To be honest, we didn’t know what to expect when we asked potential contributors to this issue of *SAQ* to assess the current state of queer thinking by reflecting on, among other things, what in their work isn’t queer. Though we couldn’t predict what our authors would make of this question, we had a variety of reasons for posing it in these terms.

In the first place, we’d been hearing from some quarters that queer theory, if not already passé, was rapidly approaching its expiration date, and we wanted to learn from others whether or how this rumor might be true.¹ We knew, of course, that the activist energies that helped to fuel queer academic work in the United States have declined sharply since the early 1990s, when the books that would become foundational for queer theory first began to appear.² With *Gender Trouble* and *Epistemology of the Closet* now close to reaching their age of majority, it didn’t entirely surprise us that a recent issue of a journal could ask, “What’s Queer about Queer Studies Now?”—with *now* an obviously pointed way of announcing a departure from earlier habits of thought.³ But the authors around whom queer theory crystallized seem to have spent the past decade distancing
themselves from *their* previous work: in recent years, for example, Judith Butler has been writing about justice and human rights, Michael Warner about sermons and secularism, and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick about Melanie Klein and Buddhism. In what sense, we asked ourselves, are these writers’ current interests commensurate with their earlier (or concurrent) work on sexuality—if, indeed, they are? Does the very distinction between the sexual and the nonsexual matter to queer thinking and, if so, when, where, and how? Can work be regarded as queer if it’s not explicitly “about” sexuality? Does finding oneself “after” queer theory differ—in terms of desire, location, temporality, loyalty, antagonism, comradeship, or competence—from finding oneself “after” a traditional academic discipline, critical race theory, a religious orientation, a political conviction, feminism, lesbian and gay studies . . . ?

We posed these questions to a host of potential contributors whose previous work on queer subjects suggested that they might have something especially pertinent to say in response—either because the focus of their work has changed over the course of their careers, or because it hasn’t; either because their work revolves around sexual and nonsexual topics alike, or because it retains queerness as its single or predominant object or lens. Since younger scholars are “after” queer theory in yet another sense, we wondered, too, what they might tell us about inheriting a canon of queer texts and preoccupations at a moment so different from the early 1990s. Finally, and in order to delimit even further the range of responses, we directed these questions for the most part to people in the fields we know best, literary and legal studies. We envisioned, at any rate, an issue consisting of many short essays (suitable for reading on the subway, say, or in the john), focused reflections on the trajectory of each contributor’s work and its relation to queer theory rather than extended analyses. We hoped that these would be “personal” statements whose purpose, for once, would be to tell rather than to show.

Even within the fields we targeted, these nineteen essays are still less than fully representative of the range of current queer work. We note, most obviously, the scarcity of contributions from people working in film and cultural studies and on non-Anglophone literatures, as well as the near-total absence of essays from people working principally in law. We regret the resulting gaps, of course, though we knew from the start that we wouldn’t be able to include here everything we wanted. One thing we learned, or so we think we did, is that queer theory in the law schools has nothing like the
éclat it still enjoys in literary study. Most of the people we took to be doing queer work in law didn’t warm to our invitation at all, and when they did, our question about being “after” didn’t resonate with their sense of how queerness came to matter in their work (if, that is, it has mattered at all). We see in this nonresponse the effects of a great many causes. To name a few: the simple temporal lag of the law schools (queer theory started elsewhere); the failure of queer theory to engage the critical tradition in legal studies (and its resulting failure to grok the critique of rights); hostility in centrist legal studies both to the a-rationalist traditions of thought that have provided so much to queer theory, and to theoretical approaches more generally that do not quickly produce a “policy recommendation”; the plenitude of legal problems that have nothing to do with (are “after”?') sex; and the usual politics of law-as-praxis versus humanities-as-theory with all the angst of unrequited love it has produced on both sides of the divide. We were very disappointed with this outcome.

The demurrals from people in literature were revealing in other ways. Some declined given the press of their existing commitments (what comes “after sex” may turn out to be administration). Others replied—also unsurprisingly—that they had said already everything they wanted on this subject, while a few others regretted having so much to say that our page limit would have been a vexation. What was more surprising to one of us, if anticipated by the other, was that several people responded to our invitation not so much by declining it as by refusing it. Some expressed their continuing skepticism about queer theory itself, while others (apparently not much engaged by the question in our title) reacted angrily to “our” supposition that sex, like Hegel’s conception of art, had become a thing of the past.5

As if we knew the meaning of sex. Or after. Or since. Or writing. Or queer theory.

(Well, we do. But we’re not telling. Or showing.)

Thus the space into which this collection crowds its energies is highly specific. Despite all of our different recruitment failures, we present here immensely rich and varied essays that, taken together, suggest that all kinds of excitement remain possible “after sex.” Not only are these essays all “on writing,” they are also the thing they are writing about. And they are about something that hovers at the limits of articulation, at the opening edge of their authors’ sense of their work. Though the contributors wrote for the most part in isolation from one another and had only a few very oblique
questions from us to go by, highly articulate if often tacit conversations can be traced across these different texts. As the first readers of this collection, we were struck by its sustained meditation on sex as a source of delight and trouble, as a subject of serious inquiry, as a political conundrum, and as a spur or occasion for writing. We were also astonished at how often that meditation was itself enabled by a thought of “after-ness”: in reporting on the state of queer theory vis-à-vis their own intellectual itineraries, our authors have lots to say about the affects, theoretical demands, and politics of thinking and writing in time.

In the first place, none of the contributors wanted after to signify a decisive loss or relinquishment of sex, queer theory, or temps perdues. Crisp distinctions between before and after appealed to no one. Instead, the essays multiplied the meanings of “After Sex?” and sent the potential linearity of that question (“Now that sex is over, what comes after it?”) around a Möbius strip (“In sex, what am I after?”) in order to make it possible, again and again, for everything that is posterior to precede. The question of succession—did queer theory ever replace feminism? did Foucault supplant Freud? did gay become queer?—seemed universally uninteresting and inapposite. While no one denied that succession can and does occur (it is, of course, conceivable to have a cigarette after sex), our authors were much more interested in posing questions about simultaneity, multiple temporalities, and overlapping regimes of social practice, thought, and analysis. Though these questions are distinctly audible in the contributions of Lauren Berlant, Lee Edelman, Carla Freccero, Elizabeth Freeman, Jonathan Goldberg, Neville Hoad, Michael Moon, and Elizabeth A. Povinelli, it is safe to say that their echoes reverberate throughout all the essays, otherwise so very different.

There are good reasons why this complex sensibility about time runs through a collection of essays of/about queer theory. The very relationship between two books crucial for all queer theory—volumes 1 and 2 of Foucault’s History of Sexuality—plants the temporal question in the center of the courtyard. Foucault’s own struggle with the problematic of a “Great Paradigm Shift” to modernity from antiquity, the intense exploration he made into that claim by proceeding backward, in volume 2, from the modern to the antique, has imbricated the question, what is sexuality? with the question, when is it?—and this has ensured that no simple answer to either will satisfy anyone who has a taste for queer. Freud, too, struggled with the syntax of his discovery that the individual’s progression through a series of stages (oral, anal, genital) is finally all but indistinguishable from a repetitive marching in place, “the finding of an object” from “a refinding of it.”

Queer theory—dependent as it is on these two precursors—will thus be less the story of the emergence of an identity than an acknowledgment of a temporal predicament, an impasse, in Berlant’s terms. Which is why so many of this volume’s contributors and other queer writers put pressure on the full semantic range of “after-ness” and the problem of historical periodization. “Did I turn up at the party a little late, or awkwardly early?” asks Kate Thomas—leaving the question suspended. Reciting Gertrude Stein, Michael Moon wonders, “What is the use of being a boy if one is going to grow up to be a man?” What, indeed?

Without a doubt, however, our invitation did encourage people who devoted major portions of their thinking and writing careers to work on sexuality and/or in queer theory to reflect on the possibility of directing some of their passions and energies elsewhere—to work that was not about sexuality or that wasn’t queer, at least in some significant way. Unsurprisingly, serious dissension broke out over this query. Many contributors seem to take some version of Freud’s “expanded notion” of sexuality—its extension beyond its “popular meaning”—to be a prime condition of queer thinking. Thus Joseph Litvak admits to having trouble identifying what in his work isn’t queer: “It is not just that the imperial ambitions of so much queer theory seem to render the question almost unanswerable. The problem is less that queer theory makes ‘everything about sex’ than that it lodges the ‘nonsexual’ firmly within the ‘sexual.’” Similarly pondering whether a queer sense of sex “obliterates any distinction between the sexual and the nonsexual,” Freeman suggests that the collapse of the distinction is itself the point: “Wasn’t my being queer, in the first instance, about finding sex where it was not supposed to be, failing to find it where it was, finding that sex was not, after all, what I thought it was?” This may be, if such a thing exists, queer doxa. For one potential contributor, the very idea of an “outside” to sexuality (let alone an “end”) seemed preposterous. Milder demurrals also arrived: for several authors, the possibility of a break with sexuality was exactly what they did not want—or even think possible. For Moon, sexuality was like the weather, inescapably an element in everything; for Litvak and Richard Rambuss, work on the dark, harsh, and undignified elements of sexuality remained a crucial, treasured, and not-yet-completed agenda. Litvak, Rambuss, and Erica Rand all close their essays with a decisive response to the query “After Sex?”: “No, not for me, thank you.”

For similar reasons, other contributors resisted the idea that queer theory—originating, we suppose most would agree, in work on sexuality—
must be limited to that topic. Goldberg’s reading of Lucretius is situated in the problematic of succession from volume 1 to volume 2 but is not ostensibly “about” sex, sexuality, or gender; Rand insists on the importance of domains such as race that operate autonomously of sex (but noted as well that when she studies them, such domains tend perversely to morph into sex all over again); Michael Cobb proposes bravely to leave sex behind altogether so that he can inquire queerly into the politics and affects of singleness; Povinelli wonders what kind of being she becomes when she passionately affiliates with sexual and nonsexual identities; and Freeman probes again and again for what is “least queer” in her work—note, not not queer but least queer—and finds it in her desire to understand the lives of ordinary women, the sentimentalism of their affective appeals to one another, and the sheer relief she herself experiences in putting her scholarly finger on the pulse of the everyday. Thomas invites us to share her amazement that an obsessive emphasis on sexuality has led queer readings of Michael Field’s lesbianism to miss entirely the fact that all of the authors’ sex was incest!

But even as the contributors reject across the board the idea that queer theory has a single “proper object” called “sexuality,” some seem ready to take a break from queer theory, to imagine questions that it cannot answer. For Freccero, the “insatiable appetites and marvelous elasticity” of queer theory are good reasons to treasure, sustain, and extend it—but they also obscure the possibility that queer theory might not be “the conceptual analytic most useful to what is being described.” Here Freccero echoes Gayle Rubin’s pragmatic attitude toward theory:

For some, feminism had become the successor to Marxism and was supposed to be the next grand theory of all human misery. I am skeptical of any attempt to privilege one set of analytical tools over all others and of all such claims of theoretical and political omnipotence.

I approach systems of thought as tools people use to get leverage and control over certain problems. I am skeptical of all universal tools. A tool may do one job brilliantly and be less helpful for another. [When I wrote “Thinking Sex,”] I did not see feminism as the best tool for the job of getting leverage over issues of sexual variation.

Povinelli makes a similar point, less pragmatic than critical: an understanding of the “larger social matrices” within which sexuality studies and queer theory have emerged can’t be extracted solely from the materials of
sexuality studies and queer theory. And Rand and Hoad desire an “outside” to queer theory because they want to avoid universalizing political formations generally; this seems to both of them important, normatively, at this moment in the historical extension of the American empire.

And then there’s “and”: queer theory and critical race theory; queer theory and feminism; queer subjects and racial subjects; queer theory and “lesbian and gay studies.” And “and” has been multiplying: when thinking about racial, ethnic, religious, and other dimensions along which subjectivity and political life can be divided, the contributors and many other participants in the queer-theoretical enterprise have moved beyond multiculturalism to transnationality and globalization. Several contributors—plus two who got away—seek to put gay and lesbian identity back on the map, as projects needing queer affirmation, inhabitation, or perhaps even rehabilitation. The affective range of these projects is large and suggests a somewhat surprising—and, to us, somewhat disconcerting—but apparently strong association of the lesbian mark with utopia (Ann Cvetkovich) and the gay male mark with various intensities of dystopia (Rambuss). We will return to the divisions in the volume that have arisen in response to the “shift to affect” below; here, what interests us is the suggestion that intellectual work might productively correspond, in queer projects, with highly conventional gender distinctions. Other contributors took the disaggregative, explosive, biopoweristic, multiple-rather-than-serial impulses of queer work to domains strongly structured by racial and national discourses: for Richard Thompson Ford the “queer” is a way to loosen the lockups of race-equality talk, while for Bethany Schneider (via Craig Womack and Hank Williams) the paradoxes of American Indian sovereignty are most salient precisely in relation to their queerness. For José Esteban Muñoz the soft labile openness of peaceful sleep becomes a model for opening up feminism, queer theory, and “even race” (race being for all three of these contributors, it seems, more difficult to “queer” than sexuality). That is to say, when our authors offered us identity-inflected or intersectional work, they implicitly argued that a queer impulse was indispensable and directly productive, both of desire and of analysis—even if, as Schneider underscores, different kinds of queerness don’t map neatly onto each other. Only Hoad wondered whether the transnational and the global have become the “new queer,” effectively supplanting it from a vanguardist position in academic life that it may never regain.

To the extent, then, that queer theory lives on in these essays, it lives on
after itself. What is it like to be doing queer theory still, to be working today in a tradition that has managed somehow to have acquired a past? Several essays recall the hectic, heady, and truly terrifying days of its birth in the riveting nexus of the feminist sex wars with the crescendo—which at the time we did not know would diminish—in AIDS-related deaths among gay men in the United States. Jeff Nunokawa offers a particularly poignant reminiscence of the queer street, the delicate encounter of activist with theoretical energies, back in the legendary day of Queer Nation and ACT UP. He and Sedgwick take on, directly, the fact that those days are over. What replaces the sense of political purpose of those inaugural moments?

Some of our contributors find rich theoretical and stylistic resources with which to make sense of current circumstances in two contemporary forms of queer analysis: the so-called antisocial thesis (the Bersanian project, exemplified here by Edelman) and the turn to affect (the Sedgwickian project, exemplified here not by Sedgwick—more about that later—but by Berlant and Cvetkovitch). The difference between these styles of analysis can sometimes be performed as a stark parting of the ways, which may make each as susceptible to caricature as, well, masculinity and femininity. Where the antisocial thesis offers a stern polemic, a strict oppositional stance, a lashing style, and an intense focus on political and psychic dysphoria, the turn to affect offers an open-ended or exploratory trajectory, a distrust and avoidance of yes/no structures, luxuriantly sensuous writing . . . and an intense focus on political and psychic dysphoria. So much for the absolute difference between the two. To be sure, some of our contributors—Cvetkovitch, Ford, Moon, Muñoz, Thomas—sound an ecstatic, enamored note, while others—Cobb, Litvak, Rambuss—seek out the lessons of hard experience, but these differences resist reduction to any antisocial/affective contrast. Other offerings utterly confound the two poles. Berlant’s essay—actually a composite of twenty-one prose poems—is as antinormative as Edelman’s but also more antiformal; the affective repertoire it discovers in what she describes as the current sexual and political impasse is vast. Povinelli’s essay—which spans her politically and affectively problematic identification with American lesbian life and her equally problematic identification with her Australian tribal friends—generates this thought: “I can relate, and as a result I am disturbed.” Having traced some pretty severe pathologies in queer history to strong social/subjective dichotomies, Freccero shifts to a more hortatory mode, to urge a queer and postqueer historiography that—rather than dividing affect, desire, the psy-
From the social and the political—aims to study their relations. Indeed, for Edelman, “the antisocial is never, of course, distinct from the social itself,” which means that even in this iconic essay the world of affect is alive and well.

Still, the antisocial project comes in for serious criticism in Nunokawa’s and Sedgwick’s essays. Nunokawa laments the Bersanian tradition in queer theory (if not queer theory tout court) for spurning the possibilities suggested in volume 1 that a utopian search for a happier embodiment might be launched from the idea that power is not (always) nearly so monolithic and top-down as it had seemed at the very pitch of the AIDS epidemic in the United States. For Nunokawa, the microplay of micropowers in the small social avoidances of everyday life—for tools to notice them, he turns to the sociologist Erving Goffman—constitute, simply, a factual rebuke to the Manichaeanism of the Bersanian vision: “How, by this view, could anyone get out alive?”

Sedgwick is yet more critical of queer orthodoxies in an essay we include in this collection even though it had its origin elsewhere—and even though (or especially because) it questions both the Freudian and Foucauldian dimensions of queerness and departs from queer theory in ways unlike any other essay in this collection. Sedgwick argues that Foucault himself failed to elaborate any of his utopian hunches and that queer theory—which she sees as almost completely dedicated to reproducing this failure—entrenches and solidifies (better said, perhaps, symptomatizes) the repressive hypothesis in every purported denunciation of it. Along with Nunokawa, Sedgwick marvels at the deathly pall saturating queer work committed to what Duncan Kennedy has described as “paranoid structuralism,” work in which Sedgwick discerns an anguished bondage to Melanie Klein’s “paranoid/schizoid” position. If a certain paranoid response may have been appropriate in the United States during the height of the AIDS crisis, does it remain so today? Both Nunokawa and Sedgwick suggest that it does not, in the one case replacing paranoia with a focus on the small deaths of social separation permeating all sociability and in the other with what may seem a renunciation of politics altogether. Though she forbears to respond directly to our initiating questions, we think Sedgwick has answered them distinctively. The temporal orientation she seeks is entirely forward. The very futurity that Edelman decries as the teleological design of heteronormative domination, Sedgwick—turning to Klein’s depressive position for help—cherishes. The capacity to foment a future—to live—
now seems unavailable to her inside the terms of queer theory, including the theory she herself had once produced. We have placed her essay non-
alphabetically at the end of this collection to mark her departure from all that has gone before: a hard-won, exciting, trenchant form of “after-ness”—and another possibility, adding to the rich array that precedes it in this collection, for writing since queer theory.

Notes

For material assistance in the production of this issue, the editors gratefully acknowledge the support of the Amherst College Language and Literature Fund and the Harvard Law School Program on Law and Social Thought.

1 “It is commonly felt that Queer Theory is less an ongoing event than a periodisable moment, a relatively defunct agenda that can be safely syllabised and packaged for digestion through a shrink-wrapped assortment of contained debates (essentialism vs. social construction, the politics of outing, transgendering, etc.).” Stephen Shapiro, “Marx to the Rescue! Queer Theory and the Crisis of Prestige,” New Formations, no. 53 (Summer 2004): 77–90, at 77. See also David M. Halperin, “The Normalization of Queer Theory,” Journal of Homosexuality 45 (2003): 339–43.


3 David L. Eng, Judith Halberstam, and José Esteban Muñoz, eds., “What’s Queer about Queer Studies Now?” special issue, Social Text, no. 84–85 (Fall/Winter 2005).

in many areas the moment may be past when theory was in a very productive relation to sexual activism” (13).

And what if it were? As Lauren Berlant puts it in her essay for this volume: “So I wonder: is everyone beyond sex (not just the queer scholars who might have, you know, been there and done that, aged out, made art, bought property, endured AIDS, forged a couple, taken hormones, had events, reproduced, gotten tenure, had episodes, done new research, said what they had to say, heard what there was to hear, looked around the room, gotten bored)?”


11 We refer of course to Judith Butler’s essay “Against Proper Objects,” in feminism meets queer theory, ed. Elizabeth Weed and Naomi Schor (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 1–30 (originally this collection was a special issue of differences 6 [Summer/Fall 1994]). For one editor’s reflections on why “taking a break” can be a good thing to do, see Janet Halley, Split Decisions: How and Why to Take a Break from Feminism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).


“accounts of their positions.” The resulting text has the texture, though not the form, of a debate.
