclectic and political agnosticism was the project of a generation in rebellion, establishing a new academic foothold, less in Europe than in the United States, and part of a new academic sense in the field about the appropriate role for political and philosophical controversy in law.9 My own intuition – and it is no more than that – is that comparative law’s post-war disengagement is in some way the symptom of

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8 The history of disciplinary commitment has often been obscured in histories of the discipline written by its post-war practitioners. For an excellent overview of this forgotten history, see Twining, supra, note 4, p. 39, who remarks on the absence in histories written by insiders of any reference to philosophical or methodological engagement: “To an outsider, there seem to be some striking omissions from the orthodox histories: first, there are passing nods at classic forerunners, especially Montesquieu, Ihering, and Maine, but there is scarcely any reference to developments in legal theory in the twentieth century and especially since the Second World War. Legal theory and legal philosophy are treated as subjects apart, debates about positivism are ignored, recent developments are not cited and the virtual disappearance of historical jurisprudence is left unexplained. The main exception is the alleged ‘functionalist’ approach, which contains rather feeble echoes of the early Roscoe Pound and possibly of the Free Law School.”

9 In their 1998 edition, long after they were widely regarded as representatives of an establishment which had itself peaked a decade or two before, Zweigert and Kötz, supra, note 4, continue to present their functionalism as a youthful attack on a discipline gone stale. See Twining, supra, note 4, p. 56, n. 103. Twining sees something similar in efforts by younger scholars in the field, such as Pierre Legrand and William Ewald, to promote methodological engagement while attacking their predecessors for lacking a defensible ‘method’. See Twining, supra, note 4, p. 54, n. 99.

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a kind of academic post-traumatic stress disorder. The men who developed the practice of analysing similarities and differences without method or politics seem to have remembered pre-war comparative work to have been entangled in inconclusive philosophical debates about what law is and could become – indeed, they remembered far more methodological disagreement than actually characterized their field. And they remembered these debates to have been fraught with political meaning and, more specifically, with ideology.

They adopted the professional project of mapping and explaining similarities and differences as an escape from philosophy and the politics of ideology. Their quotidian work, identifying legal phenomena, mapping, comparing, turning repeatedly back from method and from politics, re-minded them of their new profession’s neutrality and objectivity. The comparatist’s routine practice reassured him constantly that no, that was before – now we are practical men who have not fallen for endless speculation, nor become embroiled in ideological battle. My intuition, in short, is that there is something almost compulsive about the post-war comparatist’s political and methodological renunciation.

As an argumentative or rhetorical effect, moreover, methodological eclectic and political agnosticism is unstable, the argumentative apparatus which supports it is full of elisions, ambiguities, hidden contradictions, understatements and overstatements which can be, and often are, the object of criticism, often from other comparatists. These criticisms are often successful, in the sense that a comparative effort which seemed – to its author, to others – to have foresworn methodological commitment can be shown to have nevertheless been insufficiently open, to have fallen for false and premature closure in the search for descriptive knowledge. The posture of political disengagement is similarly fragile, open to successful criticism that the author has fallen prematurely for a conclusion which betrays an ideological predisposition. In this sense, the comparatist’s eclectic posture is an ongoing performance and it works only when, and for as long as, it remains plausible for a given author, audience or reader. Because no one has discovered a fool-proof way to avoid such criticism, the posture is consistently under threat. To complete a professional analysis of the similarities and differences among legal regimes, the effect of methodological openness and political disengagement must be sustained throughout.

But the escape from politics and method remains a wish. When compulsives repeatedly wash their hands, they do obscure the trauma, the memory
and fear of something dirty. But compulsive hand-washing is also traumatic and keeps one's mind preoccupied, if not with dirt, then with cleanliness. Something similar is going on in comparative law. To the extent the routine choices made in comparing law do have a politics or have beaten a path of methodological preference, the agnostic fog sustains, legitimates and obscures it. By holding firm to pluralism and neutrality, by continuing the enumeration of similarities and differences, the profession is able to obscure the ongoing contribution it makes to global governance - but it does not eliminate it. The constant rejection of remembered methodological dispute and political taint nevertheless keeps comparative law preoccupied with the terms of those disputes. And these common-sense assumptions and default practices turn out themselves to have a politics.

The essay ends by speculating more concretely about the politics of contemporary comparative law. Post-war comparative law can often be politically evaluated in the same terms used to understand the politics of pre-war comparatists. Sometimes, they slip off the wagon and one can associate their work with ideological positions or social interests in the broader society. Sometimes, they do promote broad social reform efforts - legal harmonization, diversification, pluralism - which track choices made by government. They do sometimes do applied work or find themselves managing institutions in the academic, governmental or business worlds. But more often, they are careful to avoid doing so. Their methodological choices and professional enthusiasms are extremely difficult to associate with political positions in any of these senses.

As a result, identifying the politics of comparative law after the Second World War requires a different sort of inquiry - into the effects of the discipline's default judgements and background assumptions. It turns out these may well have identifiable effects which we can associate with positions in debates we think of more readily as political. To the extent that these political effects are obscured by the field's apolitical posture, contesting them will mean drawing that posture and the discipline's fluid common sense into question. To my mind, there is no going back on methodological proliferation and there is much to be said for the development of eclectic professional judgement in the weighing and balancing of factors whose significance will always remain open to challenge. Although eclecticism can obscure - even for comparatists - the association of their work with ideological debates and social interests, it does not guarantee political neutrality.

or disengagement. A routine identification of the politics of comparative intellectual work would permit contestation and encourage a more engaged professional life.

The rhetorical practices of methodological eclecticism

In its pure and simplest form, the basic comparative-law performance is a written account of similarities and differences among legal regimes. The European common-core project, for example, consists of many such accounts. This basic comparative performance sets to one side legal writing which considers foreign legal systems in their own terms. No US or European law professor will understand Chinese law in its own terms as well as the best minds at Beijing University - the comparatist's value-added lies in the account of similarities and differences. We must also set aside writing which seeks to apply knowledge about foreign legal systems - whether in developing transnational litigation strategies and institutions, in conducting international commercial arbitration or in identifying regulatory strategies for international economic or social life. For the comparatist, these applications of comparative knowledge come only at the price of hurrying. In rushing to application, we are likely to forgo the objectivity and generality of training necessary to execute a sophisticated comparatist performance. Better to slow down, prepare, train, learn - until the virtues of patience replace the firm channels of method.

The comparatist builds an account of the similarities and differences among legal regimes in four distinct steps, which I develop here in rough schematic terms. At each stage, the inquiry may be derailed into application or methodological disputation. Only by stilling the will to conclude, by forgoing philosophical conclusions or being drawn into methodological debate, can the performance be completed. It is this forbearance which generates the effect of methodological eclecticism and political neutrality.

10 According to Bussani, supra, note 2, p. 794, n. 22, in the European common-core project, they took it as a starting point that 'the domestic lawyer is not necessarily the best reporter on his or her own system. She or he may control more information about the system than a foreign lawyer, and it is an understatement to say that committed nationals of all member States are a big asset to our project. Nationals, however, may be less well-equipped to detect the hidden data and the rhetorical attitude of the system because they are misled by automatic assumptions [. . .]. The participants in our project are comparatists, and as comparatists, are asked to deal with the questionnaires as if they had to describe their own law.'
Identify interesting differences and similarities among legal phenomena in different legal regimes

We begin by finding a legal phenomenon in one legal regime which can be ‘compared’ with a legal phenomenon in another. The ‘legal phenomenon’ could be a rule, an institution, a practice, an approach to an economic problem, a custom, a professional ethic, just about anything.11 Often, comparatists set out with a hunch or loose first impression. Perhaps they visited Mexico and found a whole world of family law which seemed outside the range of variation they were used to in the United States. Maybe they learned Japanese in the army and got interested in Japan — now that I am a law professor, let us see how the Japanese handle a problem I am interested in. Sometimes, it is a matter of broader academic fashion — it is the late 1970s and everyone is trying to figure out why Japan is hot and Europe is cold or it is the 1990s and everyone is talking about US dominance of the high-tech/internet sector: I am a law professor, perhaps there is a legal explanation.

Of course, hunches like this do not just happen — there is usually also a wish. Perhaps that the United States be more or less like Japan or that differences and similarities be understood in a new way by some relevant elite. But these purposes, projects, motives will generally not be visible on the surface of the work. Quite the contrary — the comparative performance presents itself as coming upon the materials it compares disinterestedly, accidentally. For many comparatists, the starting-point is assigned — in the European common-core project, for example, teams have been assigned to canvass a range of jurisdictions to map similarities and differences in contract rules about ‘good faith’, property rules about ‘adverse possession’ and so forth, with the goal of eventually covering the whole of private law for the whole of Europe. And doing so without any a priori wish for more or less uniformity.

Once underway, comparatists have preferences about how to define the phenomena to be compared. Some start with formal rules which interest them, others start with aspects of the legal context or social outcomes which seem to stand out. These may be relatively abstract social functions (how do these regimes strengthen kinship or encourage entrepreneurship?) or, as in the common-core project, specific fact-patterns whose legal treatment can then be compared. The ‘legal regimes’ which host the legal phenomena to be compared can also be identified in different ways. Some define the regimes in formal jurisdictional or national terms, others in looser cultural and economic terms. For some, legal regimes are organized in a roughly hierarchical stack — local, national, international — while for others, they are more fluid, interpenetrating and overlapping. Looking at this work, we might say comparative performances could be seen to make choices along a continuum, as in figure 11.1.

![Figure 11.1](image)

Although these preferences sometimes are disputed in methodological terms, more often regimes and legal phenomena are identified in a very fluid and ad hoc way.12 Legal phenomena can be narrow or broad, multiple or

11 Indeed, there is a little sub-literature on the question whether there are things which cannot, in their nature, be compared. Although opinions differ, the non-comparability list, even of enthusiasts, is very short. For example, see H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 30–55; id., ‘Are Legal Traditions Incommensurable’, (2001) 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 133.

12 To get a sense for the extreme fluidity of this practice — even when described in methodological terms — see Wencelas J. Wagner, ‘Research in Comparative Law: Some Theoretical Considerations’, in Ralph A. Neuman (ed.), Essays in Jurisprudence in Honor of Roscoe Pound (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962), p. 519; ‘What should be the subject matter of comparative studies? Legal principles and rules can either be similar or dissimilar both in space and time, and occasionally they have no counterpart in other legal systems. In the tremendous maze of materials from which the comparatist may draw, which should he select for his research? The simple and obvious reply is that the answer to this question should depend on the purpose of the study undertaken.'
specific, formal or situationally embedded; regimes can be of any number and situated at almost any degree of difference from one another. At the end of this 'research' phase, we have a loose map. Divorce as a legal institution is this in a legal regime we call 'Japanese' and this in what we call the 'legal regime' of the United States.

When these preferences do become the focus of methodological debate, the comparative work of the article ends. Taking a methodological tack aborts the analysis. The point of the article could then be to demonstrate either the correct way of identifying or the extreme difficulty of identifying phenomena in a methodologically defensible way. The difficulty of identifying what should and should not be in the 'divorce regime' in numerous places might illuminate a general argument about the embedded and contextual nature of law. The ability to identify phenomena which 'function' as adjudication in widely varying cultures might substantiate an argument for the centrality of adjudication to the abstract transhistorical or transcultural thing we call 'law'. This moves the discussion to questions of legal philosophy – we have an essay about what law is rather than an account of similarities and differences among legal regimes.

The best contemporary comparative work simply aggregates these points of view, multiplying ways of thinking about the phenomena to be compared. Indeed, doing so seems the only way to keep going with the comparative project – to avoid becoming entangled in a philosophical debate. It is abstentions such as these which honour the memory of the method 'war-aster-baby'. Do not go there – we have had those philosophical debates and they did not end well, no one won a decisive victory, they distracted us from learning anything useful or interesting, they entangled legal scholarship in ideology. It is the echo of this memory which stays the comparatist's hand from methodological rumination and permits the analysis to continue.

And in this vagueness, this abstention from method, there is a default position. By far the most common default remains the national legal system – one compares the legal phenomenon of 'divorce' in, say, Japan and the United States, or 'administrative discretion' in South Korea and Austria, without too much attention to the coherence of the idea that there is a 'Japanese legal system'. These sort of pairings are then aggregated into more complex arrangements – a number of European, American or Asian national systems might be cross-compared. Perhaps the Japanese legal regime is part of a broader 'Asian' legal order or family of law, perhaps not.

We have already here some clues to the work of methodological abstention – or eclecticism – in contemporary comparative law. There is a problem, what to write about, there is a set of choices, arranged in terms which might be, even have been, methodologically disputed. There is a methodological agnosticism. And then there is a default, wrapped in the enigmas of abstention. If the default has a politics, it will be protected here. Likewise the wish which animated the endeavour.

Where there are similarities, deal with the 'transplant' hypothesis

The next step is to determine whether any similarities between the two legal phenomena so identified result from the 'transplant' of a legal idea or institution from one place to another or to both places from the same third source. It is hard to understand why the relationship of 'influence' gets such preliminary and, therefore, prominent, treatment in comparing. Of course, there is no question that legal regimes influence one another. If things which seem similar in two places are similar because one has influenced the other, one need look no further for an 'explanation'. Perhaps the similarities in Japanese and US legal codes about divorce are rooted in the post-1945 US occupation of Japan. Perhaps the North Korean administrative code is really still based on a German implant from the nineteenth century which continues to have echoes in Austrian law. To the extent one has influenced the other, perhaps the places are really not different and no 'comparison' is possible.

That said, comparatists differ a great deal in how seriously they pursue the search for evidence of transplantation or influence. As a result, there are choices to be made at this stage as well. The more formally one defines the phenomena to be compared, the more often similarities which seem to arise from transplant will strike one. The more one thinks of law as an autonomous professional practice, or as a universal problem-solver, and the less one thinks of it as a cultural expression, the more one will be interested in similarities and the more transplantation will seem a good
starting-point for analysis. Again, comparative work might be arranged along a continuum, as in figure 11.2.

\[ \text{The Transplant Hypothesis} \]

- Take transplantation very seriously
- Take transplantation less seriously

Loss of transplants (influence important in defining substance of the law) Few transplants (influence less important in defining substance of the law)

Figure 11.2

There is a further point. In searching for influence, one might focus on differences as well as similarities. Although the transplant idea has been used disproportionately to explain similarities rather than differences, we might imagine that patterns of cultural influence would as readily produce differences as similarities. Failed transplant efforts, indigenous reactions against transplantation, intentional or accidental misreadings of transplanted material, ideas at the source of the transplant about what was needed 'in the periphery' might all generate differences. The more one thought of law in formal terms, the more likely one might think of influence as a matter of similarities. The more one focused on the historical and social context, the more likely one would foreground the hand of influence in resistance, misreading and difference. We could add an axis of choice open to the comparatist at this stage of the work, as in figure 11.3.

\[ \text{Stress transplant of similarities} \]

\[ \text{Stress influence in differences} \]

Figure 11.3

Most of the choices encountered in this second phase of the comparative performance have been the subject of a quite polarized methodological debate within comparative law, in which each side views the other to be short-circuiting the analysis.\(^{14}\) Those hostile to transplantation question whether it is possible, in the sense of 'intellectually defensible' or 'logically coherent', to identify legal phenomena in one place as having an 'identity' which could be moved. The degree of legal autonomy necessary for there to be a transplant hypothesis to investigate reflects, from this point of view, a failure to continue the search for a cultural/contextual/historical understanding of what has happened. On the other side, transplantation proponents question the coherence of the category of 'culture' as anything other than a default name for social or economic needs and functions which have not yet been explained. For these people, one should continue the analysis until all aspects of a legal order can be understood as either learning or innovation in solving problems or performing functions which are universal, at least within a given type of economy or stage of development.

We have here not the memory, but the living potential for disciplinary death by method. Taking the transplant hypothesis too seriously – either way – sidetracks the basic comparative project, moving us off into legal theory – to what extent is law a universal problem-solver or form of professional specialized knowledge and to what extent is it rooted in, and expressive of, local cultural life?\(^{15}\) Indeed, participants on both sides of this debate say that they do so out of dissatisfaction with the conventions of comparative-law practice. For the sophisticated comparative analyst embarking upon a project as ambitious as mapping the common core of European private law, it does not pay to become entangled in such debates. Instead, we find agnosticism, restraint and reasonableness about whether to stress similarities or differences. In this work, metabolized into the mainstream comparative activity, the transplant debate simply blurs the edges of legal phenomena and regimes identified in the first phase of the work – perhaps these phenomena are not so similar, perhaps these regimes are not so different. We can think further about the importance of influence later...

in the work, transplant will be one among many explanations of the degree of difference or similarity among legal phenomena in various regimes.

Although this eclecticism protects the enterprise, here too there is a default position – the priority accorded hypotheses about transplant focuses the comparatist’s attention first on similarities and on reception, while foregrounding the autonomy of legal phenomena from context. And here too, if this default has a politics, it is methodological restraint which defends it.

*Allocate the similarities and differences which remain variably to cultural and technical factors*

This is where the real work begins. We have a map of similarities and differences among legal phenomena in different legal regimes. We are heading for an explanation of variation. In this phase, the comparatist identifies the factors, other than transplantation, which might go into the explanation. Generally speaking, there are two broad types of factors, which we might call ‘cultural’ and ‘technical’. The preliminary separation of cultural and technical factors is largely a matter of intuition or common sense.

On the culture side, we have, obviously, different legal cultures: Japan is Japan and the United States is the United States. Legal cultures could be defined as national legal regimes, but they could also be loose descriptions – the Japanese ‘way of resolving disputes’ or the ‘US approach to business’ – which float a bit free of their moorings in national legal regimes. Legal cultures might be framed as large cultural families (Asian law, African law, European law, Socialist law and so forth) or more parochially (the New York regulatory system, California law, Inuit practice in a specific community with this much Canadian influence, etc.). As one begins to allocate some of the similarities and differences one has uncovered to ‘culture’, all these possible ideas about what legal cultures are will be in play. Indeed, the word ‘culture’ itself may or may not be used – sometimes these factors are more fashionably described as ‘social’ or ‘socio-economic’ or simply ‘contextual’ considerations.

On the technical side, something similar is at work. The idea is to identify a technical dimension of society which might be responsible for legal phenomena in more or less the same way as a legal ‘culture’. We start with the common-sense idea that there are, obviously, different economic/social systems in the world, different levels of economic advancement, from primitive hunter/gatherer economies right up through late industrial democracy and advanced industrial capitalism. A legal phenomenon might be part of the ‘advanced industrial capitalism’ package in the same way it might be part of the ‘Japanese legal culture’ package. Technical levels might be drawn in very broad historical terms – primitive society, underdeveloped economies and late industrial capitalism (or feudalism and bourgeois capitalism). But the technical factors responsible for legal phenomena might also be associated with broad economic functions – resolving disputes, securing debt, facilitating price signalling, etc. – which might cut across historical stages of economic development. Like legal cultures, moreover, technical factors might also be framed more narrowly – the specific needs of an urban global banking centre or a complex commodities market. As we begin to associate the legal phenomena we have identified with different aspects of the regimes in which we have found them, all these various ways of framing technical explanations will be in play.

So, let us say we have decided that something called a ‘divorce regime’ can be identified in both Japan and the United States. And let us say we decide that the Japanese and the US legal systems are different enough to make comparison worthwhile – maybe they are Asian and we are western, maybe they are just Japanese and we are American, maybe it is Kyoto and Los Angeles, whatever. And let us say we eliminate the transplant hypothesis in assessing similarities (and maybe even differences) between the Japanese and US divorce regimes. We can imagine that Japan and the United States are both culturally different (perhaps Asian/western) and culturally similar (modern democratic consumer societies, for example). And we can imagine that they are both technically similar (perhaps both late industrial capitalism) and technically different (perhaps industrial systems based on different functional relations between work-family, for example). Now we need to figure out, with more or less precision, which of the aspects of each divorce system should be attributed to culture (Asian/western, say) and which to *tekhnē* (late industrial capitalism, say).

In allocating similarities and differences in legal phenomena to cultural and technical differences and similarities among legal regimes, the comparatist faces a series of choices. How much should be attributed to culture, how much to *tekhnē*? How should the cultural and the technical be defined? Individuals will have preferences. Some comparatists favour broad ‘family-like’ cultural categories, others more local cultural contexts. Some work more with stages of economic development, others with social/
economic functions. Some think in terms of broad categories, others in more narrowly defined institutional or sectoral terms.

These preferences are analogous to others we have seen. It is easy to imagine that a comparatist sympathetic to a formal identification of legal phenomena, to the transplant hypothesis, to the autonomy of law and legal professionals or to law as a universal phenomenon, might lean toward a broad sense about legal cultures. Comparatists who tend to think of legal cultures as large-scale families of law may well lean toward thinking of the technical in terms of broad historical phases of economic development. We might line these choices up, more or less as follows, in figure 11.4.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 11.4**

These choices certainly could be debated in methodological terms and these debates might well – on analogy to debates about transplantation – be joined in strongly polarized terms. In the best contemporary comparative work, however, this tends not to happen. Instead, the cultural and the technical are understood in very loose terms – a looseness which blunts the emergence of bold methodological claims. This is encouraged by the loose overlap of the terms: is ‘modern democratic consumer society’ a cultural type or a stage of technical development? What about ‘industrial economy with communal work-family structures’? The process of allocation is guided less by method than by the hand of professional good judgement, intuition and experience. One allocates bits here and there as seems to make sense, given one’s judgement as a scholar about how things work.

A number of background assumptions are nevertheless at work, such as that technical explanations can be validated by data from other places, while cultural explanations can be validated by data from other legal or social dimensions of the same location. The technical is, in this sense, global,

the cultural local. The technical is somehow a more rational, the cultural a more irrational domain. The cultural requires an explanation in the language of history and meaning and leaves room for – indeed, is the room for – the mysteries of social connectedness. The cultural seems linked to the domains of either private life or national public patriotism, while the technical seems linked to the intermediate spaces of commerce and the economy and expresses itself in the language of function and performance rather than meaning. Where these background ideas have a politics, where their extension participates in a broader political project, the professional judgements of comparatists to stress one or the other contribute to that politics. And that support would be shrouded in the fog of methodological restraint and eclectic good sense.

Default judgements also emerge in this phase of the work. Similarities between legal phenomena in different locations (once the transplant hypothesis has been dealt with) tend to be allocated to economic stages or functional necessities, while differences tend to be allocated to cultures. The most conventional comparatist piece might well suggest that differences in the Japanese and US divorce regimes reflect cultural differences and similarities reflect the common economic or functional situation of women and families in modern industrial democracies. This common default arises from the common-sense idea that what modern economies are, are similar, rational, regardless of where they are located, and what cultures are, are different.

Although this is the default judgement, it is only a default. It can be, and often is, confounded, if not directly contested. It just turns out that in allocating things to the technical and the cultural, it sometimes comes out the other way. So, we often find legal similarities allocated to culture (Japan and the United States turn out to be culturally similar on this point) and differences allocated to the technical (but the functional needs of different industrial models for workers places different demands on the divorce system in the two locations). Two different economic models can turn out, on this point, to be similar, while two very similar cultures can, paradoxically, turn out to be different. In the same way, similarities in legal phenomena can be allocated to differences in technical or cultural positions, just as legal differences can be allocated to technical or cultural similarities.

These choices are loosely analogous to choices we have seen made at earlier stages in the work. When people associate legal similarities to cultural or
technical differences or legal differences with cultural or technical similarities, they make law an outlier to the general situation. When they associate legal similarities with cultural/technical similarities and differences with differences, by the same token, they make law expressive of cultural or technical identity. And, naturally enough, we can imagine that comparatists would differ in their tendency to treat law as an outlier, either to economic/functional or cultural identities. We might organize these choices in the following way, as in figure 11.5.

![Diagram: Working with Technical and Cultural Factors]

Figure 11.5

The sophisticated comparatist appreciates the range of different ways of articulating cultural identity and achieving economic objectives in a given system and is attentive to the possibility that particular legal phenomena can play a variety of roles, even conflicting ones, in these different domains of social life. One simply does the best one can in developing an understanding of the differences and similarities between these legal phenomena and these legal regimes, taking all of this into account. But if there is a default here, and that default has a politics, it is defended and obscured by this open and pragmatic methodological eclecticism.

*Generate a plausible causal account of what you have mapped*

The most capable hands have picked their way slowly, meanderingly, to this point, resisting methodological contestation. And some comparative work simply stops here, as if to say, 'here are some similarities and differences among legal phenomena and legal regimes, suggesting cultural and technical differences and similarities of various kinds – I thought you would like to know'. In Twining's words, 'that concern is with description and analysis rather than evaluation and prescription.' For the hardy, however, there is more – some sort of an explanation – the 'analysis' part, which can pull it all together.

What we want here is a story which qualifies our original identification of the 'same phenomena in different regimes' in important ways, but which does not run us into philosophical disputation or political commitment. Staying descriptive is helpful. After study, it might turn out that what is really going on is a bit of transplantation, so the regimes are not really different, some cultural specificity, which makes the legal phenomena more different than we thought, but also some economically or technically driven uniformity. But it can be difficult to develop a stable and plausible account with such a range of diverging factors and interpretive modes.

One common method for doing so is to invent some idiosyncratic intermediate models which combine cultural and technical similarities and differences. Having looked at the legal phenomena of 'good faith' across Europe, we might find that there are two or three different regime types and a couple of outlier countries. We might find, say, a Dutch model and a corporatist model and a full-liability model, with Iceland and Greece as outlier regimes. Stories about these types can contain a range of thoughts – about the effects or purposes of one regime or another, about the inten- tions of legislators foiled and achieved and so forth. There might be a reference to distributional consequences – perhaps the 'Dutch' way of thinking about 'good faith' reflects a commitment to consumers, as a cultural trait or political achievement. A description of this type preserves the absence of methodological or legal-philosophical controversy. The best description you are likely to get will be custom-tailored to the complexity of these legal phenomena and regime types. It all turns out to be very complex, indeed.

Such an account can be extended in time. Relations among the models might suggest the process of cultural consolidation, or of convergence of technical rationality, or of cultural variation or of technical experimentation. It is hard to avoid an illustration of the sorts of background narratives which can be confounded or confirmed by analysis, as in figure 11.6.

But an eclectic description calls for an eclectic temporal explanation – a combination of historical influences and functional/evolutionary developments. No culture has come to dominate but neither have cultures disappeared, no economic function has figured out the one and only best

16 In describing the effort to uncover patterns of influence and transplantation, Collins despair that 'no one ever succeeds in pursuing this method satisfactorily, for the budding comparatist always leaves out one of the dimensions of culture, society, economy, history, politics, and legal logic': Hugh Collins, 'Methods and Aims of Comparative Contract Law', (1991) 11 Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 396, p. 398.

17 Twining, supra, note 4, p. 34.
practice. Still, some cultures are getting stronger, others weaker, and the field of technical possibility has undoubtedly been usefully narrowed. The more complex the story, the more intricate the history, the harder it is to think of such an account as illustrating a method, much less having a politics. The more eclectic the descriptive account, the more likely we have to conclude that although things have come a long way, there is a long way still to go.

If we look back at the various stages in the development of a comparative performance, the comparatist faced choices at every point. How to identify legal phenomena or regimes, how to identify and weigh the significance of transplantation, how to assess the relative weight of cultural and technical factors in understanding similarities and differences, how to assemble these factors into a satisfactory descriptive account and analysis? All of these choices seem ripe for methodological controversy — they raise eternal questions about the nature of law which have been the stuff of methodological debates in most other legal fields (figure 11.7).

The rise of the comparative law professional and the fall from method and politics

The replacement of political and methodological engagement with eclectic professional judgement was the work of post-war comparatists — people like Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, Otto Kahn-Freund, Max Rheinstein, Rudolf Schlessinger, Wolfgang Friedmann and Arthur von Mehren — who

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19 For a particularly striking example, see Rodolfo Sacco, 'Diversity and Uniformity in the Law', (2001) 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 171. Sacco's succinct and extremely general reflections on the virtues and likely extent of legal diversity and uniformity, built on a tissue of class-room examples, contrast nicely with the apparently endless and agnostic common-core project described by Bussani, supra, at text accompanying notes 2 and 3.
were all eager to establish the field as a respected academic discipline.\textsuperscript{20} These men wrote more about method than about politics. They stressed the need to differentiate comparative work from political engagement. Methodologically, they differed on many points – most famously on the relative weight to be accorded cultural and historical developments as opposed to social or economic functions in explaining diverse legal phenomena. But they wrote as if it were imperative to keep methodological disagreements from getting out of hand. Each wrote as if methodological controversy was elsewhere – in other people’s work, in earlier work, in the work of younger colleagues. Each pitched his project as a resolution of methodological divergence. Taken collectively, their project was to escape politics and intellectual controversy into methodological eclecticism. If for their predecessors comparative law had been an anti-formalist crusade with clear consequences, for them it was prudent common sense. Such political enthusiasm as remained was chastened and vague, the loose politics of universal humanism. Their passion was directed rather to the professionalization of knowledge and improvement of legal education. The virtues and necessities of systematic comparative knowledge and professional capacity loomed far larger in their aspirations.

Far more work needs to be done on the intellectual history of comparative law to figure out how and why this professional voice emerged. There is something resigned or world-weary in the tone. Deeply learned, these men did not wear their knowledge lightly. They wrote as if they had learned the futility of methodological debate, had lost confidence in their ability to resolve methodological controversy productively. It is hard not to imagine that this had something to do with the large number of German political refugees in this generation – Wolfgang Friedmann, Otto Kahn-Freund, Clive Schmitthoff, F. A. Mann, Max Rheinstein, Friedrich Kessler, Albert Ehrenzweig, Rudolf Schlesinger – it is a long list.\textsuperscript{21} The intriguing thing is that these men succeeded in routinizing their intellectual and political trauma, transforming it into a professional training, restaged in the memory of individual comparatists as they put away political or methodological commitments to adopt the mature voice of the detached professional.

The original nature of post-war agnosticism stands out by comparison both to those who founded the discipline between the 1900 Paris Congress and the Second World War and to those precursors interested in foreign law who were not part of the project of disciplinary establishment. Many of the most significant nineteenth- and early twentieth-century legal and social theorists, historians, economists and sociologists wrote about relationships among legal systems – think of Weber, Maine, Durkheim, Marx; the list is almost as long as the canon of western social and political thought during that period.\textsuperscript{22} There were also numerous lawyers, practitioners and academics, who developed an interest in things foreign and wrote expansively about relations between legal systems. Of these, perhaps the best known was Dean John Wigmore, of Northwestern University.\textsuperscript{23} But however brilliant and insightful, these early authors have not become part of the canonical discipline of comparative law. I was struck at a comparative-law conference when a leading US comparatist insisted that these people simply could not now get tenure at any leading North American law school as comparatists and we should be wary of taking them too seriously.


There are probably many reasons for this and we should not feel too badly about it – many of these people have secure places in the canons of other fields. Even Wigmore has found a home in the law of evidence. But when ‘comparative law’ took off as a discipline at the 1900 Paris Congress, these people were not part of it. They shared neither the political projects nor the methodological commitments of the field’s founding fathers. In retrospect, it is hard not to be struck by their amateurish and undisciplined way of proceeding. As comparatists, they do seem to lack methodological rigour or discipline. They were not eclectic or pluralist in any contemporary sense – they were simply outside the set of methodological alternatives about which we have since become agnostic. The factors they considered, the range of questions they asked about legal phenomena, seem all over the map. They were not at all careful in their differentiation of technical and cultural explanations, were not even focused particularly on similarities and differences. They often had completely different intellectual agendas and dipped into knowledge about different legal regimes en route to conclusions about other things. They were, in short, simply not working in what would become the professional idiom.

At the same time, their comparisons of different legal systems were part of a wide variety of diverging political projects – efforts to introduce particular legislative changes in one place by reference to laws in place elsewhere, efforts to promote commercial opportunities in far-flung locations by suppression of local laws, efforts to govern and understand colonial possessions, efforts to strengthen the universal appeal of laissez-faire liberalism or legitimate the peculiarities of ‘bourgeois law’ or ‘freedom to contract’ by comparative historical accounts of the move from feudalism. From a contemporary perspective, their work is far too politically engaged to be respectable. But this does not place them outside the field – the masters of the comparative canon shared and expressed a political agenda for the discipline they founded. The problem with people like Maine or Marx is that they did not share the discipline’s specific political projects. No method, wrong politics.

The great comparatists of the pre-war period – people like Raymond Saleilles, Edouard Lambert, Frederick Pollock, Roscoe Pound, Ernst Rabel, Karl Llewellyn – promoted a more self-conscious discipline of comparative law and shared a loose methodological and political consensus.24

24 Pollock’s critique of Maine for speculation and unsystematic use of historical evidence illustrates this desire for a discipline: see Frederick Pollock, ‘The History of Comparative Jurisprudence’, (1903) 5 J. Society Comp. Legis. 74.

In methodological terms, they were all exuberant participants in one or another way in the rise of anti-formal and sociologically attuned legal thought. They focused on the questions which continue to structure comparative analysis – how should one identify the legal phenomenon and regimes to be compared, how significant is influence in accounting for similarities, what is the mix of cultural and technical factors which account for variation, how broadly or narrowly might cultures or economic/social phases of development be identified? Their answers all fell to the right end of the various alternatives sketched in the last section. Their common project was to align law with what they saw as a transformed social and economic world – to make it at once more international, more expressive of cosmopolitan and humanitarian values and more responsive to social and economic needs. None shared Bussani’s agnosticism about the desirability of uniform international rules – all were committed internationalists and all favoured more harmonization of law. Method seemed to have social and political consequences – awakening legal science to anti-formalism through comparison would strike a blow for humanist liberal cosmopolitanism. Some went further – comparative anti-formalism offered a mode of progressive or leftist engagement on behalf of the socially disadvantaged or the culturally different. All felt comfortable participating in public life, making choices and advocating positions on issues facing government on the basis of their comparative knowledge.

Of course, these early masters of comparative law also differed in both their methodological and political emphases. Should law be internationalized by universal codification or by exhortations for each legal order to develop an embedded response to what were increasingly universal social and economic problems? What was the place of cultural specificity in the law being developed for the newly international economic system? Was the comparatist’s contribution better made from the academy or in public service? How could law best respond to the needs of social development, how best to ameliorate the sharp edges of industrialization? How left-wing is the project of responding to new social needs or economic conditions? What social interests should the legal system be newly attentive to – commercial interests, labour? Still, they shared broadly anti-formal methodological styles and broadly reformist political motives. No one advocated preserving law’s detached autonomy or protecting corporate and governmental institutions from demands for social change.
The profession of comparative law, institutionalized under Lambert's direction in the law faculty at Lyon, was directed to train a cadre of elite legal professionals capable of understanding law across national contexts, soothing international tensions and finding uniform solutions to modern social problems. To do so, they would need to bring new voices to the table— not just the law of jurists, but the law made by social actors, such as unions, professional associations or chambers of commerce. In reflecting on the significance of the 1900 Paris Congress, Lambert says:

Depuis 1900 les perspectives ouvertes à l'action du droit comparé se sont singulièremen étargées. Elles se sont élargies, elles s'élargissent chaque jour un peu plus, sous l'action d'un triple courant d'idées qui se dessine dans l'ensemble de la communauté internationale des peuples industrialisés. C'est d'abord l'éveil de l'esprit international créé par les conséquences économiques de la guerre [...]. Ce sont ensuite les réclamations, de plus en plus énergiques, des opinions publiques des divers pays en faveur de la socialisation du droit, c'est-à-dire d'une interprétation plus souple et plus éclairée de lois et de précédents judiciaires datant souvent d'un autre âge, et de leur adaptation aux conditions économiques de la vie contemporaine. [...] Le mouvement vers la socialisation et le mouvement vers l'internationalisation du droit se prête un mutuel appui et l'un et l'autre subissent la poussée d'un troisième mouvement dont la concurrence accélérera de plus en plus leur marche. Ce troisième mouvement, c'est l'entrée en compétition avec le droit des juristes des droits faits, pour leur discipline intérieure et pour le règlement des rapports économiques entre leurs membres, par les groupements de justiciables, tels que les syndicats professionnels ou les chambres syndicales et les associations corporatives des diverses branches du commerce et de l'industrie. [...] Dès sa naissance [le droit de ces groupements de justiciables] prend une humeur internationale parce que les activités, dont il règule et rationalise la concurrence, sont déjà, et deviennent chaque jour davantage, des activités internationales.  


27 For example, see id., L'institut de droit comparé: son programme, ses méthodes d'enseignement (Lyon: A. Rey, 1921).

28 Id., 'Rapport fait à la séance d'inauguration de la session de 1929 à La Haye sur le rôle d'un congrès international de droit comparé en l'an 1931'; in Trauxes de l'Académie internationale de droit comparé, vol. II (1929), fascicle 1, pp. 4–5. Lambert describes the objectives of the congress in these terms: 'La tâche essentielle d'un pareil Congrès sera de préparer et de mettre en mouvement le travail collectif et réfléchi de l'élite des juristes des divers pays par lequel la profession légale internationale — c'est-à-dire le vaste groupement naturel formé par les hommes qui se consacrent à l'étude et l'application du droit — adaptera son activité scientifique d'ensemble aux devoirs et aux sources d'influence sociale que lui crée la naissance de cette communauté économique et politique supra-nationale' (id., p. 8).
In pursuing this project of ‘la socialisation et […] l’internationalisation du droit’, Lambert was clear that codification, both nationally and internationally would be useful. Indeed, Lambert’s comparative legal study was anything but agnostic on the desirability of more international and uniform law – solutions would not be found in parochial national traditions:

Le moment n’est-il pas venu pour la science du droit de réagir, par une orientation de ses disciplines dans le sens de l’universalisme, contre les causes de méconnaissance juridique qu’elle a semées entre les nations par la dispersion antérieure de son travail? N’a-t-elle pas maintenant le devoir de rapprocher ses ramifications locales et de leur infuser une humeur internationale?  

At the same time, the international legal regime would find its roots in sociological, economic and cultural realities:

Au-dessous de ses sources formelles et secondaires, – de ce que j’ai pris l’habitude d’appeler ses matrice, – le corps de droit international ou supra-national, qu’étudie le droit comparé, a aussi ses sources matérielles ou primaires fournisant la matière première – le donné, comme dit Gény – des produits façonnés – ou construits – par ses matrice. C’est l’ensemble des forces économiques, sociales ou morales, qui chaque jour resserrera un peu plus la solidarité ou l’interdépendance entre tous les éléments de la communauté internationale. Les plus nombreuses, les plus tenacement agissantes sont d’ordre économique. […] Parallèlement à ces facteurs économiques, il y a aussi des forces éthiques ou des forces spirituelles – de grandes vagues de l’opinion publique ou de parties agissant de l’opinion publique mondiale – qui contribuent puissamment à élaborer la matière première d’un droit supra-national.  

Lambert promoted codification on the basis of standards rather than rules and emphasized the need for a uniform private law to be achieved through local enforcement, interpretation and implementation. The key to a successful codification, in Lambert’s mind, was to engage successfully with customary law and to allow international rules to root in the soil of each legal regime. Only then could unification be part of a broader cultural development towards shared understanding. To succeed, international legislation would need to harmonize the specifics of national social conditions with the need for uniformity:

30 Id., supra, note 26, p. 491.

31 Id., p. 490. Lambert considers the difficulty, the need and the method for achieving this harmonization in these terms: ‘L’imprévu est un des faits de vie apophtegmatiques qui ont eu à la diriger [i.e., the enterprise of unifying labour law after the Versailles Treaty and the establishment of the International Labour Organization] […] qu’il serait chimérique de poursuivre, même sur les terrains les mieux choisis, les plus préparés de ce domaine, une uniformisation matérielle des dispositions des diverses lois d’Etats. Que tout ce qu’il était possible d’obtenir à la longue et par étapes, c’était l’élaboration d’une équivalence générale ou moyenne entre ces dispositions, l’acceptation de directives communes, susceptibles d’être adaptées aux conditions particulières de chaque pays, de chaque région et d’être conciliées avec les nécessités propres à chaque branche de l’activité industrielle et commerciale. Un droit international du travail, plus encore que cette branche de législations nationales, ne peut manifestement se développer que sous la forme qui est en contraste le plus net avec un régime de règles uniformes et par conséquent rigides […] le rattachement entre nations d’un droit veritablement uniforme […] aboutirait à immobiliser les parties du droit pour lesquelles [il] s’établirait, à empêcher l’adaptation progressive de leurs principes aux transformations d’un milieu social et économique, qui est en perpétuelle évolution, qui, même à certaines heures – comme l’heure présente – remue avec une intensité inquiétante de puissance de renouvellement. Ou bien, malgré l’existence d’une législation uniforme, les Etats reliés par elle apporteront chacun dans leur version nationale de la législation uniforme les perfectionnements nécessaires à son maintien en harmonie avec le mouvement général de leurs institutions et leurs moeurs économiques, et alors l’uniformité sera vite rompue. Où, pour maintenir cette uniformité, on s’abstiendra, de part et d’autre, de légiférer sur la partie du droit uniformisée. Mais alors ce sera l’obstacle à tout progrès législatif en cette matière’; id., pp. 487–8.
L'existence, parmi les fonctions judiciaires, de cette délicate mission de découverte du droit, est elle-même la conséquence d'un phénomène sociologique que l'œuvre de Gény a fait ressortir en une éclatante lumière: la présence inévitée dans tous les corps du droit, – qu'ils soient principalement législatifs, comme ceux des pays de droit civil, ou principalement judiciaires, comme ceux des pays de Common law – de lacunes qui, à mesure qu'on arrive à les combler sur certains points, se réforment nécessairement sur d'autres. C'est encore à Gény que revient le mérite d'avoir précisé [...] le rôle qui revient, dans la poursuite des cas non-prévus, à la libre recherche scientifique, et les conditions dans lesquelles elle doit être menée pour ne point tomber dans l'arbitraire et l'anarchie des doctrines du 'droit libre'. Elle a besoin, à cette fin, de faire appel à tous les instruments qui peuvent lui faciliter la découverte de la solution la plus conforme à ce que Gény appelle la 'nature des choses positives' ou à ce que j'appelle l'infrastructure économique et sociale du droit. Sugiyaïma ne s'est certes point trompé en signalant [...] le droit comparé comme le principal, et le plus naturellement indiqué de ces instruments.32

To contemporary eyes, Lambert's comparative-law writing seems refreshingly direct – there is a clear social objective and a sense of methodological self-confidence. The broad outlines of methodological choices which now seem more fraught with difficulty are here – law as a social fact in particular contexts alongside law as a response to universal social and economic needs or conditions, law as the self-conscious work of a scholarly elite who would look for inspiration in the customary laws of private enterprises, unions and other economic actors, a broad assault on the arid disengagement of existing formal law from social conditions to be achieved by codification, uniform codification to be achieved by local interpretation of broad standards.33

In retrospect, many of Lambert's proposals seem contradictory and idiosyncratic. For later scholars, the codes which emerged from anti-formalist enthusiasm in the 1920s would seem as out of touch with social reality as the national legal traditions Lambert sought to overcome through codification. Were we to trace the choices described in the last section through Lambert's work, he would seem to lurch from one spectrum to another. His individual propositions today seem bold and, in a sense, naive, unaware of the range of possibilities from which they had been plucked and, therefore, not well defended from criticism. A comparatist would no longer write as Lambert did, because he or she would have introjected these potential critics, and we might understand the move from pre- to post-war comparatism as the introduction of these cautions. Anti-formalism is no longer a self-confident assertion, but a set of opposing factors among which only a chastened judgement is possible. But all this was yet to come.

If we take Roscoe Pound, a leading US proponent of comparative law during the inter-war period, we find a similarly self-confident political and methodological project for comparative law. Pound saw comparative law as part of a broader enterprise of sociological jurisprudence.34 The formal precepts of a given law were not sufficient to understand or work successfully in a legal order. Looking beyond the formal law seemed to blend with looking beyond one's own legal system – looking comparatively would force looking behind formal legal doctrines:

Matthew Arnold used to say that one who knew only his Bible knew not his Bible. May we not say that one who knows only the laws of his own jurisdiction knows not the laws of his jurisdiction?35

Formal legal precepts rested upon a social process or 'technique' which gave them nuance and meaning and to comprehend a legal system, comparatists would need to master its technique:

Comparison of judicial and juristic technique is the beginning of wisdom in comparative law. It is also a prerequisite of professional use in any one country of the law books of another. One only has to have seen highly trained students from Continental universities trying to use English or American law books, or intelligent American lawyers trying to use Continental or Latin American codes, to perceive how hopeless it is to seek the law of another land from its law books without mastery of the technique of that law.36

32 Id., p. 492.
33 Lambert's methodological and political self-confidence on this score was shared by many of his contemporaries. For an interesting international law parallel promoting anti-formalism, interdisciplinarity and connection of law with sociological and political realities, all through codification, see Alejandro Alvarez, 'The New International Law', Transactions of the Grotius Society, pp. 35-51 (16 April 1929).
36 Ibid.
Managing a legal order rooted in the social fabric can easily go awry — judges and others may rely too much on the formal rules or might be tempted to substitute their own preferences for the law. For Pound, all this was particularly worrying when, as he experienced the 1930s, the legal system needed not only to be managed, but defended:

A time of transition, a time of creative lawmaking, a time of legislative and judicial and juristic experimentation, a time of novel theories as to what the law is or of theories that there is no law — that there is only a process none too thoroughly concealed with a camouflage of technical development of the grounds of its operation from the authoritative materials — such a time demands a deeper and wider knowledge of the technique and of the materials of judicial and administrative determination than is called for in an era of stability and quiescence. In the latter minute and accurate information as to the legal precepts recognized and applied by the tribunals of the time and place could make a learned and effective lawyer. In the former these precepts are on trial. They are not thought of as finally established, but as subject to inquiry as to their force and validity. Hence one who merely knows them as they are in comparison to themselves, is likely to be found wanting.37

As a result, Pound had a very concrete project in mind for the discipline of comparative law and proposed a particular method of work to achieve it. Comparative law was to be enlisted in the struggle within the legal intelligentsia against those — the ‘new realists’ or ‘radical new realists’ — who would see law only in its effects or would root law in the subjective and personal attitudes of particular judges. At the same time, the legal establishment needed to defend itself against those who would seek to disconnect law from social life, either retreating into the ‘old systems of natural law’ or, like the ‘analytic jurists’ of the previous century, ignore the urgent need to align law with social needs and ideals. The legal order must be grounded in reality, which, for Pound, meant the reality of what ought to be done:

Let it be repeated. Faithful portrayal of what courts and law makers and jurists do is not the whole task of a science of law. One of the conspicuous actualities of the legal order is the impossibility of divorcing what they do from what they ought to do or what they feel they ought to do [...]. Critical portrayals of the ideal element in law, valuings of traditional ideals with respect to the actualities of the social and legal order, and the results to which they lead in the social and legal order of today, are as much in touch with reality [...] as psychological theories of the behavior of particular judges in particular cases.38

The way to do this was to uncover the ‘ideal’ elements in a legal system and use them both as a basis for rationalizing and systematizing legal rules and to give nuance and flexibility to the interpretation of formal legal rules. These ‘ideals’ are a part of the law, but may easily be overlooked or not understood.39 It is here that the comparatist can be helpful — by comparing the law of a legal system with itself over time and with other legal orders, the ideal element within it can be illuminated:

But I look forward most, for the purposes of the immediate future, to a study of the ideal element in law, a study of the received ideals of American law, which, if it is to be what it should be, must be carried on comparatively. It must be comparative as to the received ideals of the past, in different stages of legal development, in comparison with those of yesterday and today. It must be comparative as to the ideal element in different bodies of law in comparison with each other [...]. I look forward to a comparative philosophical jurisprudence which shall be able the better to do the needed work upon the ideal element.40

By identifying the ideal element in law through comparative study, it will be possible to animate and defend the legal order without relying on the attitudes of particular judges, but also without making the ‘mistake [...] to set off the ideal element as something of independent validity above the law — as in the old systems of natural law, and [...] to set it off in order to ignore it, as did the analytical jurists of the last century.41

Comparative study would not only reinforce the authority of the established legal order, but it would also encourage the legal system to become more international as legal elites become more aware of the ‘universal character of law’.42 Through comparative work, jurists will learn that:

37 Ibid.
39 Id., supra, note 35, p. 60.
40 Id., supra, note 35, p. 60.
41 Id., supra, note 39, p. 4.
law is general, tending more and more to be universal, while it is laws that
are local [...]. The legal order (ordre juridique, Rechtsordnung) is general
and tends to be universal with the continually increasing economic and cultural
unification of the world. Advent of comparative law as a practical subject
of study, writing and teaching is but an item in the process of world unification
which has gone on increasingly on every side in the history of civilization. War
of small town with small town, of clan with clan, tribe with tribe, country
with country, empire with empire, and today reaching to continent with
continent, shows a process of erasing the minor distinctions that make for
local polities and jurisdictions and call for local legal orders and multiplied
local laws [...]. And, what is specially significant, the foregoing items of closer
juridal relations of peoples with peoples today do not have behind them any
movement toward an omniscient universal super-state. On the contrary,
peoples are insistent as ever upon local political independence [...]. Today
comparative law becomes, as it were, a book of sketches toward a map of a
law of the world, not a chart of a tangle of Main Streets leading nowhere.43

Pound’s reflections on comparative law are as methodologically self-
confident and politically brash as those of Lambert. They share Lambert’s
broadly anti-formal and social orientation, as well as his internationalist
and universalizing objectives. Like Lambert, Pound manages to put together
things which no longer combine so easily – universal ideals which are part
of the law of particular places or ideals which are facts of a legal culture. He
developed elaborate models of stages of legal development, which were both
historically specific to particular legal traditions and more general trans-
historical phenomena.44 He privileges neither customary nor legislative
materials in accounting for foreign legal orders:

A developed body of legal precepts is made of two elements, an enacted or
imperative and a traditional or habitual element.45

Pound’s programme is not Lambert’s – locating hidden legal ideals is
not learning the customary laws of unions and commercial associations.
Countering the American realist challenge is not building a more socially
progressive legal order in the sphere of French legal influence. Encouraging
jurists to navigate by universal ideals is quite a long way from promoting
codification of standards which will be interpreted to accord with local social
and economic needs. Although Pound and Lambert are not in methodological
debate – they both develop their comparative-law ideas as if they spoke
for a consensus in the field – the material for a recollection of methodo-
logical struggle is there. Once one has learned both, anti-formalism offers
choices, not solutions, and we are ready for the emergence of eclecticism.

In Germany, Ernst Rabel was the most significant comparatist of the
inter-war period.46 Rabel began as a historian of Roman law, turning to
comparative law only after the First World War. In the years before emi-
grating to the United States just before the outbreak of war, Rabel sat on
numerous arbitral tribunals, served several times as an ad hoc judge at
the Permanent Court for International Justice, was an active advisor to a
wide range of German commercial interests and was the founder and direc-
tor of the Kaiser-Wilhelm Institute for Foreign and International Private
Law in Berlin, where he was also professor. Like Lambert, Rabel saw the
institutionalization of comparative legal work as an important project.
Looking back on his career after the war, these other more engaged roles
slipped from view and it was his work building the institutional and profes-
sional resources for sustained comparative work which he remembered as
his most lasting contribution – and which he repeatedly urged on his US
colleagues.47

Like Lambert, Rabel was a lifelong enthusiast of uniform international
legal rules for private law and a passionate advocate of codification.
He worked extensively preparing for the Hague Conference on the

(eds.), Twenty-First Century Comparative and Conflicts Law: Legal Essays in Honor of Hessel E.

44 For an excellent account of this ambivalence in Pound’s comparative writing, see generally
Lasser, supra, note 34.

45 Roscoe Pound, Jurisprudence, vol. II (St Paul: West, 1959), p. 9, as quoted in Lasser, supra,
note 34.

46 I am indebted to two excellent recent studies of Rabel’s comparative legacy. See David J. Gerber,
‘Sculpting the Agenda of Comparative Law: Ernst Rabel and the Façade of Language’, in Riles,
supra, note 22, pp. 190–208; Bianca Gardella Tedeschi, ‘Anti-formalist Strands in Comparative
Legal Thought’ (2001), on file with the author. Representative works by Rabel in English are:
series of speeches and lectures by Rabel in English on a variety of topics in comparative law]
Study (Chicago: Callaghan, 1945), 4 vols. [hereinafter Conflict].

of comparative law as ‘a chief weapon in the armory of the American jurist’. Id., p. 225.
International Sale of Goods and devoted effort as well to the potential codification of a uniform law of conflicts. He was a strong supporter of the American Law Institute’s restatement projects:

We are pleased to imagine what it would mean, if over great stretches of the earth for the first time a central chapter of the law of obligations would be governed by uniform legislation. What a field for judges like Holmes and authors like Williston, what interchange of solutions, methods, systems! It is not true that unification is practically useless without a common court of appeals. Good decisions have a persuasive power. Common legal science is a greater benefit than is generally imagined. Within each country the international sales law would rival the domestic law by intrinsic strength, as did in Rome the *ius gentium* with the *ius civilis*. Looked at in this way, it is well worthwhile to help the international law of sales to come into existence.48

Rabel was anything but agnostic about the relative desirability of uniformity and diversity in law. At his most fair-minded, he admitted that divergences would need to be attended to — but similarity was the objective:

On the international plan, of course, we would not dare to play down the differences. We have to ascertain dissimilarities as well as similarities. Both are equally important and we have to investigate the causes of both. Nevertheless, at the present stage consideration of the common features and the basic ideas are still in the foreground.49

Rabel consistently advocated comparative legal study in practical terms — as a guarantee against provincialism, a source of better regulations and rules. During the inter-war period, however, he also advocated comparative law as an urgent aid in resolving European conflicts by promoting an international spirit for the solution to international problems. But he was also a strong advocate of German national ambitions and saw more professional comparative law as offering competitive advantages to Germany, German business and German lawyers:50

The reconstruction of the fatherland and its strengthening vis-à-vis the outside world require a sharpened perception of the events of the world. The new tasks must also find the jurists armed.51

Only through comparative engagement with foreign law could German commercial interests be defended internationally and only through engagement with an international ‘spirit’ could German national and commercial interests be achieved on the world stage.

In methodological terms, Rabel was influenced by the German ‘jurisprudence of interests’ and by sociological jurisprudence. His uptake of these ideas reflected the influence of the distinctively German nineteenth-century legal tradition in which he was trained — but this tradition urgently needed reformation to permit German commercial interests to achieve their objectives on the world stage. Specific legal rules were best understood in the context of the ‘system’ of which they were a part. Understanding a legal system, in turn, required first, historical analysis of the system’s development, second, an awareness of the existing legal system as it worked in practice and third, an understanding of a broader ‘component that penetrated philosophy, where historical and systematic legal science, together with legal philosophy, examine the deepest issues of the evolution and impact of law.52 Although Rabel began as a legal historian, he focused most of his inter-war comparative effort on an attempt to understand the workings of foreign legal systems in practice. He never devoted much energy to the ‘deepest philosophical issues’ and his methodological commitments are never very clearly articulated. He expressed eagerness to pursue comparative law as a ‘pure science’ by looking beneath the surface of legal language and doctrine to understand the workings of legal rules in practice. And his analysis of legal rules was consistently attentive to the needs and interests of commercial players.

In the United States after the war, Rabel completed a number of short reflective essays and speeches and two major projects. The largest of these was a multi-volume study of comparative conflict of laws rules sponsored by the American Law Institute and intended to serve as the basis for an international effort to unify conflict of laws.53 Without methodological or historical gloss, these lengthy descriptions focus on the outcomes achieved through various conflicts rules in different systems. His one post-war comparative study was a magisterial overview of the ‘Private Laws of Western Civilization’ published in a series of articles by the *Louisiana Law Review*.54 These lectures consider Roman law, the French civil code, the German and

52 Id., p. 2, as quoted in Gerber, supra, note 46, p. 197, n. 18.
53 See Rabel, Conflict, supra, note 46.
Swiss codes and the common and civil law in historical terms, enumerating various salient differences and similarities. If there is a common theme, it is the identification of the difficulty, encountered differently in each tradition, of escaping the practical constraints of legal formalism to allow for a more practical attention to ‘the social purposes more than the technical qualities of the law’.55

In comparison to Lambert and Pound, Rabel’s focus was far more on the practical outcomes of legal rules as they were encountered by practitioners and commercial actors. He places little emphasis on ideals or normative commitments, although his historical surveys often conclude that a system is committed to a specific idea, such as legalism, precedent, etc. In peering through the language of the law to practice, he was not looking for customary law and, unlike Lambert, was not seeking the views of business people or union leaders about what the law was or should be. He was seeking to canvass the practical outcomes which resulted as different legal systems were in fact applied – and he was confident that these could be harmonized by legislative codification.

Max Rheinstein describes Rabel’s methodological preoccupations this way:

As a comparatist, Rabel had, of necessity, to apply the method which has come to be called in Germany that of the jurisprudence of interests and in this country that of sociological jurisprudence. This method has often been stated to be opposed to that of conceptual jurisprudence. No such opposition existed in Rabel’s thought. In his view law was to be treated as a body of rules and concepts arranged harmoniously and systematically. It was his aim to improve the ‘system’, to refine its concepts, and to prevent their obfuscation [citation omitted]. For him the good lawyer was he who would master the concepts and handle them deftly and cleanly for the achievement of the ends of good policy. A policy would not be good policy, however, if it neglected to consider the experiences of two millennia which had come to be precipitated in the concepts of the Civil Law. Only on rare occasions did Rabel articulate

55 Id., p. 9. Rabel credits Roman law with inventing the idea that ‘the judge should evaluate evidence brought before him according to his own conscientious conviction, and not bound by formalized legal rules determining what this or that document is worth, how many witnesses are needed, of what kind, et cetera;’ id., p. 10. See Gerber, supra, note 46, p. 10. Rabel traces the historically specific fate of this idea in the other systems, which have very different attitudes toward written law – the rather loose Swiss, the more detailed German code, the French conception of legality, the British opposition of formal rules and equity, the US experience with precedent and so forth.

57 Basic references for David include René David, Traité élémentaire de droit civil comparé (Paris: J.G.D.J., 1950). In relation to this book, David himself later said, in a collection of articles, speeches and essays written over more than thirty years, grouped by topic, and introduced by a general comment on the place of the particular topic in David’s work, that it was generally out of date, but that the methodological and theoretical dimension of the work, which was its real focus and purpose ‘mérite encore d’être lu’; id., Le droit comparé: droits d’hier, droits de demain (Paris: Economica, 1982), p. 39 [hereinafter Le droit comparé]. See also id., Les grands systèmes de droit contemporains, 11th ed. by Camille Jauffret-Spínosi (Paris: Dalloz, 2002), translated into English, from earlier editions, as id. and John E. C. Brierley, Major Legal Systems in the World Today, 3d ed. (London: Stevens, 1985); id., Les avatars d’un comparatiste (Paris: Economica, 1982) [hereinafter Avatars]. In this, his autobiograph[y, David mainly discusses the methodological/theoretical orientations of his comparative work; see id., pp. 258–68, being c. 18 entitled ‘Mon œuvre’. On David’s comparative work, see Jorge L. Eriquil, ‘René David: At the Head of the Legal Family’, in Riles, supra, note 22, pp. 212–35.
58 For example, see David, Le droit comparé, supra, note 57, p. 66: “En vérité, tout le monde le sait, [les juges] jouent dans nos pays comme dans les pays de common law un rôle important de création du droit. On peut, à l’occasion, leur demander et obtenir d’eux une ‘interprétation’ de la loi plus orientée vers une solution de justice que commandée par la volonté du législateur ou par des textes que celui-ci a prescrits. Et là-d’en, in the same piece: ‘Le droit n’a jamais été statique. Toujours il a dû s’adapter à des changements qui se produisaient dans les circonstances, dans les techniques, dans les idées, et qui conduisaient à concevoir d’une manière nouvelle la justice. L’on doit néanmoins reconnaître que cette évolution a pris, dans nos sociétés actuelles, un caractère révolutionnaire parce que le droit, au lieu de se fixer pour tâches essentielles le maintien de l’ordre et la garantie de droits individuels, vise aujourd’hui, à un degré égal et parfois supérieur, à transformer l’ordre social existant et à donner effet à un type nouveau de droits: droits économiques et sociaux, droits collectifs ou diffus:’ id., p. 71. Or, in his most classic piece of work: ‘When considering a foreign law, we must however bear in mind that the manner in which such law is presented in its formal sources
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...is not necessarily the only factor conditioning social relations in that country': id. and Brierley, supra, note 57, p. 13. At the same time, David sets aside the view that 'considered comparative law as no more than an aspect of the sociology of law': ibid.

The first three pieces in David, Le droit comparé, supra, note 57, are eulogies for Lambert (l’Édouard Lambert a été un grand comparatiste (...). Il a été de ceux qui, parce qu’ils croyaient à la communauté internationale et parce qu’ils savaient se donner tout entier à son service, ont le mieux servi l'intérêt de leur pays; il a été un grand Français': id., p. 20), Harold Gorteridge (un des maîtres incontestés du droit comparé': id., p. 21) and Felipe de Soló Carriáres (l’Œuvre scientifique de Soló est considérable, et elle aurait sufi à elle seule à le classer comme un grand comparatiste': id., p. 33). Elsewhere, he cites Pound as a reference for the sociological dimension of comparative studies in law, referring to 'l’Œuvre de Roscoe Pound, le grand comparatiste américain': id., Avatars, supra, note 57, p. 259. He also presents Lambert as an example: ‘Mon modèle était plutôt Édouard Lambert, quoique je m’émeuisses des tendances un peu chimériques auxquelles l’avait porté sa générosité naturelle’ (id., p. 294).

For example, see id., Le droit comparé, supra, note 57, p. 63: ‘Je ne conçois pas en effet que l’on puisse “se spécialiser” dans son droit national, et tout ignorer des conceptions différentes du droit, de son rôle, de ses techniques, que l’on peut avoir dans telle ou telle région du monde: aux États-Unis qui pour notre bonne bouche ou notre malheur sont aujourd’hui la puissance dominante dans la politique et l’économie du monde, – dans l’Union soviétique qui met en cause, dans leur fondement même, nos institutions, – dans les pays d’Europe occidentale, avec lesquels nous voudrions nous unir étroitement, – dans les pays du tiers-monde, dont la mire pose un problème analogique pour la morale universelle et la paix du monde. Se replier sur la seule étude de notre droit national me paraît être aujourd’hui une position – peut-être malheureusement une tendance – anachronique, sans que je fasse à cet égard une différence entre les “grandes puissances” – celles qui se qualifient de telles, disent les Britanniques, – et les plus petits pays, – ceux qui ont plus de modestie ou une conscience plus nette de leur poids dans le monde contemporain. Tous ceux qui veulent regarder le droit comme une science, tous ceux qui sont conscients de la nécessité d’élaborer un ordre international nouveau fondé sur la justice [... adhéreront à la conviction qu’un juriste digne de ce nom doit avoir quelque connaissance de ce que sont les principaux systèmes de droit dans le monde contemporain.”

Law is not universal in its ideals – the Chinese, the Islamic are simply too different to be assimilated in this way to the western legal tradition. Against Lambert, David argues that the comparison of legislation and the aspiration for codification were both too formalist and too positivist – which could lead to a politics of apology for totalitarian departures from culturally embedded freedoms. At the same time, one can go too far toward the culturally particularist end of the spectrum, a position David associates with Lambert’s predecessor, François Gény. Such a position could also lead to cultural/racial justifications of totalitarianism which underestimated the positive force of the universal rights of man. Anti-formalism has given rise to a choice.

In building a middle way which could avoid these extremes, David is careful to give appropriate weight to both cultural and functional/technical aspects of law. Though distinct, both culture and function are crucial to an understanding of similarities and differences among legal regimes.

63 For example, see id., Le droit comparé, supra, note 57, pp. 93–4: ‘Concernant la définition du droit, on trouve aux États-Unis d’Amérique une formule célèbre, selon laquelle le droit n’est pas autre chose que la prédiction raisonnable de ce que les cours de justice pourront décider dans telle ou telle affaire si celle-ci vient à leur être soumise [...]. Transportons-nous [...] en pays d’Islam. Le droit musulman (shā’ia) consiste dans les préceptes, rattachés à la religion, qui doivent gouverner la conduite des Musulmans dans leurs rapports les uns aux autres, s’ils ont la préoccupation de leur salut éternel [...]. Le droit tel que le définit Holmes et le droit musulman sont deux choses toutes différentes.’ And, further: ‘En France, en Angleterre, en Allemagne, aux États-Unis d’Amérique on souhaite que la société vienne à être aussi complètement soumise que possible au droit; [...] le droit est symbole de justice, les citoyens sont invités à lutter pour assurer son règne. Dans l’Extrême-Orient au contraire, la philosophie traditionnelle voit dans le droit un pis-aller, une technique bonne tout au plus à discipliner les barbares; l’honnête citoyen ne se soucie pas du droit, il se tient à l’écart des tribunaux et ignore les lois pour vivre selon les règles de la morale, de convenance et d’étiquette, héritées des ancêtres, que lui dicte son sentiment d’appartenance à une certaine communauté. Ici encore il est difficile, en en conviendra, de comparer les deux types de droit: celui qui représente un idéal de justice et celui dont on apprécie qu’il aura le moins possible lieu d’intervenir’: id., p. 94.

64 See Esquirol, supra, note 57, pp. 218–23.

65 Id., pp. 223–9. As Esquirol points out, there was not only an overt liberal politics in this methodological project but David also had a nationalist agenda, for it was in French legal culture that the two extremes had been avoided and the universal rights of man given cultural form. It is interesting to note that both Lambert and Rabel shared this combination of nationalist pride and humanist cosmopolitanism at some point in their career. On Rabel, see, for example, Gerber, supra, note 46. For a glimpse of Lambert’s post-war slightly nationalist (and slightly anti-German) undertones, see, for example, Lambert, supra, note 29, pp. 6–10.

66 For example, see David, Le droit comparé, supra, note 57, p. 7: ‘le droit comparé, c’est essentiellement la lutte contre les idées fausses et les préjugés, engendrés par l’attitude isolationniste qu’ont prise les juristes dans la plupart des pays. Une première idée fausse consiste à penser que le droit est considéré en tous pays de la même manière que chez nous: que partout il jouit du même prestige et qu’un y voit partout l’assise fondamentale de la société. Une seconde idée fausse est de croire que le droit est partout conçu comme étant un ensemble de normes, ayant pour les intéressés et pour les
David proposes a series of 'legal families'. These go through various iterations in his work – in Major Legal Systems in the World Today, he distinguished 'Romano-Germanic, Common Law, Socialist systems, Muslim-Hindu-Jewish, and Far East'. These broad families, straddling cultural and technical similarities and differences are simply suggestive:

These discussions, however, if pushed too far, do not make very much sense in the end. The idea of a 'legal family' does not correspond to a biological reality: it is no more than a didactic device. We are attempting no more than to underscore the similarities and differences of the various legal systems – and, in that light, almost any systematic classification would serve the purpose. The matter turns upon the context in which one is placed and the aim in mind. The suitability of any classification will depend upon whether the perspective is world-wide or regional, or whether attention is given to public, private or criminal law. Each approach can undoubtedly be justified from the point of view of the person proposing it and none can, in the end, be recognised as exclusive.

The eclectic voice for post-war comparative law is born. From this point, the canon of great comparatists becomes increasingly modest about its aims, eclectic in its methods and distant from the wisdom of earlier comparatists. But the middle ground to be provided by David's legal families turns out itself to be unstable and subject to attack.

The main alternative to David’s legal families idea was the functionalism of Konrad Zweigert and Heinz Kötz. Like David, they situate themselves firmly in the anti-formalist tradition:

"Il est nécessaire que la science de l'assurance ait à sa disposition une méthode générale de classement des normes de la loi. La méthode qui nous propose est celle de la classification systématique des normes légales. Elle repose sur la notion de 'famille juridique' ou 'système juridique'. Cette méthode a pour but de regrouper les normes légales en fonction des caractéristiques de leur structure et de leur fonctionnement. Elle permet de mieux comprendre les relations entre les différents systèmes juridiques et de les comparer de manière systématique."— Zweigert and Kötz, supra, note 67, p. 21.
about how common problems are solved elsewhere to the legislator or judge. They are careful to distinguish ‘theoretical-descriptive’ comparative law from ‘applied’ comparative law and caution that applied comparative law, which ‘suggests how a specific problem can most appropriately be solved under given social and economic circumstances’ and ‘provides advice on legal policy’ can place comparatists under ‘considerable pressure’.

For Zweigert and Kötz, there is no particular reason to think the result will be more uniform law or more international law. The most one might shoo for would be to ‘reduce the number of divergencies in law, attributable not to the political, moral or social qualities of the different nations, but to historical accident or to temporary or contingent circumstances’. Their concern is far more for the science of law itself, which can now be carried out on an international basis:

It now becomes unmistakably clear that an international legal science is possible. After a period of national legal developments, producing academically and doctrinally sophisticated structures, each apparently peculiar and incomparable, private law can once again become, as it was in the era of natural law, a proper object of international research, without losing its claim to scientific exactitude and objectivity. To this recognition of the fact that law, and especially private law, may properly be studied outside national boundaries, comparative law has greatly contributed, though other legal disciplines also have long been pointing the way. [...] What we must aim for is a truly international comparative law which could form the basis for a universal legal science. This new legal science could provide the scholar with new methods of thought, new systematic concepts, new methods of posing questions, new material discoveries, and new standards of criticism: his scientific scope would be increased to include the experience of all the legal science in the world, and he would be provided with the means to deal with them. It would facilitate the mutual comprehension of jurists of different nationalities and allay the misunderstandings which come from the prejudices, constraints, and diverse vocabularies of the different systems.

Their aspiration for comparative law is oriented toward enhancing a ‘scientific’ understanding of law and ‘no study deserves the name of science if it limits itself to phenomena arising within its national boundaries’. The echoes of sociological jurisprudence survive in the aspiration that comparative law provide a good heuristic for what have become pragmatic mental habits. Training in comparative law shows that the rule currently operative is only one of several possible solutions; it provides an effective antidote to uncritical faith in legal doctrine; it teaches us that what is presented as pure natural law proves to be nothing of the sort as soon as one crosses a frontier, and it keeps reminding us that while doctrine and categories are essential in any system, they can sometimes become irrelevant to the functioning and efficacy of the law in action and degenerate into futile professional games.

Zweigert and Kötz place themselves proudly in the history of comparative law, but they are not entirely sanguine about the work of their predecessors. They stress the range of diverse methods and approaches which have been taken to the subject and the numerous sources and influences on the comparative profession. For them, the discipline has come into its own as an institutionalized profession through the establishment of ‘special institutes, fully equipped with the personnel and plant needed for sustained work, and finally, the representation of comparatists from all countries in the Association internationale des sciences juridiques’ – and, most importantly, through methodological consolidation.

For Zweigert and Kötz, the pre-war comparative-law world offered a number of alternative approaches, among which Rabel had emerged as the dominant voice:

The methods of Rabel and his contemporaries at home and abroad have won through. The problems they identified and the programmes they established constitute the tasks of comparative law today.

The only puzzle here is that Rabel was not in a method war with Lambert or any other comparatist. The specific differences which divided Rabel and Lambert – more or less attention to customary law in codification, say – are not what concern Zweigert and Kötz. They are agnostic about choices of this type. Nevertheless, in some way Rabel has come to stand for a tradition which is more practical in its orientation, more interested in uniform practical needs and less in cultural differences, while Lambert has come to stand for a comparative law more attuned to history, culture,

75 Id., p. 11.  76 Id., p. 2.  77 Id., pp. 45–6.  78 Id., p. 15.

79 Id., p. 22.  80 Id., p. 3 [discussing the importance of Lambert's and Saleilles's initiative to launch the 1900 Paris Congress]. Zweigert and Kötz examine the history of the discipline in their short chapter entitled 'The History of Comparative Law': id., pp. 48–62.

81 Id., p. 62.

82 Ibid. Besides themselves, they counted among Rabel's functionalist successors Rheinstein, Kessler and Kahn-Freund.
context, difference. Rabel and Lambert have come to stand for opposite ends of the various spectrums sketched in the last section.

For Zweigert and Kötz, the pull of practicality and uniformity leads to a comparative legal science which could resist both the tendencies of cultural particularism or rule-scepticism and of traditional formalism, by focusing on ‘function’:

The basic methodological principle of all comparative law is that of functionality. From this basic principle stem all the other rules which determine the choice of laws to compare, the scope of the undertaking, the creation of a system of comparative law, and so on. Incomparables cannot usefully be compared, and in law the only things which are comparable are those which fulfill the same function. This proposition may seem self-evident, but may of its applications, though familiar to the experienced comparatist, are not obvious to the beginner. The proposition rests on what every comparatist learns, namely that the legal system of every society faces essentially the same problems, and solves these problems with quite different means though very often with similar results. The question to which any comparative study is devoted must be posed in purely functional terms; the problem must be stated without any reference to the concepts of one’s own legal system.

In a sense, nothing could be further from David’s contemporaneous notion of ‘legal families’. ‘Legal families’ and ‘functions’ do mark poles of the cultural-technical spectrum for comparative law in the 1950s. And yet, just as David’s legal families were proposed as a middle way between cultural particularism and universalism, so the idea of function is designed to float between universals and the particularities of specific contexts and ensure that the comparatist has fully grasped the details of each legal regime’s specificity.

The post-war comparative discipline of David and Zweigert and Kötz had become a respectable participant in the mainstream of post-war anti-formalist thought. The social and practically engaged projects and energy of Pound, Lambert or Rabel have disappeared, replaced by far more modest objectives for the professionalization of the discipline itself. It would be easy to associate Lambert, Rabel or Pound with ideological positions and social interests – far less so David or Zweigert and Kötz. In a sense, as the academic establishment of the comparative profession was consolidated, its social aspirations diminished. The new profession would make a contribution more to knowledge than policy.

On the methodological side, the story is more complex. David and Zweigert and Kötz write both more and more explicitly about method. David and Zweigert and Kötz do differ on method and talk about their method, but they each present their own method as a mediation of a methodological controversy which they locate in the past. Zweigert and Kötz associate this earlier division with the names of Lambert and Rabel, David with the names of Pound, Lambert and Geny. They each propose a methodological synthesis. And yet, looking back, their own proposals have become marks for the methodological alternatives of cultural differentiation and technical universalism. Indeed, in retrospect, it is easy to overlook their efforts at synthesis – ‘functionalism’ has been remembered as a technical assault on the embeddedness of law, rather than as a heuristic to ensure attention to differences.

‘Legal families’ seems like a crude substitute for careful attention to similarities, differences and influences.

The methodologically eclectic and politically neutral comparative-law sensibility reached its first best expression in the work of Rudolf Schlesinger...
influential Cornell project of the 1950s, which provides the methodological origins for the ongoing effort to identify the common core of European private law.\(^{87}\) In many ways, it was Schlesinger who routinized the professional activity of post-war comparatists. His project was enormously ambitious, involving dozens of students over many years. The objective was to compile as accurate and complete a picture as possible of similarities and differences among leading private-law systems. Schlesinger offers none of the broad social or cosmopolitan political justifications of Lambert or Pound. His concerns are directed exclusively towards the development of knowledge and the enrichment of legal education.

This work was to be carried out in the tradition of anti-formalism, but Schlesinger's objective was neither to demonstrate the truth of anti-formalist insights nor to mobilize them in a project of legal reform. His goal was to generate an accurate description and analysis of legal similarities and differences among legal regimes. Anti-formalism provided a taken-for-granted background conception of what law is so as to guide the comparatist in identifying legal phenomena for comparison.

In doing comparative work, Schlesinger exhorted his students, it was important to deal with the 'living law'. To do so, one should use a 'factual' rather than a 'concept-oriented approach'.\(^{88}\) Schlesinger was interested in cultural differences and sympathetic to the idea that these differences might well run in families. But he was not pursuing a global taxonomy of legal systems. Rather, he was seeking a micro-description of similarities and differences. He was sympathetic to the functionalist idea and often suggested that an accurate identification of the 'same' legal phenomena in another legal culture required attention to whatever in that culture performed the same 'function'. But his functionalism was instrumental to his descriptive endeavour. The key for Schlesinger was the use of hypothetical fact-patterns or 'problems' against which the reactions of various legal systems can be compared.\(^{89}\) Investigators from various legal systems were asked how a given fact-pattern would be assessed in their own legal regime so as to facilitate understanding of similarities and differences free from the distraction of pre-existing ideas about legal rules and categories, but also from preferences rooted in particular cultural needs or technical functions.

Distance from practical engagement with government is explicitly promoted by Rodolfo Sacco, the Italian comparatist who provides the link between the Cornell project and the current effort led largely by Sacco's students to mobilize researchers for a description of the common core of European private law.\(^{90}\) Sacco goes out of his way to deride efforts to justify comparative legal study on the basis of its usefulness:

Like other sciences, comparative law remains a science as long as it acquires knowledge and regardless of whether or not the knowledge is put to any further use [...]. Comparative law is like other sciences in that its aim must be the acquisition of knowledge. Like other branches of legal science, it seeks knowledge of law.\(^{91}\)


Schlesinger, 'The Common Core', supra, note 87, p. 73: 'It is a well known truism in comparative law that different legal systems, even in the countless instances in which they arrive at identical results, usually proceed along divergent conceptual routes. [...]. Misunderstandings among lawyers brought up in different legal systems can be effectively minimized if a segment of life is chosen as the focus and the normal unit of discussion. In this way, and only in this way, can one be sure that all members of the group always address themselves to the same point, and that they penetrate through the layers of classification and concept with which each legal system covers its actual solutions of social problems. [...] If used by a team of comparatists, the case-oriented factual method forces each participant to face and to answer the question: how does your legal system react to this particular fact situation? What remedy, if any, does your system make available to the plaintiff in this case? If the question is posed in this form, functional

similarities between legal systems will be uncovered upon which a concept-oriented approach would throw no light. It will be found in countless instances that many or all legal systems reach a similar result, although they do so by the use of widely divergent theories and labels' [emphasis original]. Schlesinger adds moreover: 'In a comparative research project, as in other contexts, it is doubtless convenient to use reported cases as ready-made materials for discussion; but it does not follow that one should either limit oneself to reported cases, or use them without constant appraisal of their real importance as living law': *ibid*. On the relevance of history and historical context in comparative work, see also *ibid.*, 'The Past and Future', supra, note 87.

The practical details of the 'factual method' are presented in the general introduction to the Cornell project's results in the area of contract law in *ibid.*, *Formation of Contracts*, supra, note 87, pp. 30–41. On the relationship between the 'functional' and the 'factual' method, see *ibid.*, 'The Common Core', supra, note 87, p. 74.

For a comparison of Sacco and Schlesinger, see Mattei, supra, note 87.

Even the objective of increased international understanding and harmony seems to be going too far:

In general, then, the use to which scientific ideas are put affects neither the definition of science nor the validity of its conclusions. Jurists are generally aware of this truth. They do not think their work is valid because it can be used to achieve this or that practical end. In the case of comparative law, however, a different standard is applied, or at least it was thirty years ago. Those who compare legal systems are always asked about the purpose of such comparisons. The idea seems to be that the study of foreign legal systems is a legitimate enterprise only if it results in proposals for the reform of domestic law. [...] The effort to justify comparative law by its practical uses sometimes verges on the ridiculous. According to some sentimentalists, comparison is supposed to increase understanding among peoples and foster the peaceful coexistence of nations. According to that idea, the statesmen who triggered the two world wars would have stopped at the brink of catastrophe had they only attended courses in comparative law. Napoleon himself would have given up his imperialistic dreams had he spent less time over the code that bears his name and more on the *gemeines Recht* and the *kormicha pravda*.

Sacco's approach to comparative law is also rooted in his anti-formalist conception of law. Sometimes, as for Schlesinger, anti-formalism seems a background assumption which guides good comparative practice. Comparison of legal systems and rules from the most diverse socio-economic and political traditions is possible only if one pushes behind law's formal appearances, avoiding false similarities and differences. At other times, anti-formalism seems an idea of which jurists constantly need

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92 Id., pp. 1-2.
93 Thus, for example, Sacco exhorts us that the 'operative rules of [...] two systems may be more similar than the vocabularies in which they are expressed': id., p. 13. Or: 'it is wrong to believe that the first step toward comparison is to identify "the legal rule" of the countries to be compared. That is the typical view of an inexperienced jurist. It is a misleading simplification which the student of comparative law has a duty to criticize. Instead of speaking of "the legal rule" of a country, we must speak instead of the rules of constitutions, legislatures, courts, and, indeed, of the scholars who formulate legal doctrine. The reason jurists often fail to do so is that their thought is dominated by a fundamental idea: that in a given country at a given moment the rule contained in the constitution or in legislation, the rule formulated by scholars, the rule declared by courts, and the rule actually enforced by courts, have an identical content and are therefore the same': id., p. 21. Or: 'We should not think, however, that we understand a legal system when we know only how courts have actually resolved cases. Knowledge of a legal system entails knowledge of factors present today which determine how cases will be resolved in the future. We must not only show how courts have acted but consider the influences to which judges are subject': id., p. 23.
94 Id., p. 24.
95 On the relationship between Sacco and Schlesinger, see id., pp. 27-30 [where Sacco mentions the Cornell project as an important step in the same direction as the theory of legal formants]. See generally Mattei, supra, note 87.
phenomena across different legal regimes which are neither technical nor cultural, providing a middle way between attention to formal rules and social contexts. But where Schlesinger's problems seemed to direct the comparatist to identify the one solution which would emerge in different legal systems, Sacco's notion of 'legal formants' makes it possible to keep the ambivalence and multiplicity of legal rules in each system at play in the comparison. The truly careful comparatist will write an account of similarities and differences among legal phenomena which keeps in mind that legal phenomena are often, even quite often, multiple, contradictory and ambivalent, even within one legal culture:

Thus even the jurist who seeks a single legal rule, indeed who proceeds from the axiom that there can be one rule in force, recognizes implicitly that living law contains many different elements such as statutory rules, the formulations of scholars, and the decision of judges - elements that he keeps separate in his own thinking. [...] [W]e will call them, borrowing from phonetics, the 'legal formants'. The jurist concerned with the law within a single country examines all of these elements and then eliminates the complications that arise from their multiplicity to arrive at one rule. He does so by a process of interpretation. Yet this process does not guarantee that this is, in his system, only a single rule. Several interpretations will be possible and logic alone will not show that one is correct and another false. Within a given legal system with multiple 'legal formants' there is no guarantee that they will be in harmony rather than in conflict.  

The 'legal formant' idea permits investigation of elements within a legal system which are in tension with one another:

Comparison recognizes that the 'legal formants' within a system are not always uniform and therefore contradiction is possible. The principle of non-contradiction, the fetish of municipal lawyers, loses all value in an historical perspective, and the comparative perspective is historical par excellence.

The 'legal formant' idea is not intended as an intervention in debates about what law or government should be or do, nor does it take sides in methodological debates between, say, functionalism and the tradition of legal families. For Sacco, the aim is simply anti-dogmatic:

98 It would certainly be possible to read Sacco's theory of 'legal formants' as a challenge to functionalism, both as a method of comparison and as an idea about law and society, as Michele Graziaedel does elsewhere in this book. The different levels or spheres in which law operates,

In both Europe and the United States, the comparative-law discipline of Schlesinger or Sacco is methodologically eclectic and careful to remain 'objective', neutral and disengaged from ideological debate and the application of its insights by government. Post-war comparatists speak much less in terms which resonate easily with ideological positions in the broader society and are less easily linked with particular social interests (labour, German commerce, etc.) than their pre-war predecessors. They participate less readily in public life or governmental work. They hesitate more about the application of their knowledge and insist more intently on the virtues of disengaged knowledge than their predecessors.

They do speak a great deal about method. But the methods they propose are extremely nuanced mediations of more extreme methodological alternatives identified with comparative work in the past or with work done by others. Nevertheless, their methodological middle-positions continue to differ, or to seem in retrospect to differ, and to do so in a more structured way than did those before the war. We might say that the post-war authors are consistent eclectics, whose debates occupy an ever-shrinking centre of the anti-formalist spectrum, while their pre-war predecessors were more pluralist in their anti-formalism, ranging more widely among the methodological options.

How can we make sense of this story? The clearest story would be the chastening of overt political commitment by anti-formalism in legal science. The comparative-law profession has been, from the start, insistently anti-formalist about legal materials. For the founders, anti-formalism and sociological realism seemed vital methodological assaults on the mainstream legal science of the time. They were associated with strong projects each quasi-autonomous vis-à-vis the other, suggest the importance of differing legal forms even where the results for one or another hypothesized 'function' are identical, and the fact that legal orders are often in contradiction within themselves suggests a critique of universalism, as well as of the idea, hidden but present in functionalism, that societies do things differently to express their 'cultures' in a world of universal functions.

99 Sacco, supra, note 91, pp. 25–6.
of internationalization and law reform, with defences of particular social interests against others and with projects of governance and modernization. After the war, as anti-formalism became mainstream – and as the discipline moved from Europe to the United States – the tone shifted. Anti-formalism now would guarantee comparative law's disciplinary place in the mainstream legal academy and would serve pedagogic purposes in helping 'beginners' overcome parochialism and the common tendency to overestimate the importance of legal forms. Anti-formalism remains the vocabulary for comparative work. Comparatists in each generation are insistent on the need to awaken the legal establishment to anti-formalism. But the anti-establishment and anti-parochial edge of early work has been redirected against those who are naive – students, beginners – who need comparative legal education to become sophisticated participants in establishment life. The project in society has become a knowledge project.

Within this story lies a second – the role of debates within the anti-formalist tradition in bringing about that chastening. For each scholar in the founding generation, anti-formalism had a relatively clear meaning – for Lambert, attention to social and economic needs and desires; for Pound, attention to legal ideals; for Rabel, attention to practical outcomes. These were all offered as departures from textual positivism and as corrections for overinvestment in existing legal forms. We could situate all of them on the right end of the spectrums of the last section; each was proposed and defended as an assault on those who thought about law in terms we now associate with the left-hand columns. And yet, looking back, these were quite different ideas, which were understood to have quite different ideological associations and social consequences. With hindsight, we could say that in some way the spectrum between anti-formalism and traditional jurisprudence repeated itself in the choice between, say, legal ideals and social needs or between social needs and practical results, between codification by legislation and codification by custom and so forth. The rift with the establishment became a rift within anti-formalism. Social and political choices were sublimated by methodological choices.

If we were to align our comparatists on the spectrums developed in the last section from relatively more formal and universal to relatively more cultural and differentiated, the results would look something like figure 11.8.

We could say that the 'great debate' between embedded social/cultural needs/ideals and universal functions has continued. But something has changed: the debate has become both muted and muddy. Muted, in the sense that the positions are getting closer together – the debate is evermore a matter of the narcissism of small differences. Schlesinger's 'factual problems' and Sacco's 'legal formants' are more similar than Zweigert and Kötz's 'functions' and David's 'families'. Although 'fact problems' lies further to the universal/technical end of things than 'legal formants', both were proposed as middle positions, efforts to bridge the gap between culturally embedded and universal/technical emphases. And the same could be said of 'families' and 'functions'. As the space of the debate narrows, the extremes disappear into the past, into the naiveté of youth, into the positions of unnamed extremists.

The debate has also become muddy in the sense that it is evermore difficult to tell what goes where. Figuring out where to put Pound in the story suggests the difficulty. Compared to Lambert, Pound seemed far less interested in the details of factual difference and far more interested in the discovery of universal ideals. And yet, his ideals were also specific to a culture – by looking abroad, understanding the 'ideal element' in law, one could see the factual presence of an 'ought' in one's own legal culture. Compared to Rabel's attention to practical commercial outcomes, Pound's orientation seems very much to the culturally embedded side of the spectrum.

The fluidity of association among the various positions – among the various choices enumerated in the last section – is what makes it possible to mute the debate over time. The left-to-right alignment of the choices comparatists make within the anti-formalist tradition is a matter only of loose analogy. We might say there is an iron law at work here: the more scholars seek to find a middle way between these methodological alternatives, the muddier the terms will become. But the more what had seemed
diverse preferences within a large tradition will come to seem analogous choices between two unpalatable extremes.

It might be possible to redraw figure 11.8 to take into account something like perceived degrees of separation between the terms. Looked at in 1935, it might appear something like figure 11.9. Looked at in 1955, it might appear something like figure 11.10. And from 2000, it looks like figure 11.11.

This trend highlights a third story – the effects of the slow coming to consciousness of these first two stories. The key difference between the pre- and post-war comparatists is a shift in the tone with which these methodological matters are discussed. The pre-war comparatists cast themselves as outsiders to convention, as engaged social and political actors and as methodological mavericks. The post-war comparatists, by contrast, present themselves more often as insiders, neutral scientists and methodological mediators. This posture reflected in large part, of course, changed circumstances. After the war, largely in the United States, the field of comparative law was aligned with the legal academy’s mainstream post-realist common sense. But methodological pronouncements also seem chastened by awareness of

the earlier methodological struggle. There certainly was intellectual and political struggle in the 1930s – just not much in comparative law. Standing on the shoulders of giants after 1950 meant seeing their feet of clay – their relative methodological naivety – and reading it as an extreme. Writing yourself into the field after 1950 meant writing yourself against extremism – and against your predecessors. For our predecessors, methodological choices were there to be made – for us, they are there to be balanced, managed, blended, avoided.100

The process of disengagement from methodological commitment seems to have been repeated as the field progressed. The ‘great’ comparatists seem great because they had a strong, if idiosyncratic, methodological formulation. But it is increasingly difficult to find a comparatist who associates with – or even can state clearly – the methodological position of these

100 Duncan Kennedy has written the best study I know of the post-war anti-formalist consciousness of method balancing. See Duncan Kennedy, “From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller’s ‘Consideration and Form’,” (2000) 100 Columbia L.R. 94.
early masters. When a great comparatist enters the canon, he is proposing a method which seems like common sense, good professional judgement. At least some people are willing, at least for a moment, to affiliate themselves with this work. Each person who affiliates with a master will want to tweak the method, amending and complexifying it, adding elements from other places, before settling down to wise professional judgement of his own. Indeed, to write as a master, one must write one’s predecessors into the margins and occupy the sensible methodological middle. The earlier master is increasingly remembered not for good sense, but for tilting too far and being too preoccupied with methodological matters. Taken together, past masters stand for clear methodological positions, current masters are mature eclectics. In this sense, the moment of methodological division, the clean separation of the poles in the above lists, is always happening and never happened at all.

It is not surprising that scholars of later generations, among them my own contemporaries, are tempted to unsettle the eclectic post-war comparatist by insisting on the significance of methodological clarity. And there have been periodic outbreaks of methodological extremism – the Pierre Legrand–Alan Watson debate might be an illustration. But I do not think these efforts have laid much of a glove on the sensibility of the post-war generation. And indeed, the practical work of the common-core project proceeds with a post-war method of pragmatic eclectic judgement. From the point of view of the field’s elder statesmen, these new debates have a definite ‘been there, done that’ quality.

I have a great deal of sympathy for their reaction – it does seem too late to put the genie of methodological scepticism back in the bottle. An eclectic and unstable effort to pick one’s way among all these choices seems unavoidable in thinking about similarities and differences among legal regimes. But this methodological conclusion leaves us with no sense for what has become of the social and political engagements of comparative law. My intuition is that the post-war generation were fleeing more than methodological controversy, that they fled to the method-of-no-method as a sublimation of politics and as a retreat from engagement with governance projects. From my point of view, the problem with the post-war generation was not its methodological eclecticism, but the politics-of-no-politics which this eclecticism facilitated.

It was much easier to understand pre-war comparatists as political actors. They offered polemics for large-scale law-reform projects – to harmonize and codify international rules, to make domestic law more international or social in orientation, to strengthen commercial interests and so forth. They easily associated methodological choices with ideological positions and social interests. To be an anti-formalist about law implied something about one’s political commitments and building a more anti-formal legal order seemed hard to distinguish from building a legal system more attuned to ‘social’ interests, international harmonization, etc. As a more eclectic methodological spirit overtook the field, comparatists seemed to withdraw from politics. Polemics for legal reform were replaced by careful agnosticism about the desirability of, say, legal harmonization. We find instead polemics for the autonomy and neutrality of comparative research. At the same time, methodological commitments became harder to associate cleanly with ideological and social positions.

These may simply have been parallel developments – methodological maturity and political disengagement. But eclecticism also contributed to disengagement. To the extent methodological commitments could still be easily associated with ideological positions or social interests, post-war eclecticism blurred the picture. After the war, moreover, ‘anti-formalism’ no longer seemed the natural methodological vocabulary of the left alone. With eclecticism came an attenuation of the associations between methodological commitments and ideological positions or social interests. This attenuation compounded the distance post-war eclectics felt from political engagement and seems to have strengthened their determination not to launch polemics for projects of law reform. Or, perhaps more accurately, attenuation sapped something of their confidence as participants in law-reform polemics. For pre-war comparatists, methodological commitments – to various strands of anti-formalism – had provided not only the language, but also the authority, for political engagement. Once anti-formalism ceased to provide stable political guidance, and comparatists ceased to feel stable in their anti-formal commitments, they felt incapacitated from overt political engagement.

To reframe the work of contemporary comparatists in political terms does not mean resurrecting a reliable drive-shaft between method and

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politics, although if it could be done it might be welcome. The challenge is to render the projects and commitments of methodological eclecticism visible and contestable, disputing the intuitively appealing idea that avoiding methodological dogmatism avoids or neutralizes political effects. My proposal is that doing so may embolden comparatists to pursue political projects even in the absence of clear methodological guidance – harnessing their mature eclectic pragmatism to political objectives which can be embraced or contested. But doing this requires a sharper sense for what it means to say that a professional discipline ‘participates in governance’ or ‘has a politics’.

The politics of contemporary comparative law

The apparent un-politics of today’s global regime results in large part from the fact that those who govern are not the people we normally think of as global governors – they are rarely politicians and only very rarely work for foreign ministries or international governmental agencies. Nor are they shadowy ‘capitalists’ plotting behind closed doors. The international world is largely governed by professional people exercising their expertise: by lawyers and economists, by political scientists and policy professionals, by engineers and business managers.

The most important impediment to appreciating the governing role of experts managing the background norms and institutions of global society is the widespread sense that their work is simply not political or contestable because they are experts, managers, pragmatic problem-solvers, technical people. The norms and institutions they manage lie in the background, their professional work involves advising, implementing or interpreting rather than deciding, their decisions seem compelled by their expertise, their expertise rarely takes the form we think of as the terms of political debate. Their vocabularies do not seem like the vocabularies of power – they seem like vocabularies of advice, implementation, technique, know-how.

To contest the politics of expert governance requires that we both identify the decisions these experts make and then associate them with the ideological positions and social interests we usually imagine when we think of contesting something ‘politically’. Contesting professional choices requires translation – from the key of knowledge to the key of power, from the vocabulary of expertise to the vocabularies of ideology and interest. A discipline like comparative law participates in global governance when people practising the discipline do things – decide things, place some and not other knowledge in play, argue in one way and not in another – which have consequences that can be associated either with the ideological positions in the broader society through which political debate happens or with social interests which we understand to be in political contestation. This process of translation can be relatively easy or more difficult.

When comparative work is put to use by non-comparatists in their more overtly political projects, it is usually rather easy to associate it with the ideological positions or social interests implicated in those projects. Once comparatists identify two types of legal regime – say regimes of ‘status’ and of ‘contract’ – we might well predict that someone else will make it their project to move from one to the other. If such a move can plausibly be thought to benefit ‘the left’ or ‘the right’, we can contest the comparatist’s contribution in these terms. Should comparative analysis reveal that the global hegemon has a different rule about a problem than whatever prevails locally, someone else – a hegemonic investor, a local politician, a business or labour group – will likely make adoption of the hegemonic approach their own political objective. It may be easy to see this new rule as benefiting one social interest over another and to contest it in those terms.

Associating the uses made of comparative work with ideology or interest can often be done even where the work itself is insistently neutral or agnostic. Indeed, claims to neutrality may simply enhance the effectiveness of the work and strengthen its association with politically contestable positions. If the European Union seeks to harmonize European private law and funds an inquiry into the existence of a common core of private law, it may not matter if the project discovers a core or not – if not, the work strengthens the impetus to legislate. Either way, the project’s self-conscious agnosticism about the desirability of uniform rules strengthens its authority and its contribution to the Union’s political project.

Once we depart from the use or application of comparative law, it becomes more difficult to translate it into politically contestable terms. In the most compelling case, we would identify effects of the comparative work and associate those effects with ideology or interest. The whole point of a knowledge project like comparative law is to affect what people know. If knowing this rather than that will strengthen one ideological position, legitimate or channel elite action to strengthen one social interest, we can contest the comparative work as an act of governance. It is easy to imagine comparative work having an effect on those who consume it, changing
their ideas about law and the world in some way which could affect what they do.

Sometimes, these effects arise because experts are pursuing a political agenda, either within the discretionary space offered by their professional vocabulary or by subverting its terms. In these cases, we could say the discipline has been captured by ideology or interest. Professionals may proclaim their ideological commitment and interest or they may keep them to themselves. In the easiest case, the expert says 'I do this for labour' and his action does help labour. Somewhat harder is the case where the expert says 'I do this for labour' and the decision misfires or has unexpected effects which hurt labour, or the expert was mistaken or dissembling about his intention. These cases will benefit from sociological attention to the effects, rather than the intention or expressed justification for professional judgement. They encourage us to take professional expressions of interest with a grain of salt. But government by expert makes these easy cases rare indeed. The vocabularies experts use to make and justify decisions are rarely vocabularies of interest or ideology.

Experts generally say something more like 'I do this as an exercise of professional judgement.' In these cases, we can simply ignore what the expert said and focus on the effects of their decisions. If we focus on effects and patterns emerge favourable to one or another interest or ideology, and we do not think the discipline has been 'captured', we will be inclined to think the effects result from the materials and methods of the discipline itself – perhaps from its default practices and background assumptions, perhaps from some bias in the vocabulary of professional judgement. The expert may not have been aware of the effects of his decision, much less of their association with ideology or interest. We might say that the discipline has a bias or blindspot which affects – even swamps – the discretion of professionals working in it.

We can also try to translate the professional vocabularies experts use to make decisions directly into the political vocabularies of ideology and interest. Sometimes, expert vocabularies give us clues to the ideological impact of their work, even where they eschew saying directly 'I do this for labour.' The vocabulary experts use for discussing their background assumptions and default practices – the vocabulary of method – may give us clues to the political biases of everyday professional practices. Sometimes, these methodological commitments offer quite reliable predictors for the political valence and impact of expert decision – think of 'strict interpretation' in debates about US constitutional interpretation. More often, however, it is difficult to associate methodological commitments with ideology or interest without investigating the impact of decisions in concrete cases. And, of course, not everything experts do by default will have given rise to overt methodological discussion. Sometimes, there are background assumptions shared across methodological lines of which professionals may be only partly conscious. Nevertheless, when assumptions and defaults are brought to the attention of the professional as methodological commitments, they sometimes can be associated with ideology or interest in ways which will make them seem political.

This can sometimes be done without reference to outcomes or effects. Imagine an expert saying 'I do this applying the blue method,' a method widely associated with the interests of labour but which it is impossible to demonstrate will generate decisions favouring labour in any determinate way. Imagine this particular 'blue-method' decision has consequences which are themselves difficult to associate with labour or that it has no identifiable consequences. There may even be cases 'applying the blue method' which were deeply harmful to labour and this might be such a case. It might nevertheless turn out that saying 'I do this applying the blue method' strengthens the position of labour-friendly rhetoric among elites or allows labour-friendly experts to identify and ally with one another, strengthening their position for other projects. Where this happens, we can associate the expression of methodological commitment with an ideology or interest even if the comparative work done using this method has no significant effects favouring that ideological position or interest.

Identifying the political stakes in expert work is most difficult where the expert says, in effect, 'I am not doing anything and I am not applying any method, but I thought you would like to know about this.' This posture makes it more difficult to identify the choices experts make – choices to make this known rather than that – and removes any clue in the expert's vocabulary to the ideological or interest impact of the decision. It makes it difficult to see the methodological expression as making an independent contribution to the rhetorical power of one or another ideology or interest among elites. Professionals who are proud of their neutral disengagement will often criticize one another's work for ideological or other bias. They work hard to pull one another back from application and use – to cleanse one another's projects of any clue to an association with interest or ideology. Their disengagement from ideology and interest is self-enforcing. This is
the posture exemplified by the post-war comparatist, making it particularly difficult to locate a contestable politics or participation in governance.

In this sense, it has become far more difficult to identify the politics of comparative law since the Second World War. Before the war, comparatists associated their own work with ideological positions, social interests and governance choices in ways which seemed plausible and which provided the basis for their participation in large-scale efforts of legal and political reform. Others pursuing related reform projects could recognize these comparatists as allies because they spoke a methodological language which translated easily into political terms. Pre-war comparatists pursued a wide range of projects in the broad methodological vocabulary of anti-formalism which was easy to associate with ideology and interest. They used the anti-formal vocabulary to express rebellion against what they saw as the mainstream of their profession and to express solidarity with broad reform efforts to make law more responsive to political reality, more attuned to social needs and interests, more modern, international and uniform. Sometimes, they expressed more specific political projects and affiliations — assist German commercial interests, defend US legal tradition against realist scepticism, transform the law in the French colonial sphere of influence.

The pre-war anti-formalist tradition had lots of pieces which had not yet been systematized into a series of choices to be made or avoided. And the vocabulary seemed compatible with — seemed even to express — a range of quite different political initiatives. We would need more sociological work to determine whether their ideas about the politics of comparative law were realistic. Did comparative work focusing on the needs of commerce actually benefit German commercial interests? Would comparative attention to legal ideals really strengthen the US democratic order in a time of crisis? Would replacement of legal forms by the voice of customary law provide the basis for more harmonious international life or advance the interests of social forces, labour and so forth? But comparatists were both confident that their anti-formalism would contribute to these political projects and willing to say so. After the war, the situation became far more complex. The anti-formal tradition had become mainstream and many of its internal ambivalences and ambiguities had been systematized as loosely homologous choices. Seen with post-war hindsight, pre-war anti-formalism seemed far more uniform politically — if diverse methodologically — than it had seemed to those who inhabited it. Post-war comparatists, having become eclectic and agnostic, also inhabited a vocabulary which supported a fluid range of political associations — but these associations had become far less easy to identify or contest.

Although post-war legal professionals in many other legal disciplines are more comfortable making 'policy' or contributing to 'governance' than comparatists, they share comparativism's eclecticism about method and historical relationship to the tradition of anti-formalism. The argumentative choices which structure analysis of similarities and differences among legal regimes have much in common with the routine arguments of many allied fields. 102 Although the comparatist's political disengagement is rather extreme, a sensibility which allies methodological pluralism and modesty about governance or detachment from ideological debates is quite common elsewhere. Understanding how to translate the work of post-war comparatists into a politically contestable vocabulary is suggestive for thinking about the politics of other legal fields which share this methodological history and broad sensibility.

My colleague Duncan Kennedy is developing a hypothesis about the history of legal method and doctrine over the last century and a half which might provide a basis for translating professional performances into more overt projects, contestable in ideological or interest terms. He identifies three quite different projects of legal 'globalization' within the lifetime of comparative law — 'classical legal thought' from 1850 to 1900, 'social legal thought' from 1900 to 1950 and 'policy/rights consciousness' from 1950 to 2000. Each period was characterized by an enormous collective effort to develop and spread a specific way of doing law and politics which combined ideas about law, priorities for legal and political work, methodological commitments for lawyers and legal scholars. 103 Moreover, each period saw the primary influence of a national legal system, German to French to US, and focused attention on a set of political priorities and concerns, from laissez-faire individualism through various social-welfare projects to global commerce, development and human rights.

102 My own work on public international law and international economic law turned up a strikingly similar set of argumentative choices with a similar history and sensibility. See David Kennedy, supra, note 18; id., 'The International Style in Postwar Law and Policy', [1994] Utah L.R. 7.
Comparative legal work has played a range of supporting roles in broad global endeavours of this kind – sorting targets of opportunity, conveying knowledge about the project from the centre to the periphery, legitimating its ideas about law, politics and the world. It is now clear that interwar comparatists played a significant role in spreading anti-formal and socially orientated ideas about law. A great deal of excellent work has already been done tracing the involvement of comparatists in these projects of the global legal intelligentsia. It is reasonable to imagine that their post-war successors participated in the development and spread of more eclectic, agnostic and pragmatic ideas about law and politics. But these post-war knowledge-projects are more difficult to translate into the languages of political contestation.

To do so, we must focus attention more firmly on default practices or deeply shared background assumptions than upon overt methodological commitments. Direct expression of ideological commitment or interest will be rare. We will need to be alert to the effects of broad ideas about how economies develop, about the relationship between public and private law, about the spatial arrangement of the globe’s cultural or economic centre and periphery, which we might learn to translate into politically contestable terms. We should attend to the persuasive burden this discipline shoulders for its disciplinary neighbours. Indeed, comparative law often supports projects of international lawyers which are easier to interpret in ideological or interest terms. And we should be alert to the role comparative law might play in the rise and fall of broad ideas – Keynesianism, socialism, neo-liberalism, planning, laissez-faire, etc. In a disaggregated political culture, the ebbs and flows of such ideas can affect decisions in widely dispersed places in ways which we might more easily understand in ideological or interest terms. And sometimes, the comparatist’s methodological vocabulary can provide the basis for expressing political sympathies and identifying allies even where these expressions are not turned into decisions whose effects can be associated with ideological positions or interests.

A quick general example will illustrate the potential – but also the difficulties – of identifying the politically contestable effects of background assumptions and defaults in post-war comparative work. In multijurisdictional big-firm practice, people often compare laws with a motive. Lawyers might compare insurance laws in twenty-five European countries to figure out where to base a new venture offering, say, direct-mail cross-border insurance services. (I once did such a study.) Unlike an academic comparative study of the same regimes, a study generated in law practice will focus on differences in the distributional consequences of various regimes – which ones are good for insurers, reinsurers, consumers, business clients and so forth. By contrast, academic comparatists talk about distributional effects like accidental tourists, as if to suggest ‘I do not myself care which way this goes’ or ‘I certainly have no stake’ in the distributional issue. Gone is the insistent tone used to assess whether a legal phenomenon is or is not part of a national culture, is or is not a solution to a general problem in late industrial capitalism, is or is not part of the legal fabric as the result of a transplant from elsewhere and so forth. This is a decision by the comparatist – to downplay distributional consequences in assessing similarities and differences among legal regimes, to investigate and highlight technical similarities or cultural differences. It could be otherwise – indeed, commercial lawyers do the opposite quite routinely.

To translate this decision into politically contestable terms we first need to identify its effects – perhaps its effects on the ideas people who consume comparative study have about law. Here are some hypotheses. Comparative work of this sort might contribute to ignorance about the distributional consequences of legal regimes. And it might turn out that a legal regime whose distributional effects remain unseen will be different and affect interests and ideological positions differently from one whose effects are more visible for contestation. It might be easier to export or import a legal regime which could seem to be managed without references to distributional consequences. The authority of regime managers might be strengthened by the perception that their work did not involve distributional choices. The particular types of law studied by comparatists, often private-law regimes, may come to seem particularly innocent of distribution. This idea might strengthen ideas about appropriate relations between the economy and the state and so forth.

And then we need to associate these effects plausibly with ideological positions or social interests which struggle with one another in our polity.
Much will depend on time and place. More overt attention to the distributional consequences of legal regimes by comparatists might make it easier for left-wing regulators to generate redistributive proposals—but this effect might be swamped by the knowledge now also in the hands of their opponents or by the delegitimation effect by attention to distribution on the status of the field as a whole. And so on. The work of translating knowledge projects into politically contestable terms will need to be done in very specific contextual terms.\footnote{For example, see Echigo’s investigation of the role played by comparatists in a variety of particular legal elites in Latin America in the second half of the twentieth century, supra note 104. Echigo contends that Latin American comparatists throughout the post-war period propounded an understanding of Latin American law as essentially ‘European’ and equated this cultural affinity with a relatively formal, and often quite specific, conception of law. In his analysis, this attitude about the ‘nature’ of the legal system came to be shared more widely among legal elites and had a series of identifiable political consequences. As he sees it, this conception strengthened the hands of those within particular elites who, at various times, sought to blunt North American inspired reforms, at first coming from the left and then from the right. At other times, it helped consolidate the hold of a nineteenth-century ‘liberal’ political elite in its resistance to locally inspired populist legislative and democratic reforms, keeping the same elite from feeling implicated in the public-law transformations wrought during periods of dictatorship and so on.}

It is often tempting to forgo inquiry into the context-specific effects of a discipline’s default practices or background assumptions and rely instead on the associations people in the field themselves make between their broad methodological commitments and ideological positions or social interests. Although eclectic agnosticism will make this difficult, it may still be possible from time to time. But it can be very misleading.

Inattention to distribution could be either an overt methodological commitment or something which somehow just keeps happening, the result of a blind spot in the dim reaches of professional consciousness, of character, of sensibility or professional training. Either way, once contested, the decision to background distribution would be brought forward to methodological consciousness. Now imagine that a ‘distributionist’ school emerges. Proponents of the school might defend distributionalismin political terms—perhaps as a progressive strategy to make left-wing legislative experiments more likely or to reset the field’s centrist balance by removing anti-progressive bias. But they could also do so in apolitical terms—as a scientific desire to ‘tell the whole story’. And the mainstream, now conscious of its inattention to distribution, might defend it as scientific neutrality. But they might also do so as centrist politics—or even as a bulwark against leftist efforts to make rent-seeking too prevalent in transnational regulatory projects. In reading this exchange, we might well be struck by the apolitical commitment of both sides. Or we might find the difference expressed in sharply ideological terms. Either way, we should be sceptical. The association of oneself or one’s opponent with an ideological position can represent a professional commitment and/or itself be a political strategy.

The associations post-war eclectics make between their routine practices and social interests or ideological positions are particularly likely to be misleading because post-war comparatists use methodological debates to signal political preferences to one another in ways which are cut off from any sense about consequences. It is as if, in taking their voms of disengagement, they also preserved a kind of shadow vocabulary for discussing their personal political preferences with one another. This signalling vocabulary is largely built from fragments of earlier methodological debates and is based on a memory that anti-formalism before the war had been associated with the left. As we have seen, this memory is inaccurate—anti-formalism was associated with a range of political initiatives. Nevertheless, the idea of pre-war left-wing anti-formalism survives as a kind of genetic political tag on the expression of methodological choices on the anti-formal end of all the choices within the post-war anti-formalist mainstream vocabulary. As post-war comparatists identify and analyse similarities and differences between legal regimes the choices they make seem coded more or less as in figure 11.12.

Figure 11.12
This sort of identification can be significant – if only because saying it is so can sometimes make it so. If comparatists with leftist sympathies use particular methodological arguments to recognize one another and to consolidate their positions within the field, and if the field then does become engaged in a political project, this language can become the vocabulary of their progressive gesture – even without a persuasive link between thinking about law in these terms and, say, redistributing income.

For post-war comparatists, however, these method fragments carry only a very light and tentative political charge. The new eclecticism encourages people with all sorts of different projects to pick among these methodological bits in an ad hoc way so that any given piece of comparative-law work will contain a range of method fragments, each of which will help neutralize the political charge of the others. It has also become easy to imagine a leftist argument in the language of universal/technical functionalism or a right-wing argument in the language of cultural identity. Moreover, agnosticism about political commitment and enthusiasm for disengagement have stilled the impulse to investigate the effects of comparative work in ways which could substantiate associations between any of these methodological choices and social interests or ideological positions.

Consequently, internal disciplinary discussions in this shadow vocabulary are far too vague and mushy to provide the basis for much common political engagement – or for reliable assessments on our part of the relations between comparative work and ideological positions or social interests. At the start of a comparative-law conference, I heard the participants getting to know one another by speaking very generally about their discipline in a way which seemed charged with political energy. But just what were these people communicating about their political character? The code has become so uncertain that I became increasingly suspect that they liked talking about their politics in terms which both announced and obscured their commitments. To give you an idea of what I mean, here is what I came up with after a couple of hours – perhaps you can rearrange these quotations more successfully:

Left:
‘attention to the losers’;
‘everyone has a standpoint’;
‘we can certainly learn from the subaltern – what we learn is critique, engagement’;

Right:
‘I’d like to contrast work which focuses on description, on analysis, from that which focuses on judgement’;
‘the aim should be a description without an agenda’;
‘you can only really judge where you are from yourself – so not in comparative work’;
‘the story of progress to modernization remains the central story for comparative law’;
‘To me, colonialism is interesting as history, but otherwise only if we can generalize from it in some way’;
‘best practices can only be identified if we understand the efficiencies’;
‘there is an inner world of differences and an external world of similarities – communication and understanding are about similarities, coherences’;
‘functionalism’.

I am sure I got code quite off – but I bet they did too. Moreover, it seems unlikely that the consequences of adopting these methodological commitments could be associated with ideological positions with enough plausibility to provide much guidance about the discipline’s participation in the work of rulership or governance. Let us take one which is rather clear: ‘attention to the loser’. That does signal ‘left’ (maybe ‘left fuzziness’) in today’s academy, but it does not seem at all clear that
comparative-law work which either repeated this phrase a lot or described legal phenomena with extreme sensitivity to the viewpoint of the loser could be said to participate in governance as a leftist — to be a left political act, as it were. That would totally depend on who read it and what they did with it. For all we know, it could end up identifying targets for winners.\textsuperscript{107}

Of course, even post-war eclectics also do sometimes discuss the effect they hope their work will have in terms we should be able to associate with political interests or ideological positions. These tend to be private backroom conversations, strategic assessments which range from furtive to bumptious and from cynical to idealistic. At a recent meeting of comparatists involved in the common-core project, many were willing to speak to me between sessions in terms which contrasted sharply with the agnosticism of Bussani’s description and with the eclectic restraint of the actual work they were producing. Restricted to background conversation, these political strategies remained vague and untested, their fantastic, almost magic realist tone conflicting sharply with the modest restraint of the comparative work itself.

For some, the project would spread legal anti-formalism and ideas about ‘legal formants’ to other areas of legal thought — on the view that this would be a more significant (maybe leftist?) political intervention than anything which might come from any increase in either harmonization or differentiation. Others thought people in those other fields, once contaminated by anti-formalist thinking, would experience a Brechtian moment of alienation from the naturalization of their own working assumptions, wake up and join the vanguard. Well, maybe. Or perhaps the project would give academics access to a process of law reform which would otherwise be handled by technocrats in Brussels, in the hopes that this would make it more...progressive or humanist or who knows. Perhaps the agnostic self-presentation will tip the balance back from a pro-unification agenda and

\textsuperscript{107} At another point, we were discussing 'the state' and whether it was an important way of defining the 'regimes' whose legal phenomena would be compared. Someone asked what we meant by 'the state' and it immediately emerged that for some the key idea, or moment of state creation, was the consolidation of force across a territory in the criminal law, for others the consolidation of boundary control, for others the consolidation of administration, for others the consolidation of the welfare state, for others the consolidation of Keynesian monetary policy. Each of these seemed to signal a political affinity, though I must say I found this code even more obscure. An exercise to try at home: figure out which signals left, which right, which centre.

should be understood, in that sense, to be an anti-federal intervention. Or maybe the idea is to train students working on the common-core project in a mode of scholarship (attentive to all possible conflicting legal formants) which, when used by them in law firms, will have some good political effect, sharpening their critical impulses precisely by modelling how to eschew the critical. All expressed confidence that a known law would be more reasonable and democratic than an obscure and local law — that obscurantism is the totalitarian devil’s plaything.

The interesting point is that these assertions and motives remain beneath the surface, hunches, private hopes — despite the fact that they would often make excellent hypotheses for comparative study. Does it turn out that obscurantism lines up with extremism and totalitarianism, clarity about rules with calm and centred democracy? It sounds possible, but we can quickly think of counter-examples, different interpretations of the relationship between democracy and the mystical, reason and fascism. The puzzle is the hesitation to speak about these possible political projects concretely enough to assess their plausibility.

To identify and assess the politics of an agnostic project like the common core, we need better hypotheses about the possible effects of this kind of work. Where these effects seem plausible and can be associated with ideological choices or social interests we might then contest them. We might develop hypotheses about individual comparative-law projects in particular contexts, about the effects of the field’s routine default practices or background assumptions on the thinking of elites who consume comparative legal work and about the role of the comparative-law profession itself in the broader intellectual division of labour and the distribution of comparative legal services.

\textbf{The projects of individuals and groups in the comparative discipline}

Sometimes, of course, comparatists do work intended to have effects which are easy to interpret in political terms. One might compare capital punishment regimes to find out how to make one work more effectively, just as one might do so to assess their different effects on minority communities. The projects of pre-war comparatists were easier to identify and more attention to their effects would give us a better sense for their politics. Amr Shalakany’s study of the work of Lambert and his Egyptian student Sanhouri seeking simultaneously to modernize, Islamicize and socialize Egyptian law
provides a model for understanding the politics of such an effort. But post-war comparatists also sometimes contribute directly to projects whose politics we can assess and might contest.

Many comparatists have helped build the international private-law regime – staffing institutions to restate and reform private-law rules, elaborating a scholarly consensus on the most reasonable or workable rules for international commerce, building institutions to resolve disputes through arbitration, advising legislators in the periphery on how such matters are handled in the most advanced economies or advising at the centre on the applicability of common commercial rules in peripheral settings. Sometimes, it is easy to associate the regime which results with ideological positions and interests, even if it is not overtly biased in one or another direction. The participation of agnostic and eclectic comparatists in the elaboration of the private-law regime strengthens the claim that it reduces the ‘risks’ associated with national politics and regulatory distortion by eliminating politics altogether from the law governing international commercial transactions. The particular rules which emerge from comparative harmonizations may well be stripped of their exceptions or formalized in ways which will seem to favour some interests over others.

Generally, however, the reform projects of post-war comparatists are altogether less visible than this. In one model effort to identify the politics of such a project, Robert Wai analyses the widespread effort of Canadian judges to transform Canadian private-law and conflict of laws rules to align Canadian law with what they saw, after careful comparative study, to be the needs of ‘internationalism’ or ‘globalization’. It is easy to understand how such a project could emerge and how acknowledging it openly could seem to erode its power or break its magic. Were Canadian judges to have proposed changes in the private-law rules by reference to the interests and ideologies which would be enhanced by their adoption, rather than in the language of deference to ‘internationalism’ and the findings of comparative study, the rules and the effects might well have been different.

In my experience, eclectic post-war comparatists often find themselves doing work which they have an intuitive or semi-conscious sense will be part of a project one might understand in ideological or interest terms. Imagine that you work for a United Nations agency developing a training programme to provide technical assistance to government staff from developing countries who will soon participate in a round of GATT negotiations. You teach negotiating skills, assertiveness training, procedural rules. You may well have an agenda in providing this training – some combination of strengthening their hand for the negotiation to come and assimilating their countries to the institutional structure of the free-trade regime. Under the new rubric of ‘transparency’, GATT negotiations promote awareness of the domestic legislation affecting trade in each state party. Your students’ governments will need to make their legislation available. But what legislation ‘affects’ trade and what will the strong players be looking for? You commission and present a comparative study of legislation in other developing nations which participate in GATT. You know that your presentation will send two messages – how to comply with GATT by removing obvious subsidies and barriers to trade and how to hide an industrial policy in a newly transparent world. How these two messages are weighted and taken up by your students may affect the range of regulatory objectives they feel able to pursue. It may be quite easy to anticipate the distributional effects of maintaining different regulatory laws on different social interests. The choices you make in putting the comparative presentation together will influence the message which your students learn and will make them feel empowered to maintain some, but not other, regulatory initiatives.

The effects of shared knowledge practices: what are the legal regimes?

If we revisit the choices post-war comparatists make as they analyse similarities and differences among legal regimes, we will often be able to identify default choices and background assumptions which we can interpret in political terms. The first step was to identify two (or more) legal regimes which are different enough to merit a comparison of legal phenomena found
within them. Both how this is done and the fact that it is done may have contestable effects. Imagine that comparatists’ default choices reinforced the idea that differences between African and European law were more salient than differences among legal regimes within Africa or within Europe. There might be an underlying idea here that African law is more primitive or more communal. ‘Knowing’ this might change how some elites – in Africa, in Europe, elsewhere – evaluate specific legal reforms. Europeans might be convinced to export simplified or stripped-down legal formula which would have different distributional consequences than the more complex regimes they also know. African elites might be strengthened in their resistance – or in their assimilation. People in and outside Africa might invoke the ‘African example’ when debating communitarian legal schemes and find their proposals accredited or discredited by the association.

The eclectic practice of identifying legal regimes in both cultural and technical terms strengthens the idea that legal regimes both float freely from their context, and communicate with one another, while also somehow remaining connected to political and social history. Identifying legal regimes to compare bears witness to the quasi-autonomy of law. ‘Knowing’ this may strengthen the hand of those pursuing more concrete governance projects – perhaps nationalist projects to root law more firmly in culture and perhaps cosmopolitan projects to loosen the grip of culture in the name of international understanding and tolerance. Separating legal regimes for comparison strengthens the idea that differences signal local cultural roots, similarities an affiliation with the foreign, the international or the universal. Knowing this channels expression of elite impulses to national self-determination or international cooperation. This comparative witness can affect the choices professionals in neighbouring disciplines make. In building a public international law regime, international lawyers under comparative tutelage may become more committed to doctrines marking jurisdictional limits along the territorial lines between states or treating differently things which happen within a territory, things which pass between two territories and things which happen ‘above’ or ‘outside’ the territorial plane altogether.

The default tendency to identify and differentiate legal regimes in loosely national terms might make some governance projects seem more or less legitimate. Reassured about the coherence and identity of legal regimes,

a governing elite – national or international – might be more or less willing to ‘intervene’ from one ‘into’ another. The map of ‘similar’ and ‘different’ might mark natural areas for legitimate and illegitimate intervention. To assess these political effects, we would need to understand better whether an elite metabolized ‘difference’ as an excuse to stay home or seek conquest, or whether they saw it as natural to ally with those who were the same or different. Annelise Riles provides a suggestive model for this exploration in her study of the quite different ideas nineteenth-century British international lawyers had of ‘culture’ in Europe, where it promised communication, and in Africa, where it legitimated control.112

Imagine that instead of defaulting to national regimes, comparatists separated legal regimes governing different industries across national lines – comparing at will employment or good-faith contracting in the ‘pharmaceutical legal regime’ with the same phenomena in the ‘automotive legal regime’. As elites learned from these new comparatists, we can imagine their sense of possible political initiatives changing in ways it would be hard, but not impossible, to predict. Take a decision by General Motors to require ISO 9000 quality standards in all contracts wherever it does business which sparks a global transformation of quality-control management, first in the automotive industry and then more broadly.113 Should we celebrate or worry about the extension of US law to Thailand or Automotive law to Textiles? Re-mapping the legal world in industrial terms might make the initiatives of non-state actors – whether shareholders or protestors – seem more or less legitimate. Elites might be more inclined to think of income differences within the ‘automotive’ regime as they now think of differences within Brazil or the United States and differences between income distributions in ‘automotive’ and ‘textile’ regimes like those between countries.

The idea that knowledge professionals contribute to various imperial and neo-colonial projects when they strengthen stereotypes about the east and the west, the north and the south, the modern and the primitive, the familiar and the exotic and so forth has become familiar. Most eclectic comparatists

111 In his contribution to this book, Patrick Glenn stresses the irony that comparativism has reinforced the idea that legal heritages are national.


avoid charges of ‘orientalism’ by avoiding ‘normative’ interpretations of the differences between legal regimes and by describing similarities and differences in complex ways which avoid simple contrasts between east and west or north and south. But the default practices of this post-orientalist practice – distinguishing regimes in loose cultural ‘families’ and economic ‘stages’ of development – may also reinforce elite notions about natural affinities and differences in ways which affect policy-making. It is easy to imagine, for example, that elites will think differently about efforts to link Israeli and Egyptian law if they see these two regimes as ‘European/late industrial capitalism’ and ‘Islamic-traditional/underdevelopment’ rather than as two ‘post-colonial/developing’ legal regimes. Assisted by comparative-law study, European elites understand relations among European Union Member States in terms of ‘cohesion’ or ‘subsidiarity’ and relations with central European countries in terms of ‘preparing’ less well developed nations to ‘catch up’. Knowing this affects both the way they shape internal regulatory systems and the way they relate to the international trade system. This interpretive frame makes Greece and Denmark seem more similar than they otherwise might appear, Austria and Slovenia more different.

Dividing legal regimes for comparison in this way can also make it seem evident that the question for ‘other’ societies is whether and how to modernize and westernize. ‘Knowing’ this may strengthen or weaken the hands of some elites – ‘modernizers’ perhaps – against others. Imagine a small ‘transitional’ central European regime when the post-orientalist comparatists come to town with the precise intention of explaining the rich diversity within the European/Modern Capitalist tradition. They come not to dominate, but to empowering by pointing out the range of choices available. And they may well – but they also bring the message that there is such a thing as legal modernity. However, in the modernization of legal culture in one of these ways is what it means to transit the transition. When this happens, the agnostic comparatist has participated in governance – delivered a message whose effects we can associate with ideological positions and social interests. The comparatist offers lenses through which the centre can know itself and interpret the periphery, the global can know itself by contrast to the local, and lenses through which the periphery and the local can express their identity and understand the centre. The impact

of this work might be felt in the self-confidence and strategy of both the international policy class and culturally remote elites.

The effects of shared knowledge practices: what are the legal phenomena?

As in the identification of legal regimes, both how legal phenomena are identified for comparison and the fact that they are identified at all in comparative terms may have effects. The phenomena comparatists select for comparison affect what the elite knows. If comparatists spend lots of time on financial regulations and little time studying family law, this may encourage an elite to think of financial regulations in comparative terms and family law in local terms. This may affect the choices these elites make among doctrinal alternatives in each of these fields. Knowing how foreign legal systems manage health care, not how they regulate sports, how they deal with intellectual property, but very little about what they do with real property, lots about comparative private law but very little about public law, may influence the range of regulatory options elites consider or the strength of their attachment to some, but not other, local laws. Preferences of this type are often easy to associate with ideological commitments or the interests of different social groups.

In selecting phenomena suitable for comparison, the comparatist also bears witness to the ‘fact’ of law’s quasi-autonomy. Legal regimes are made up of rules, institutions, practices which are instances of something more general also found in other legal regimes. For eclectic comparatists, it is neither all transplants nor incomparable difference. Legal phenomena in different regimes ‘are’ similar enough – and different enough – to make comparison worthwhile. In some places, knowing this may strengthen elites proposing technical reform or cultural modernization. Or it may help justify distributions affected by legal rules by placing their origin somewhere outside politics and culture. Or it may make it seem more plausible for judges to fill gaps in legislation without themselves legislating. Knowing that law is quasi-autonomous may make the import of harmonized legal rules seem more palatable by making them seem the product of technical necessity, cultural influence or accidental professional borrowing rather than political contestation.

Like other legal knowledge-makers, comparatists develop and reinforce a typology of legal phenomena. As they distinguish legal phenomena for comparison, they allocate this to divorce, that to contract, this to dispute

resolution and so forth. When elites learn the default typologies which emerge, they will have their imagination about regulatory initiatives and reforms channelled in particular ways. Those seeking to improve the status of women may find their imagination limited to the category of law about women – especially if that category has a transcultural force. This sort of effect may occur even where the comparatist compared precisely in order to open up imagination about how a divorce regime might be structured.

The default typologies in comparative work routinely reinforce the idea that public and private law are different – essentially, technologically, transculturally – in ways which are not a function of local culture, politics or legal history. Public law is hierarchical, constitutional, procedural, disciplinary, political, distributional and linked very closely with regime identity. Private law is horizontal, consensual, produced by individuals, about problem-solving and economic efficiency, relatively apolitical and only loosely linked with regime identity. These differentiations reinforce the idea that the work of governments and the work of markets are different. Markets make themselves, while governments need to be constructed. Governments originate in mystical historical moments of constitutionalization, markets emerge from numerous pragmatic decisions by individual market actors and so forth.

The default typologies comparatists use to identify legal phenomena for comparison also shape what elites think can appropriately be placed in one or another category. When comparatists work with public law, they represent it to lie closer to cultural and historical developments than private law. And they identify elements within public law for comparison in ways which highlight procedural and technical aspects of a constitutional order. It makes sense to compare a phenomenon like ‘constitutional adjudication’ or ‘judicial review’ in different national western legal systems, say, Austrian, Italian and US. The comparison might sensibly focus on the presence and powers of the constitutional court in each system. Differences which emerge might be attributed to national culture and history or we might compare them in philosophical terms – which is more Kantian, more Rawlsian, more in tune with Montesquieu.

These defaults can affect how elites think about constitutional choices. Imagine the authors of a comparative study of constitutional courts describing their work in an eastern European capital in the period of transition and constitutional reform. Our authors are eclectic, agnostic, they come not to influence, but to inform. They have been careful not to express preferences among the regimes, nor to privilege either cultural or technical modes of evaluation in their report. Like their colleagues bringing a comparison of intellectual property regimes, they will bring a message about what it means to be modern and the direction of the transition. But more concretely, they will clarify options for members of an eastern European elite. Perhaps the east European consumers of this comparative performance have long preferred John Rawls to Kant or felt more culturally attuned to Austria than Italy. Perhaps they feel priority should be given the legislature or that the regions should dominate the centre. On all these points, the study will be helpful. But let us say someone represents the farmers’ party or wants to know which system will best preserve the power of the ex-nomenklatura, be most favourable to women or be most likely to get the country into the European Union fast. He or she will have to infer, reason back from what is manifest in the study and perhaps come to understand that this is not really an appropriate way to think about constitutional reform. The comparatist’s default typology for legal phenomena has reinforced the invisibility of some political considerations while foregrounding others for contestation.

The effects of shared knowledge practices: comparing phenomena across regimes

The default choices post-war comparatists make as they identify similarities and differences among legal phenomena for comparison can also have effects we might associate with ideological positions or social interests. By foregrounding the transplantation of similarities and underemphasizing the role of influence in establishing differences, comparatists reinforce the idea that differences should be thought of as aspects of tradition, culture, history. This can make local strategies of resistance and misreading seem more rooted in tradition, culture and history than efforts at assimilation. Comparatists can strengthen the idea that differentiation is naturally a matter of struggle, linked to culture and history, while assimilation is a more benign process, linked to technical alignment with best practice and economic

116 For an excellent study of the process by which the distributional allocations between men and women lost visibility in the legal reforms which accompanied the east central European transition, see Rittich, Recharacterizing, supra, note 108.
development. All these differences can change the balance of authority or legitimacy felt by different elements in a national elite.

The distinction between cultural and technical dimensions of legal regimes which lies at the heart of the post-war comparative endeavour can also have effects. Knowing that legal regimes can be broken down in this way strengthens international legal regimes whose legitimacy is based on the claim that there is a relatively technical domain in which they can exercise authority without disturbing local culture. Default ideas about what counts as technical and what as cultural – treating the economy as technical, the family as cultural – can also influence the distribution of governmental regulatory attention. Associating a group or activity (women, the religious, children, the educational) with ‘the cultural’ changes the legitimacy of political measures which affect it. International regulators propose far more dramatic interventions to deal with balance of payments problems, environmental damage or agricultural development, than they do when they think of themselves regulating the status of women or religion – even when it can clearly be predicted that the more technical intervention will, in fact, have a more intense impact on the lives of women or on the incidence of religious belief in society.

In a more general way, moreover, the default associations of cultural and technical with irrational and rational, mystical and instrumental, local and global, social connection or meaning and economic function, all influence the relative legitimacy of elite projects. Elites might feel quite differently about regulatory initiatives were they to understand global governance as ‘cultural’ and local initiatives as ‘technical’. The association of culture with location makes it seem less legitimate to ‘intervene’ in far-away places without a good reason. Knowing that a divorce regime is part of such a thing as ‘Japanese legal culture’ makes it seem less legitimate to argue that ‘the French system is just better’ and makes arguments about ‘women’s rights’ seem automatically to be about foreign cultural intervention. We might see this as an anti-imperialist bias in comparative work, despite the apparent agnosticism about whether difference or similarity is to be desired.

**Being a discipline in the intellectual class**

Comparativists differ in the ambitions they have for their profession. Some urge the profession to commit itself methodologically in ways we are urged to interpret in ideological or interest terms. In this book, Upenendra Baxi urges us to adopt a stance of empathy with those who have little, who have been marginal or losers in one or another way. But simply being – and being seen to be – a profession may also have political effects, if only as the size and prestige of the profession multiplies the effects of comparative work. Moreover, the effects of comparative work will vary with the distribution of comparative capacity.

Imagine that you work for an international agency aiding countries making the transition from socialism to capitalism. The agency sponsors legal reforms which introduce at least legislative simulacra for the legal institutions of a ‘market society’. Let us say you promised your board or parliament that you would produce a market in mortgage-backed securities in a given recipient country and they gave you a lot of money to do so. You spent the money moving the legislation which seemed necessary for a market in mortgage-backed securities through the local political process. Then there is a snag. In the recipient country, it turns out that the name of any person with a security interest in a mortgage, even a secondary one, must be registered, making it impossible for bonds secured by mortgages to change hands fluidly. You came up with a technical solution and sold it to the locals with an interest in getting the necessary legislation off the ground – appoint a representative of the bondholder class and register his name. Your favourite ministry supports this idea, but the ministry of justice has not certified this to be in compliance with the local law and has not yet been willing to register representative members of a class. You are not sure why perhaps someone in the justice ministry is attached to the principle of registration, perhaps no one seriously thinks there will soon be a market in mortgage-backed bonds, perhaps this technical question has become symbolically part of other political machinations between ministries, between forces in the government favourable and hostile to ‘opening’ the economy.

You could apply political and economic pressure, try to influence the internal balance of power between the various ministries, hold up payment of the next aid package. And you might commission a study of how this ‘problem’ is handled in an array of countries which share, let us say, the ‘civil-law’ culture of the aid recipient but which do have secondary-mortgage bond markets. The existence of a profession which can transform this sort of political problem into a description of technical solutions to a problem common in different cultures – or different technical solutions within the same legal family – may affect the relative strength of participants in the debate, even if the report is never completed. The influence may be more
pronounced if access to comparative study is differentially distributed, more available, say, to the 'haves' than the 'have-nots'.

Moreover, like other disciplines, comparative law is a tiny life-world of its own, within which resources, honours and opportunities are distributed in various ways. The consolidation of methodologies, the availability of funding, the projects of individuals in the field – both their own will to power in the profession and their projects in the broader establishment – will affect the distribution of resources among members of the profession. This process is, if in a small world, also a project of governance, a form of politics. We can often associate gains and losses in this small world with broader ideological positions or social interests; and the politics of this small world can affect other elites. Small victories can alter the broader balance of power among forces within the larger elite.

Putting all these hypotheses together, it is striking how little we know about the politics of comparative law and how difficult it is to translate the work of eclectic post-war professionals into politically contestable terms. It is not hard to imagine that knowing one thing rather than another might affect what rulers do, but we are not accustomed to translating knowledge work into political work. Post-war comparative law has successfully insulated itself from the taint of association with the choices of political life. All we have are hypotheses, directions, hints for rendering its eclectic and agnostic surface in the politically contestable terms of ideological commitment and social interest. By following these leads, we might nurture the habit of reading professional judgements as political acts. Imagine each comparative-law project coming with an ideological and interest 'impact statement', articulating the effects that knowing this, rather than something else, might have on the distribution of ideas and things in the world. Become a habit, this heuristic might heighten the comparatist's experience of himself as a ruler. Whether they seemed compelled by expertise or open to eclectic discretion, the quotidian choices professionals make would routinely be understood to have politically contestable consequences and to be part of the fabric of global governance.

And why, might you ask, should we do this? Surely there is also a politics to making known the politics of the profession – to translating our knowledge vocabularies into vocabularies of political contestation. Post-war comparative law is animated by a powerful urge to know. Bussani, speaking of the European common-core project, puts it this way: