Monopolization doctrine currently uses vacuous standards and conclusory labels that provide no meaningful guidance about which conduct will be condemned as exclusionary. This problem is not solved by proposals to focus on whether the defendant sacrificed short-term profits in order to reap long-run monopoly returns by excluding rivals. Such proposals either implicitly exclude profits that were acquired undesirably—and thus give no meaningful guidance since they leave undefined the criteria for desirability—or include all actual profits—which provides guidance at the cost of condemning highly desirable conduct and failing to condemn highly undesirable conduct. The proper monopolization standard should instead focus on whether the alleged exclusionary conduct succeeds in furthering monopoly power (1) only if the monopolist has improved its own efficiency or (2) by impairing rival efficiency whether or not it enhances monopolist efficiency. Under this standard, which would permit the former conduct and prohibit the latter, a defendant that has increased its own efficiency by investing in its intellectual or physical property should not have a duty to share that property with rivals, but has no privilege to discriminate by offering worse terms to rivals or those who deal with rivals. Such discrimination on the basis of rivalry is not necessary to support optimal ex ante investment incentives, and its success may thus depend not on increasing the value of the property and the efficiency of the monopolist but rather on selectively impairing the efficiency of rivals. Currently vague standards for defining monopoly power can also be improved by realizing that, because monopoly power must be causally connected to exclusionary conduct: (a) the discretionary power that matters is not just a firm's power over its own prices but also a power to influence marketwide prices or impose significant marketwide foreclosure that

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impairs rival efficiency, and (b) courts demand proof of high market shares not because they provide a more administrable proxy for discretionary power but because shares have independent economic significance in assessing the causal connection. These improved standards for judging exclusionary conduct and monopoly power would not only provide more coherent guidance for lower courts and juries, but better fit and explain the actual pattern of Supreme Court case results.

INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................... 255
I. THE PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT DOCTRINAL STANDARDS.............................................. 257
   A. The Monopoly Power Element............................................................... 257
   B. The Bad Conduct Element................................................................. 261
II. THE PROBLEMS WITH FOCUSING ON WHETHER THE CONDUCT SACRIFICED PROFITS.......................................................... 268
   A. Lack of Fit with the Predatory Pricing Doctrine Being Generalized ........ 272
   B. Sacrificing Short-Run Profits to Drive Out Rivals and Reap Long-Run Monopoly Profits Is Normally Good .............................................................. 274
   C. Sacrificing Profits Is Not Necessary for Undesirable Exclusionary Conduct Either ........................................................................................................ 274
      1. Horizontal conspiracies, extramarket activities, and tortious conduct. .... 280
      2. Nontortious unilateral market conduct and the single monopoly profit myth. ........................................................................................................ 280
   D. Conclusion............................................................................................... 292
III. RESOLVING BASELINE PROBLEMS WITH PREVAILING EFFICIENCY INQUIRIES, 294
   A. Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Efficiencies ............................................................. 295
      1. Ex ante efficiencies and their relation to property rights. ..................... 295
      2. The contrast with Schumpeter’s ex post efficiency claim about monopoly power. ............................................................................................ 298
      3. Problems with the case-by-case approach of restricting property rights when they are deemed not to create significant incentives to innovate .......... 300
      4. Sorting out ex ante and ex post efficiency claims: Why proving discrimination on the basis of rivalry is necessary (but not sufficient). .......... 305
   B. Whether Conduct Succeeds by Enhancing Monopolist Efficiency or by Worsening Rival Efficiency .............................................................. 315
      1. Conduct that succeeds by improving the monopolist’s own efficiency. ..... 316
      2. Conduct that succeeds by impairing rival efficiency. .............................. 320
      3. Conclusion .............................................................................................. 330
IV. THE CAUSAL LINK TO MONOPOLY POWER ................................................................. 330
   A. The Causal Connection to Marketwide Effects ..................................... 331
   B. The Economic Relevance of Market Share .......................................... 334
   C. Enhancing Monopoly Power Versus Slowing Its Decline ...................... 337
   D. The Irrelevance of Buyer Acceptance, Initiation, or Terminability ........ 339
CONCLUSION...................................................................................................................... 342
INTRODUCTION

We’ve all gotten used to a little vagueness in law. Sometimes you just can’t foresee or account for the full complexity of life, and, when that is so, the best the law can do is define some general guidelines for courts and juries to apply to particular facts. But for decades monopolization doctrine has been governed by standards that are not just vague but vacuous.

Vague standards might be uncertain around the edges as applied to tough facts, but at least offer genuinely guiding normative principles. We may not be able to define precisely how many hairs one needs to lose before one turns bald, but we all understand the general concept of baldness and what moves one closer or further from that state. Vacuous standards, in contrast, are utterly conclusory, failing to identify a coherent norm that provides any real help in distinguishing bad behavior from good or even in knowing which way certain factual conclusions cut. That is the sad state in which current monopolization doctrine finds itself, employing conclusory labels that offer little insight into which forms of conduct should and should not be deemed undesirable or illegal.

Current proposals by academics and enforcement officials to rectify the problem focus on redefining monopolization in terms of whether the defendant sacrificed short-term profits in order to reap long-run monopoly returns by excluding rivals. But this profit-sacrifice test only replicates the underlying problem in another form, for whether or not short-run profits were sacrificed in this way turns out to have no logical connection to whether the conduct was undesirable. To the contrary, sacrificing short-run profits to exclude rivals typically reflects socially desirable investments, and undesirable conduct that excludes rivals normally requires no sacrifice of short-run profits. Nor does a profit-sacrifice test explain the pattern of cases that have been held illegal by current precedent. Delayed gratification is not an antitrust offense, nor is it necessary for committing one. One can attempt to salvage these proposals by focusing not on the timing of actual profits, but on whether the activity would ever be profitable once undesirable profits are excluded. But then the test begs the key question, which is defining when profiting from the exclusion of rivals is desirable.

Other doctrinal strands seem to focus on the efficiency of the relevant conduct. This helpfully begins to point us in the right direction, but has so far failed to grapple with two important baseline problems. First, conduct that is inefficient ex post to a firm’s investment in creating, enhancing, or maintaining the sort of intellectual or physical property that is valuable enough to confer monopoly power is often efficient when viewed ex ante. Second, in many cases the sorts of efficiencies cited by defendants—such as economies of scale or network effects—can be achieved only by denying those same efficiencies to rivals. Failure to grapple with these two baseline issues turns out often to be
functionally equivalent to focusing wrongly on whether short-term profits were sacrificed.

I will advocate that the proper monopolization standard should focus on whether the alleged exclusionary conduct succeeds in furthering monopoly power (1) only if the monopolist has improved its own efficiency or (2) by impairing rival efficiency whether or not it enhances monopolist efficiency. Where the defendant has improved its own efficiency in order to make a better or cheaper product, it should be free to sell that product at any above-cost price it wants, even though that may shrink rival market share to a size that leaves rivals less efficient. The key is that this conduct can successfully impair rival efficiency only as a byproduct of the defendant improving its own efficiency, which enhances the market options available to consumers. Similarly, when a defendant has increased its own efficiency by investing in its intellectual or physical property, a refusal to share that property with rivals should generally be legal because it rewards the improvement in the defendant’s efficiency in a way necessary to maintain ex ante incentives for investment. The one exception is when the defendant discriminates by refusing to do business with rivals—or those who deal with rivals—on the same terms as the defendant does business with other outsiders. Such discrimination on the basis of rivalry is not necessary to support optimal ex ante investment incentives, and its success thus may not depend on increasing the value of the property and the efficiency of the monopolist, but on selectively impairing the efficiency of rivals. While not sufficient to establish monopolization since ex post efficiencies are also relevant, proving discrimination on the basis of rivalry should be necessary where the claim is a refusal to deal or the imposition of conditions on dealing.

Exclusionary conduct should be illegal if it would further monopoly power by impairing the efficiency of rivals even if the defendant did not successfully enhance its own efficiency. Pricing below cost, for example, seeks to reap sales beyond those earned by a monopolist’s successful efforts to make itself more efficient, and can thus divert sales from rivals in a way that impairs rival efficiency even if the defendant never made itself more efficient than its rivals. Likewise, exclusionary conditions that discriminate against rivals (or those who deal with them) can foreclose resources, suppliers, or outlets in a way that impairs the efficiency of rivals by denying them economies of scale, scope, learning, or network effects. Although such conditions might also help the defendant secure similar “economies of share,” allowing that sort of efficiency defense turns out to be conceptually identical (for any defendant with a market share over 50%) to the commonly rejected claim that a monopolist can defend its conduct by showing that the industry is a natural monopoly. Further, in such cases achieving those efficiencies by internal expansion will generally be a less restrictive alternative to achieving them with exclusionary conditions. Thus, rather than requiring antitrust courts and juries to engage in open-ended balancing in such cases, such exclusionary conduct should be illegal because it
would successfully enhance monopoly power by impairing the efficiency of rivals, whether or not it enhanced the monopolist’s efficiency.

While existing doctrinal standards on monopoly power cannot be said to be vacuous, they do create unnecessary vagueness because they have difficulty dealing with the ubiquitous pricing discretion of firms in modern brand-differentiated markets, rely on vague references to a “substantial” degree of a market power that itself only exists when substantial, and exhibit an underlying split over whether pricing discretion or market share is the underlying variable whose substantiability matters. I will show that proper economic analysis of how to judge the exclusionary conduct that must be causally connected to that monopoly power explains why monopoly power requires showing both (a) a market share above 50% and (b) an ability to either influence marketwide prices or impose significant marketwide foreclosure that impairs rival efficiency.

I will further argue that these proposed standards would not only provide a more coherent and desirable standard for guiding lower courts and juries but also better explain the actual pattern of Supreme Court case results. But to consider all these issues, we first need to understand the nature of the problems with our current doctrinal standards.

I. THE PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT DOCTRINAL STANDARDS

Our current problems start at the top. The fundamental standard, articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Grinnell, is:

The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.1

This standard has been reaffirmed by the Court in recent decades.2 Yet both elements suffer from an uncertainty that is as extensive as it is unnecessary.

A. The Monopoly Power Element

The Court defines “monopoly power” as “the power to control prices or exclude competition.”3 This definition raises a problem because the standard economic definition of any “market power” is a power to raise prices over the

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competitive level. Given this, doesn’t all market power necessarily give a defendant “control” over its prices and thus make it a monopolist? Apparently not, because the Court has stressed: “Monopoly power under § 2 requires, of course, something greater than market power under § 1.” But then, just what is the difference?

To an economist, the distinction is theoretically puzzling: A firm either enjoys a downward-sloping demand curve or it doesn’t. But courts and regulators sensibly recoil from that conclusion because it would make antitrust far too sweeping given that, in our brand-differentiated world, just about every producer has a brand name that enables it to enjoy a downward-sloping demand curve and thus has some pricing discretion. This is a problem that has only gotten worse over time, as we have moved from an economy that tends to focus on mass-produced, homogeneous commodities to an economy that focuses on providing not only brand-differentiated products but services and experiences that inevitably enjoy some pricing discretion. Likewise, the price discrimination normally taken to evidence market power is so ubiquitous that it would indicate market power exists everywhere. The logical purity of the economist’s test thus must be rejected, for it would disable the monopoly power element from serving its intended function of limiting antitrust challenges against unilateral conduct to a subset of cases where the potential harm to markets is gravest.

The usual reaction is to cut down on this excessive potential sweep by defining monopoly power to be a “significant” or “substantial” degree of market power. But this raises three problems. The first is rather predictable:

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5. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 481.


This approach is vague about how much power it takes to cross this line of “substantiality.” The second problem is more comical. To avoid excessive sweep even under § 1, market power itself is normally defined as not just any ability to raise prices above competitive levels but an ability to raise prices “substantially” over those levels.\(^{10}\) We are thus left with a standard that defines itself as requiring a substantial degree of a sort of power that is itself defined to exist only when substantial. This builds vagueness upon vagueness. It reminds me of the story of the flat-earth adherent who insisted the earth rested on the back of a giant turtle, and when asked what held up the turtle, answered that from then on, “it’s turtles all the way down.”\(^{11}\) Substantial turtles, one supposes.

The third problem is more serious: This standard fails even to define which variable is having its “substantiality” judged. One could imagine, as Landes and Posner advocate, deciding the monopoly power issue based directly on whether a particular firm’s individual demand curve has an elasticity lower than some defined number \(X\), or on whether it has the ability to raise prices more than \(Y\) percent over the competitive level, with less demanding \(Xs\) and \(Ys\) being used to define market power.\(^{12}\) But while considering such issues, courts generally seem moved more by market shares, with the classic formulation being that 90% is certainly enough, 33% is certainly not, and 60-64% is close to the line.\(^{13}\) Nor is the market share approach supported by only precedent and the statutory language referring to a “monopoly,” for a pure firm-specific demand elasticity approach that ignored market share would create problems by sweeping in firms with brands that enjoy considerable pricing discretion but compete vigorously with other brands. It would also cause legal rules to vary from day to day with shifts in demand, costs, or rival abilities, and would subject different firms that engage in the same anticompetitive conduct to acquire the same high market share to different rules depending on the degree of demand elasticity in their industry. On the other hand, a market share test is problematic because high market shares may not indicate much ability to raise prices.

\(^{10}\) II A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶ 502, at 90.

\(^{11}\) This story is apocryphal and apparently was created by a commentator on William James, who combined an 1897 illustration by James that used the less evocative image of “rocks all the way down” with the legend from ancient Hindu or Greek that the earth rested on a giant turtle or (in the Greek version) on the back of Atlas who was standing on a turtle. See Roger C. Cramton, Demystifying Legal Scholarship, 75 GEO. L.J. 1, 2 n.4 (1986).

\(^{12}\) See Landes & Posner, supra note 4.

\(^{13}\) See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand, J.); see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481 (1992) (proving 80-95% market share is enough to survive summary judgment, and describing a prior case as holding that “over two-thirds of the market is a monopoly”); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966) (“The existence of such [monopoly] power ordinarily may be inferred from the predominant share of the market . . . . In the present case, 87% [share of the business] leaves no doubt that . . . defendants have monopoly power . . . if that business is the relevant market.”).
prices over competitive levels, which is the economic injury of concern.\textsuperscript{14}

We are thus left uncertain about just what to do when our inferences from market share conflict with those from firm-specific demand elasticity. Further, this underlying divergence disables courts from specifying more precise criteria for “significance.” Courts can’t say that the significance line is crossed by a demand elasticity of $X$, or a market share of $Y$, because either effort to devise a more precise standard could lead to absurd results under the other method. A firm may have 99% market share but no power to raise prices at all if the rivals comprising the other 1% can instantly expand to supply the entire market if the 99% firm tried to raise prices. And even Landes and Posner recoil from the fact that their test would indicate that most firms that make a brand of orange juice, coffee, beer, or other similar product have monopoly power (despite their small market shares) because the firm-specific demand elasticities for such firms usually range from 2.5 to 5, implying a price 25-67\% over marginal cost.\textsuperscript{15} In these cases, they say, “mechanical application of [their test] would incorrectly suggest the existence of a monopoly problem,” but they provide no theory to determine what the criteria are for nonmechanical application or how to determine when conclusions created by their test are incorrect.\textsuperscript{16}

Still, while verging on vacuity, the current monopoly power standard is, in the end, merely vague. Why? Because at least we all have a sense of what sort of evidence moves us closer to a conclusion of monopoly power: More market share or more discretion over prices makes it more likely a firm has monopoly power. Sometimes these two standards diverge, but it is not the case that the sort of evidence that affirmatively supports a monopoly power conclusion under one standard actually cuts against that conclusion under the other standard. And often the same sort of evidence supports a monopoly power conclusion under either standard. While we may not know how many lost hairs it takes to become bald, and have some conflict in beliefs about what precisely constitutes a hair, most of the time that variation in belief does not matter much because the same sorts of things are judged a hair under either belief.

Nonetheless, the underlying unresolved divergence in methodology does prevent us from reducing the vagueness in the current monopoly power standard, and thus does produce a vagueness that is unnecessarily large. But let me defer until later the issue of how best to reduce this unnecessary vagueness, for it turns out that the answers flow in part from clarifying which exclusionary conduct merits condemnation.

\textsuperscript{14} See Areeda & Kaplow, supra note 4, at 564-72; Landes & Posner, supra note 4.
\textsuperscript{15} See Landes & Posner, supra note 4, at 956-57.
\textsuperscript{16} Id. at 957.
B. The Bad Conduct Element

It is the element of improper conduct that is truly vacuous. Leaving aside cases where monopoly is acquired by historic accident, the Supreme Court never explains what distinguishes “the willful acquisition or maintenance of [monopoly] power” from “growth or development as a consequence of a superior product [or] business acumen.” 17 It seems obvious that often firms willfully acquire or maintain monopoly power precisely through business acumen or developing a superior product. The two are not at all mutually exclusive concepts. And while cases of historic accident can be distinguished because they are not willful, it is hard to think of cases where a firm really has a monopoly thrust upon it without the aid of any willful conduct.

One might be tempted to adopt a more charitable reading, concluding that the Supreme Court did not really think willfulness was distinct from using business acumen or making a superior product, but meant to exempt from its prohibition any conduct that falls within the category of a “superior product” or “business acumen.” But Grinnell itself indicates it does not share this reading, holding that because the “monopoly power was consciously acquired, we have no reason to reach” the issue of whether defendants had proven “that their dominance is due to skill, acumen, and the like.” 18 Further, in at least three other cases, the Supreme Court has held that a firm that develops a superior product must sometimes share it with its rivals. 19

Likewise, every federal circuit court has interpreted this general monopolization standard to impose an antitrust duty to deal with rivals when sharing is feasible and a monopolist has developed a product that is so superior that it is “essential” for rivals to compete and cannot practically be duplicated. 20 True, many scholars conclude that this essential facilities doctrine

18. Id. at 576 n.7; see also id. at 571 (“[T]his second ingredient presents no major problem here, as what was done in building the empire was done plainly and explicitly for a single purpose.”).
20. See Interface Group v. Massachusetts Port Authority, 816 F.2d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1987); Twin Labs. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 568-69 (2d Cir.1990); Ideal Dairy Farms v. John Labatt, 90 F.3d 737, 748 (3d Cir.1996); Laurel Sand v. CSX Transp., 924 F.2d 539, 544 (4th Cir. 1991); Mid-Texas Communications Sys. v. AT&T, 615 F.2d 1372, 1387 n.12 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Directory Sales Mgmt. v. Ohio Bell Tel., 833 F.2d 606, 612 (6th Cir.1987); MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir.1983); Willman v. Heartland Hospital, 34 F.3d 605, 613 (8th Cir.1994); Ferguson v. Greater Pocatello Chamber of Commerce, 848 F.2d 976, 983 (9th Cir.1988); McKenzie v. Mercy Hospital, 854 F.2d 365, 369 (10th Cir.1988); Covad Commun. v. BellSouth, 299 F.3d 1272, 1286-88 (11th Cir.2002), cert. pending, 71 U.S.L.W. 3640 (2003); Caribbean Broadcasting v. Cable & Wireless, 148 F.3d 1080, 1088 (D.C.Cir.1998); Intergraph Corporation v. Intel Corporation, 195 F.3d 1346, 1356-57 (Fed.
is misguided.\textsuperscript{21} And this doctrine has not yet been accepted by the Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{22} But the concern that the essential facilities doctrine might misguidedly extend beyond the Supreme Court’s antitrust duty to deal rests on the mistaken premise that this doctrine might require sharing even when the Supreme Court would hold that a refusal to deal was justified. In fact, the lower courts applying the essential facilities doctrine have interpreted its element requiring that sharing be “feasible” to mean the same set of open-ended factors that the Court examines to decide whether a refusal to deal is justified.\textsuperscript{23} This, if anything, makes the essential facilities doctrine narrower than the Supreme Court doctrine, which has required sharing even in cases like \textit{Aspen} where the denied facility, while helpful, was clearly not essential for the rival to compete, since it did so without it.\textsuperscript{24} In any event, whether broader or narrower than the Supreme Court’s doctrine, the point here is that the persistence of the essential facilities doctrine in the lower courts demonstrates that the Supreme Court’s more general monopolization standards have not provided sufficient guidance to make it clear that antitrust duties to deal do not apply to monopolists who develop “superior” products.

Perhaps in these other cases, the courts mean to rest on the linguistic distinction that the wrongful act was not the development of the superior product but the willful refusal to share it with rivals who need it. But if a superior product always had to be shared with rivals whenever nonsharing would lead to a monopoly, then a superior product could never lead to the “development” of monopoly power, which would logically be inconsistent with the notion that this exception defines a protected activity that does lead to that development. In any event, no firm invests in developing a superior product in order to share it with rivals; firms do so in order to reap the profits that come

\textsuperscript{21} See, e.g., IIIA \textsc{Areeda} & \textsc{Hovenkamp}, supra note 9, ¶¶ 770e, 771b-c, 773a; Gregory J. Werden, \textit{The Law and Economics of the Essential Facility Doctrine}, 32 \textit{St. Louis U. L.J.} 433, 479-80 (1987).

\textsuperscript{22} See \textit{Aspen}, 472 U.S. at 611 n.44; AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 428 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (calling the essential facilities doctrine “an antitrust doctrine that this Court has never adopted”).

\textsuperscript{23} See \textit{Willman}, 34 F.3d at 613; \textit{Laurel Sand}, 924 F.2d at 545; Illinois \textit{ex rel. Burris} v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line, 935 F.2d 1469, 1483 (7th Cir. 1991); Abcor Corp. v. AM Int’l, 916 F.2d 924 (4th Cir. 1990); Oahu Gas v. Pac. Res., 838 F.2d 360, 368-70 (9th Cir. 1988); S. Pac. Communications Co. v. AT&T, 740 F.2d 980, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1984); \textit{MCI Communications Corp.}, 708 F.2d at 1132, 1137-38; 

\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Aspen}, 472 U.S., at 594-95 (describing facts as showing that the refusal to deal caused rival’s market share to drop to 11%, which obviously means it was not eliminated from the market).
from producing a product that is sufficiently superior to what rivals can provide that it reaps monopoly profits. We thus need a coherent theory for determining when sharing a superior product is required and when it isn’t, which, as we shall see, the Supreme Court has yet to provide.

Nor does the Court’s test offer any norms for defining what a “superior product” or “business acumen” mean. Why isn’t it just good “business acumen” to refuse to share one’s superior product with rivals in order to drive it out of the market? If a firm designs its product in a way that makes it hard for buyers to use rival products, why isn’t that just good “business acumen” or even a “superior product” in the business sense that it brings in more profits? If a firm bundles its monopoly power product with another product in a way that prevents rivals from gaining enough market share in the latter to increase their ability to compete with the former, why isn’t that just good “business acumen” or maybe even a “superior product” in the business sense? If a firm lowers prices whenever rivals enter the market in order to drive those rivals out and restore monopoly prices, is that succeeding by “business acumen” or a “superior product” if the lowered prices are above cost? If a firm instead offers discounts conditioned on the buyer giving it a large share of its business, thus assuring itself economies of scale and denying them to rivals, is that just good “business acumen” or a bad willful acquisition and maintenance of monopoly power?

Without an underlying normative theory, the Court’s test offers no way for resolving such questions about what the terms “superior product” and “business acumen” might mean. Even if we could get past the above problems, the Grinnell test would offer no help for addressing conduct that does not neatly fall into the categories of business acumen or a superior product, but nonetheless does seem a desirable way of willfully acquiring or maintaining monopoly power.

Courts and commentators have offered other formulations to get around these problems with the Grinnell test. One stresses that the condemned conduct

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25. See X PHILLIP E. ARIEEDA, ENER ELHAUGE & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1757, at 335-41 (1996) (collecting cases that sometimes condemn such conduct as monopolization and sometimes do not).

26. See Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001); X AREEDA, ELHAUGE & HOVENKAMP, supra note 25, ¶ 1746, at 224-29 (collecting cases that sometimes condemn such conduct as monopolization and sometimes do not).


28. Compare LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (condemning such conduct as monopolization), with Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1061-62 (8th Cir. 2000) (not condemning such conduct).
must be “anticompetitive or exclusionary,” which the Aspen Court defined (borrowing the famous formulation of Professors Areeda and Turner) as conduct that “(1) tends to impair the opportunities of rivals, but also (2) either does not further competition on the merits or does so in an unnecessarily restrictive way.”

Likewise, in their parallel doctrine, European Community (“E.C.”) courts have defined an abuse of a dominant position as conduct by a dominant firm that (1) hinders its competition and (2) does not reflect “normal competition.” Unfortunately, neither the term “exclusionary” nor factor (1) provide serious help with the above questions because vigorous competition often does exclude or impair the opportunities of rivals, such as when the firm builds a better mousetrap and excludes rivals from the patents they need to make a competitive mousetrap and thus drives them out of the market. The term “anticompetitive” might look more promising, but isn’t. By “anticompetitive” conduct, the Court cannot mean whatever conduct reduces market rivalry, for that would preclude the very possibility the Court is trying to distinguish—the possibility that desirable conduct can achieve or maintain a monopoly that extinguishes competition. Further, the Court has held that sometimes a monopolist is affirmatively obliged to diminish market rivalry through cooperation with rivals by giving them access to its product, squarely rejecting the notion that vigorously competing with rivals by refusing to share its product could never be characterized as “anticompetitive or exclusionary.”

Accordingly, which way this test comes out boils down to the mystery of which forms of competition will be judged “on the merits” (or “normal competition”) and which won’t be, and the even greater mystery of when conduct that is competition on the merits can nonetheless be judged unnecessarily restrictive of competition. The utter vacuity of this sort of standard is neatly illustrated by the fact that the same conduct—using above-cost price cuts to drive out rivals—has been labeled “competition on the merits.”


31. In fact, when earlier cases did articulate the test as whether monopoly power was created by conscious conduct that “excluded competition,” they concluded that a firm could thus be guilty of monopolization even if its conduct was “honestly industrial” and not “actuated solely by a desire to prevent competition.” Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 813-14 (1946) (quoting and “welcom[ing] this opportunity to endorse” these statements from United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)); see also United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105-07 (1948) (favorably citing these passages from both American Tobacco and Alcoa and holding that therefore monopolization could be proven simply by the “existence of power ‘to exclude competition when it is desired to do so’ . . . coupled with the purpose or intent to exercise that power”).

merits” in the United States\(^{33}\) but not “normal competition” in Europe.\(^{34}\) Something is driving these conclusions, but it is not the determinate meaning of terms like “exclusionary,” “competition,” “merits,” or “normal.”

Another formulation, originating in \textit{Griffith} but reaffirmed by the \textit{Kodak} Court, defines monopolizing conduct as “the use of monopoly power ‘to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor.’”\(^{35}\) But this does not eliminate the problems with the prior formulations; indeed it exacerbates them. It does not eliminate the problems because perfectly desirable competitive behavior can “foreclose competition” and “destroy a competitor,” such as when a firm figures out how to make a better or cheaper product and thus takes away market sales from rivals and drives them out of the market. It exacerbates these problems because it suggests that the mere “use” of monopoly power to foreclose or exclude rivals or even just gain a “competitive advantage” can be illegal. That test would not only fail to distinguish desirable “uses” like reaping superior efficiencies, but would condemn them far more often since such uses almost always meet the weak standard of conferring a mere “competitive advantage.” Further, that test would eliminate any requirement to prove a causal connection between the alleged misconduct and the existence of the monopoly power in question.

A final set of formulations stresses that a firm does not engage in monopolization if its conduct is motivated by “valid business reasons,” a “normal business purpose,” or “legitimate competitive reasons.”\(^{36}\) But each of these formulations turns on what content one gives to the key placeholder term—“valid,” “normal,” or “legitimate.”\(^{37}\) Without any specification of the criteria used to distinguish the invalid, abnormal, or illegitimate, these criteria leave the standard completely vacuous because those terms can be filled in with opposing normative conceptions. The same goes for attempted monopolization cases, which have defined the prohibited conduct as “conduct which \textit{unfairly} tends to destroy competition” but neglected to define just what fairness means.\(^{38}\) None of these conclusory labels aids the substantive inquiry. This is


\(^{36}\) \text{Kodak}, 504 U.S. at 483 \& n.32; \textit{Aspen}, 472 U.S. at 605, 608.

\(^{37}\) The same is true for other formulations that try to distinguish between “improper conduct” and “honestly industrial” conduct. \textit{Aspen}, 472 U.S. at 596 (quoting jury instructions).

\(^{38}\) \text{Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan}, 506 U.S. 445, 458 (1993) (emphasis added); \textit{see also id.} at 459 (defining prohibited conduct as “‘unfair’ or ‘predatory’ tactics”).
particularly alarming because the Court has now twice indicated that it is only the existence of such a valid or legitimate reason that determines whether a monopolist even has the right to compete rather than cooperate with its rivals by refusing to give rivals access to its product.\textsuperscript{39}

In short, current tests of monopolization leave us uncertain about not only how many hairs you need to escape being bald, but even whether the existence of a particular kind of follicle cuts for or against a conclusion of baldness.

All this ambiguity would be bad enough if it merely meant future decisions would be determined by whatever underlying norms will be applied by Supreme Court justices, a slowly changing group about whose normative preferences one can make an educated guess. But what makes this all worse is that in the vast bulk of cases, decisionmaking under these vacuous standards will instead be made by randomly selected lower court judges and jurors operating without any coherent guidance. Whether judges conclude that the evidence satisfies standards for summary judgment or directed verdict will turn on whatever implicit norms they use (consciously or not) to fill in the placeholder terms in particular cases. And if the judges don’t decide the issue, the same problem will infect jury verdicts, for the typical set of jury instructions states the above sorts of standards and then leaves it up to the jury to divine the metaphysical difference between acquiring or maintaining monopoly power through (1) willful, anticompetitive, or exclusionary means or purposes, and (2) business acumen, superior products, competition on the merits, or valid and legitimate business reasons.\textsuperscript{40} Without more guidance, different jurors are likely to use completely different normative understandings about what all these terms mean. Indeed, the \textit{Aspen} Court itself acknowledged that “contrary inferences might reasonably be drawn” about whether the conduct in that case could “fairly be characterized as exclusionary,”\textsuperscript{41} thus suggesting it would have affirmed a jury verdict in either direction.

The notion that judges or juries applying vacuous standards are likely to be upheld no matter what they decide provides cold comfort to firms trying to plan their conduct. It means firms must operate under the risk that the actual criteria by which their conduct will be judged will depend largely on the happenstance of which judge and jurors will be selected in a trial a great number of years later that will retroactively decide whether to assess multimillion or even multibillion dollar treble damages. Further, firms run the risk that different judges or juries will reach inconsistent conclusions about the legality of their conduct based on different implicit normative criteria. These sorts of risks cannot help but chill investments to create product offerings with a sufficient

\footnotesize{39. \textit{Kodak}, 504 U.S. at 483 \& n.32; \textit{Aspen}, 472 U.S. at 605, 608.}

\footnotesize{40. \textit{Aspen}, 472 U.S. at 595-97 (recounting a typical set of court-approved jury instructions).}

\footnotesize{41. \textit{Id.} at 604.
quality or cost advantage over preexisting market options to enjoy monopoly power.

The great indeterminacy of its exclusionary conduct standard has not escaped the Court. To the contrary, the Court has twice acknowledged that under its test it "is sometimes difficult to distinguish robust competition from conduct with long-term anticompetitive effects," and thus consciously focused on using the market power requirements of § 2 to prevent its vacuous exclusionary conduct standard from chilling desirable market conduct throughout our economy. But this strategy has two problems. First, as noted above, the monopoly power requirement is not exactly clear. Second, even if that element were clear, this inability to distinguish desirable from undesirable conduct will chill desirable conduct by monopolists or—worse—firms aspiring to become monopolists through innovation or investments, which are probably the greatest engine for economic progress.

But it would be unfair to blame this problem on the courts, for the fact is that antitrust scholars have yet to provide them with much help. To the contrary, scholars have so far also been unable to devise administrable standards for sorting out desirable from undesirable conduct that tends to exclude rivals. Moreover, while the standards articulated by the United States Supreme Court have regrettably been conclusory, I will show below that the actual results of its cases do fit a consistent economic logic.

One might wonder how I can claim that current doctrine is incoherent while I also claim to offer a coherent standard that is consistent with current doctrine. But there is no inconsistency, for my claim is only that the standards articulated by the Court lack content, not that the Court’s judgment about how to dispose of individual cases is unsound. As in many areas, the actual results reached by courts can often be explained by theories they themselves did not articulate, perhaps because the courts rested on intuitive judgments they could not fully explain, or because underlying theoretical concerns cause parties not to present certain arguments. In such cases, courts might have more confidence in the result than in the general theory that justifies it, and thus often sensibly resolve cases with a conclusory standard that provides a placeholder for a theory to be provided later. But at some point that theory must actually be provided, or else lower courts and juries will simply be left with an open-ended


43. This was acknowledged in a recent amicus brief by prominent antitrust economists William Baumol, Janus Ordover, Frederick Warren-Boulton, and Robert Willig, who stated that courts and legal and economic scholars had not yet been able to solve the "vexing problem" of developing "workable standards" for determining when conduct was exclusionary, so that there is not yet any "universal economic litmus test" for judging this question. See Brief of Amici Curiae Economics Professors in Support of Respondent at 3-4, Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 305 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 1480 (2003) (No. 02-682).
delegation to make up standards as they go. It is high time to see if we are at the point where we can articulate a sound economic theory that makes sense of the case law in a way that can be fashioned into an administrable standard that provides more meaningful guidance to lower courts and juries.

II. THE PROBLEMS WITH FOCUSING ON WHETHER THE CONDUCT SACRIFICED PROFITS

Oddly, the one exception to the current vacuity of monopolization standards may be the most maligned area of monopolization law—predatory pricing doctrine. You may love it or you may hate it, but at least you have some idea what the doctrine means. Indeed, that may be what makes this doctrine the most vulnerable to criticism: It provides some defined target to take shots at. If you price below your incremental costs and have enough market power to make it reasonably likely that you can recoup your losses by raising prices after you have disciplined or driven out your rival, then you have engaged in predatory pricing. If you price above cost, you are home free. We may have a lot of uncertainty around the edges, including what precise measure of costs to use. But we can spot the bald man and the above-cost pricer without difficulty in most cases, and can at least tell in which direction it cuts to have evidence of an increase or decrease in either costs or the ability to recoup profits in the long run.

It did not always used to be that way. Once upon a time, predatory pricing doctrine was governed by a standard as vacuous as any. Whether a price was predatory turned mainly on whether it was “intended” to harm rivals. The problem was that all desirable procompetitive behavior and innovation is intended to harm rivals—driving those rivals out of the market by making a cheaper or better product is how firms earn the monopoly profits that reward

44. The shots have been taken from both sides. For the argument that below-cost pricing should never be considered monopolization, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 269-304, 333-37 (1981); Janusz A. Ordover, Predatory Pricing, in 3 THE PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 77, 79 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (collecting critiques). For the argument that above-cost pricing should sometimes be considered predatory, see Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for Prevention of Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE L.J. 1, 2-3 (1979); Edlin, supra note 27, at 945-46; Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284, 290-92 (1977).
46. For an article reviewing the issue, and arguing that the measure should be the actual cost variation caused by whatever output increase is allegedly predatory, see Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts Are Not Predatory, supra note 8, at 703-26.
47. See, e.g., Moore v. Mead’s Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115, 118 (1954); Forster Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 335 F.2d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 1964); Md. Baking Co. v. FTC, 243 F.2d 716, 718 (4th Cir. 1957); E.B. Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511, 517 (6th Cir. 1944).
their investments and innovations in lowering costs and raising quality. Thus, this standard helped not a whit in sorting out bad pricing from good. This sort of vacuity has remained omnipresent for the rest of monopolization doctrine, but was stamped out of predatory pricing doctrine by the concrete test requiring below-cost pricing and likely recoupment.

The relative success with predatory pricing doctrine has led courts and commentators to try to generalize it into a global standard for determining what conduct meets the exclusionary conduct element of the monopolization test. These courts and scholars use the term “predatory” conduct to describe this element, and then define it to be conduct that involves a sacrifice of short-run profits that would not be profitable unless a firm reaped long-run monopoly returns by excluding or disciplining rivals. The one who did the most to popularize this as a monopolization test was Robert Bork, who did so first as a scholar in his acclaimed book *The Antitrust Paradox*, and who then as a judge elevated this test into law, stating:

> [P]redation involves aggression against business rivals through the use of business practices that would not be considered profit maximizing except for the expectation that (1) actual rivals will be driven from the market, or the entry of potential rivals blocked or delayed, so that the predator will gain or retain a market share sufficient to command monopoly profits, or (2) rivals will be chastened sufficiently to abandon competitive behavior the predator finds threatening to its realization of monopoly profits.

Other courts have focused even more explicitly on the short-term profit-sacrifice test as one possible way of proving the improper conduct element of monopolization, and the Supreme Court in *Aspen* summarized its conclusion


49. This general sort of standard was used in the original Areeda-Turner article that first set forth a concrete cost-based test for predation. See Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, *Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act*, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697, 698 (1975).


51. See LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 164 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“[E]xclusionary practice has been defined as ‘a method by which a firm ... trades a part of its monopoly profits, at least temporarily, for a larger market share, by making it unprofitable for other sellers to compete with it.’ Once a monopolist achieves its goal by excluding potential competitors, it can then increase the price of its product to the point at which it will maximize its profit.”) (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, *ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE* 28 (1976)) (citation omitted); Advanced Health-Care Serv. v. Radford Cmty. Hosp., 910 F.2d 139, 148 (4th Cir. 1990) (“For example, if a plaintiff shows that a defendant has harmed consumers and competition by making a short-term sacrifice in order to further its exclusive, anti-competitive objectives, it has shown predation by that defendant.”). One should not, however, oversell these statements. The statement in *Advanced Health-Care* indicates that the court believed such a profit sacrifice was sufficient to show
in a way that seemed to look favorably on that proposition. Likewise, numerous scholars have approved such a general test of what constitutes predation.

Joining this bandwagon, the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission are currently pushing this profit-sacrificing conduct test in their legal briefs in monopolization cases. The Department of Justice did so in its two most prominent recent monopolization cases: the Microsoft litigation and predation but not that it was necessary. Even that sufficiency seems limited by a requirement to also show harm to consumers, and the court’s statement that the ultimate benchmark is whether “the exclusion was based on superior efficiency.” Id. at 147. Likewise, LePage’s also stated that “a defendant’s assertion that it acted in furtherance of its economic interests does not constitute the type of business justification that is an acceptable defense to § 2 monopolization.” 324 F.3d at 163. This indicated that the LePage’s court thought the fact that conduct increased rather than sacrificed profits would not be any defense, which suggests this court may have also believed such a profit sacrifice was sufficient but not necessary to show monopolization. Further, like Advanced Health-Care, the LePage’s opinion also suggested that efficiency and the effect on consumer welfare was the ultimate barometer. Id.

52. Although it did not explicitly adopt such a test as the governing standard, the Aspen Court did summarize its analysis by stating: “[T]he evidence supports an inference that Ski Co. was not motivated by efficiency concerns and that it was willing to sacrifice short-run benefits and consumer goodwill in exchange for a perceived long-run impact on its smaller rival.” Aspen, 472 U.S. at 610-11; see also id. at 608 (“The jury may well have concluded that Ski Co. elected to forgo these short-run benefits because it was more interested in reducing competition in the Aspen market over the long run by harming its smaller competitor.”). This language indicates that the Aspen Court saw this as at least one viable means of proving monopolization, but the Court did not state that proving a sacrifice in short-term profits was necessary to prove monopolization. Further, as we will see, the Supreme Court’s addition of the factor that the defendant lacked any efficiency motive is potentially an important limitation that may mean such a sacrifice in short-term profits is not sufficient to show monopolization either. See infra text accompanying notes 118-121. Nor did Aspen actually involve a short-term sacrifice of overall profits. See infra text accompanying notes 104-05.

53. See POSNER, supra note 51; LAWRENCE ANTHONY SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 113 (1977) (arguing that the characteristic feature that distinguishes honestly industrial competitive behavior from predation is that in the latter, “the predator is acting in a way which will not maximize present or foreseeable future profits unless it drives or keeps others out or forces them to tread softly. . . . Such conduct makes sense if, but only if, it is seen as a means of driving out or controlling competitors’); Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8, 9-10 (1981) (“[P]redatory behavior is a response to a rival that sacrifices part of the profit that could be earned under competitive circumstances, were the rival to remain viable, in order to induce exit and gain consequent additional monopoly profit.”). For similar formulations limited to predatory pricing, see Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brody & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239, 2242-43 (2000); Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K. Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213, 219-20 (1979).

54. See Brief for Appellees United States and the State Plaintiffs at 48, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Nos. 00-5212, 00-5213), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f7400/7425.pdf. (last visited Nov. 15, 2003). This position does not appear to have been adopted by the en banc D.C. Circuit Court. See infra text
the American Airlines predatory pricing case.\textsuperscript{55} And both agencies have also done so in an amicus brief in the first monopolization case to be granted certiorari by the United States Supreme Court in a decade.\textsuperscript{56} A recent speech by a top-level antitrust official indicates that these are not just three isolated positions, but reflect a common and considered government position.\textsuperscript{57}

This short-term profit-sacrificing test has a superficial attraction that has evidently proven irresistible. But when one peers under the hood, one finds three devastating defects. To summarize them before demonstrating them: First, this test is not really a generalization from predatory pricing doctrine because the test does not actually fit even that doctrine as it stands. Second, sacrificing profits in the short run to drive out rivals and reap long-run monopoly profits is normally socially desirable, and thus should be rewarded rather than penalized with treble antitrust damages. Third, it is not generally necessary to sacrifice short-run profits in order to engage in undesirable exclusionary conduct. The fit between the test and the desired results is thus decidedly poor. Sacrificing profits is neither sufficient nor necessary to show that conduct that excludes rivals is undesirable, nor does it even correlate well with the desirability of such conduct.

Before explicating these points, let me flag an interpretative variation that alters the application of these points. Although I think the language in the above cases and briefs is best read to require proof of a short-term sacrifice in actual profits, one could instead read it to require only that the conduct would sacrifice profits (at any time) unless it harmed rival competition. And other cases commonly cited for the profit-sacrificing test are even more clearly limited to this proposition.\textsuperscript{58} This variation could be interpreted as consistent

accompanying notes 186, 227. To the extent it is relevant, I filed a Tunney Act statement opposing the DOJ-Microsoft settlement in this case.

\textsuperscript{55} See Brief for Appellant United States at 25, 29-31, United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003) (No. 01-3202), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f9800/9814.pdf. (last visited Nov. 15, 2003). This government position was previously criticized in Elhauge, \textit{Why Above-Cost Price Cuts Are Not Predatory}, supra note 8, at 693, and ultimately rejected by the Tenth Circuit in \textit{United States v. AMR Corp.}, 355 F.3d 1109, 1118-19 & n.13 (10th Cir. 2003).

\textsuperscript{56} See Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8, 16, Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 305 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 1480 (2003) (No. 02-682), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f201000/201048.pdf. (last visited Nov. 15, 2003). To the extent it is relevant, I have consulted for Verizon on this case, and I am a consultant to the FTC on other matters. The views expressed in this article are my own, and are not intended to reflect the views of either Verizon or the FTC.


\textsuperscript{58} See Stearns Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 523-24 (5th Cir.
with my point that some undesirable exclusionary conduct can increase monopoly profits even in the short run by hampering rival competition, and thus should be condemned even if it involves no overall sacrifice in short-term profits. However, this variation would remain inconsistent with the first two points that desirable conduct (like above-cost price cuts and innovation) often would not be profit-maximizing unless it enabled the firm to drive out rivals, and thus should not be condemned even if it would involve a profit-sacrifice unless it harmed rival competition.

One might try to salvage this variation by saying that it means to exclude only those profits earned by excluding competition through undesirable conduct. But then one has just begged the question of which exclusionary conduct is undesirable. This does not improve upon such conclusory standards as whether there is a “valid business justification.” Indeed, it worsens matters by obscuring the fact that some normative judgment is implicitly being made through decisions about which profits to count. Further, this variation eliminates any administrability benefit that a profit-sacrifice test might otherwise have by making the test turn not on actual profits (which one can measure) but on what profits would have been once undesirable profits are excluded. Not only would that hypothetical inquiry be difficult, it would seem entirely unnecessary since this understanding of the test presupposes the court has standards for determining the desirability of conduct—and if we have those, they could just be applied directly to the conduct rather than getting at the issue indirectly by estimating desirable profits.

In short, any variation that asks whether profits would have been sacrificed if one excluded profits that were earned undesirably avoids substantive problems at the cost of depriving the test of any content. The following discussion will thus focus on the variation that does have content—the test that asks whether actual profits were sacrificed in the short run.

A. Lack of Fit with the Predatory Pricing Doctrine Being Generalized

It turns out that the short-term profit-sacrificing test for when conduct is exclusionary fails to even explain the predatory pricing doctrine it endeavors to generalize. The key reason is that its short-run benchmark is failing to maximize profits, which does not correspond to the below-cost pricing required by U.S. predatory pricing doctrine.

Any monopolist maximizes its short-run profits by setting a monopoly price well above its costs—indeed, that is what makes monopolies allocatively inefficient.59 It follows then that a monopolist who sets its prices anywhere

59. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 4, at 88-98; ROBERT S. Pindyck & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, MICROECONOMICS 328-51 (5th ed. 2001).
between its monopoly price and its costs must be sacrificing short-run profits, even though it is not pricing below cost. A monopolist who engages in such pricing thus cannot be in violation of U.S. predatory pricing doctrine under *Brooke.* But such a monopolist would be in violation of the proposed predation standard because it would be sacrificing short-run profits, and the only rational reason to do so would be to either keep out or drive out rivals and thus earn greater profits in the long run.

Indeed, courts, regulators, and commentators who have used this predation standard have logically been driven to these conclusions. Some have concluded that under this standard any monopolist who uses limit pricing—that is, prices at a level that is above cost but below its short-term, profit-maximizing price in order to keep out rivals who are not efficient enough to enter at that price level—is engaged in illegal predatory pricing. Others have concluded the same for a monopolist that reacts to entry by cutting its prices to an above-cost level that fails to maximize short-run profits but drives out the less efficient entrant and thus allows the restoration of monopoly profits.

Nonetheless, under *Brooke,* setting above-cost prices is perfectly legal even if designed to drive out entrants or keep them from entering. Thus, this proposed test cannot be justified as a generalization of actual predatory pricing doctrine. It would rather radically expand it.

Nor would such an expansion of predatory pricing be desirable, for it would amount to an affirmative legal *duty* to charge the profit-maximizing monopoly price whenever possible. That is, it would forcibly require the main evil antitrust hopes to minimize—monopoly pricing far above marginal costs. Such pricing is harmful not only to consumer welfare but to allocative efficiency because by definition such pricing leaves unserved marginal consumers who would have been willing to pay a lower price that would still exceed the costs of serving them. Further, it turns out that one cannot justify the imposition of this short-term harm to consumers and to efficiency with the hope that it will, by encouraging entry, lead to greater efficiency and consumer

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61. *See, e.g.*, Transamerica Computer Co. *v. IBM Corp.*, 698 F.2d 1377, 1387 (9th Cir. 1983).

62. *See Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts Are Not Predatory, supra* note 8, at 684, 691-95, 701, 754-55 (collecting sources making this argument). One of the many oddities of the latter position is that it aims to force monopolists to engage in everyday limit pricing that would also violate the proposed predation standard. *See id.* at 792-95.

benefits in the long run, for reasons I have detailed elsewhere.\textsuperscript{64}

B. Sacrificing Short-Run Profits to Drive Out Rivals and Reap Long-Run
Monopoly Profits Is Normally Good

Well, one might wonder, how do we know these problems with the profit-
sacrifice test are not unique to predatory pricing doctrine? Maybe the test works
just fine for defining other sorts of exclusionary conduct. Afraid not. To the
contrary, the problem is that what this test identifies as the signature of evil—
sacrificing short-run profits in order to drive out rivals and reap long-run
monopoly profits—is normally the stamp of virtue.

This is easiest to see when the issue is whether to invest in the creation of
intellectual property. Suppose a firm is deciding whether in year 1 to invest $1
billion in research that has a 50\% chance of successfully producing by year 3 a
patented product that is so much more valuable than existing market options
that it will drive firms providing those existing options out of the market and
yield the firm $4 billion in supracompetitive profits. Once the successful
innovation has occurred, the patented product will have monopoly power
precisely because it is so much more valuable than alternative market options,
thereby satisfying the first element of the monopolization test. Further, the
profit-sacrifice test for proving the element of exclusionary conduct would also
be met because the firm did create that monopoly power by sacrificing short-
run profits in year 1 in order to create a better product that could drive out
rivals and reap long-run monopoly profits starting in year 3. Likewise, the
firm’s decision to invest in innovation makes no sense but for the prospect of
those monopoly returns.

The point is easily generalized. Investments in innovation that create
monopoly power \textit{typically} would be unprofitable but for the prospect of the
monopoly returns reaped by excluding rivals. Normal competitive returns are
available by just investing in bonds or the stock market. It is only the prospect
of supracompetitive returns that could induce a firm to make risky investments
in research that might not pan out. Further, even sure-thing investments in
innovation involve sunk costs that would never be incurred but for the prospect
that they could be recouped in the long run by supracompetitive above-cost
pricing.

Thus, read literally, the proposed predation test would prohibit investments
in innovation, subjecting them to treble damages. Some scholars have indeed
been willing to walk the logical plank that this test leads them to fall off,
concluding that antitrust law should thus condemn as “predatory” any product
innovations whose profitability depends on their ability to drive rivals out of

\textsuperscript{64} See Elhauge, \textit{Why Above-Cost Price Cuts Are Not Predatory}, supra note 8, at 686-
89, 754-827.
the market. But this has the proper policy priority exactly backwards. Such innovations make consumers and society better off by giving them new market options that are better (because they are cheaper or of higher quality) than the market options they would have had without the innovation. This is the most desirable form of market activity we can have. To condemn it is to fetishize the ex post avoidance of static allocative inefficiency under given cost and demand curves, and ignore the disastrous ex ante effects such a standard would have on dynamic productive efficiency that either raises demand curves by making the product more desirable or lowers cost curves by making the product cheaper to make. Repeated economic studies indicate the latter is far more valuable.

One might protest that producing a superior product is covered by the exception to Grinnell and in any event does not really “exclude” the rival from anything. So perhaps, if we combine those notions with a profit-sacrifice test, we are fine after all. Not really. For all it takes is a request by the rival for access to the intellectual property to satisfy any such requirements.

Suppose, in the above example, it has become obvious in year 2 that the research has been successful although it will take until year 3 to set up production and begin yielding profits. A rival then offers $1 million for access to the intellectual property rights so it can compete in year 3. The innovative firm declines to sell access. The rival sues. It can clearly show that in year 2 the firm excluded the rival from access to its property and in doing so sacrificed short-run profits by forgoing a $1 million payment. Further, that decision made no rational economic sense but for the prospect that in year 3 the firm would take advantage of having excluded its rival from access to the intellectual property it needed to compete, driving the rival out of the market and reaping monopoly profits. Thus, under the proposed standard, this refusal to deal would be illegal predation.

65. See Ordover & Willig, supra note 53, at 22-30.
66. See III Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 9, ¶ 720a, at 255 & n.3 (collecting sources); Areeda & Kaplow, supra note 4, at 31; Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy 84-92, 99-106 (3d ed. 1950); Moses Abramovitz, Resource and Output Trends in the United States Since 1870, 46 AM. ECON. REV. 5 (1956); Robert M. Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth, 70 Q.J. ECON. 65 (1956); Robert M. Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function, 39 REV. ECON. & STAT. 312 (1957); see also R.E. Caves & M.E. Porter, Market Structure, Oligopoly, and Stability of Market Shares, 26 J. INDUS. ECON. 289 (1978) (showing that the degree to which market shares fluctuate influences market performance far more than the size of market shares); Michael E. Porter, The Current Competitiveness Index: Measuring the Microeconomic Foundations of Prosperity, in THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2000 40, 45 (2000) (showing that nations with better market performance generally compete by innovation and differentiation rather than by price and imitation); Mariko Sakakibara & Michael E. Porter, Competing at Home to Win Abroad: Evidence from Japanese Industry, 83 REV. ECON. & STAT. 310, 312 (2001) (same); Oliver E. Williamson, Economics as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18, 22-23 (1968) (proving that, even in static models, the productive efficiency gains from a small cost reduction usually offset the allocative efficiency loss from increasing prices over costs).
Again, this result would be disastrous. If firms could not exclude rivals from the fruits of their innovations when they are successful, then no firm would have any incentive to invest in innovation. Instead, every firm would have an incentive to lazily avoid making investments in innovation since it would know it could free ride off its rivals if any of them successfully innovated.

Well, one might wonder, can’t we avoid this issue by just concluding that federal patent and copyright law must trump antitrust law, and thus apply the proposed predation standard only outside their realm? No, and for three reasons. First, the application of monopolization standards to patents and copyrights cannot be so easily avoided. In fact, courts often do apply the antitrust duty to deal to patents and copyrights, although the lack of coherent guidance has not surprisingly left the lower courts split on precisely when any antitrust duty applies. 67 Nor would any conclusion that patent and copyright statutes simply trump antitrust duties to deal be sensible on the merits. After all, the rights to exclude conferred by those statutes are no different than the rights to exclude conferred by any property right, so that if antitrust law duties to deal are viewed as compatible with the latter, they are equally compatible with the former. 68 Patent and copyright thus cannot be hermetically sealed away from

67. See CSU, LLC v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325-30 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (concluding that “[i]ntellectual property rights do not confer a privilege to violate the antitrust laws,” but also holding that there is no antitrust liability for a refusal to give access to a lawful patent or copyright unless the anticompetitive effect exceeds its statutory scope); Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1356-57 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (applying essential facilities doctrine to Intel’s intellectual property and patented chips); Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1215-20, 1129 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding, on remand from the Supreme Court’s Kodak decision, that owners of patents and copyrights must provide access to them if the plaintiff can rebut the presumption that they have a valid business justification for denying access); Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1184-87 & n.64 (1st Cir. 1994) (same for copyrights, but suggesting in dicta that maybe not for patents); David L. Adridge Co. v. Microsoft Corp., 995 F. Supp. 728 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (applying essential facilities doctrine to assess claimed antitrust duty to provide access to Microsoft’s Windows 95); see also Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 253 F.3d 34, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001) (calling “frivolous” Microsoft’s argument that “‘if intellectual property rights have been lawfully acquired, . . . their subsequent exercise cannot give rise to antitrust liability’” and holding that Microsoft could not condition access to its copyrights on restrictions on their use that hampered rivals from competing with the monopoly power earned by the copyrights) E.U. cases have been even freer with applying antitrust duties to deal to patents and copyrights. See Case 238/87, AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd., 1998 E.C.R. 6211; Joined Cases 241/91 & 242/91, Radio Telefis Eireann and Indep. Television Publ’ns Ltd. v. Commission, 1995 E.C.R. I-743, ¶ 48-50; Case COMP D3/38.044, NDC Health v. IMS Health, 2002 O.J. (L 59) 18.

68. See Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 425, 429 (1908) (“Patents are property, and entitled to the same rights and sanctions as other property. . . . As to the suggestion that competitors were excluded from the use of the new patent, we answer that such exclusion may be said to have been of the very essence of the right conferred by the patent, as it is the privilege of any owner of property to use or not use it, without question
antitrust duties applicable to other forms of property. Indeed, the federal antitrust agencies have issued guidelines stressing, “The Agencies apply the same general antitrust principles to conduct involving intellectual property that they apply to conduct involving any other form of tangible or intangible property.” 69 Further, the courts have a very strong presumption against implied repeals of antitrust law, holding that repeal can be “implied only if necessary to make the [nonantitrust statute] work, and even then only to the minimum extent necessary.” 70

Second, many intellectual property rights are creations of state law, and thus cannot be said to implicitly repeal otherwise applicable federal antitrust law. This includes the crucial rights protecting trade secrets, which may be far more important than patent rights. Indeed, empirical studies indicate that, in the bulk of industries, most innovation would have been undertaken without patent protection, with the percentages ranging from 62 to 89% for the chemical, petroleum, machinery, and fabricated metal industries, to 99 to 100% for the office equipment, motor vehicles, instruments, primary metals, rubber, and textile industries. 71 Since 66 to 84% of patentable inventions were in fact patented in all these industries, the main reason for the general lack of reliance on patents would appear to be that most of these inventions did not meet the standards for federal patent protection. 72 But the fact that 16 to 34% of patentable inventions are not patented suggests there is also another factor, most likely the fact that firms often prefer trade secret protection because patent law requires disclosure. 73 In either case, since these are hardly industries where federal copyright protection is very important, the inventors who invest in making such innovations must be relying on the protection of state law, including the property right to exclude that is, in practice, what maintains trade secrets.

Third, and most important, the above analysis of the proposed predation standard’s undesirable effect on investments to create intellectual property of motive.”) (emphases added).


71. See Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32-2 MGMT. SCI. 173, 175 tbl.1 (1986). The only exception discovered in Mansfield’s study was that 60% of pharmaceutical innovations would not have been undertaken without patent protection. But Mansfield’s study also did not include modern high-tech industries like software or computers, which probably would also exhibit a higher percentage of innovations that would not be undertaken without patent or copyright protection.

72. See id. at 177 tbl.2

applies equally to investments made to create, enhance, or maintain the value of any property right—physical or intellectual. After all, garden-variety property rights are not mere matters of private prerogative. To the contrary, they (like intellectual property rights) are recognized by the state when and where the state believes those rights will lead to more desirable conduct by encouraging investment in the property, and the essence of that encouragement is provided by the core property right to exclude others.74 If there were no right to exclude others from the fruits of investments made in the property, then the property right cannot provide the encouragement to invest that is the main purpose for recognizing property rights to begin with.

Again, suppose a firm is deciding whether to invest $1 billion in year 1, only now the investment is to build a plant that will make a product that is better or cheaper than rivals can make. If it is right that this investment will be successful, then the firm will, starting in year 3, drive its rivals out and reap $4 billion in monopoly profits. Consumers would be better off, not worse off, if the investment occurs because it will create a market option that is superior to what they had before. True, after the investment, the firm will have monopoly power. But such monopoly power is desirable because it simply means the firm has created something so much cheaper or better than rivals can produce that there are no reasonably interchangeable substitutes constraining the firm to price at cost. The prospect of those monopoly profits will thus encourage consumer-benefiting investments that otherwise would not be made.

But under the proposed predation standard, the investment would never be made. This is because if a firm does make that investment, its rivals can offer $1 million in year 2 for a lease to use the plant in year 3. The firm that denies this rival request for access will necessarily be sacrificing short-term profits in year 2, which is only profitable because this exclusion of rivals enables the firm to reap long-run monopoly profits starting in year 3. Thus, to avoid treble damages, the firm would have to give rivals access to any plant that constitutes a sufficient improvement over other market options to enjoy monopoly power. And if a firm has to give its rivals access to such a plant, there is no incentive to make the investment necessary to create the market-improving plant at all.

One might be tempted to respond that “of course, we would not be stupid enough to apply the profit-sacrifice test to that sort of case,” and that this is thus an attack on a straw man. But then one has to ask what precisely are the normative criteria that determine when the profit-sacrifice test would apply and when it wouldn’t. If we have nothing to go on other than “we know it when we see it,” then the resulting test is no better than a conclusory standard and a good deal worse since it does not even provide a placeholder term to remind us to undertake the normative analysis. If we would use implicit normative criteria for determining what sorts of conduct that exclude rivals is desirable even when

74. For elaboration, see infra Parts III.A.1 & 3.
it sacrifices profits, then those implicit criteria are what really does the work, and we should focus on defining them explicitly rather than hiding normative judgments in ad hoc decisions about when to apply the profit-sacrifice test.

Nor are the above points limited to investments as dramatic as the creation of new physical property that will enjoy monopoly power. The same would be true for investments that enhance or maintain the value of existing property that, when enhanced or maintained, confers monopoly power. Thus, the profit-sacrifice test would also deter a firm from making an investment in remodeling its plant to enhance its efficiency in a way that would make it sufficiently market-improving to reap monopoly profits. It would even deter a firm from making optimal investments for maintenance upkeep on a plant that was already sufficiently better than other market options to enjoy monopoly power. One might again try to avoid these problems by creating some additional exceptions, but that again begs the question of what the normative criteria for recognizing exceptions are.

Indeed, the point is not even limited to investments in property. It also applies to investments in the nexus of contractual rights we call firms. Often, what gives a firm monopoly power is not its property rights, but an advantage in personnel, organization, or distribution. Firms may need to make costly investments to train personnel to make a product better or more cheaply, or to adopt changes in organization or distribution that yield great efficiencies. Investments in creating a brand with a desirable reputation (that is, advertising) may also be necessary to efficiently overcome the consumer information costs that would otherwise lead consumers to underconsume because they find information costs too high and uninformed consumption too risky. All those sorts of investments can involve short-term sacrifices in profits that would be irrational unless the firm expects the investment to give it some advantage that allows it to price above cost in the future—that is, reaps the firm some significant market power that a court might well deem monopoly power. If a rival could wait out the investments and then claim that access to the personnel, organization, distribution system, or brand is necessary for it to compete away those supracompetitive profits, then those investments will never be made in the first place.

None of these consequences make any sense. Delayed gratification is not an antitrust offense. The proposed standard fails not because it runs into difficulties in idiosyncratic cases but for the fundamental reason that sacrificing short-term profits to make the sort of investments that enable one to destroy one’s rivals in the future is ordinarily not a sign of evil but the mark of capitalistic virtue.
C. Sacrificing Profits Is Not Necessary for Undesirable Exclusionary Conduct Either

The standard also fails because it turns out that sacrificing short-term profits is normally not even necessary for illicit monopolization. This is most obvious in cases where the defendant uses a horizontal conspiracy, extramarket activities, or tortious conduct to further monopoly power. After establishing that point, I move on to the less obvious task of showing that the same is true when the monopolist unilaterally imposes conditions on access to its product, a task which requires exposing the single monopoly profit myth that has come to distort thought in this area.

1. Horizontal conspiracies, extramarket activities, and tortious conduct.

Consider the offense of horizontally combining to form a monopoly or monopolistic cartel. This activity is immediately profitable without any sacrifice of short-run profits. True, one could normally tackle those cases through § 1 liability for concerted action under the Sherman Antitrust Act. But that does not alter the doctrinal embarrassment that combinations are conduct that the courts have always held to constitute monopolization under § 2 even though they would not meet the proposed profit-sacrificing standard for determining which conduct constitutes monopolization.

Further, there is at least one important case that could not be challenged under § 1: the case of an unsuccessful attempt to combine to form a monopolistic cartel, which could only be challenged as attempted monopolization under § 2 since § 1 does not cover attempted conspiracy.

More fundamentally, there are many undesirable forms of unilateral exclusionary conduct that do not involve short-term sacrifices of profits. This is easiest to see for unilateral extramarket activities, like filing false papers to procure a patent that excludes rivals. Filing false papers is no more costly than filing honest papers, and indeed may even be cheaper because it requires less research. Yet the Court in *Walker Process* had no difficulty concluding that filing false patent papers to secure a monopoly constituted illegal monopolization. The same is true for many other activities that influence governmental action to exclude rivals but which lie outside the scope of

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75. *See, e.g.,* United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 576 (1966); Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 783-84, 808-09, 813-14 (1946) (noting that this constitutes monopolization as well as a conspiracy to monopolize); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 70-75 (1911) (same).


antitrust petitioning immunity. These often can inflict costs on rivals that immediately hamper their ability to compete and thus produce higher profits in the short run that exceed any petitioning costs. In *Continental Ore*, the defendant vanadium producer simply had its subsidiary exercise a discretionary agency power it had been given to exclude rivals, an activity that required no short-term sacrifice of profits. Other cases deny immunity for baseless litigation that harms rivals or for procuring rubberstamp governmental approvals, activities which might often reap immediate gains for monopolists that swamp any petitioning costs.

The same is also true of many unilateral market activities by monopolists that are tortious in nature. Consider, for example, the simple tactic of falsely disparaging the quality of rival products. Such deceptive conduct by a monopolist to enhance or maintain its monopoly power is patently undesirable, and has been held to constitute monopolizing conduct. Yet, there is no reason to think it involves a short-term sacrifice of profits. Lying is cheap in the short run, and can immediately shift buyers away from rivals. The costs of lying are, if anything, likely to come in the long run, when the consumers figure out the lies, which should diminish the reputation of the lying firm in a way that may make consumers more reluctant to buy from it. But by then the anticompetitive exclusion of the rival may have already been achieved. In any event, here is a form of monopolizing conduct that can often be entirely profitable in the short run.

One can easily generalize the point to many other forms of tortious conduct against rivals that enhances or maintains monopoly power. For example, monopolists have sometimes resorted to destroying or damaging their rival’s property to hamper them from making or distributing their products. Such activities are clearly undesirable ways of enhancing or maintaining monopoly power, and have thus been held to constitute monopolization. Yet, such

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conduct can be entirely profitable in the short run because it undermines a rival’s short-term ability to compete. Likewise, a monopolist who bribes another firm’s employees to get them to shift business from rivals or to divulge the rival’s trade secrets need not sacrifice any short-run profits, especially if the bribe is paid only after the business is diverted. Yet, such conduct has also been held to constitute monopolization.\textsuperscript{84}

Again, one can try to gerrymand the profit-sacrifice test by creating ad hoc exceptions making it inapplicable in cases (like the above) where it does not work. Indeed, in its briefing, the U.S. government has taken precisely that position, acknowledging that fraud, deception, sham litigation, and bad-faith administrative filings are cases where its profit-sacrifice test does not work and then making that test inapplicable in those cases.\textsuperscript{85} Perhaps they would also concede this test should not apply to conspiracies or other tortious conduct. But whatever the set of exceptions it might be willing to define, the real decisions are being made by whatever implicit norm determines when the profit-sacrifice test does and doesn’t apply. And the government offers no test for when its profit-sacrifice test applies. If it means to say that the profit-sacrifice test applies except in cases where undesirable exclusionary conduct does not require a profit-sacrifice, then the real question is what the criteria are to determine desirability.

Nor is this problem with the profit-sacrifice test solved by merely recognizing exceptions for horizontal conspiracies, extramarket activities, and tortious conduct, as I show next.

\textbf{2. Nontortious unilateral market conduct and the single monopoly profit myth.}

The problems with the profit-sacrifice test extend even to nontortious unilateral market conduct. In particular, these problems also apply when judging conditions a monopolist might unilaterally impose on the availability and prices of monopoly goods. This point requires more explanation because it is an issue that has become obscured by the single monopoly profit myth. The genesis of this myth was a famous article by Aaron Director and Edward H. Levi, which argued that, to get buyers to accept any undesirable restriction to exclude rivals, a monopolist would have to offer a discount (from the monopoly price it would otherwise charge) that sufficed to offset any harm the

\textsuperscript{84} See Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 624 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1980).

restriction imposed on buyers. Although Director and Levi themselves pointed out that this might sometimes benefit the monopolist when the restriction imposed even greater costs on rivals, some have been misled by this form of argument to conclude that exclusionary conditions imposed by a monopolist can never really harm buyers, and thus should be per se lawful.

The profit-sacrificing standard appears to rest on the more modest premise that Director and Levi’s point holds in the short run—and thus requires the monopolist to incur a short-term sacrifice in profits to impose any undesirable condition—but that this sacrifice can be more than made up by the long-run increase in monopoly prices made possible once the exclusionary conduct has excluded rivals or impaired their efficiency. Exclusionary conduct might, for example, foreclose enough of the market to deprive rivals of: (1) efficiencies of scale in production or research, (2) learning curve economies, (3) network effects, or (4) the most efficient distributors or suppliers. That can deter entry, drive rivals out of the market, slow down their growth, or simply leave rivals less efficient than they otherwise would have been. When it has any of those effects, rivals will have less ability in the future to restrain the monopolist from raising prices, so an investment in lowering short-term prices to get buyers to accept the exclusionary conduct will allow the monopolist to charge higher long-run prices than it otherwise could have.

But this sort of logical premise for a profit-sacrificing standard itself raises an immediate problem. Why would buyers agree to buy under a policy that gives them short-term benefits that are outweighed by a long-term cost, when on balance they are worse off? This is a problem not just for exclusionary agreements with buyers but even for exclusionary conduct that would be deemed purely unilateral—like predatory pricing or refusals to deal with rivals—because buyers could always cease doing business with any monopolist known to engage in tactics designed to increase its long-run ability to exploit buyers. The answer is obvious if you think about it. If there were only one buyer who was the ultimate consumer of the monopoly product, that buyer wouldn’t agree to buy from a firm that engaged in such exclusionary tactics. Such a unitary consumer would compare the same short-term benefits and long-term costs that the monopolist is considering in reverse, and say “no

87. Id. at 290.
89. For example, the leading antitrust treatise mistakenly believes that a monopolist cannot increase short-run profits with exclusive dealing, but acknowledges that it can cause long-term harm to buyers and competition. See XI HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1802d5, at 72 (1998).
90. See infra text accompanying notes 209-215 (summarizing these theories).
thanks.” So the answers must lie in the realities that (1) there often are multiple buyers and (2) they often are not ultimate consumers but intermediate buyers. But those same realities also indicate that a monopolist need not sacrifice any short-term profits to impose undesirable exclusionary conditions. To see why, let’s take each reality in turn.

**Collective Action Problems.** Most markets have not one buyer but many buyers. This reality means that those buyers face serious collective action problems when confronting a unitary monopolist. Those collective action problems can make it individually rational for each buyer to agree with a monopolist to restrictions that harm buyers as a group. Suppose each buyer is offered a small short-term discount from a monopoly price if it will agree to buy under an exclusionary policy that will, if most buyers agree to it, hamper the ability of rivals to compete and thus enhance the seller’s market power against all buyers. If they think about the anticompetitive consequences at all, each buyer will individually reason that, if enough other buyers agree to the exclusionary policy, then the seller will successfully create or protect anticompetitive seller market power regardless of what the individual buyer does, since it alone does not have a large enough buyer share to prevent that marketwide result from occurring. And, if enough other buyers do not agree to the exclusionary policy, then the seller will fail to gain or protect anticompetitive market power regardless of what the individual buyer does. Thus, no matter what it expects other buyers to do, each individual buyer has incentives to agree to the exclusionary policy in exchange for the discount because its individual decision has little influence on whether the adverse marketwide effects occur, but does definitely determine whether or not that buyer gets a discount. Since every buyer has those individual incentives, each will agree to the exclusionary policy for a small discount even though those

91. Where the defendant is acting as a monopsonist, the answers lie in the parallel realities that: (1) there often are multiple suppliers and (2) any supplier is not the ultimate consumer.

A third possibility is that the buyer’s management might agree to an anticompetitive policy that is contrary to the buyer’s long-term interests because agency costs make the management an imperfect decisionmaker for the buyer’s interests. For example, if agency costs meant that a manager only gets credit for events that happen during her tenure, then she might be tempted to agree to short-term discounts that are profitable in the short run, and thus earn her a promotion or a better job elsewhere, leaving the long-run harm of higher costs to be blamed either on her successor or on marketwide forces. Such agency cost problems would seem to be the only explanation for why a short-term bribe would persuade a single, consuming buyer to agree to an anticompetitive scheme that harms it in the long run. However, the proponents of the short-term profit-sacrificing test do not base their claim on a theory of agency costs, perhaps because considering similar agency costs on the monopolist’s side would undermine their premise that the exclusionary schemes must be efficient. See Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 550-552 (1985).

agreements will collectively create or protect the anticompetitive market power that imposes a long-term harm on them all. Indeed, if there are many buyers, their individual decisions will have so little effect on the marketwide outcome that none will find it worthwhile to incur the costs of even thinking through the anticompetitive consequences—they will simply accept any discount offered.

Such collective action problems can explain why buyers agree to any of the conduct condemned as monopolization by the Supreme Court. They explain why buyers agree to short-term below-cost predatory prices even though that drives out rivals and creates greater long-term monopoly profits that buyers must pay. They explain why, in *Lorain Journal*, individual firms continued to advertise with a newspaper monopolist that refused to deal with firms that bought advertising from its radio station rival, even though that exclusionary condition hampered competition that otherwise would have lowered the newspaper’s advertising prices charged to those advertisers. They explain why, in *Griffith*, a chain that had a theater monopoly in some towns could get multiple film distributors to agree to give that chain exclusive rights in other towns even though that extended the chain’s monopoly power against the distributors to more towns. They explain why, in *United Shoe*, a monopolist supplier of shoe machinery could get 1460 shoe manufacturers to agree to lease restrictions with “virtually no expressed dissatisfaction” even though, in the Court’s opinion, the restrictions harmedly excluded the monopolist’s rivals and thus raised long-run machinery prices. They explain why, in *Aspen*, skiers continued to buy ski lift tickets from the monopolist ski mountain even though it changed to a no-joint-pass policy that made those lift tickets less desirable to consumers and, in the Court’s view, increased long-run monopoly prices against them. And they explain why, in *Kodak*, owners continued to buy parts from Kodak even though the new policy of bundling them with service, in the Court’s view, might increase Kodak’s monopoly profits. Indeed, it is this

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93. *See Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts Are Not Predatory*, supra note 8, at 60-61 (explaining why these collective action problems are not solved by rivals offering long-term contracts contingent on their survival).


97. *United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp.*, 110 F. Supp. 295, 340 (D. Mass. 1953), aff’d per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); CARL KAYSEN, UNITED STATES V. UNITED SHOE MACHINERY CORPORATION 278 (1956). An alternative view is that the defendant’s lease-only policy benefited buyers by lowering their financing, risk-bearing, and transaction costs, and that the various lease restrictions were necessary to maintain efficient incentives to use and maintain leased machines. *See John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Eric Rasmusen & J. Mark Ramseyer, The Leasing Monopolist*, 37 UCLA L. REV. 693, 709-17 (1990). If so, then collective action problems would not be necessary to explain the arrangements.


basic dynamic—that the monopolist can act as one while its buying counterparts have collective action problems—that gives the monopolist market power and enables any exclusionary conduct harmful to those buyers.

But closer analysis reveals that, other than in the case of below-cost pricing, a monopolist can exploit buyers’ collective action problems without sacrificing short-term profits. Let’s begin by supposing that the offered discount is from the monopoly price that prevailed right before the exclusionary conduct was initiated. Even in that case there may be no discernable sacrifice of profits because the offered discount could be trivially small. The reason is that the collective action problems mean each individual buyer has incentives to accept that trivially small discount because there is an even smaller likelihood that its individual refusal to participate will prevent marketwide exclusion of rivals. If there are 1000 buyers, each individual buyer will conclude that its decision to participate will definitely earn it the trivial discount and that the decisions of the other 999 buyers will determine whether the scheme successfully excludes the seller’s rival regardless of what the individual buyer decides.

Further, any such discount can be paid in an end-of-year rebate, by which point the enhanced monopoly power may well have already kicked in and begun increasing profits. If so, the monopolist may not even have to sacrifice even a trivial amount of short-term profits. By setting the timing of rebates after whatever time the exclusionary scheme begins to enhance or maintain monopoly profits, a monopolist can avoid ever sacrificing profits.

It is only a small step from these points to realize that the discount does not have to be from whatever price prevailed before the exclusionary conduct started. It suffices to offer contracts that give buyers a future discount from whatever turns out to be the future market price. Each individual buyer will still have incentives to agree to accept exclusionary conduct in exchange for that discount no matter what it expects other buyers to do, for all the same collective action reasons noted above. Because every buyer has incentives to agree, the exclusionary conduct will succeed in raising future market prices, and thus the discount will be from a future price baseline that was inflated by the exclusionary scheme itself. Accordingly, the firm seeking to create or maintain a monopoly by offering such a future discount need not sacrifice any short-term profits at all.

Indeed, even when a firm couples its exclusionary policy with a fixed price, that price may not entail any sacrifice of short-term profits. This is because buyers will accept that fixed price as long as it reflects a discount from the expected future supracompetitive price. If, given collective action problems, each buyer expects a sufficient number of other buyers to agree to the exclusionary conduct, the expected future price will be inflated by the predicted success of the exclusionary conduct. Thus, each buyer will accept exclusionary conduct as long as the associated price is discounted from the full monopoly
price the firm will be able to charge in the future (given the predicted impairment of rival efficiency from the exclusionary conduct) even though that price is above the prices that preceded the exclusionary scheme.\footnote{For a model proving this for exclusive dealing, see Eric B. Rasmusen, J. Mark Ramseyer & John S. Wiley, Jr., \textit{Naked Exclusion}, 81 \textit{A.M.ECON. REV.} 1137 (1991).}

In short, in any case where collective action problems mean that a firm can successfully exploit buyers by offering short-term discounts that sacrifice current profits in exchange for acceptance of exclusionary conduct that raises long-run monopoly prices, those same collective action problems mean that the firm can do the same without sacrificing short-term profits at all. It can exploit collective action problems by offering trivial discounts from prior prices that have no noticeable effect on short-term profits or rebates whose payment is delayed until after the monopoly profits are enhanced. It can even offer prices that are a discount only from the expected long-run monopoly prices that will result when the scheme succeeds, and thus actually allow the firm to \textit{increase} short-term profits.

This may be precisely what happened in \textit{Griffith}, where there was no evidence that the defendant threatened to withhold its services in monopoly towns at all, let alone that it discounted those monopoly services to get the exclusionary rights in other towns.\footnote{See \textit{Griffith v. United States}, 334 U.S. 100, 104-05, 107-08 (1948).} Nor was there any evidence of a short-term profit sacrifice in \textit{Lorain Journal, United Shoe}, or \textit{Kodak}. Indeed, the Court in \textit{United Shoe} held illegal practices by a monopolist that it acknowledged were traditional in the industry and used by the firm’s nonmonopolist rivals, even though these facts meant those nonmonopoly firms must thus have found the practice profitable even without any increased monopoly returns.\footnote{\textit{United Shoe Mach. Corp.}, 110 F. Supp. at 340, 344 (D. Mass. 1953), \textit{aff'd per curiam}, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). Also suggesting that the practices were profitable even without any contribution to monopoly returns was the fact that the practices were used by the defendant before becoming a monopolist. \textit{See} Wiley et al., \textit{supra} note 97, at 717.} Also inconsistent with a profit-sacrificing requirement is the fact that the \textit{Otter Tail} Court rejected the defense that the alleged misconduct prevented a loss of profits, stating that the ""promotion of self-interest alone does not . . . immunize otherwise illegal conduct.""\footnote{410 U.S. 366, 380 (1973) (quoting United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 375 (1967)).}

Even in \textit{Aspen}, the case that comes closest to articulating a short-term profit-sacrificing test, the defendant does not appear to have actually sacrificed short-term profits. To be sure, the Court emphasized that, by discontinuing its cooperation with its rival on a joint ski pass, the defendant had sacrificed consumer goodwill and short-term profits it could have made by accepting its rival’s bank-funded vouchers or selling lift tickets to its rivals in bulk.\footnote{Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608, 610-11 (1985). But}
those sacrifices would mean a short-term sacrifice of overall profits only if the profits foregone by diminished consumer goodwill and lost sales through the rival were not exceeded by the increased short-term profits made by increased sales of the defendant’s three-mountain pass or separate lift tickets directly to consumers. Given that discontinuing the joint pass increased the defendant’s market share in its very first year, \(^{105}\) and that no evidence was cited that the total market output of ski lift tickets sold declined, it instead seems likely that the conduct increased the Aspen defendant’s profits even in the short run.

Intermediate Buyers (or Suppliers). The reality that monopolists often sell to intermediate buyers means that those buyers can also have strong incentives to agree to exclusionary arrangements even when buyers do not face collective action problems because they have market power (or can collectively be organized to have market power). The reason is that such intermediate buyers have incentives to collude with upstream sellers in ways that create supracompetitive profits for the sellers and intermediate buyers and pass on the anticompetitive costs to downstream buyers. In particular, intermediate buyers have incentives to agree to arrangements that preserve or enhance seller market power (by excluding or impairing the efficiency of the seller’s rivals) in exchange for either (1) side payments that split the seller’s supracompetitive profits or (2) special discounts that give the participating buyers market advantages over other buyers and thus enhance the participating buyers’ downstream market power. \(^{106}\) This is true whether buyers have market power individually or collectively, as long as the intermediate buyers sell to others in a downstream market. Indeed, the ability of intermediate buyers to reach agreements with sellers that help sellers acquire market power in exchange for a share of the resulting supracompetitive profits (either directly or by increasing the buyers’ downstream market power) is just one special application of the general Coase Theorem. \(^{107}\) Giving such side payments or special discounts is necessary to get these buyers to agree to the scheme that increases monopoly profits, but since those increased monopoly profits fund the side payments and special discounts, the monopolist need never sacrifice any profits.

In the side payment scenario, buyers agree to an arrangement that enhances seller market power, even if that means each buyer must pay more for the seller’s product, in exchange for the seller agreeing to share its supracompetitive profits through side payments. Such payments are

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105. See id. at 594.


107. See Areeda et al., supra note 106, at 204-06 & n.4; Hovenkamp, supra note 106.
distinguishable from simple product discounts because they are not made on a per-unit basis for a single product. Sometimes they reflect lump sum payments; other times they reflect discounts on multiple products. In either case, the key is that, because they are not mere per-unit discounts on a single product, such side payments do not decrease the buyers’ marginal cost for that product in a way that would cause them to pass on any savings from the side payments downstream to consumers. Instead, the increased prices for the monopolized good are passed on to the buyers’ customers as part of increased marginal costs without an offset for the side payment. The buyers’ losses thus result only from reduced sales, which can be more than offset by the side payments that are funded out of the sellers’ monopoly overcharge. In short, such side payments increase the buyer’s profits without reducing its marginal costs, and thus effectively constitute the payment of a share of the sellers’ enhanced monopoly profits in exchange for helping the seller enhance those monopoly profits.

In the special discount scenario, participating buyers agree to the arrangement in exchange for special per-unit discounts that are unavailable to nonparticipating buyers. These special discounts enhance the participating buyers’ market power downstream by giving them a cost advantage over existing or potential rivals that effectively constitutes a barrier to rival expansion or entry. In these cases, the seller effectively agrees to enhance the participating buyers’ downstream market power (through discounts unavailable to the buyers’ rivals) in exchange for the participating buyers helping to maintain and enhance the seller’s market power upstream (by excluding the seller’s rivals).

In some cases, the special discount to these participating buyers might just offset the supracompetitive price inflation that results from the enhanced seller market power. Sellers have incentives to agree to such special discounts because the agreements with the participating buyers that enhance seller market power enable the sellers to charge supracompetitive price levels to the nonparticipating buyers. The participating buyers have incentives to agree because the agreement does not increase their costs, but does increase the costs of their rivals. This helps the participating buyers keep out new entrants, and oust or hobble their rivals. In such cases, the exchange is a straightforward trade of enhanced seller market power (exercised against other rival buyers) in exchange for enhanced buyer market power (exercised against downstream buyers). Profits for both seller and buyers will increase in the short run.

In other cases, the special discounts might even exceed the supracompetitive price inflation attributable to whatever aid the participating buyers provide to seller market power. In these cases, the seller effectively gives the participating buyers a share of the proceeds from its enhanced seller market power against nonparticipating buyers, and enhances the participating buyers’ downstream market power. The larger the share of purchases made by the participating buyers, the less advantageous such a scheme can be to the
seller. But if the ratio of nonparticipating buyers is sufficiently high, the seller can profit in the short run from such a scheme.

Perhaps more typically, the special discounts are smaller than the supracompetitive price inflation that results from the enhanced seller market power. That would result in prices to the participating buyers that are higher than they would be without the agreement. Even then, these buyers might be willing to agree to this price increase because their special discount means that the price increase raises their rivals’ costs more than their own, and thus enhances participating buyers’ market power compared to rival buyers. In this case, the participating buyers would pay some premium (in input prices) in exchange for an increase in their downstream profits. Here, the participating buyers effectively give the seller a share of the supracompetitive profits created by their enhanced buyer market power, as well as give the seller enhanced market power against nonparticipating buyers. Again, this is clearly profitable for the monopolist seller even in the short run.

Indeed, this last scenario is what happened in the mother of all monopolization cases, the famous Standard Oil case. Back then, railroad transportation was necessary to get crude oil to refiners and then distribute refined oil. Standard Oil agreed to pay the railroads at least 15% more than it was previously paying in exchange for the railroads making sure that the price paid by Standard Oil was a significant discount from the price charged to other oil refiners. Faced with transportation costs that were now significantly higher than Standard Oil’s, the other refiners were either driven out of the market or, because they realized they could not compete at this cost disadvantage, sold their business to Standard Oil.

Interestingly enough, a powerful buyer has incentives to agree to arrangements that create or enhance seller market power even though the seller does not guarantee the buyer any special discount in exchange. The reason is that, even without any formal seller commitment, a buyer with market power knows that it will have the leverage to negotiate for some special discount from the supracompetitive price that a seller with market power will charge to buyers who have no significant market share. And that special discount will give the powerful buyer an additional advantage over its rivals in the downstream market. In contrast, if the seller market were perfectly competitive, then seller prices will all be at cost, and even a powerful buyer will not be able to negotiate any special discount from a price set at cost because no seller wants to lose money. True, faced with a competitive seller market, a buyer with monopsony power will buy at prices that are below the competitive level, but those lower prices result from lower marketwide output that puts sellers at a

110. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 32-33; Granitz & Klein, supra note 106, at 14.
lower point on their marginal cost curves, and thus still results in prices that are at cost and are equally available to the buyer’s rivals. That can be a profitable way to exploit existing buyer market power, but will not increase that buyer’s downstream market power vis-à-vis rival buyers. Thus, counterintuitively, a powerful buyer will often prefer to create or maintain seller market power even though the buyer knows that such power will increase prices.

This last point explains the continued implementation of the scheme in *Standard Oil*. In that case, a corporate charter and contracts initially provided a formal commitment to special discounts, which caused all the major rival refiners in Cleveland to sell to their businesses to Standard Oil, thus giving it buyer market power.\(^{111}\) But the formal commitment was withdrawn before it was ever implemented because it provoked crude oil suppliers to strike violently and the Pennsylvania legislature to revoke the corporate charter for the entity that was going to be the vehicle for guaranteeing these special discounts.\(^{112}\) Why then did Standard Oil continue to assist railroads to enhance their market power over transportation? The answer is that Standard Oil’s buyer market power sufficed to enable it to negotiate for special discounts without any formal commitment by the railroads.\(^{113}\) And those special discounts in turn forced the rest of the refiners to sell their businesses to Standard Oil.\(^ {114}\) To get the benefit of those special discounts, Standard Oil was willing not only to pay more than the competitive rate for transportation but to block a new transportation technology (pipelines) that would have lowered its transportation costs.\(^ {115}\)

Where intermediate buyers do not have market power, they are instead likely to have collective action problems that can also drive them to accept special discounts even though the discount is from a supracompetitive price. Each buyer has incentives to agree to the special discount even if the price is higher than the prior price in order to gain a market advantage over nonparticipating rivals. Further, each individual buyer realizes that, if it did not agree to accept this price, it would suffer a market disadvantage by paying higher expected future prices than its rivals and that this market disadvantage might drive it from the market. But because every buyer has those same incentives, the end result will be that no buyer has any market advantage over other buyers because they will have all agreed to the exclusionary agreements that in aggregate give the seller enhanced market power to charge them higher prices than otherwise would have prevailed on the market.

\(^{111}\) Granitz & Klein, *supra* note 106, at 9-10, 14-16.
\(^{112}\) *Id.* at 14-15.
\(^{113}\) *Id.* at 17-20. When railroads extended special discounts to rival refiners, Standard Oil exercised its buyer market power aggressively to force railroads to keep the discounts special to Standard Oil. *Id.* at 27-31, 34-35.
\(^ {114}\) *Id.* at 20-23.
\(^ {115}\) *Id.* at 18-22, 31-37.
Buyers who are not monopsonists but have some degree of market power may begin with a side payment or special discount strategy, but end up with a collective action problem. Such buyers may agree to exclusionary conduct because they expect that the discounts they receive will give them an advantage over their rivals that enhances their downstream market power. But they may find that this induces other buyers to likewise agree, with the end result that no buyer enjoys a special discount or market advantage over others. Instead, each buyer will have received a discount from a price that has been inflated by the fact that the marketwide effects have helped the seller enhance, maintain, or slow down the erosion of its monopoly power. The existence of such collective action problems among buyers is not inconsistent with the fact that they may individually have some market power. After all, the classic prisoner’s dilemma creates such problems for only two actors, and thus two or more buyers with market power will likely find themselves vulnerable to these problems. True, such buyers are less likely to conclude that their individual agreement has no significant influence on whether the marketwide anticompetitive effect will occur. But the same problem can result because their individual decisions definitely determine whether they get a discount that inures to only their benefit, but has lower odds of determining whether a marketwide harm is created that would, if created, be shared with the other buyers anyway.

None of the above scenarios involving side payments or special discounts require a monopolist to sacrifice any short-term profits. To the contrary, in all these scenarios the side payments and special discounts are funded out of the additional supracompetitive profits that the exclusionary scheme creates. Thus, they can be expected to involve an increase in short-term profits as well as long-term profits. For example, in *Standard Oil*, the monopolizing conduct increased the short-run profits of both the railroads and Standard Oil.116

D. Conclusion

Even the canonical sort of exclusionary conduct envisioned by a standard that focuses on whether the monopolist sacrificed short-term profits depends upon the existence of buyer collective action problems or seller-buyer collusion to harm downstream buyers. The existence of these two realities is thus necessary to explain why monopolizing conduct could ever succeed. Yet, as the analysis above shows, those same realities also mean that a short-term sacrifice in profits might never be necessary. Thus, the nature of the underlying problems explodes any claim that the sacrifice of short-term profits should be the key factor in determining whether monopolization has occurred.

The fundamental problem with the profit-sacrifice test is that it focuses on the timeline of efforts to increase profits rather than on whether the means of

116. *Id.* at 12-14, 24-27.
increasing profits are desirable. Firms can increase profits through desirable activities or undesirable activities. Both desirable and undesirable activities sometimes require a short-term sacrifice of profits to reap long-term gains, and sometimes do not. Thus, the key question is not whether a business strategy requires delayed gratification. The key question is what our standards are for judging which activities are desirable and which are undesirable.

True, as noted above, one can read some versions of the profit-sacrifice test as focused not on the timeline of actual profits, but on whether the conduct would (at whatever time) have sacrificed profits but for a harm to rival competition. Such a reading would at least avoid immunizing much of the undesirable conduct detailed in Part II.C. However, it would still condemn desirable conduct like above-cost price cuts and innovation and investment to improve product quality or lower price, which Parts II.A and II.B showed often does sacrifice profits unless it enables a firm to drive out rivals. One might try to defend the test by saying that it only means to cover cases where rivals are excluded in undesirable ways, and thus does not cover the exclusion of rivals by such activities as offering above-cost prices or excluding rivals from a superior product, perhaps by asserting that these are not “really” exclusions of competition. But then the key work is being done by whatever unarticulated norm of desirability determines which exclusions of rivals count and which do not.

The general problem is that the efforts to modify the profit-sacrifice test to avoid its substantive defects necessarily require distinguishing between profits earned desirably (even if it excludes rivals) and profits earned undesirably (by excluding rivals in undesirable ways). Not only does this beg the question of what the criteria of desirability are, it also eliminates any administrability benefit by converting the test from one based on actual profits to one based on the desirability of how those profits were acquired. Further, once one stipulates the requisite criteria of desirability necessary to give this test meaning, one could simply apply that standard directly to the conduct in question, rather than doing so indirectly by deciding which profits to count. Thus, these efforts to salvage the profit-sacrifice test only make it just as conclusive as existing standards like the “legitimate” or “valid” business purpose tests, but more complicated to apply. Presumably, the underlying standard of desirability that would be invoked has something to do with efficiency. But it obscures the underlying efficiency inquiry by requiring it to be reframed as a question of hypothetical profitability once undesirable profits are excluded.

One important issue obscured by a profit-sacrifice test is whether, in monopolization cases, the existence of an efficiency benefit should suffice to immunize conduct or instead be weighed against the anticompetitive costs in the normal rule of reason fashion. If the proposed test would make a profit-sacrifice necessary to prove monopolization, it would seem to presuppose the former answer. After all, if there is an efficiency benefit, even a nonmonopolist
would find the conduct profitable, and thus the monopolist should find the conduct profitable even once one subtracts any additional monopoly returns from undesirably hampering rivals. Maybe that is sometimes the correct answer, but rather than address such issues through the indirect and obscuring rubric of hypothetical profitability analysis, it is better to address the efficiency issues directly, which is what I turn to next.

III. RESOLVING BASELINE PROBLEMS WITH PREVAILING EFFICIENCY INQUIRIES

Although Supreme Court monopolization cases have generally rested on conclusory labels, such as whether conduct is “exclusionary,” “competition on the merits,” or had “legitimate,” “normal,” or “valid” business purposes, there are several sentences in the Aspen opinion that suggest an underlying norm with more content, and that norm is economic efficiency. The Aspen Court began its analysis by stating: “If a firm has been ‘attempting to exclude rivals on some basis other than efficiency,’ it is fair to characterize its behavior as predatory.” The Court also said that the jury’s conclusion that the conduct was not justified by any normal business purpose was supported by the defendant’s “failure to offer any efficiency justification” for its conduct. Finally, the Court summarized its analysis by saying the evidence supported the conclusion that the defendant “was not motivated by efficiency concerns and that it was willing to sacrifice short-run benefits and consumer goodwill in exchange for a perceived long-run impact on its smaller rival.” This reference to a lack of efficiency motivation would seem to conceptually limit any reliance on a pure short-term profit-sacrificing test, indicating that the Court did not believe such a profit-sacrifice was itself sufficient to prove illegality.

This is certainly an important step toward developing a coherent standard. Unfortunately, this seeming identification of efficiency as the relevant norm has not been repeated in the other Supreme Court monopolization cases, including the Kodak decision that followed. And even the Aspen Court never makes clear that efficiency is the sole normative standard rather than just one factor in determining whether a justification is “valid” or not. True, as a

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117. See supra Part I.B.
119. Id. at 608.
120. Id. at 610–11 (footnote omitted).
121. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 483 & n.32 (1992) (stating that “[l]iability turns . . . on whether ‘valid business reasons’ can explain Kodak’s actions” or whether it has “valid business justifications” or “legitimate competitive reasons,” without ever identifying efficiency as the norm by which validity and legitimacy is judged) (citation omitted).
122. Some have concluded that the criteria for determining when monopoly-furthering
predictive matter, it would be surprising (given its other antitrust precedents) if the Supreme Court did not embrace some form of an efficiency norm as the principal criterion to judge which monopoly-furthering conduct constitutes illegal monopolization. But even if we assume this, the problem remains that the Supreme Court’s scant development of the issue means that none of its monopolization opinions address the baseline issues necessary to give the efficiency concept more definitive content. In particular, none of the cases answer the key question: Efficient compared to what?

A. Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Efficiencies

1. Ex ante efficiencies and their relation to property rights.

One important baseline issue the Supreme Court has yet to face is whether to consider efficiency from an ex ante or ex post perspective. As a result, the Court’s methodology for considering whether such efficiencies exist has so far focused solely on ex post efficiencies. For many cases, this turns out to be the functional equivalent of mistakenly focusing only on whether the monopolist has sacrificed short-term profits to exclude its rival.

This was certainly the case in Aspen itself. There the Court held that the defendant, which owned three of the four ski mountains in Aspen, engaged in monopolization because it refused to continue cooperating with the rival that owned the other mountain in offering a joint four-mountain ski pass. The Court reasoned that, while a monopolist did not always have a duty to cooperate with rivals, it could not refuse to do so without a valid business reason. The Court then relied on the following to show that there was no valid business reason or efficiency justification for the refusal: (1) Consumers liked the four-mountain pass, and could weigh mountain quality as they saw fit under a joint pass that allocated revenue by consumer usage; (2) the defendant’s rival lost market share when the joint pass was discontinued; (3) the defendant had to forego profits it could have made by accepting its rival’s bank-funded vouchers or selling lift tickets to its rival in bulk; and (4) accepting the four-mountain pass (or equivalent vouchers) did not impose higher monitoring or administrative costs than the other means by which the defendant sold lift.

ABA SECTION ON ANTITRUST, 2002 ANNUAL REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 249 (5th ed. 2003) (emphasis added).

123. See Aspen, 472 U.S. at 600-05.
124. Id. at 605-07, 609-10.
125. Id. at 608.
126. Id.
tickets.\textsuperscript{127}

But one could say the same sorts of things for just about every case after a firm has already invested in the creation, enhancement, or maintenance of property that consumers regard as so much more valuable than other market options that the firm that controls access to that property enjoys monopoly power. Consumers will prefer to have the monopolist share that property with rivals, since that will drive down prices. Rivals denied access to that property will lose market share. The firm that denies rival access will lose profits it could have made by giving rivals access to its property. And ordinarily, monitoring or administrative costs will not be any higher when access is given to rivals, or at least not higher than the revenue from selling that access. Thus, failing to share with rivals the property that confers monopoly power will almost always look inefficient from this purely ex post perspective.

Nor is the logic producing that conclusion a simple result of the four factors the Aspen Court happened to examine. The more fundamental problem is that, from an ex post perspective, excluding rivals from any property rights valuable and unique enough to enjoy monopoly power will generally constrain consumer choice, lower output, and raise prices, thus producing allocative inefficiency. This is certainly true with intellectual property, where sharing is normally costless, and thus any dissemination of the knowledge protected by the property right will produce more efficient competition in using that knowledge. But it is also true with any other kind of physical property that gives the owner monopoly power,\textsuperscript{128} assuming sharing is not more costly than the efficiency gains from competitive use of the property.

Such an ex post approach ignores the ex ante reality that it is precisely the prospect of being able to exclude rivals from one’s property and charge a price above the marginal cost of using it that is necessary to encourage the prior investments that created the property, or enhanced or maintained its value. Indeed, any antitrust law judgment that mandatory sharing is efficient would seem to raise considerable tension with the property law judgment that a right to exclude furthers social welfare. As the Court has elsewhere noted, “the right to exclude others” is “‘one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.’”\textsuperscript{129} The recognition of a property right reflects a government determination that the property right creates

\textsuperscript{127} Id. at 608-09.

\textsuperscript{128} If the property were readily duplicable by rivals, then it would not confer such monopoly power. But there are other reasons why monopoly power might be lacking even if duplication were impossible, such as when other sorts of property confer similar advantages that prevent an owner of the nonduplicable property from raising prices above cost. For example, while patents cannot be duplicated, sometimes they lack market power because other patents provide substitutes for accomplishing the same functional goal.

desirable incentives for investment. This is true whether one subscribes to the now-dominant utilitarian theories of property or to the Lockean theory that mixing in the investment of one’s labor to increase the value of property makes one morally deserving of having one’s property rights protected.

True, Locke articulated his theory in a way that seemed to limit it to investments that take the form of labor, but that was based on his empirical premise that “labor makes for the greatest part of the value of things” and “ninety-nine hundredths” of the property expenses. Those factual suppositions may have been accurate in Locke’s times, but today the proportion of value is surely in the opposite direction. Thus, once one adjusts Locke’s empirical premise for the current reality, Locke’s logic would naturally extend his moral claim to other investments that, when mixed in, significantly increase the value of the property, and would thus make the nonlabor investor equally deserving of property rights protection.

A similar point about the relation of antitrust and property law was made by Harold Demsetz, who elegantly showed that whether one believes that a barrier to entry is desirable or not turns on whether one believes the property right to exclude that creates that barrier is desirable or not.

Since the whole point of property rights is to create barriers to entry by giving a right of exclusion, “the problem of defining ownership is precisely that of creating properly scaled legal barriers to entry.” If another body of law has created a property right to exclude outsiders, then that must be because a governmental lawmaker believed that right had desirable effects. If property rights are restricted to allow sharing and imitation, then a necessary cost will be a reduced incentive to invest and invent. Thus, antitrust courts cannot lower those barriers by restricting property rights without reducing whatever valuable effect
the property right was supposed to have. The same goes for rights to exclude rivals from one’s organization, personnel, or brand.\footnote{138}

2. The contrast with Schumpeter’s ex post efficiency claim about monopoly power.

The distinction between ex ante and ex post efficiency claims helps us disentangle the point here from a long-lasting debate between Schumpeter and his critics. The argument here is that the prospect of future monopoly profits is necessary to encourage ex ante innovation and investment to create that monopoly power. It thus differs entirely from, although it is often confused with, the Schumpeterian claim that existing market power fosters more innovation and investment ex post (that is, after the creation of the market power) because greater market power means the firm that innovates and invests will reap more of the fruits.\footnote{139}

Schumpeter’s argument has been contested on two levels, neither of which undermines the point here. First, Kenneth Arrow and others have offered economic models indicating that a firm that is already a monopolist has less incentive to invest in cost-reducing innovation.\footnote{140} The math is complex, but the logic simple. A monopolist by definition begins with lower output than a competitive market. Thus, any reduction in per-unit cost the monopolist earns from innovation must be multiplied by a smaller output to get the total gain. Further, a monopolist gains less from innovation because any monopoly profits that result from that innovation in part replace monopoly profits it was already earning. But Arrow’s model depends crucially on the assumption that a competitive firm that created a similar innovation would enjoy effective patent protection barring others from access to such an innovation, thus allowing it to reap monopoly profits in the future. In other words, Arrow’s model depends on the enforcement of patent rights to exclude rivals from the fruits of an investment in innovation, and would not hold if instead the successful innovator had to give rivals access to that innovation at marginal cost. Further, although limited to patent protection of cost-reducing innovation, Arrow’s model can readily be extended to other forms of property protection given to noninnovative investments that decrease product cost, as well as those given to innovations or other investments that increase product value. Thus, Arrow’s model confirms, not rebuts, the point that enforcement of those property rights

\footnote{138. \textit{See supra} Part II.B.}

\footnote{139. \textit{SCHUMPETER, supra} note 66, at 84-92, 99-106.}

against antitrust claims is necessary to maximize ex ante incentives to innovate and invest.

Nor does this Arrowian argument even effectively disprove Schumpeter’s claim, for Schumpeter’s claim was that existing market power is necessary to encourage innovation precisely where legal rights do not effectively protect innovation. Schumpeter was particularly concerned about innovative changes in organization, distribution, or scale that would not be protected legally by patents, and might thus go unrewarded without some existing market power.\textsuperscript{141} Thus, if antitrust duties to deal are extended to prevent firms from legally excluding rivals from the fruits of their innovations (or other investments), that would not only lessen future innovation and investment, but perversely increase the validity of Schumpeter’s claim that we have to tolerate great market power to get significant innovation or investment at all. Among other things, such an antitrust duty to deal would perversely mean that enforcement agencies should allow bigger mergers even when they would create market power, because that would encourage innovation and investment that otherwise would not occur because the antitrust duty had lessened property protection. Thus, the combination of Arrow’s model of effective property protection and Schumpeter’s analysis of incentives where property protection is ineffective demonstrates the vice rather than the virtue of allowing antitrust duties to deal to interfere with standard property rights.

The second level at which Schumpeter’s point has been criticized is by the theory of X-inefficiency, which argues that monopolists are more likely than competitive firms to exhibit laziness and other agency problems.\textsuperscript{142} This theory

\textsuperscript{141} See SCHUMPETER, supra note 66, at 84-85, 88-89. Arrow’s model further depends on the unrealistic assumption that the existing monopolist is immune from entry by innovating rivals. Schumpeter’s more realistic assumption was that monopolists face the threat that others will innovate in order to replace them through a process he called “creative destruction.” Id. Under that more realistic assumption, it can be shown that there are actually mixed effects. See TIROLE, supra note 140, at 392-96. These effects depend on whether the innovation is drastic or not, with a nondrastic innovation being one where preinnovation cost levels constrain a firm that controls any new innovation to charge less than the full monopoly price. An existing monopolist has greater incentives to create nondrastic innovations because when it makes such innovations the firm maintains its monopoly profits, whereas an entrant who makes such innovations gains only a share of duopoly profits. But an existing monopolist has less incentive to create drastic innovations because when it makes such innovations it replaces its existing monopoly profits to some extent, whereas an entrant who makes such a drastic innovation reaps full monopoly profits with no replacement offset. In either case, though, property protection is vital to encourage either a drastic or nondrastic innovation by either the monopolist or entrant.

makes a fair amount of sense from the perspective of corporate law theory, which normally stresses that, even though capital markets imperfectly constrain agency costs, those agency costs will be limited by product market competition.\(^{143}\) If the firm enjoys monopoly power, then this lessens the product market constraint and thus predictably should increase agency costs.\(^{144}\) But this rise in agency costs is by definition limited to the lesser of either the capital market constraint or the firm’s monopoly power, the latter of which can be no bigger than the difference in value or cost between its product and other market options. Thus, any rise in agency costs cannot exceed the benefits reaped by the creation or maintenance of monopoly power from desirable innovation or investment. In short, while X-inefficiencies may tend to reduce the important benefits of monopoly power that exist because of innovation and investment, they cannot eliminate those benefits. One should also not exaggerate the difference because agency costs will also persist (to a lesser degree) in competitive markets.\(^{145}\)

3. Problems with the case-by-case approach of restricting property rights when they are deemed not to create significant incentives to innovate.

This distinction between ex ante and ex post incentives to innovate also helps address various claims by many prominent scholars that patent rights should be restricted on a case-by-case basis by imposing antitrust duties only in those cases where courts have determined that the patent rights create little incentive to innovate. Although this scholarship has focused on patents, the logic behind the proposals for such case-by-case assessments extends in obvious ways to other forms of property rights.

For example, Professor Scherer argues that, while duties to deal would theoretically reduce incentives to invest in many industries, antitrust courts have correctly chosen to impose duties to license patents only in those industries where the duty would have no adverse effect on investment in innovation because firms still had competitive incentives to innovate.\(^{146}\) He


\(^{145}\) See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, *Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure*, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 330 (1976) (“[T]he existence of competition in product . . . markets will not eliminate the agency costs due to managerial control problems . . . . If my competitors all incur agency costs equal to or greater than mine I will not be eliminated from the market by their competition.”).

\(^{146}\) F. M. Scherer, The Economic Effects of Compulsory Patent Licensing 63, 75 (Graduate Sch. of Bus. Admin., Ctr. for the Study of Fin. Insts., N.Y. Univ., Monograph
finds this conclusion confirmed by evidence that the firms operating under these duties did not in fact invest any less in innovation than firms in other industries. But both his theory and evidence are purely ex post. They cannot tell us whether, if these firms had realized the law would impose this risk of compulsory patent licensing, they would have had sufficient ex ante incentives to create the initial inventions that led to the duty being imposed. Further, once judicial decisions did create such a legal risk of compulsory patent licensing, that risk would apply to all future innovations that might get patented by any firm. Thus, one would not expect this antitrust risk to diminish innovation more for those firms or industries that happened to have suffered compulsory licensing on past innovations. If anything, one would think that, since the firms subject to such duties in the past usually already possessed monopoly power, they would (under Schumpeterian analysis) have somewhat higher incentives to invest in innovation, which is in fact what Scherer found. But this does not alter the fact that such duties lower the ex ante incentive to invest for all firms who dream that innovation will bring them future monopoly profits.

Others have similarly suggested that, at least in the patent context, rather than giving inventors a categorical right to exclude in order to further their incentives to innovate, courts should employ a case-by-case standard that weighs the extent to which exclusion contributes to innovation incentives against the allocative inefficiency created by excluding imitators. An influential article by Louis Kaplow, for example, proposes that each restrictive practice imposed by a patentee should be evaluated by balancing “the reward the patentee receives” from the practice against “the monopoly loss that results.” Although he does not himself apply this test to refusals to license patents to rivals, modern case law would seem to make such refusals a “restrictive practice” that should be judged by his proposed test. But such a determination seems beyond the ken of antitrust judges and juries, and having it resolved through antitrust litigation is bound to produce great uncertainty and highly inconsistent results, which would make business planning impossible. Nor does it ask the right question, which is instead the relationship between the reward to the patentee and the social value of the invention. After all, the monopoly loss that results from the exclusion of rivals is an ex post loss that exists only if we compare it to a baseline that assumes the invention was made in the first place. But we get to that baseline only if there are adequate ex ante incentives to innovate, and those incentives will be optimal if the reward to the patentee equals the social value of the invention. That social value equals the difference in value between the market option created by the patent and the preexisting market options available from its rivals. Allowing the patentee to exclude rivals

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147. *Id.* at 95.
from its patent will generally allow it to charge a price premium no greater than that difference, for if it tried to charge any more, consumers would instead turn to the preexisting market options that were available without the patent. The same is true for any other sort of intellectual or physical property right recognized by the law to encourage investments.

Professors Ayres and Klemperer make the even stronger claim that “unconstrained monopoly pricing is not a cost-justified means of rewarding patentees” because “[t]he last bit of monopoly pricing produces large amounts of deadweight loss for a relatively small amount of patentee profit.”149 Thus, they conclude that “restricting the patentee’s monopoly power a small amount is likely to increase social welfare” because “[t]he benefit of reducing the deadweight loss of supra-competitive pricing is likely to outweigh the costs of a slightly lower incentive to innovate.”150 This might suggest that imposing duties to deal on patent holders (or on any monopolist) would be desirable because any decrease in incentives to innovate would be outweighed by the gain in reduced monopoly pricing.

But there are two general problems with the Ayres-Klemperer analysis, as well as a separate problem with applying it to antitrust duties to deal. First, it depends on the assumption that demand elasticity is high. If instead it is low (as one would think would be typical for innovations not available elsewhere), then at the margin there would be little gain in social welfare but a lot of loss in monopoly profits and thus a great loss in the incentive to innovate. Further, ex ante to innovation, a monopolist will likely be uncertain about what the demand elasticity will be, and thus the prospect of reducing prospective monopoly pricing can have a large effect on expected profits and thus on discouraging investments in innovation.

Second, even though Ayres and Klemperer show that sometimes the loss in monopoly profits is relatively small, any loss will necessarily discourage some socially desirable innovation at the margin. Allowing full monopoly pricing permits the monopolist to reap no more than the difference between the value of what it has produced and the value of the next best market option, which is the same as the social value of the innovation. Any lower price reduces profits from this level and will thus produce suboptimal investment in innovation. Ayres and Klemperer rely on the intuition that a small reduction in expected profits will reduce innovation only a little and that this will be offset by the improved ex post allocative efficiency. But to the extent this diminution in profits deters some investment in innovation, then the innovation will never be made and no offsetting improvement in ex post efficiency will result. Further,

150. Id. at 990.
any reduction in innovation will have productive efficiency costs that (because of their dynamic effects) will tend to far exceed the social welfare benefit of any improvement in allocative efficiency for those innovations that are made.  

In any event, for present purposes one need not resolve those complex issues, for there is a separate problem with extending the Ayres-Klemperer claim to antitrust duties to deal. Namely, a requirement of sharing imposes not a small, but a large reduction on the scope of monopoly power, and thus will have much more devastating effects on innovation incentives. To make the reduction small, one must instead imagine antitrust courts setting a price on access that is not at cost but rather just a little below the monopoly level. However, determining just how far below to go would require antitrust judges and juries to set sail on the sea of doubt of determining a reasonable price, which they have always avoided. Moreover, once one adopts that approach, it is not at all clear why it should be limited to cases that can be framed as antitrust claims. If judges and juries know what the “reasonable” price is that a monopolist should charge, then that should be a claim available to any buyer of the patented product and thus a general limitation on patent law. Further, doing so through antitrust raises the risk that any monopolist that guesses wrong about how a jury will rule will be smacked with treble damages. That will tend to make monopolists overshoot and offer a price substantially below the best estimate of what a jury might require, which would make the expected loss of monopoly profits high, and thus cause a great negative effect on innovation.

Even if critics are right that the property rights provided by patent law are broader than necessary to encourage innovation, the fact is that Congress reached a contrary empirical judgment when it enacted the patent statutes. Antitrust law does not authorize judges and juries to second-guess that legislative judgment based on contrary academic theories or empirical studies. Those theories and studies should instead be argued to Congress, and if they are persuasive, they would call for far more sweeping changes in patent laws than occasional (and haphazardly applied) antitrust duties to deal with rivals.

The arguments above for rejecting duties to license patents apply equally to efforts to impose duties to license the copyrights created by federal law or to share access to the host of physical property rights normally defined by state laws. In all those cases, the property rights are recognized to protect investment and innovation, and are defined in the way that this body of law deemed optimal to do so.

More generally, all arguments for imposing an antitrust duty to deal at a court-set price basically amount to a claim that the relevant property rights should be converted into liability rules. For what they would do is shift from (a) an owner’s property right to exclude unless he consents to any price offered for

151. *See supra* sources collected in note 67.
access to (b) a rule that allows others to invade his property as long as they pay a court-determined rate. While there is now a rich literature on the complex tradeoffs between choosing property versus liability rules,\textsuperscript{152} the point here is that these are tradeoffs that have already been made by the body of property law that defines the limits of the relevant property rights. There is no reason for antitrust to upset those tradeoffs by injecting an uncertain threat of treble damages for exceeding different limits defined on a case-by-case basis by antitrust judges and juries.

Although various legal sources support this conclusion that antitrust law should treat patent rights to exclude like other property rights to exclude,\textsuperscript{153} others have argued that patent rights merit special treatment. Professor Kaplow, for example, expresses the commonly held view that patent law raises special tensions with antitrust law because “the very purpose of a patent grant is to reward the patentee by limiting competition, in full recognition that monopolistic evils are the price society will pay.”\textsuperscript{154} But this is neither true nor distinguishes other property rights. Patent rights do not preclude competition or guarantee monopolistic evils. They merely provide a right to exclude others from a particular innovation. Such patent rights often compete with other patents or methods of accomplishing the same goal, and thus may or may not enjoy any monopoly or market power. Whether a patent confers monopoly power depends entirely on how much value the patent has compared to other market options, which is what determines the level of patentee reward.

And one could say precisely the same for copyrights or physical property rights, like the right to exclude rivals from a plant in which one made investments. Such rights to exclude may or may not preclude competition or confer monopoly power, depending on how valuable that copyright or plant is compared to other market options. Whichever sort of property right we are talking about, its ability to preclude competition or create monopoly power turns on its economic value compared to the property rights held by others, not


\textsuperscript{153} See supra notes 67-70 (collecting sources).

\textsuperscript{154} Kaplow, supra note 148, at 1817.
on some metaphysical distinction about the sort of property right. Alternatively, if one wishes to use words in a noneconomic meaning and thus style patents as a preclusion of competition and creation of a monopoly, one could equally say that physical property rights preclude others from competing in the use of the same property and give one firm a monopoly over use of that property.

One might be tempted to distinguish patent rights on the ground that investments in trying to create a new patent are more risky, and thus that maintaining ex ante incentives by limiting antitrust duties to deal is more critical for patent rights. But this distinction fails on several scores. First, it may or may not be true. Some big investments in physical property turn out to be risky indeed—consider the billions plowed into telecommunications in the late 1990s. Some investments in creating patents are not so risky, such as many efforts to patent an improvement on a drug with a known pharmaceutical purpose covered by medical insurance. And firms could always adjust for risk by investing in a diversified portfolio of innovation efforts. If we really believed the degree of risk mattered, courts should advert directly to that factor rather than drawing any categorical distinction between patent and physical rights.

Second, greater certainty in outcomes would not eliminate the ex ante incentive problem with imposing duties to share physical property. If it would cost $1 billion to build a bridge that is so socially desirable that it would reap $1.1 billion in monopoly profits, then any duty to share the rights to that bridge with rivals will suffice to deter investment in that bridge. That would result in the socially undesirable absence of a bridge. Greater certainty that an investment will produce a desired product or service will not help if it is also certain that the law will prevent firms from reaping any monopoly returns for making such investments. Such a duty to deal will still produce suboptimal investment in physical property, only this time it is an investment we are otherwise certain would be desired by consumers.

4. Sorting out ex ante and ex post efficiency claims: Why proving discrimination on the basis of rivalry is necessary (but not sufficient).

Where does the above analysis leave us? On the one hand, the Supreme Court cannot mean that the ex post inefficiencies of excluding rivals always suffice to require dealing with rivals as a matter of antitrust law. If it did, then socially desirable investments necessary to make or maintain monopoly power would never be made, and consumers would lose a market option that they regard as substantially better than other market options. Further, the Court has explicitly rejected the notion that monopolists always have a duty to deal with
rivals.  

On the other hand, once we admit ex ante efficiencies, couldn’t any monopolist always say it had a “valid” efficiency justification for refusing to share its property rights with its rivals? After all, since any property right to exclude outsiders must reflect a decision by some governmental lawmaker that this right has desirable effects, those desirable effects would seem to always provide a “legitimate” business reason for the exclusion. The monopolist would merely have to observe that its refusal to deal with rivals must increase its overall expected profits in some way (otherwise why would it refuse?), and any such profit increase must necessarily confer the efficiency benefit of increasing ex ante incentives to create, enhance, or maintain the valuable property that confers the monopoly power. The problem is that such a conclusion, coupled with the doctrine that conduct is not exclusionary if a monopolist has a legitimate or valid business purpose or efficiency motive, would indicate that monopolists never have a duty to deal with their rivals. And the Court has explicitly rejected that notion as well.

In short, since the Supreme Court has rejected both the notion that a monopolist must always deal with rivals and the notion that it never has to do so, it must reject, respectively, any theory that ex post inefficiencies always require sharing or that ex ante efficiencies always justify denying sharing. Alas, the Court has never articulated how it resolves cases that raise both ex post inefficiencies and ex ante efficiencies.

Although its analysis focused solely on the ex post inefficiencies of refusing to share with rivals, the Aspen decision cannot reasonably be read as rejecting inquiry into these ex ante efficiencies, for the defendant never offered them. Perhaps the defendant did not think it had very strong ex ante efficiencies to offer. One tempting, but ultimately unsatisfying, theory for why this might be has to do with the provenance of its market power. After all, mountains in Aspen are a natural resource that the defendant did not have to create with investments and that rivals could not physically duplicate. While investments were necessary to develop the mountains into ski facilities, much of the monopoly power was created not by those investments but by the acquisition of the already-existing second and third mountains from other firms, one of which was already fully developed. Further, by the time of the disputed refusal, the defendant had already been recouping its investment with the joint pass for fifteen years, and it found joint passes a sufficient means of recouping investments in ski mountains in other competitive towns.

Likewise, in other duty to deal cases, the provenance of the monopoly

156. Id.
157. Id. at 587-89 & nn.2-5.
158. Id. at 589-93, 603 & n.30.
power at issue suggested the relative weakness of arguments about the need to encourage the investments that created that power. In *Otter Tail*, “the defendants’ facilities depended upon exclusive government grants.”¹⁵⁹ In *Terminal Railroad*, the monopoly was created by the combination of existing railroad facilities rather than by fresh investment.¹⁶⁰ Moreover, one possible explanation for the greater general willingness of E.C. lawmakers to impose duties to deal on monopolists is that, compared to the United States, more of the monopolies in Europe were created by regulations, government subsidies, or permitted combinations rather than by innovation or other investments.¹⁶¹ And prominent critics of the essential facilities doctrine have said that the next best alternative to eliminating it would be to restrict it to cases where the facility is a natural monopoly, legally protected from competition, or publicly subsidized.¹⁶² They justify their limitation on grounds that otherwise rivals could duplicate the facilities, but the same limitation could also be justified on a provenance approach.

What makes this theory unsatisfying is that, while it may explain what actually motivated the litigants in past cases not to raise this issue, it does not provide a sound basis for generating a doctrine to decide the ex ante versus ex post issue in the full range of monopolization cases. For several reasons, it would be unwise to resolve that issue through judicial or jury inquiry into how the relevant monopoly power was created. Such an inquiry would be highly uncertain, and in most cases the sources that created the monopoly power would be mixed. Even if courts could be sure that the monopoly power was not created by investments that were made based on the prospect of monopoly profits, there remains the need for ongoing investments to maintain or enhance the value of the property that enjoys monopoly power. And giving property owners incentives to make such ongoing investments in their property is certainly an important reason why property rights are recognized. Finally, if the monopoly were really created improperly or because of bad government policy, then the correct solution is to break up the monopoly to undo those past improprieties or errors.¹⁶³ Forced sharing of the improperly created monopoly

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¹⁶². IIIA AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶ 771c, at 173.
¹⁶³. Where instead the underlying economic fundamentals produce a natural monopoly because of economies of scale or scope, the proper remedy would be utility rate regulation. But the decision whether to impose such utility rate regulation must be left up to the legislators and regulators, who can set up an expert prospective system for setting and monitoring rates to keep profits sufficient to induce the requisite investments to create and maintain the natural monopoly. Nor should courts be quick to leap to conclusions of natural
does not remedy the past mistakes. Rather, it worsens them by undermining not only the monopolist’s incentives to maintain and enhance the value of property that gives it monopoly power but also rival incentives to innovate or invest to duplicate the functional benefits of that property. And it creates enormous administrative difficulties by requiring antitrust judges and juries to set the reasonable price for access, a task rendered only more difficult by the fact that optimal prices will continually vary over time with changing market conditions, but will end up being assessed retrospectively by antitrust tribunals after years of adversary proceedings, with any wrong guess being punished by treble damages.

But there is a more telling reason why ex ante efficiencies could not reasonably have been offered in Aspen. The Aspen defendant’s refusal to cooperate in offering a joint pass took the specific form of refusing to sell lift tickets to its rival at either the wholesale price it was offering other tour operators who bought in bulk or even at the same retail price it offered to consumers. This is a more promising basis for a doctrinal rule because an antitrust rule preventing that sort of discriminatory refusal does not deprive the defendant of any right to set the rate of reimbursement for its investments, past or current. The monopolist has already done so by setting the price at which it is willing to sell its product to others. And if that price does not suffice to induce the investment ex ante, then it merely indicates the investment was not optimal to make in the first place. Further, given that this price would reflect the monopoly price set by the defendant, a duty to sell to rivals at that price would not undermine rival incentives to invest to duplicate the intellectual or physical property that generates the monopoly power. Finally, it vastly simplifies administrability to base the antitrust doctrine on whether the defendant is refusing to sell to rivals at the same terms that it sells to others. Antitrust judges and juries applying such a doctrine would not have to assess the relevance of mixed causes for the creation of the monopoly power, nor the relative weight of past and present investments. Nor would they have to independently determine what the proper reasonable price is. All they would have to determine is whether a monopolist enhanced or maintained its monopoly power by refusing to sell to rivals on the same terms as it sold to others.

In short, while the ex ante efficiencies created by property rights do justify

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monopoly since distinguishing natural from temporary monopolies is difficult, and today’s natural monopoly can change tomorrow with changes in demand, technology, or other factors. Further, if the market is a natural monopoly that merits regulation, the appropriate rate regulation would extend far beyond antitrust rules that regulate the rates at which monopolists must deal only with rivals and only when other criteria that satisfy the duty to deal elements are met.

virtually all refusals to deal on terms other than the price set by the property owner, they do not justify discriminatory refusals to deal with those buyers who are (or deal with) rivals. Although this factor has not been explicitly mentioned in Supreme Court case law, such discrimination obviously exists for garden-variety exclusionary conditions that limit the ability of buyers of the monopoly product to buy from rivals, since such conditions necessarily discriminate against buyers who deal with rivals. Less obviously, such discrimination against rivals existed in every case where the Court held a monopolist liable for a unilateral refusal to deal directly with its rivals. This doctrinal observation about the anti-rival discrimination present in refusal to deal cases was apparently first made by Judge Posner in a 1986 opinion. However, Judge Posner did not link such discrimination to ex ante incentives to invest in property or provide any other theory of why discrimination should be a relevant antitrust principle. Judge Posner also seems to have mistakenly believed Aspen did not involve such discrimination against rivals. But he was right that Otter Tail did. There, the defendant discriminated against rivals by refusing to supply or wheel electric power to those municipalities that competed with the defendant in the retail distribution of electricity to houses, even though the defendant had entered into contracts that set prices for both supplying and wheeling electricity to nonrival electric systems.

Further, while Judge Posner does not mention it, such anti-rival discrimination also existed in all the pre-Otter Tail cases where the Supreme Court affirmed antitrust liability for a refusal to deal. In Terminal Railroad, which involved concerted action creating a monopoly, the defendants discriminated against rivals by refusing them access to the consolidated facilities on the same terms granted to members of the combination and the remedy was accordingly limited to requiring such equal treatment. In Lorain

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165. See Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 377 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) (The “essential feature of the refusal-to-deal cases” is “a monopoly supplier’s discriminating against a customer because the customer has decided to compete with it.”).

166. Id. (concluding that Aspen was not a conventional case because the rival “was never a customer of” the monopolist).

167. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 368-72 (1973); United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 331 F. Supp. 54, 57-58 (D. Minn. 1971); Appendix at 103-11, United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 331 F. Supp. 54 (D. Minn. 1971) (No. 71-991) (collecting lower court findings that Otter Tail’s refusals to deal were “discriminatory” because it entered into contracts to sell wheel and wholesale electric power to electric systems that did not compete with it in retailing electricity); Brief for the United States at 18, United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 331 F. Supp. 54 (D. Minn. 1971) (No. 71-991) (“Otter Tail’s refusals to deal . . . were based solely upon the fact that the proposed municipal systems would replace Otter Tail as the retail distributor of electricity in the towns. Since it wholesaled and wheeled power to other municipalities, the company’s refusals were discriminatory.”).

Journal, the defendant discriminated by refusing to sell advertising space to those advertisers who dealt with its rival. And in the now largely forgotten 1927 Kodak case, the defendant refused to sell to a rival dealer at the same wholesale price it offered to other dealers.

Finally, in the only post-1986 Supreme Court monopolization case on the topic, the 1992 Kodak case, the defendant discriminatorily refused to sell parts both to firms that competed with it in providing service and to buyers who bought service from its rivals. Indeed, in this last case, the Court rejected on principle the argument that such discrimination was justified to fully exploit the defendant’s “investment” in creating the parts over which it had a monopoly. This amounts to a rejection of the proposition that furthering such ex ante investment incentives justifies discrimination against rivals or those who deal with them.

All these cases are thus consistent with the relatively administrable rule that ex ante efficiencies always justify refusals to deal unless the monopolist discriminates on the basis of rivalry by refusing to offer rivals (or buyers who deal with rivals) the same terms that it voluntarily offers other similarly situated buyers. Buyers might not be similarly situated if it is more costly to serve some buyers than others, which certainly means this rule is not entirely free of ambiguity. And there may often be a factual dispute about whether the refusal to deal was on the basis of rivalry rather than because the firm is difficult to deal with for unrelated reasons. But compared to conclusory references to whether refusals further “valid” business reasons, such a rule provides a far clearer method for monopolists to avoid liability, and for tribunals to adjudicate and remedy it. Further, any requirement to sell at the defendant-set monopoly price undermines neither the monopolist’s ex ante incentives to invest nor its rival’s incentives to duplicate those investments. And since the defendant itself has consented to the price, this use of antitrust law does not convert property rights into liability rules.

None of this means that antitrust law does or should impose some general common carrier duty of nondiscrimination on all monopolists. After all, under U.S. law, monopolists generally are free to choose whom they wish to deal with and to engage in price discrimination as long as they do not violate the particular requirements of the Robinson-Patman Act. The above analysis instead shows that discrimination on the basis of rivalry is necessary to rebut
the otherwise ubiquitous justification that allowing a monopolist to exclude others from its property furthers ex ante efficiencies. This does not mean that such discrimination is also sufficient to prove monopolization, for the other elements would still have to be proved. In particular, it would remain necessary to show that the refusal to deal with the rival on equal terms was not justified by ex post inefficiencies that would result from sharing, and that the refusal to deal contributed significantly to enhancing, maintaining, or slowing the erosion of monopoly power. For example, a refusal to deal with rivals would not satisfy those conditions if sharing access with rivals created costs that exceeded any procompetitive benefits, or if the rival could feasibly duplicate the facilities it sought to require the monopolist to share. Proof on those issues thus remains necessary in a duty to deal or essential facilities case. Likewise, where the alleged exclusionary conduct is that the monopolist is selling to buyers on exclusionary conditions that limit their purchases from rivals (like tying, exclusive dealing, or other obligations that limit purchases from rivals), the legality of that conduct may turn on whether it furthers ex post efficiencies.

Limiting any antitrust duty to deal to cases where the defendant discriminates against rivals minimizes what would otherwise be tricky Takings Clause issues. After all, as the Court has elsewhere noted, the very “hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude others,” which is “‘one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.’” To require an owner to give others “access” to its property on terms set by the government would “deprive” the owner of this

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173. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608-09 (1985) (considering claimed ex post inefficiencies); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 378, 381-82 (1973) (considering both the difficulty of municipalities creating their own facilities and any ex post inefficiencies created by a duty to deal); Terminal R.R., 224 U.S. at 405 (stating that ordinarily the defendants could set whatever terms they wanted for their facilities or “exclude[] altogether” other firms because, “[i]f such terms were too onerous, there would ordinarily remain the right and power [for rivals] to construct their own” facilities, but that the situation in this case was “most extraordinary” because such duplication was not feasible); supra note 20 (collecting lower court essential facilities cases requiring that a plaintiff prove the facility is nonduplicable and that sharing is feasible).

174. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 483-85 (1992) (considering such claimed ex post efficiencies, but rejecting on principle the claim that discriminating against rivals or those who deal with them was necessary to fully exploit the investment it made in creating valuable parts); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (holding that a court must consider any offered procompetitive justifications for a monopolist’s exclusionary conditions), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001); see also LePage’s, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 163-64 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) (considering procompetitive justifications for such exclusionary conditions). But see infra Part III.B.2 (noting that Supreme Court cases properly reject the alleged efficiency defense that such exclusionary conditions further ex post efficiencies by diverting various “economies of share” away from rivals to the monopolist).

right, and thus “[w]ithout question” would constitute “a taking” of property under the Fifth Amendment.\textsuperscript{176} The antitrust laws are not somehow immune from this limitation, and thus antitrust duties to deal at a court-set price would raise difficult just compensation issues. On the other hand, where the defendant itself sells access to its property on terms it sets, a government requirement that such access also be sold to rivals on equal terms would seem either to raise no takings issue or to prove that the payment of a price set by the defendant by definition provides the requisite “just compensation.”\textsuperscript{177}

This limitation on a monopolist’s right to discriminate among outsiders should be sharply distinguished from claims that the defendant has discriminated in favor of itself over all outsiders. That sort of “discrimination” in favor of a property owner is inherent in the property right to exclude, and is necessary to further ex ante incentives to invest in property. Consistent with this point, the federal appellate courts have rejected the proposition that the essential facilities doctrine requires firms “to cease using its own facility so that [a rival] can begin using it.”\textsuperscript{178} Nor do they require firms that use their own facilities but do not voluntarily provide them to other outsiders to enter into a new line of business by providing those facilities to rivals.\textsuperscript{179} Unless a firm

\textsuperscript{176} Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994).

\textsuperscript{177} Likewise, when a patent holder conditions his license on payment of a particular price, he lies within the doctrine that “the patentee may grant a license to make, use and vend articles under the specification of his patent for any royalty or upon any condition the performance of which is reasonably within the reward which the patentee by the grant of the patent is entitled to secure.” United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489 (1926). But he may exceed the limits of that doctrine when he tries to reap rewards above that level by imposing conditions that discriminate against rivals.

\textsuperscript{178} City of Vernon v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 955 F.2d 1361, 1366-67 (9th Cir. 1992); see also MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1149 (7th Cir. 1983) (rejecting such a claim or any rival claim to “preferential access”). A different sort of case is the one where a monopolist buys up property that is a necessary input for rivals and does not use the property itself but rather holds onto the property to keep it from rivals. Such an exclusionary suppression of inputs by a monopolist constitutes illegal monopolization under well-established antitrust law. See, e.g., Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 803-04 (1946); III Areeda & Turner, supra note 29, at 8, 250; see also III Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 9, ¶ 702c, at 152 (noting that the same applies for hiring talent that the monopolist does not use in order to deny it to rivals). Since the property was created by others and is going unused by the monopolist, there is no tenable argument in such a case that the right to exclude is necessary to preserve ex ante incentives to create and preserve property valuable enough to enjoy monopoly power.

\textsuperscript{179} See Laurel Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. CSX Transp., Inc., 924 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that the relevant sort of discrimination against rivals is only present when a firm decides to “withhold from one member of the public a service offered to the rest”); cf. XIV Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 2312c, at 23-24 (1999) (noting that even the Robinson-Patman Act does not apply to discrimination between the defendant’s own retail operation and independent retailers). In contrast, the European Community has stated that a dominant firm with an essential facility acts illegally if it “refuses other companies access to that facility without objective justification or grants access to competitors only on terms less
voluntarily engages in the business of providing access to its property, courts would have no baseline to determine whether a defendant was discriminating in the terms it was offering rivals.

Similarly, one should also distinguish the case where a firm has in effect merely transferred the right to exploit valuable patent or other property rights from itself to another firm. Such a transfer does not increase the first firm’s monopoly power but merely replaces the monopolist with a more efficient firm, which is entirely desirable. This sort of replacement should accordingly not be deemed to trigger a nondiscrimination duty to also transfer that property to all other rivals as well, for such a duty could destroy the value of the property right and thus inefficiently discourage transfers to firms that can make more use of the property. For example, often the firms or individuals that are good at innovating and creating new patents are not the best entities for actually making and selling the patented product. It will thus often be desirable for the patent holder to exclusively license that patent to another firm. If any such exclusive license were invalid, and the patent holder were obligated to also license the patent to all other firms that want to use it, then the first firm would not be willing to pay as big a flat or annual fee for it because the obligation to license the patent to other firms would destroy its monopoly power. This would discourage such licensing, either requiring other forms of licensing that might be less efficient or obligating the inventing firm to make the product itself even though it is less efficient. Either of these less efficient alternatives would reduce the returns on creating the patent, and thus would lead to suboptimal investments in such innovations. Likewise, a firm that makes the investment to create some physical property—such as a bridge—that is so valuable that it enjoys monopoly power should be able to lease that bridge to another firm to operate as a monopoly without then having a nondiscrimination duty to also lease the bridge to any other firm that wants to operate the same bridge in competition with the first firm. Otherwise, such a duty would discourage transfers to the most efficient bridge operator, which in turn would lead to suboptimal investments in valuable bridges. On the other hand, if the licensee

favourable than those which it gives its own services,” thereby “imposing a competitive disadvantage on its competitor,” because a company which occupies “a dominant position may not discriminate in favour of its own activities in a related market.” Commission Decision 94/19/EC, 1994 O.J. (L 15) 8, at ¶ 66. This condemnation of discrimination in favor of oneself seems hard to square with basic property rights and the maintenance of ex ante incentives for investment.

180. If monitoring and enforcement costs are nonexistent, it would presumably always be more efficient for the patent holder to license as many manufacturers as it can with royalties paid on a per unit basis. If the patent reduces the cost of manufacture by $10 (or increases the product value by $10), then firms should be willing to pay a $10 per unit royalty and the patent holder will want competition in manufacturing to maximize the number of units made. But monitoring and enforcement costs may be sufficiently high that it is more efficient to license the patent on some lump-sum or annual basis.
or lessee of the right to operate the monopoly then sells the underlying product or service to outsiders generally, rivals should be able to buy that product or service on the same terms as other outsiders.

Limiting any monopolist’s duty to deal to cases involving discrimination against rivals should also be contrasted with the commonly cited alternative of limiting any such duty to cases where the monopolist terminated an existing willingness to supply rivals. True, there is language in *Aspen* that could be read to suggest such a limitation, but such a limitation would be inconsistent with *Otter Tail*, which imposed a duty to deal with a new entrant and thus did not require any termination of a preexisting willingness to supply the rival. Such a limitation would also bear no relationship to preserving ex ante incentives. Indeed, such a limitation would create perverse incentives for a monopolist to refrain from ever dealing with a rival, even if it were otherwise inclined to do so, out of the fear that this proposed antitrust rule would convert any such dealing into the sort of lifetime tenure normally reserved for professors. It would thus affirmatively encourage precisely the sort of discrimination against rivals that is least necessary to further ex ante incentives. One might fear that a nondiscrimination rule would have the similar effect of discouraging a monopolist from dealing with anyone so that it would not have to deal with its rivals. But that sort of behavior is implausible and self-deterring, for if a monopolist does not sell to someone, it cannot make any profit or recoup its investments. A termination rule would also improperly freeze in place a business practice even though it has become inefficient. A nondiscrimination rule instead would allow the defendant to abandon an inefficient business practice as long as it does so even-handedly. The main benefit of a requirement of proving termination is that, compared to having no limit at all, it does aid administrability because past terms provide some benchmark for determining the terms at which the monopolist must deal. But the aid is limited because whatever terms were reasonable yesterday will change quickly over time as market conditions change. A requirement of proving discrimination against rivals, in contrast, provides a substantively better benchmark that is also easier to administer since it is constantly updated at each moment in time by whatever terms the defendant offers to nonrival outsiders.


183. A monopolist might prefer to keep some input for its own use in order to combine it with other inputs in order to sell a finished product to outsiders. But that is simply an exercise of its right to exclude others from its property that property law protects to further ex ante efficiencies. See generally X AREEDA, ELHAUGE & HOVENKAMP, *supra* note 25, ¶¶ 1748, at 242-50 (explaining why such cases are appropriately judged under the duty to deal rather than the tying doctrine).
B. Whether Conduct Succeeds by Enhancing Monopolist Efficiency or by Worsening Rival Efficiency

Suppose a monopolist’s exclusionary conduct does have an efficiency justification. Does that suffice to make its conduct legal? Or does the Court then have to move on to weighing that efficiency benefit against the inefficiency harms created by the exclusionary conduct?

The former conclusion seems supported by the cases stating that conduct that tends to exclude rivals is nonetheless legal if it furthers “valid,” “normal,” or “legitimate” business purposes. If efficiency benefits suffice to make a purpose valid, normal, or legitimate, then that would seem to indicate that they suffice to make the conduct legal. But other cases suggest that in a monopolization case, just as for any case involving agreements in restraint of trade, the efficiency benefit should be weighed against the anticompetitive harm. This goes all the way back to the Standard Oil case, where the Supreme Court acknowledged that the statutory word “monopolize” was ambiguous, and announced that “the criteria to be resorted to in any given case for the purpose of ascertaining whether violations of [§ 2] have been committed is the rule of reason.”

More specifically, in the recent Microsoft en banc decision, the D.C. Circuit stated in dicta that, if exclusionary conduct had both an anticompetitive effect and a procompetitive justification, then a monopolization claim would be resolved by determining whether “the anticompetitive harm of the conduct outweighs the procompetitive benefit.”

How can we reconcile these seemingly conflicting lines of cases, and if open-ended balancing is required, how can antitrust courts and juries possibly do it without creating massive business uncertainty? The answer lies in distinguishing whether the alleged exclusionary conduct succeeds in furthering monopoly power (1) only if the monopolist has improved its own efficiency or (2) by impairing rival efficiency whether or not it enhances monopolist efficiency. In the first category of cases, the greater efficiency of the monopolist may cause it to expand, which in turn makes rivals lose sales and become less efficient. But the root cause is the increased efficiency of the monopolist because this conduct cannot expand or maintain its monopoly share unless the monopolist has improved its efficiency. In the second category of cases, the decreased rival efficiency procured by the exclusionary conduct causes the monopolist to gain or maintain its monopoly share even if the conduct does not improve the efficiency of the monopolist at all. For reasons explained below, the first category should be per se legal, and the latter per se

illegal, without having courts or juries engage in any open-ended balancing.

1. Conduct that succeeds by improving the monopolist’s own efficiency.

In the first camp fall cases where the monopolist has simply improved its own efficiency by creating a “superior product” or using its “business acumen” to figure out how to make its costs lower, and then bested its rivals on the market by selling a product that is better or cheaper than the products offered by rivals. In such cases, the monopolist’s conduct certainly has an efficiency justification. On the other hand, it is also true that driving out the less efficient rivals can produce anticompetitive effects that might, if one could do the social welfare calculation accurately, outweigh those efficiency benefits. For example, many scholars have argued that a monopolist should not be able to exploit its greater efficiency by charging above-cost prices that drive out its less efficient rivals because of the allocative inefficiency that results when rivals are driven out or deterred from entering.187 In addition, as noted above, scholars sometimes argue that, while a property right to exclude does give a monopolist greater incentives to invest in improving its own efficiency, an antitrust duty to deal should nonetheless be imposed when this efficiency benefit is offset by the allocative inefficiency that will result if rivals do not get access to the benefits of that property too.188 Similarly, while the Microsoft case involved many exclusionary conditions imposed on buyers, one of the claims was that Microsoft’s technological bundling of its operating system and browser constituted monopolization because it excluded rivals in the browser market. This issue was ultimately resolved by the holding that there was no technological or efficiency benefit at all from that bundling.189 But suppose there had been. Would the efficiency benefits from producing this “superior product” then have to be weighed against the harm? So some have concluded, noting that it is possible that any efficiency gain from the improved product would be offset by the inefficiency costs created by the exclusion of browser rivals.190

It is this sort of claim that I think the Supreme Court correctly means to reject with its monopolization test, which stresses that monopolies earned by

188. See supra Part III.A.3.
189. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 66-67.
190. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 958-59 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Wald, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, and Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 617, 650 (1999) (arguing that such a product design should be condemned if it “improves product performance by $5 and also creates barriers to competition that permit the monopolist to raise prices by $50”).
“superior products” and “business acumen” are legal. That test suggests that, when a firm figures out how to make a better or cheaper product, and then uses that advantage to drive out rivals, antitrust tribunals will not engage in a social welfare calculus to determine whether the product improvement offsets the inefficiency produced by the loss of competition. Such an open-ended balancing inquiry by antitrust judges and juries would often be inaccurate, hard to predict years in advance when the business decision must be made, and too costly to litigate. Thus the risk posed by such an inquiry, coupled with the risk of treble damages, would greatly deter desirable innovation and investments in improving products or the methods of making them. In such cases, the existence of any efficiency justification will instead suffice to end the inquiry.

Significantly, the various statements by the Supreme Court that a “valid” or “legitimate” business reason would suffice to legalize otherwise exclusionary conduct were all made in a context that suggested those statements were limited to refusals to deal, where the defendant is seeking to reap an advantage from a superior product. In such cases, as noted above, any nondiscriminatory refusal to deal or insistence on high prices furthers ex ante efficiencies, and thus should suffice to protect the refusal from condemnation. This is consistent with the fact that Supreme Court cases have condemned only those refusals to deal that discriminate against rivals and thus do not further ex ante efficiencies.

Other language in Supreme Court opinions also supports this conclusion. The Copperweld Court observed that “an efficient firm may capture unsatisfied customers from an inefficient rival, whose own ability to compete may suffer as a result. This is the rule of the marketplace and is precisely the sort of competition that promotes the consumer interests that the Sherman Act aims to foster.” This language excludes from the antitrust calculus any anticompetitive effect produced by a reduction in the ability of rivals to compete because the defendant won away sales by its own greater efficiency. Likewise, Aspen favorably cited a jury instruction that stressed:

[M]onopoly power which is thrust upon a firm due to its superior business ability and efficiency does not constitute monopolization. For example, a firm that has lawfully acquired a monopoly position is not barred from taking advantage of scale economies by constructing a large and efficient factory. . . . We are concerned with conduct which unnecessarily excludes or handicaps competitors. This is conduct which does not benefit consumers by making a better product or service available—or in other ways . . . .

This language exempts conduct that harms rivals as a byproduct of increased

191. *See supra* Part I.A.
monopolist efficiency, and endorses legality for conduct that creates a “better product or service” market option for consumers. The Aspen Court also favorably quoted Robert Bork for the proposition that “‘[i]mproper exclusion (exclusion not the result of superior efficiency) is always deliberately intended.’”\footnote{Id. at 602-03 (quoting Bork, supra note 50, at 160).} This apparently approves equating “improper exclusion” with exclusion that was “not the result of superior efficiency.” So does its statement that “[i]f a firm has been ‘attempting to exclude rivals on some basis other than efficiency,’ it is fair to characterize its behavior as predatory.”\footnote{Id. at 605 (quoting Bork, supra note 50, at 138).} All these statements seem to confer per se legality on a monopolist’s efforts to make itself more efficient than rivals and then exploit that greater efficiency in a way that drives out rivals.

Consistent with this, the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the proposition that above-cost pricing can be predatory.\footnote{Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222-25 (1993). Discounts conditional on buyers limiting purchases from rivals are an entirely different matter since they can gain market share by foreclosing and limiting the efficiency of rivals even if they do not improve the efficiency of the monopolist. See LePage’s, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 163-64 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc); Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts Are Not Predatory, supra note 8, at 698 n.53; infra Part III.B.2.} This permits a monopolist to take whatever steps it wants to improve its own efficiency and lower its costs, and then to use that greater efficiency to drive out its rivals. Such above-cost price cuts to drive out rivals may sometimes produce allocative inefficiencies, but the Court is correct that permitting them will increase efficiency over the full range of cases, especially if one takes into account the effects on ex ante incentives to become more efficient.\footnote{For a detailed explanation of why this is so, see Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts Are Not Predatory, supra note 8, at 754-804.}

Similarly, while the D.C. Circuit in Microsoft did state the general test that it would balance procompetitive effects against anticompetitive ones when it was faced with a case dominated by Microsoft’s exclusionary agreements with buyers, the fact is that it did not really apply that sort of balancing test to claims that a superior product has anticompetitive effects. For example, the en banc opinion considered a claim that Microsoft had designed certain software in a way that made Java applications both faster on its operating system and incompatible with rival operating systems. Although the opinion stated that the applicable test was that “the incompatible product must have an anticompetitive effect that outweighs any procompetitive justification for the design,” it went on to hold that the fact that the product ran faster on Microsoft machines sufficed to make it legal.\footnote{United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 74-75 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001).} This technological benefit was certainly a procompetitive justification but did not really eliminate the anticompetitive...
November 2003] MONOPOLIZATION STANDARDS 319

effect (although the court said it did) since the product design still impaired rival efficiency in a way that reduced the ability of rivals to constrain Microsoft’s monopoly power. It thus amounted to a holding that any technological benefit suffices when the monopolist has improved its own product, without any need to weigh it against any anticompetitive consequences that the product design may have created by impairing rival efficiency.

Further, when the D.C. Circuit had earlier considered in isolation the product design question of whether technologically bundling the operating system and browser was anticompetitive, the court had specifically concluded that any technological benefit from the bundling would suffice to make the bundle legal.\(^{201}\) The court recoiled in horror from the dissent’s suggestion that it should decide whether to condemn the creation of such a superior product by weighing its technological benefit against any resulting anticompetitive harm.\(^{202}\) On this the D.C. Circuit was correct that such a social welfare calculus was “not feasible in any predictable or useful way” since placing a value on any technological benefit is beyond the ability of antitrust courts, and weighing any such technological value against the anticompetitive harm would involve trading off “incommensurable” factors.\(^{203}\) While it reached that decision in the context of enforcing a consent decree, the same conclusion is even more justified for typical antitrust litigation because leaving such an open-ended issue to antitrust judges and juries imposing treble damages would create a severe risk of overdeterring desirable product innovation.\(^{204}\) In the en banc decision, the D.C. Circuit condemned this technological bundling as exclusionary conduct not because its anticompetitive effect outweighed its technological benefit, but because it turned out not to have any technological benefit at all.\(^{205}\) Indeed, the district court had found that this bundling actually worsened technological performance.\(^{206}\)

The D.C. Circuit’s analysis certainly indicates that showing an anticompetitive effect is necessary to condemn a product design because a court need not even reach the procompetitive justification issue until such an

\(^{201}\) United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 949-51 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

\(^{202}\) Id. at 952-53.

\(^{203}\) Id.

\(^{204}\) For my prior argument making that point in a coauthored treatise, see X Areeda, Elhauge & Hovenkamp, supra note 25, ¶ 1746b, at 226-27. On the other hand, the defendant must show that there is some technological benefit derived from the bundling being done by it rather than by its buyers. Id. at 227-29. The D.C. Circuit mistakenly applied this test in its first opinion, relying on an asserted technological benefit that could have equally been produced by allowing Microsoft’s buyers—who were computer makers—to bundle the operating system and browser if they thought that produced a worthwhile technological benefit. See Einer Elhauge, The Court Failed My Test, WASH. TIMES, July 10, 1998, at A19.

\(^{205}\) Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 66-67.

anticompetitive effect is shown. Thus, the lack of a technological benefit does not suffice to make a monopolist’s product design illegal. But the court’s holdings also indicate that any actual technological benefit does suffice to make the monopolist’s product design legal even though it may have offsetting anticompetitive effects.

The point is not that unilateral efforts to improve or exploit a monopolist’s efficiency by offering a superior or cheaper product never impose offsetting inefficiencies by driving out rivals and ending market competition. The point is that normally the benefits of such efforts greatly outweigh the costs, and antitrust courts and juries cannot reliably determine when that general rule does not hold. Thus, antitrust doctrine sensibly prefers to rely not on such case-by-case substantive judgments, but on a market process that allows monopolists to reap whatever gains they can by efforts to improve their own efficiency, while subjecting them to the constant counter-pressure that their rivals will be trying to do the same. Accordingly, where alleged exclusionary conduct does have an efficiency justification, and can succeed in furthering monopoly power only to the extent the monopolist has successfully improved its own efficiency, then that alone suffices to make the conduct legal without further inquiry into its possibly adverse effects on overall market efficiency.

2. Conduct that succeeds by impairing rival efficiency.

Now let’s consider exclusionary conduct that furthers monopoly power by impairing rival efficiency whether or not it enhances the monopolist’s own efficiency. Normally such exclusionary conduct does so because it forecloses rivals from supplies or outlets they need to achieve full efficiency. Below-cost pricing, for example, can divert sales from rivals in a way that impairs rival efficiency even if the defendant did not enhance its own efficiency, because its prices are lower than its efficiency justifies. More typically, a monopolist forecloses rivals by imposing exclusionary conditions on sales that limit the ability of buyers to buy from its rivals. For example, a monopolist might offer a product discount (on this or another product) if buyers will agree to buy all or some high percentage of their purchases from the monopolist. If enough other buyers agree, then this can produce a substantial marketwide foreclosure.

207. See supra note 67 (collecting sources showing that dynamic increases in productive efficiency have far more effect on social welfare than static decreases in allocative efficiency).

208. Foreclosing buyers will not foreclose rivals if those buyers are dealers who merely resell the product to ultimate consumers, entry barriers to being a dealer are zero, and any entrant can immediately and costlessly expand sales to any extent necessary. In that case, rivals can simply create a new dealer entrant who can immediately access the entire consumer market. But foreclosure will limit rival sales under more realistic assumptions about dealer entry and expandability. Nor is this likely to be an issue if the foreclosed buyers do not merely resell the product but use it in some fashion. This is clearest when buyers are
Likewise, a monopolist might impose similar exclusionary conditions on its purchases that limit the ability of suppliers to supply its rivals. All these exclusionary conditions are discriminatory in the sense noted above because they discriminate against those who deal with rivals.

Where such foreclosure so completely deprives rivals of supplies or outlets that they cannot make any sales at all, then they cannot stay in business and the harm to their efficiency is plain. But exclusionary conditions that produce far less extreme foreclosure can also impair rival efficiency. In most industries, there are economies of scale at low output levels, so that firms can lower their costs by expanding until they reach the output level that minimizes their costs, which is called the minimum efficient scale. If foreclosure prevents a competitive number of rivals from maintaining this scale, or from expanding their operations to reach it, then it impairs their efficiency.209 Foreclosure can similarly deprive rivals of economies of scope if, without the foreclosure, rival expansion would have enabled them to offer a variety of products that can more efficiently be produced or sold together than separately. Further, even if rivals are able to achieve their minimum efficient scale and scope of production, foreclosure that bars rivals from the most efficient suppliers210 or means of distribution211 will also impair rival efficiency by increasing their costs for delivering products to customers. Most industries are also characterized by a learning curve,212 so that substantial foreclosure of the market can impair rival efficiency by simply slowing down rival expansion even though it does not outright prevent that expansion.

If rival efficiency is impaired in any of these ways, then rivals will have to cover their now-higher costs by charging higher prices than they otherwise would have. This will worsen the market options available to consumers, and mean that these rivals will impose less of a constraint on the monopolist’s

the ultimate consumers of the product, for then a rival could not possibly overcome foreclosure by creating new buyers and having them expand to make all market purchases.

209. Note that this anticompetitive effect is not necessarily eliminated if the unforeclosed market can sustain merely one rival, for if only one rival exists it would be less likely to undercut monopoly pricing since it knows it will make less profit in the long run if it did. Rather, to avoid this anticompetitive effect, the unforeclosed market must be large enough to sustain (at their minimum efficient scale) the number of rivals that is sufficient to prevent such coordination.


211. See LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 159-60 & n.14 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 70-71 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001). Although such distributors are nominally buyers, one can conceptualize their foreclosure as effectively a foreclosure of the most efficient suppliers of a necessary input called distribution services.

market power than they otherwise would have. This can thus enhance or maintain monopoly power even if it never drives rivals out of the market.

Many modern industries are also characterized by network effects, which means that one seller’s product is more valuable to buyers the more other buyers have purchased the same good from that seller. Where network effects exist, foreclosure can impair rival efficiency by denying rivals access to the number of buyers they need to make their products more valuable to all buyers. Rather than raising rivals’ costs, this strategy succeeds by lowering the value of rivals’ products. This also worsens the market options available to consumers and lessens the ability of rivals to constrain the monopolist’s market power.

Finally, in markets where competition by innovation is important, foreclosure can deny rivals economies of scale in recouping investments in research. If firms are foreclosed from a significant share of the market, then successful innovations will have a smaller payoff than they otherwise would have, which will discourage efficient investments in research and innovation. For example, suppose it would cost $1 million to invest in research by a firm that has a 50% chance of successfully innovating to create a product that would be sufficiently better than current market options and that, if created, would take all customers in a market with 2.1 million customers and earn the firm an additional $1 per customer. Without foreclosure, capital markets would provide the firm with funding because the expected returns are $1.05 million, which exceeds the $1 million cost, and this is socially efficient since the net benefits exceed the costs. But if even as little as 10% of the market were foreclosed, then capital markets would not provide the firm with funding for its research because the expected payoff would be only $945,000, which is less than the cost. Thus, in this example, 10% foreclosure could preclude rivals from obtaining the capital funding they need to make efficient, socially desirable investments in research and development. Because incentives for research investments are optimal if the entire market is open to a firm that succeeds with new innovation, agreements that foreclose a significant share of the market will discourage some funding necessary to make efficient investments in innovation. This suboptimal level of innovation will deprive


214. For simplicity, costs here include normal returns on capital, and earnings reflect the present value of future earnings. Investors are also assumed to be risk neutral. Taking risk aversion into account would only exacerbate the anticompetitive effects of foreclosure by increasing the risks faced by new innovative companies.
consumers of better market options, and will help protect the monopolist’s market power against innovative threats.

There are many subtle distinctions among economies of scale, scope, learning, research, and network effects. But they can all roughly be described as economies that depend on reaching a certain market share—so for purposes of linguistic simplicity let me call them all “economies of share.”215 The common element is that such economies of share can be denied to rivals through marketwide foreclosure. Exclusionary conduct that produces a marketwide foreclosure that denies rivals these economies of share thus impairs rival efficiency.

Note that the proper baseline for determining whether rival efficiency has been impaired is not the status quo. That is, the question is not whether the conduct has rendered the rival less efficient than it had been in the past. For generally exclusionary conduct is used to preserve existing monopoly power by preventing rivals from gaining efficiencies they otherwise would have gained.216 Thus, the proper baseline is whether the exclusionary conduct helps enhance or maintain monopoly power by depriving rivals of efficiencies they could have obtained without the exclusionary conduct. Since a nondiscriminatory setting of the above-cost terms on which the monopolist will deal is simply an exercise of the property right to exclude that rewards and reflects an independent improvement in monopolist efficiency, such conduct should not be considered an exclusionary impairment of rival efficiency.217 Rather, one must show the monopolist went beyond the improvement in its monopolist efficiency either by pricing below its cost or by discriminating against rivals or those who deal with them.

The key factor that distinguishes the sort of exclusionary conduct that merits condemnation is that it can successfully increase or maintain the monopolist’s market power even if the monopolist has not increased its efficiency in any way. Where the conduct in fact does not increase the monopolist’s efficiency at all, then the issue is easy, for such conduct impairs rival efficiency without any offsetting efficiency benefit on the other side of the

215. More precisely, economies of scale depend on size, but if we assume market output is relatively static then a certain share implies a certain size. Likewise, economies of scope more precisely depend on achieving a certain size across multiple product markets. And learning curve economies more precisely depend on total past production rather than current size or share, but if a firm is foreclosed from a substantial share of the market in its early years that will limit its total past production and thus slow down its progress along the learning curve.

216. See infra Part IV.C.

217. If one instead adopted a baseline that entitled rivals to access to such property because their efficiency would be impaired without it, then that would seem to “make all property rights illegal” because their “purpose and effect is to raise others’ (including rivals’) costs of using goods protected by” those property rights. Wesley J. Liebeler, Exclusion and Inefficiency, 11 REGULATION 34, 38 (1987).
ledger. For example, suppose there are economies of scale and the monopolist acknowledges that the minimum efficient scale is 40%, but the monopolist uses exclusionary agreements that foreclose its only rival from 70% of the market. The monopolist might try to argue that those agreements were necessary to encourage it to make the sunk cost investments in its facilities to attain economies of scale. But that argument would be easy to reject, for the economies of scale by definition bottom out at 40% of the market, and thus the agreements that assured the monopolist 70% of the market provided no incremental increase in the monopolist’s efficiency. Instead, the sole effect of the agreements is to worsen the efficiency of the monopolist’s rival by denying it economies of scale.

This same sort of analysis applies to any case where economies of share peter out below 50% of the market. Such economies of share can never provide a justification for exclusionary conduct by a monopolist who has a market share over 50%.

A seemingly more difficult case is where the monopolist claims that economies of share extend beyond 50% of the market. In that case, the monopolist might argue that exclusionary conditions that guarantee it more than 50% of the market are necessary for it to improve its own efficiency. True, if the economies of share are over 50%, then any exclusionary conduct that guarantees the monopolist over 50% of the market must by definition be impairing rival efficiency by holding it below 50%. But in such a case, should antitrust judges and juries then be saddled with the task of weighing whether the gain in monopolist efficiency turns out to benefit consumers more than they suffer from the impairment of rival efficiency?

The answer is no, and for a number of reasons. To begin with, even if we assume economies of share do extend to a size larger than 50% of the market, there is ordinarily a plain, less restrictive alternative to using exclusionary conditions to guarantee the monopolist a share above 50%. Namely, the firm can use vigorous above-cost price competition and internal expansion through sales without conditions that discriminate against rivals. If there are economies of share that extend beyond 50%, a firm can keep expanding and lowering prices as it achieves those greater economies, until it has fully achieved its minimum efficient share. This would provide a market test of whether economies of share really justify a firm of that size. Further, a firm that has achieved economies of share through such price competition remains vulnerable to competition by a rival who is more efficient and has an even lower cost curve, thus assuring that the market gets the most efficient firm or firms. And through such price competition the market can also adjust for the

218. Or, in the case of network effects, a higher overall demand curve.
219. For an explanation of how a rival that does not have a higher cost curve than an incumbent monopolist can overcome economies of scale if there is no marketwide
fact that today’s economies of share can change tomorrow as technology and consumer demand change, making a size that seems efficient today inefficient tomorrow.

In contrast to relying on such a market test, there are several problems with claims that economies of share justify exclusionary conditions that guarantee certain shares to the monopolist. Assigning market share by such exclusionary conditions rather than by open competition can result in the monopolist becoming larger than economies of share really justify or persisting at a size that later becomes unjustified when changes in technology and consumer demand change economies of share. Further, such exclusionary conditions can give a less efficient incumbent firm exclusive access to the benefits of economies of share, preventing a rival that is more efficient (because it has a lower overall cost curve) from being able to compete because the exclusionary conditions foreclose that rival from the access to buyers that it needs to achieve its own economies of share. Accordingly, it is better to allow free market competition to determine whether economies of share require a firm of a given size and which firm that should be, rather than to allow those issues to be determined by a form of private self-regulation through discriminatory conditions, subject to imperfect review years later by antitrust judges and juries.

Indeed, the argument that economies of share justify exclusionary conduct that assures that share to one firm over its rivals turns out to be conceptually no different than the argument that exclusionary conduct to achieve a monopoly should be legal if the market is a natural monopoly. That argument has been rejected by well-accepted antitrust economics, and for the same reasons.\(^\text{220}\) Banning such exclusionary conduct despite the seeming inevitability of monopoly helps “assure survival for the most efficient competitor and protect the processes of competition when the claimed inevitability [of monopoly] is less than sure.”\(^\text{221}\) Further, it preserves an undistorted market that is able to adjust if today’s natural monopoly becomes unnatural tomorrow because of changing demand or costs.\(^\text{222}\) Counterintuitive as it may seem, we can have

foreclosure, see Elhaug, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts Are Not Predatory, supra note 8, at 786-92. In contrast, if the monopolist ties product availability or price discounts to the share of its product that is taken, that can disable a rival from achieving those same economies of share.

\(^{220}\) See III A REEDA \& HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, at 125-26. The holding in Otter Tail rejected a dissenting argument that the monopolization claim should be dismissed because monopoly was inevitable given that the market was a natural monopoly. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 388-89 (1973) (Stewart, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

\(^{221}\) A REEDA \& KAPLOW, supra note 4, at 616.

\(^{222}\) See Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 581 (1969) (“No natural monopoly can safely be assumed . . . to last forever, impervious to changes in technology and consumer taste.”).
temporary natural monopolies, and we would not want to allow exclusionary conduct to preclude the process of competition by firms seeking either to end the monopoly or to become the next temporary monopolist.

This well-accepted rejection of the natural monopoly defense has more bite than one might think. After all, in every monopolization case, the defendant has a market share over 50%. Thus, any argument that economies of share required the exclusionary conduct that secured that share necessarily amounts to a claim that the minimum efficient share is greater than 50%. This is the same as claiming that the market is a natural monopoly not only when those economies of share increase across all market output but also when those economies remain flat at outputs beyond the minimum efficient share because a market cannot by definition have two firms with greater than 50% market share. In cases when diseconomies eventually increase beyond a minimum efficient share that is above 50% of the market, then a natural monopoly will still result if the largest firm can supply the entire market more efficiently than multiple firms could, which will often be the case given that all but one firm would have to be operating below the minimum efficient share. Other times, a natural duopoly could result with the largest firm enjoying some market share between the supra-50% minimum efficient share and 100% of the market. But this will typically be enough to constitute a monopoly share for antitrust purposes. Indeed, we know any monopolization defendant claiming that economies of share justify exclusionary conduct guaranteeing it a given market share must have a market share sufficient to be deemed a monopoly because otherwise the first monopolization element would not have been satisfied. We can thus call all the above claimed natural monopolies for antitrust purposes because they are cases where the defendant’s claim is necessarily that market conditions naturally give one firm what antitrust law would deem a monopoly share.

Accordingly, claims that a monopolist’s exclusionary conduct is justified by economies of share amounts to a claim that it is entitled to engage in exclusionary conduct to achieve or maintain a monopoly because market conditions naturally give one firm a monopoly share. Sometimes such claims may have economic merit. But it would still be better to have their merit determined not by private self-regulation or antitrust juries but by an undistorted market test of requiring free competition without the exclusionary conduct. Such a market test can more accurately determine not only whether

223. As we will see, the analysis here helps explain why a 50% market share has been a de facto lower bound to prove monopoly power even though market share is a highly imperfect proxy for the extent of a firm’s ability to price above cost. See infra Part IV.B.

224. See CARLTON & PELLOFF, supra note 4, at 101-03.

225. Although the last scenario would not technically be a natural monopoly under the standard economic definition that the costs of having one firm supply 100% of market demand are lower than the costs of two or more firms doing so, the others would. Id.
market conditions naturally produce a monopoly but who the most efficient natural monopolist is, and can rapidly alter either conclusion whenever circumstances change.

In short, where economies of share exist, there are two possibilities. One possibility is that economies of share peter out somewhere below a 50% share of the market given existing technology and demand. If so, then those economies of share cannot provide any efficiency justification for exclusionary conduct that attains or maintains a monopoly market share over 50%. The other possibility is that those economies of share go beyond 50% of the market. If so, then we have a market that naturally gives one firm a monopoly share, and exclusionary conditions that guarantee a given share for the monopolist still should not be permitted because requiring competition by internal expansion without such conditions will provide us with a market test that assures that economies of share are really that high, that the monopolist is the firm that can most efficiently take advantage of them, and that can nimbly adjust either conclusion with future changes in technology, demand, or firm efficiency.

Consistent with this analysis, United Shoe rejected on principle an argument that the exclusionary practices considered there were justified because achieving economies of scale, production, distribution, or research required reaching a monopoly share. Likewise, the Microsoft en banc decision rejected Microsoft’s arguments that various exclusionary conditions it imposed on those it dealt with kept the market focused on its operating system. The en banc court did not dispute these claims factually, but rather rejected them as a matter of antitrust principle. Given the pervasive influence of network effects in the computer industry, clearly there are efficiency benefits to having the market focused on one operating system. The court’s treatment of this argument thus amounted to a rejection of the claim that such economies of share could ever justify exclusionary conditions designed to guarantee that the monopolist, rather than its rivals, enjoyed those economies.

This conclusion does mean that sometimes a monopolist might be prohibited from using exclusionary practices that improve its own efficiency even though those same practices would be deemed procompetitive when engaged in by its rivals, something rivals are likely to do since that practice will presumably enhance their efficiency as well. But that simply reflects the reality that “[b]ehavior that might otherwise not be of concern to the antitrust laws—or that might even be viewed as procompetitive—can take on exclusionary connotations when practiced by a monopolist.” And United Shoe upheld a

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finding of monopolization for exclusionary practices by a monopolist even though it was acknowledged that the same practices were engaged in by its rivals, would be engaged in by “honorable firms,” and were traditional in the industry, all of which suggested that the practices were efficient even when they did not further monopoly power. Those efficiency virtues were never weighed against the anticompetitive effects. Instead, United Shoe found that it sufficed that the monopolist “excludes some potential, and limits some actual, competition” and this “is not attributable solely to defendant’s ability, economies of scale, research, natural advantages, and adaptation to inevitable economic laws.” This again supports the proposition that the monopolist is immune when any harm to rivals’ ability to compete comes from its own improved efficiency, but liable for exclusionary practices that further its monopoly power by impairing rival efficiency whether or not they improve monopolist efficiency. This conclusion also is supported by the monopolization standard’s general strong preference for a monopolist that competes by improving its own efficiency and then exploits that greater efficiency to offer cheaper or better products, rather than by imposing exclusionary conditions that impair the efficiency of rivals.

Also consistent with this conclusion is the otherwise puzzling case of Palmer v. BRG. That case involved an agreement between the two main providers of bar review courses in Georgia, whereby Harcourt Brace agreed to license its nationally distributed Bar/Bri materials to BRG, with BRG agreeing to operate just in Georgia and Harcourt Brace agreeing to operate only outside Georgia. The Supreme Court summarily held that this agreement was per se illegal both as price-fixing and a horizontal market division. This holding was odd because the agreement put Harcourt Brace and BRG into a vertical supply relationship, and the Court in Sylvania had previously held that territorial divisions that are ancillary to a vertical supply relation have many procompetitive justifications and thus must be judged under the rule of reason. Whatever procompetitive justifications typically apply to vertical territorial restraints would seem at least equally applicable here and indeed probably stronger because free riding problems are greater given the ease of copying materials and because the price paid for a copyright license reflects the scope of the area of permitted use. Such procompetitive justifications would

(Scalia, J., joined by O'Connor, J. & Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing III Areeda & Turner, supra note 29, ¶ 813, at 300-02).

229. United Shoe, 110 F. Supp. at 340, 344. Also suggesting the efficiency of these practices were the facts that the same practices were used by the defendant before it became a monopolist, see Wiley et al., supra note 97, at 717, and by firms in many competitive markets for a variety of possible efficiency reasons. Id. at 709-17.


November 2003] MONOPOLIZATION STANDARDS 329

seem to take this horizontal territorial restraint out of the per se category under BMI.\textsuperscript{233} Moreover, it is hard to believe the Palmer Court would have come out the same way if there were, say, 100 firms in a market, and one of them decided to leave the market and license its materials to the other. Since such a plain lack of market power would almost certainly have altered the outcome, the rule being applied is not really one of the per se rules against horizontal price-fixing or market divisions, which require no market power.

Understood as a monopolization case, however, Palmer can easily be explained. Since the two defendants were the two main providers in Georgia, the agreement to allocate the Georgia market to just one of them created a monopoly, which was confirmed by the dramatic price increase from $150 to $400 that followed. Further, the agreement would have created that monopoly whether or not it enhanced the efficiency of the remaining provider. The case thus fell within the posited rule that, when conduct furthers monopoly power regardless of whether it enhances defendant efficiency, it is illegal without need to weigh any possible efficiency benefit against the anticompetitive cost. This rule has the per se aspect of condemning conduct without weighing its possible efficiency benefit against its anticompetitive effect, but does require proof that the conduct had the anticompetitive effect of creating or maintaining monopoly power.

Finally, this understanding is consistent with other language of the Supreme Court, which has stressed: "’The central message of the Sherman Act is that a business entity must find new customers and higher profits through internal expansion—that is, by competing successfully rather than by arranging treaties with its competitors.’”\textsuperscript{234} The same preference for internal expansion would seem to apply vis-à-vis efforts to achieve profits through treaties with others to fence out competitors. Nor is the point limited to actual expansion, for the Court has also stated that monopolists should employ the same sort of behavior to avoid market contraction in the face of increasing competition, stressing "[t]hat [the Sherman] Act assumes that an enterprise will protect itself against loss by operating with superior service, lower costs, and improved efficiency.”\textsuperscript{235} What the monopolist cannot do is instead use exclusionary conditions that discriminate on the basis of rivalry to impair rival efficiency in ways that will enhance or maintain its monopoly market share whether or not they improve the monopolist’s own efficiency.

3. Conclusion.

Rather than employing an open-ended rule of reason balancing test, antitrust law mainly employs two rules to sort out when to condemn conduct that helps acquire or maintain monopoly power. One rule makes such conduct per se legal if its exclusionary effect on rivals depends on enhancing the defendant’s efficiency. The other rule makes such conduct per se illegal if its exclusionary effect on rivals will enhance monopoly power regardless of any improvement in defendant efficiency. Like any rule, these rules are necessarily somewhat over- and underinclusive on their face, and thus can never correlate as perfectly to underlying norms of social desirability as we might imagine a perfectly applied open-ended standard would. If we lived in a world where information was costless, antitrust judges and juries weighed procompetitive benefits and anticompetitive costs with perfect accuracy, and firms could predict what judges and juries would do with similarly perfect accuracy, it would be best to have the law on exclusionary conduct simply be that “defendant conduct is illegal only when condemning it enhances social welfare.” Indeed, with such omniscience, that could be the law on every topic. Nor would we need business managers or markets at all because omniscient judges and juries could simply dictate every investment and production decision to maximize social welfare. But the real world is notably different, which is why antitrust law generally prefers to instead rely on a market process rather than substantive case-by-case judgments by antitrust judges and juries, and why in monopolization cases courts sensibly abjure such open-ended balancing, and instead employ the above rules.

IV. THE CAUSAL LINK TO MONOPOLY POWER

We are now in a position to revisit the monopoly power element. Recall that, while not entirely vacuous, current monopoly power standards have at least three problems. First, just about every firm in the real world has at least some pricing discretion, and this is only becoming a bigger problem with increasing brand differentiation and the movement of the economy away from commodities toward services and experiences. Second, monopoly power is defined as having a substantial degree of a market power that is itself defined to exist only when it is substantial. Third, and most seriously, the doctrine is unclear about whether pricing discretion or market share is the variable whose substantiality matters, with even advocates of a pure pricing discretion standard recoiling from its application when market shares dip to low levels.

237. See supra Part I.A.
A. The Causal Connection to Marketwide Effects

We can begin to make a bit more sense of these issues by noting that U.S. antitrust law does not merely require “monopoly power” in the abstract, but a causal connection between the challenged exclusionary conduct and the acquisition or maintenance of that power. Such a causal connection is implicit in the language of § 2, which makes it illegal to “monopolize,” “attempt to monopolize,” or “conspire . . . to monopolize.” The “-ize” suffix proves crucial, for it indicates that the gravamen of the offense is the illicit creation or maintenance of a monopoly power that otherwise would not exist, at least not to the same degree. Thus, the statutory language calls for proof of some causal connection between the illicit conduct and the extent of monopoly power, or in the case of attempted monopolization, at least a dangerous threat of such a causal connection.

Of course, it will often be unclear just how the market would have developed but for the defendant’s misconduct, especially when a monopolist is squelching the development of a new firm or technology. Courts have resolved that problem by holding that, because the wrongdoer appropriately bears the burden of any uncertainty caused by its misconduct, a plaintiff need only prove the exclusionary conduct was reasonably capable of making a significant causal contribution to the acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power. But the underlying basis for liability remains the reasonable likelihood of some causal link between the exclusionary conduct and the extent of the defendant’s monopoly power.

The significance of this causal link can be highlighted by the contrast with E.C. law, which does not require it. E.C. competition law instead makes the illegal act the “abuse . . . of a dominant position,” and thus focuses on whether any dominant market power that already exists was improperly used. This provision thus does not on its face cover conduct that improperly creates (or even less, attempts to create) dominant market power, but does prohibit a firm that uses even properly acquired market power to charge “unfair . . . prices.” United States antitrust law, in contrast, focuses solely on illicit conduct that bears some reasonable causal connection to monopoly power, leaving completely unregulated the prices charged by a firm that properly acquired or maintained such power.

241. Treaty Establishing the European Community, supra note 63, at art. 82.
242. Id.
Although this doctrinal difference may have resulted from the happenstance of the verb chosen for drafting, the U.S. approach reflects a much sounder policy. Illicit conduct that creates dominant market power leads to higher prices that are both avoidable and socially undesirable. It is thus important to condemn such conduct, and the failure of E.C. competition law to do so leaves an unsound gap in its regulation of anticompetitive behavior. In contrast, when a firm uses proper conduct to create something sufficiently more valuable than existing market options to enjoy dominant market power, then any high prices it earns are the proper social reward for that creation, and the denial of that reward by E.C. law seems equally unsound.

In any event, wise or not, this causal connection is a key aspect of actual U.S. antitrust doctrine, and it helps illuminate the proper understanding of the monopoly power element. For while the U.S. Supreme Court defines “monopoly power” as “the power to control prices or exclude competition,”243 this causal connection suggests that the Court does not mean a power simply to control one’s own prices or to exclude any competitor. It suggests that the Court instead means a power to control marketwide prices or to exclude the sort of marketwide competition that otherwise seems reasonably capable of constraining its power.

Focusing on this causal connection thus makes clear that it cannot suffice that a firm has the same pricing discretion that any firm has in our brand-differentiated world, even though such discretion does enable it to engage in price discrimination and raise its own prices by restricting its own output. That sort of pricing discretion depends on the existence of the brand, and thus bears no reasonable causal relation to whether exclusionary conditions impair rival efficiency in the marketplace. Rather, the proof necessary to show the sort of control over price that indicates monopoly power is that the firm can, by reducing its own output, constrain marketwide output and thus raise marketwide prices. In short, it must be able to influence the prices of others in the market, not just have some discretion over its own prices.

Indeed, when it first defined “monopoly power,” the Court was quite specific about this, stating: “Price and competition are so intimately entwined that any discussion of theory must treat them as one. It is inconceivable that price could be controlled without power over competition or vice versa.”244 Thus, the Court clearly means to exclude any sort of power over price that does not result from a power over competition. And it meant to include the sort of power over rivals that enhances the monopolist’s ability to raise prices, thus including not just the power to exclude competition from the marketplace altogether, but the power to exclude competition from enough of the market to

244. E.I. du Pont, 351 U.S. at 392.
impair rival efficiency and thus increase marketwide prices.

This need to prove a causal connection between the exclusionary conduct and the acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power might seem inconsistent with language in *Kodak* that resurrected a sentence from *Griffith* defining monopolization as “the use of monopoly power ‘to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor.’”\(^{245}\) Literally read, this language seems to condemn the use of monopoly power to gain a competitive advantage or to disadvantage rivals in some other market in which the defendant never had monopoly power. But this language in *Kodak* was dicta. Indeed, the *Kodak* Court immediately followed this language with a sentence indicating that Kodak would be liable only “[i]f Kodak adopted its parts and service policies as part of a scheme of willful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power.”\(^{246}\) This sentence appears to reverse any implication that the first language eliminated the need to prove a causal connection to the initial or continued existence of monopoly power.\(^{247}\) Further reversing any such implication was the later statement in *Spectrum Sports* that § 2 condemns unilateral conduct “only when it actually monopolizes or


\(^{246}\) *Kodak*, 504 U.S. at 483.

\(^{247}\) Although the original language in *Griffith* itself is often described as dicta, this does not appear to be technically accurate. One might be tempted to think it was dicta because it was preceded with language that seemed to emphasize the need for such a causal link by stating: “It is ... not always necessary to find a specific intent to ... build a monopoly in order to find that the anti-trust laws have been violated. It is sufficient that a ... monopoly results as the consequence of a defendant’s conduct ... .’ *Griffith*, 334 U.S. at 105. But the Court’s ultimate holding was that a violation of monopolization doctrine had been proven even though the record failed to show “[w]hat effect these practices actually had on the competitors . . . or on the growth of the [monopolist].” and the lower court had explicitly “found that no competitors were driven out of business, or acquired by appellees.” *Id.* at 109. Instead, the Court ruled that it sufficed to find a violation that “the monopoly power of appellees had some effect on their competitors and on the growth of the [monopolist],” even though the extent of that effect could not yet be determined without a remand. *Id.* Given that the relevant growth of the monopolist was into nonmonopoly towns, this holding appears to dispense with any requirement to prove a causal connection to the existence of monopoly power. But *Griffith* is full of many misguided notions that have been ignored by modern courts because they conflict with modern antitrust jurisprudence, including the notion that “monopoly power, whether lawfully or unlawfully acquired, may itself constitute an evil and stand condemned under § 2 even though it remains unexercised. For § 2 of the Act is aimed, *inter alia*, at the acquisition or retention of effective market control.” *Id.* at 107 (footnote omitted). Taken literally, this language would suggest that the firm that builds a better mousetrap so that the world will beat a path to its door will receive as its legal reward a judgment that it is liable in antitrust for treble damages. No court takes that proposition seriously. In any event, the later statements in *Kodak*, *Spectrum Sports*, and *Copperweld* appear to have reimposed the need to prove a causal connection to the acquisition or maintenance of actual monopoly power.
dangerously threatens to do so.”

B. The Economic Relevance of Market Share

Why do courts remain fixated with market shares as proof of monopoly power? After all, everyone seems to agree that market shares are at best an imperfect proxy for the power to raise prices above competitive levels. The conventional response is to try to defend the use of this imperfect proxy by saying that it is an easier or more administrable test to apply. But it is not at all clear why one would think so. Proving any market share requires establishing a particular market definition, and that has become an enormously complex task requiring inquiry into the degree of pricing discretion that a hypothetical monopolist would have if it had 100% of a market with a posited definition. It is not at all clear why a market share calculation that is derived from such an estimate of the pricing discretion of a hypothetical monopolist should be regarded as easier or more certain than inquiry into the actual pricing discretion of the actual defendant.

Nor is the puzzle eliminated if, as suggested above, we define pricing discretion to exist only when a firm can raise marketwide prices. For example, if a market had five firms with 20% market share, each producing a homogenous product, and all the firms were entirely unable to expand output, then each firm could, by reducing its own output, constrain marketwide output and raise marketwide prices. Yet no one would say that each firm was a monopolist. Why do we shrink from that conclusion because of low market shares?

Part of the reason may simply be linguistic. The Greek prefix “mono” means “one,” so it makes little linguistic sense to talk about a market with more than one monopolist. The statutory language instead suggests the sort of singularity that implies a market share of over 50%. But there is much more than this to it. For if one reflects on the above analysis, it indicates an underlying economic reality that would support the same conclusion even if “monopolize” did not happen to be the word used in the U.S. statute. The reasons are several.

First, as shown in Part II, the ability of a firm to get buyers to agree to exclusionary conditions that hamper rival efficiency and harm buyers as a

group will depend on that firm being able to act as a unitary actor that either (a) does not have the collective action problems that buyers have or (b) can reach a Coasian bargain with buyers who have market power to create supracompetitive profits and pass on the costs downstream.\footnote{251} If there are instead multiple sellers, such as in the above case of five firms each with 20% of the market, they will have their own collective action problems amongst themselves, and thus will be less able to exploit the collective action problems of buyers. Likewise, if no one large seller dominates, sellers will have more difficulty entering into a Coasian bargain with buyers to create more seller market power and share the resulting supracompetitive profits.

Second, without a dominant market share, it will be very difficult for any single firm—no matter how much discretion over prices it has—to foreclose rivals from such a large share of the market that it can impair the efficiency of those rivals. For example, in the case of five 20% firms, even if one firm imposes exclusionary conditions that absolutely foreclose its buyers and suppliers from dealing with rivals, that will still amount to only a 20% foreclosure of the market.\footnote{252} Nor would such a 20% foreclosure really contribute much to the sort of market power each firm does have, which instead turns on the inability of rivals to expand because they are already at full capacity. Thus, focusing on the causal connection to the alleged exclusionary conduct suggests that the sort of market power such a 20% seller may have is not the sort of power that should be deemed monopoly power.

Third, a dominant market share will tend to make any investment in impairing the efficiency of rivals more profitable. The benefits will be higher because a firm that succeeds in impairing rival efficiency will enjoy higher prices on more sales the larger the market share it has. And a dominant market share means a small market share left over to rivals, which lowers the cost of any investment in impairing rival efficiency if that cost is proportional to the amount of rival sales being made.

Finally, the argument in Part III that courts can safely disregard claims that exclusionary conditions were necessary for the defendant to achieve economies

\footnote{251}{See supra Part II.C.2.}

\footnote{252}{True, if three of these 20% firms entered into exclusionary agreements with their buyers, then the relevant marketwide foreclosure would be their \textit{cumulative} foreclosure of 60%. \textit{See} Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 295, 309, 314 (1949) (finding anticompetitive effects because the exclusive dealing agreements of the seven leading oil producers produced an aggregate foreclosure of 65%); FTC v. Motion Picture Adver. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 393, 395 (1953) (same when four firms had exclusive dealing arrangements with an aggregate foreclosure of 75%); United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 365-66 (1963) (stressing the cumulative foreclosure in the prior two holdings); IX PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 94, 103-04, 388, 390-91 (1991); XI HOVENKAMP, supra note 89, at 160. But, as these sources also indicate, such exclusionary agreements would be judged under the more lenient balancing standards of Sherman Act § 1 and Clayton Act § 3, rather than the hostile standards of Sherman Act § 2.}
of share that improve its own efficiency depended on the premise that the defendant’s market share was above 50%. It was that premise that justified the conclusion that any such efficiency claim must reflect either (a) economies of share that peter out below the 50% level and that thus cannot justify exclusionary conduct that assures the defendant a share higher than 50% or (b) economies of share that continue past the 50% level and thus amount to a natural monopoly claim that should be tested by market competition rather than resolved by self-regulation through exclusionary conditions. If the defendant’s market share were below 50%, then one cannot make the same claim, and thus its efficiency assertions are better judged by the more lenient rule-of-reason balancing test applicable to agreements in restraint of trade.

In short, the analysis above indicates that the continued focus by courts on whether accused monopolizers have a high market share reflects neither some linguistic hang-up nor the continued use of an imperfect proxy for an ability to raise prices above competitive levels. Rather, a high market share also has independent economic relevance because it bears on the ability of the defendant to persuade buyers to agree to exclusionary schemes, the likelihood that those schemes will impair rival efficiency, the profitability to the defendant of impairing rival efficiency, and the relevance of any economies of share the defendant may enjoy from the scheme. Thus, on economic as well as legal grounds, monopoly power should not be deemed to exist unless the exclusionary conduct contributes to the acquisition or maintenance of not only a power to raise marketwide prices or produce marketwide foreclosure but also a defendant market share of over 50%.

Interestingly, antitrust courts seem to have intuitively grasped the economic significance of having a 50% market share without articulating the theory that supports it. Lower court cases in the United States generally require a market share of at least 50% to prove monopoly power. And E.C. and Canadian courts have held that proving a 50% market share is necessary to make out the sort of prima facie evidence of a dominant position that shifts the burden to the defendant.

One implication of this analysis is to provide another basis for resolving uncertainties about market definitions and shares. Currently, the methodology for defining markets consists of all-or-nothing judgment calls about whether to include particular producers in a market based on (often mixed) evidence about the degree to which they would constrain the pricing of a hypothetical monopolist. Producers who constrain some but not “enough” are treated as if they do not constrain at all by excluding them from the market, and producers

253. See supra text accompanying notes 217-226.
255. Id. at 535-36, 538-39.
who constrain “enough” but not completely are treated as perfect substitutes by putting them in the same market. Thoughtful advocates of a pure pricing discretion model thus counsel that judges should, in deciding what weight to attach to a given market share, adjust for the all-or-nothing judgment calls that were made in defining the market. But this vastly complicates matters, and if all we cared about was pricing discretion, it is not clear why judges would not instead advert directly to the actual pricing discretion of the defendant.

The above analysis suggests that a more satisfactory way of resolving ambiguities about market definitions and shares would be to advert to the functional considerations that cause courts to be concerned about market shares at all. For example, courts could consider whether the presence of the posited rival would alter the ability of the defendant to act as a unitary negotiator who can exploit the collective action problems of buyers. Or in deciding issues of market definition, courts could consider the extent to which foreclosure in a posited narrow market could deprive rivals of economies of size without foreclosing a broader market. Adverting to these functional concerns will certainly not eliminate ambiguity, but it will avoid the schizophrenia of resolving ambiguities about market share analysis based on inferences about a pricing discretion criteria that would, if determinative, seem to suggest courts should jettison inquiry into market share altogether.

C. Enhancing Monopoly Power Versus Slowing Its Decline

A causal link between exclusionary conduct and monopoly power is not at all disproved by evidence that the alleged monopolist’s prices, profits, or market share declined during the period of exclusionary conduct. Monopolizing activities are frequently undertaken not to create monopoly power but rather to maintain and slow down the erosion of existing monopoly power. In fact, it is precisely when a monopolist sees its monopoly power waning because of a new market threat or technology that it is most desperate to cling to that power, and thus most tempted to use anticompetitive conduct to slow down that erosion and maintain some degree of monopoly power for as long as possible. Thus, there is no reason to assume exclusionary conduct will typically increase monopoly prices, profits, or shares. Rather its anticompetitive effect may typically be to prevent monopoly prices, profits, or shares from dropping further and faster, often by slowing down a market shift to a better or cheaper rival or new product. This is why the Court’s monopolization test correctly condemns not just the acquisition but also the “maintenance” of monopoly power with exclusionary conduct, which includes conduct that simply slows

256. See Areeda & Kaplow, supra note 4, at 563-64, 567.
down the erosion of monopoly power. 258

Indeed, when you think about it, it is the illegitimate extension of such temporary monopolies that antitrust law should care about most. If the market were instead a natural monopoly, it would exist and persist regardless of exclusionary conduct or antitrust law as long as the underlying economic fundamentals persisted. All antitrust law could do would be to assure fair competition to try to assure that the most efficient firm wins the natural monopoly. It is only if the monopoly is a temporary monopoly that we fear exclusionary conduct that might extend its temporary life, and thus saddle us with monopoly prices that otherwise would have been competitive.

Accordingly, the correct baseline to determine whether exclusionary conduct causes an increase in monopoly power is not how high prices, profits, or shares were in the past. Instead, the correct baseline compares the actual extent of monopoly power to the degree of power the defendant would have had without the exclusionary conduct. To illustrate, suppose a firm earns monopoly profits of $100 million, which would have decreased to $50 million without exclusionary conduct because rivals would have expanded. Suppose further that monopoly profits would instead decrease to $80 million if the firm uses exclusionary agreements with buyers that slow down rival expansion. If so, it would be in the monopolist’s interest to pay $20 million in discounts or side payments to get buyers to agree to exclusionary agreements, even when those agreements produce no efficiencies whatsoever. The firm’s monopoly profits would then show a decrease from $100 million to $60 million ($80 million minus $20 million in discounts or side payments), which might mislead someone into concluding that the firm’s exclusionary conduct failed to cause an increase in monopoly power. But in fact this exclusionary conduct would have increased monopoly power because without it the firm would have earned $10 million less in monopoly profits during that period. Thus, even though the firm’s profits are declining, it can still profitably pay up to $30 million in side payments or discounts out of the additional monopoly profits the exclusionary conduct will create. One simply needs to be careful to use the correct but for baseline rather than the historical baseline to measure the “additional” profits created by the exclusionary conduct.

In short, the absence of evidence that monopoly prices, profits, or shares eventually rose in the long run does not mean the exclusionary conduct was not anticompetitive. In the above example, the firm’s exclusionary conduct increased its profits by $10 million not by improving its efficiency but by impairing the efficiency of its rivals, and consumer welfare was harmed by

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258. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 378, 381 (1973) (invalidating exclusionary conduct designed to prevent the defendant’s rivals “from eroding its monopolistic position” even though the tactics did not prevent the defendant from losing the retail business of some municipalities).
over $30 million. This is anticompetitive even if the firm’s prices and profits never rebound to levels greater than (or even equal to) the prices and profits that prevailed before the exclusionary conduct. This is yet another reason why it makes little sense to focus on the timeline of profits rather than on substantive judgments about the nature of the underlying conduct.

D. The Irrelevance of Buyer Acceptance, Initiation, or Terminability

The fact that buyers have voluntarily agreed to exclusionary conduct also proves neither that the conduct failed to cause an increase in monopoly power, nor that the conduct must be efficient and on balance beneficial to consumer welfare. Because of the underlying collective action and seller-buyer collusion problems detailed in Part II, buyers often will agree to inefficient seller conduct that is harmful to themselves and/or downstream consumers. This is true whether buyers have market power or not. Either way, their decisions about whether agreeing to exclusionary conduct is in their individual interests cannot be taken as a reliable proxy for whether that conduct advances consumer welfare as a whole. That buyers find it in their interests to agree to exclusionary conduct thus should be no defense as a matter of antitrust theory. Nor does it have any support in antitrust law, which finds monopolization even when many buyers agree to exclusionary conditions restricting their dealing with a monopolist’s rivals.

Indeed, the contrary argument rests on a well-known logical fallacy: the fallacy of composition. The fallacy of composition is the assertion that, if something is true for individual members of a group, then it must be true for the group as a whole. Here, the fallacious argument is that, if individual buyers are made better off by agreeing to exclusionary conduct, then it must be in the interests of buyers as a group (and thus for the market as a whole) for them to so agree:

[This] fallacy of composition . . . has collapsed in the face of two major developments . . . : Mancur Olson’s logic of collective action and game theory’s Prisoner’s Dilemma. In the latter, there is a dilemma precisely

259. It is over $30 million because consumers also suffer a deadweight loss given that, without the exclusionary agreement, prices would have declined further and more consumers would have bought the product at prices that exceeded its lowered cost of production.

260. See supra Part II.C.2.


262. Hardin, supra note 92, at 2; 5 Oxford English Dictionary 693 (2d ed. 1989); Ricardo J. Caballero, A Fallacy of Composition, 82 Am. Econ. Rev. 1279, 1279 (1992) ("Fallacy of composition: A fallacy in which what is true of the part is, on that account alone, alleged to be also true on the whole.” (quoting Paul Anthony Samuelson, Economics (1955)).
because what it makes sense for an individual to do is not what it would make sense for the group to do.\textsuperscript{263}

Because of this, we cannot justifiably assume that, if it is in the interests of each individual buyer to participate in exclusionary conduct, then it is in the interests of participating buyers as a group. Even less can we assume that, if something is in the interests of participating buyers, then it is in the interests of the market as a whole given the effects on nonparticipating buyers or on those downstream who pay the anticompetitive costs.

For the same reasons, it should be irrelevant that buyers initiated an exclusionary agreement with a monopolist. The same underlying collective action and seller-buyer collusion problems that make it individually profitable for buyers to agree to anticompetitive exclusionary agreements in exchange for discounts or side payments also make it profitable for buyers to initiate such an agreement. Consistent with this, the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that exclusionary agreements do not constitute monopolization when the monopolist never demanded the exclusion, noting that the anticompetitive effect was the same regardless of who initiated the idea.\textsuperscript{264}

The same logic also means it should be no defense that exclusionary agreements are short-term or terminable by buyers on short notice. The same factors that make it in buyers’ interests to enter into the exclusionary agreement to get discounts will also make it in their interests not to terminate an exclusionary agreement that offers those discounts even though termination by all buyers would eliminate the anticompetitive effect. When the exclusionary agreement results from collusion between sellers and intermediate buyers that benefits the latter at the expense of downstream buyers, then the intermediate buyers have no incentive to terminate or decline to renew the agreement. When collective action problems induce buyers to enter into exclusionary agreements, those same collective action problems will also cause buyers not to terminate them because buyers will realize that their individual termination would lose them the discounts from the monopoly price but would not have much impact on whether the marketwide harm persists. Each buyer will thus have every incentive not to terminate in order to keep getting the discount, even though that discount is from a price that has been inflated by the seller market power that results because buyers collectively adhere to the scheme. Thus, the anticompetitive effects of such exclusionary agreements are not at all vitiating by the fact that buyers can terminate or decline to renew exclusionary agreements.

Nor does the issue whether exclusionary agreements cause anticompetitive

\textsuperscript{263} HARDIN, supra note 92, at 2.

\textsuperscript{264} Griffith, 334 U.S. at 108. Further, in another famous monopolization case, Standard Oil as a buyer initiated the plan to give the railroads selling oil exclusive transportation rights in return for the railroads giving Standard Oil special discounts. See Granitz & Klein, supra note 106, at 1-2.
harm turn on whether the buyers that agreed to them incur higher prices. First, for reasons noted above, prices may be trending downward for unrelated reasons. Second, much of the anticompetitive costs will be visited on buyers who do not adhere to such exclusionary arrangements. Participating buyers may be better off precisely because they have agreed to an arrangement that inflates prices for other buyers and gives participating buyers a discount from those inflated prices. Third, any costs to buyers are just a subset of the full social costs of the anticompetitive effects inflicted by these arrangements, which are also visited on downstream buyers and ultimately consumers. Thus, even if participating buyers received side payments or special discounts that more than offset their own increased costs, exclusionary arrangements would remain socially undesirable if they increased the seller’s monopoly profits by impairing rival efficiency.

Indeed, to the extent terminability is relevant, it tends to undermine the procompetitive justifications generally offered for exclusionary agreements. It is hard to see how these agreements can fulfill such asserted purposes as providing certainty and predictability when buyers can easily terminate the agreements whenever it suits their fancy. Such terminability also seems inconsistent with the claim that exclusive agreements are necessary to encourage relation-specific or other sunk cost investments that increase a seller’s economies of scale or scope, or otherwise make it interact more efficiently with buyers. After all, if the agreements are really terminable, then there would be nothing to prevent buyers from opportunistically exploiting any such investments by threatening to terminate the agreement unless they get a better deal that expropriates any additional efficiency created by the investment.

This shows the economic error in the conclusion by some scholars and courts that an ability to terminate (or not renew) exclusionary agreements in less than one year indicates that those agreements presumptively or probably lack any substantial foreclosing effect. That conclusion also conflicts with many Supreme Court cases that have invalidated exclusionary agreements that were terminable on short notice, even when the defendant did not have monopoly power.

265. See Omega Envtl., Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 F.3d 1157, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 1997); Thompson Everett, Inc. v. Nat’l Cable Adver., 57 F.3d 1317, 1326 (4th Cir. 1995); U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 596 (1st Cir. 1993); Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 395 (7th Cir. 1984); XI HOVENKAMP, supra note 89, at 167-69. Professor Hovenkamp and the Healthcare case acknowledge that this point does not hold if buyers receive discounts that they would lose by termination. Id. at 88, 117. But this acknowledgement swallows the supposed presumption because, as Director and Levi showed, any buyer must receive a discount from the monopoly price that otherwise could be charged to secure its consent to an exclusionary agreement. See supra text accompanying notes 86-87.

266. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 296 (1949) (invalidating
Indeed, there is also a fundamental legal flaw with the assertion that an agreement that can be terminated in less than one year cannot be anticompetitive and thus cannot violate antitrust law. The flaw is that all contracts that are unreasonable restraints of trade are unenforceable at common law, and were even before the Sherman Act was enacted, and thus have always been terminable at will. A horizontal price-fixing agreement was, for example, clearly unenforceable and thus terminable at will. The assertion that the terminability of an agreement eliminates any anticompetitive threat or antitrust liability would thus mean that neither price-fixing nor any other agreement could ever be deemed anticompetitive violations of antitrust law, thus making them all per se legal. This would effectively take Sherman Act § 1 and Clayton Act § 3 off the books, as well as any application of Sherman Act § 2 to exclusionary conduct that requires buyer acquiescence. This ludicrous result clearly conflicts with precedent and common sense. Instead, Congress must have presupposed that these antitrust enactments could be violated by agreements even if they were terminable under contract law. While terminability provides a limit on judicial enforcement of a contract, such judicial enforcement is not necessary for an antitrust offense. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has had no trouble concluding that agreements unenforceable under contract law remain illegal under federal antitrust law.267

CONCLUSION

It is time for scholars of current exclusionary conduct standards to acknowledge that the emperor has no clothes. The doctrine uses a barrage of conclusory labels like “exclusionary,” “predatory,” “valid,” “legitimate,” and “competition on the merits” to cover for a lack of any well-defined criteria for sorting out desirable from undesirable conduct that tends to exclude rivals. We can continue to pretend that these words offer some coherent standard, leaving

exclusive dealing agreements that lasted only one year and were terminable upon thirty days notice); Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 352 (1922) (invalidating exclusive dealing agreements that were terminable upon three months notice). The courts and scholars concluding otherwise have relied on FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953). But that case merely rejected a defendant’s argument that exclusive dealing agreements longer than one year should be permitted. Id. at 396. Nowhere did it suggest that any agreement shorter than one year could not be anticompetitive. Accord LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 157 n.11 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc). Indeed, the Supreme Court later sustained an FTC conclusion that certain exclusive dealing contracts were anticompetitive even though they were terminable at will. See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 318-19 & n.2 (1966) (condemning agreement even though buyers could “voluntarily withdraw” at any time), rev’g Brown Shoe Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 45, 53 (8th Cir. 1964) (sustaining agreement in part because “[r]etailers were free to abandon the arrangement at any time they saw it to their advantage so to do”).

these matters to the largely unguided discretion of antitrust judges and juries making uncertain and inconsistent decisions. Or we can try to clothe the doctrine with criteria that have more content and offer more guidance.

Unfortunately, the main proposal now circulating to do this job is to focus on whether the monopolist sacrificed short-run profits in order to earn long-run monopoly returns. This would provide the emperor with a suit that is ill-fitting indeed, for that test both condemns the very sort of conduct that is most desirable—investments that sacrifice short-run profits to increase the long-run efficiency of a firm—and fails to condemn the very sort of undesirable conduct that most needs deterrence—conduct that undesirably excludes rivals in a way that is profitable from the get-go. And efforts to salvage this test by excluding profits earned from undesirable conduct or by making the test inapplicable to desirable conduct, achieve a better fit only by depriving the test of all content.

Vague references to the efficiency of defendant conduct begin to point us in the right direction, but provide little additional assistance for they fail to address the baseline questions necessary to determine whether efficiency has been enhanced or decreased. Examining those baseline issues indicates that courts must be careful not to condemn ex post inefficiencies at the cost of preventing more important ex ante efficiencies. They must also be careful to distinguish conduct whose ability to further monopoly power depends on its ability to enhance or exploit the monopolist’s greater efficiency, from conduct that furthers monopoly power by impairing rival efficiency whether or not defendant efficiency is enhanced. Efforts to simply improve a firm’s own efficiency and win sales by selling a better or cheaper product at above-cost prices should enjoy per se legality without any general requirement to share that greater efficiency with rivals. But exclusionary conditions that discriminate on the basis of rivalry by selectively denying property or products to rivals (or buyers who deal with rivals) are not necessary to further ex ante incentives to enhance the monopolist’s efficiency, and should be illegal when they create a marketwide foreclosure that impairs rival efficiency.

Unlike with the exclusionary conduct element, it would be unfair to say that current monopoly power doctrine is like the emperor who has no clothes. But it is at best an emperor wearing a rather unsightly Speedo, for current doctrine leaves large and unnecessary uncertainties about the degree of market power required and whether pricing discretion or market share is the key variable. We can clothe it better by recognizing that the requirement of proving a causal link between the exclusionary conduct and the relevant monopoly power means that power should be not just over the defendant’s own output or prices, but a power to affect marketwide output or prices. Further, the current focus on market share does not just reflect mere legalisms or the use of an imperfect proxy. To the contrary, sound economics indicates that, in addition to possessing marketwide power over output or prices, a defendant should have at least a 50% market share to trigger monopolization doctrine.
It is of course easier to point out why the current emperor has no or scanty clothes than it is to design a new garment that will please everyone. I submit that the standards proposed above not only explain the actual pattern of case results but also provide much needed concrete guidance for antitrust courts and juries forced to sort through these tricky economic issues. Perhaps further tailoring will produce even better results. But let’s at least begin by recognizing the need for a lot more fabric and content than the current doctrinal standards now provide, and focus on specifying the best concrete content we can rather than pretending the problem does not exist.