Fairness Versus Welfare. (with Steven Shavell) (Harvard University Press, 2002; Chinese translation, Law Press China, 2007). [Amazon (purchase)]

Analytical Methods for Lawyers (with Howell Jackson, Steven Shavell, W. Kip Viscusi, & David Cope) (2nd ed.; Foundation Press, 2011; Japanese translation, 2013). [Amazon (purchase)]

Replacing the Structural Presumption, Antitrust Law Journal, vol. 84, pp. 565-627 (2022). [Olin Center WP]

A Unified Perspective on Efficiency, Redistribution, and Public Policy, National Tax Journal, vol. 73, pp. 429-472 (2020). [NBER] [Olin Center WP]

Optimal Regulation with Exemptions, International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 66, pp. 1-39 (2019).  [NBER] [Olin Center WP]

Balancing Versus Structured Decision Procedures: Antitrust, Title VII Disparate Impact, and Constitutional Law Strict Scrutiny, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 167, pp. 1375-1462 (2019).  [Olin Center WP]

On the Design of Legal Rules: Balancing Versus Structured Decision Procedures, Harvard Law Review, vol. 132, pp. 992-1065 (2019).  [Harvard Law Review]

Optimal Design of Private Litigation, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 155, pp. 64-73 (2017). [Olin Center WP]

Optimal Multistage Adjudication, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, vol. 33, pp. 613-652 (2017) [Olin Center WP]

Information and the Aim of Adjudication: Truth or Consequences?, Stanford Law Review, vol. 67, 1303-1371 (2015). [Olin Center WP]

Likelihood Ratio Tests and Legal Decision Rules, American Law and Economics Review, vol. 16, 1-39 (2014). [Olin Center WP]

Multistage Adjudication, Harvard Law Review, vol. 126, 1179-1298 (2013). [Olin Center WP]

Optimal Control of Externalities in the Presence of an Income Tax, International Economic Review, vol. 53, 487-509 (2012). [Olin Center WP]

Burden of Proof, Yale Law Journal, vol. 121, 738-859 (2012). [WWW]

On the Optimal Burden of Proof, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 119, 1104-1140 (2011). [Olin Center WP]

Discount Rates, Social Judgments, Individuals' Risk Preferences, and Uncertainty (with David Weisbach), Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, vol. 42, 125-142 (2011).

Optimal Proof Burdens, Deterrence, and the Chilling of Desirable Behavior, American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, vol. 101, 277-280 (2011).

Taxes, Permits, and Climate Change, in U.S. Energy Tax Policy (Metcalf, ed., Cambridge University Press, 2011), 168-192. [Olin Center WP]

The Social Evaluation of Intergenerational Policies and Its Application to Integrated Assessment Models of Climate Change (with Elisabeth Moyers & David Weisbach), B.E. Journal of Economics Analysis & Policy, vol. 10, issue 2, art. 7, 1-32 (2010); also in Distributional Aspects of Energy and Climate Change (Cohen, Fullerton & Topel, eds., Edward Elgar, 2013), pp. 41-74.. [BE Press ]

Optimal Policy with Heterogeneous Preferences. 8 B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy: Advances, Issue 1, Article 40, 1-28. (2008) [NBER] [Olin Center WP]

Income Taxation and Optimal Government Policy, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition (Durlauf & Blume, eds., Macmillan, 2008). [Olin Center WP]

Pareto Principle and Competing Principles, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition (Durlauf & Blume, eds., Macmillan, 2008). [Olin Center WP]

Moral Rules, the Moral Sentiments, and Behavior: Toward a Theory of an Optimal Moral System (with Steven Shavell) Journal of Political Economy, vol. 115, 494-514 (2007). [NBER]

Discounting Dollars, Discounting Lives: Intergenerational Distributive Justice and Efficiency, University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 74, 79-118 (2007). [WWW] [NBER WP] [Olin Center WP]

The Value of a Statistical Life and the Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, vol. 31, 23-34 (2005). [NBER WP] [Olin Center WP]

On the (Ir)Relevance of Distribution and Labor Supply Distortion to Government Policy, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 18, no. 4, 159-175 (2004). [NBER WP] [Olin Center WP]

Any Non-welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle: Reply (with Steven Shavell), Journal of Political Economy, vol. 112, 249-251 (2004). [WWW] [Olin Center WP]

Fairness versus Welfare: Notes on the Pareto Principle, Preferences, and Distributive Justice (with Steven Shavell), Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 32, 331-362 (2003). [WWW] [NBER WP] [Olin Center WP]

Transition Policy: A Conceptual Framework, Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues, vol. 13, 161-209 (2003).[NBER WP] [Olin Center WP]

Economic Analysis of Law (with Steven Shavell), in Handbook of Public Economics (Auerbach & Feldstein, eds.; Elsevier, 2002), vol. 3, pp. 1661-1784. [NBER] [Olin Center WP]

On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity Regulation (with Steven Shavell), American Law and Economics Review, vol. 4, 1-17 (2002). [WWW] [NBER WP] [Olin Center WP]

Any Non-Welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle, (with Steven Shavell), Journal of Political Economy, vol. 109, 281-86 (2001). [WWW] [NBER WP - Any Non-Individualistic Social Welfare Function Violates the Pareto Principle ] [Olin Center WP - Any Non-Individualistic Social Welfare Function Violates the Pareto Principle]

Fairness versus Welfare (with Steven Shavell), Harvard Law Review, vol. 114, 961-1388 (2001). [Olin Center WP - Principles of Fairness versus Human Welfare: On the Evaluation of Legal Policy]

Notions of Fairness Versus the Pareto Principle: On the Role of Logical Consistency (with Steven Shavell), Yale Law Journal, vol. 110, 237-49 (2000). [WWW] [Olin Center WP]

General Characteristics of Rules, in Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, vol. V, pp. 502-28 (Bouckaert & DeGeest, eds.; Edward Elgar, 2000). [WWW]

Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income (with Steven Shavell), Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 29, 821-35 (2000). [WWW] [Olin Center WP]

The Conflict between Notions of Fairness and the Pareto Principle (with Steven Shavell), American Law and Economic Review, vol. 1, 63-79 (1999). [WWW] [Olin Center WP]

Accuracy, Complexity, and the Income Tax, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, vol. vol. 14, 61-83 (1998). [NBER WP]

Accuracy in Adjudication, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law (Newman, ed.; Macmillan, 1998), pp. 1-7.

Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages (with Steven Shavell), Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 39, 191-210 (1996). [NBER WP]

Property Rules versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis (with Steven Shavell), Harvard Law Review, vol. 109, 713-790 (1996).

How Tax Complexity and Enforcement Affect the Equity and Efficiency of the Income Tax, National Tax Journal, vol. 48, 135-150 (1996). Reprinted in Tax Policy in the Real World (Slemrod, ed.; Cambridge University Press, 1999). [NBER WP]

Do Liability Rules Facilitate Bargaining? A Reply to Ayres and Talley (with Steven Shavell), Yale Law Journal, vol. 105, 221-233 (1995).

A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, vol. 11, 150-163 (1995). [NBER WP - A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Rules ]

Optimal Insurance Contracts When Establishing the Amount of Loss is Costly, Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, vol. 19, 139-152 (1994). [NBER WP]

Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior (with Steven Shavell), Journal of Political Economy, vol. 102, 583-606 (1994). [NBER WP]

Accuracy in the Determination of Liability (with Steven Shavell), Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 37, 1-15 (1994). [NBER WP]

The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 23, 307-401 (1994).

Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income (with Steven Shavell), Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 23, 667-681 (1994). [NBER WP - The Efficiency of the Legal System versus the Income Tax in Redistributing Income ]

Shifting Plaintiffs' Fees versus Increasing Damage Awards, RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 24, 625-630 (1993). [NBER WP]

An Ex Ante Perspective on Deregulation, Viewed Ex Post, Resource and Energy Economics, vol. 15, 153-173 (1993).

Optimal Sanctions and Differences in Individuals' Likelihood of Avoiding Detection (with Lucian Bebchuk), International Review of Law and Economics, vol. 13, 217-224 (1993). [NBER WP - Optimal Sanctions When the Probability of Apprehension Varies Among Individuals ]

Rules Versus Standards, Duke Law Journal, vol. 42, 557-629 (1992).

Government Relief for Risk Associated with Government Action, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 94, 525-541(1992). [NBER WP]

The Optimal Probability and Magnitude of Fines for Acts That Definitely Are Undesirable, International Review of Law and Economics, vol. 12, 3-11 (1992). [NBER WP]

Private Versus Socially Optimal Provision of Ex Ante Legal Advice (with Steven Shavell), Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, vol. 8, 306-320 (1992). [NBER WP]

Optimal Sanctions When Individuals Are Imperfectly Informed About the Probability of Apprehension (with Lucian Bebchuk), Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 21, 365-370 (1992). [NBER WP]

Incentives and Government Relief for Risk, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, vol. 4, 167-175 (1991). [NBER WP]

Optimal Taxation with Costly Enforcement and Evasion, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 43, 221-236 (1990). [NBER WP]

Legal Advice about Acts Already Committed (with Steven Shavell), International Review of Law and Economics, vol. 10, 149-159 (1990). [NBER WP]

Optimal Deterrence, Uninformed Individuals, and Acquiring Information about Whether Acts Are Subject to Sanctions, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, vol. 6, 93-128 (1990).

A Note on the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 42, 245-247 (1990).

Legal Advice about Information to Present in Litigation: Its Effects and Social Desirability (with Steven Shavell), Harvard Law Review, vol. 102, 565-615 (1989).

Antitrust, Law & Economics, and the Courts, Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. 50, 181-216 (1987).

An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, Harvard Law Review, vol. 99, 509-617 (1986).

Private Versus Social Costs in Bringing Suit, Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 15, 371-385 (1986).

Note, The Theoretical Foundation of the Hearsay Rules, Harvard Law Review, vol. 93, 1786-1815 (1980).