Analytical Methods for Lawyers. (with Howell Jackson, Steven Shavell, W. Kip Viscusi, & David Cope) (Foundation Press, 2003). [Amazon (purchase)]

Fairness Versus Welfare. (with Steven Shavell) (Harvard University Press, 2002; Chinese translation, Law Press China, 2007). [Amazon (purchase)]

Income Taxation and Optimal Government Policy, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition (2008). [Olin Center WP]

Pareto Principle and Competing Principles, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition (2008). [Olin Center WP]

Moral Rules, the Moral Sentiments, and Behavior: Toward a Theory of an Optimal Moral System. (with Steven Shavell) 115 Journal of Political Economy 494 (2007).

Discounting Dollars, Discounting Lives: Intergenerational Distributive Justice and Efficiency. 74 University of Chicago Law Review 79 (2007). [WWW] [NBER WP] [Olin Center WP]

The Value of a Statistical Life and the Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion. 31 Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 23 (2005). [NBER WP] [Olin Center WP]

On the (Ir)Relevance of Distribution and Labor Supply Distortion to Government Policy. 18(4) Journal of Economic Perspectives 159 (2004). [NBER WP] [Olin Center WP]

Any Non-welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle: Reply (with Steven Shavell). 112 Journal of Political Economy 249 (2004). [WWW] [Olin Center WP]

Transition Policy: A Conceptual Framework. 13 Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 161 (2003).[NBER WP] [Olin Center WP]

Economic Analysis of Law (with Steven Shavell), in Handbook of Public Economics (Auerbach & Feldstein, eds.; Elsevier, 2002), vol. 3, pp. 1661-1784. [NBER] [Olin Center WP]

On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to Quantity Regulation (with Steven Shavell) 4 American Law and Economics Review 1 (2002). [WWW] [NBER WP] [Olin Center WP]

Any Non-Welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto Principle, (with Steven Shavell). 109 Journal of Political Economy 281 (2001). [WWW] [NBER WP - Any Non-Individualistic Social Welfare Function Violates the Pareto Principle ] [Olin Center WP - Any Non-Individualistic Social Welfare Function Violates the Pareto Principle]

Fairness versus Welfare (with Steven Shavell). 114 Harvard Law Review 961 (2001). [Olin Center WP - Principles of Fairness versus Human Welfare: On the Evaluation of Legal Policy]

Notions of Fairness Versus the Pareto Principle: On the Role of Logical Consistency (with Steven Shavell). 110 Yale Law Journal 237 (2000). [WWW] [Olin Center WP]

General Characteristics of Rules, in Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, vol. V, pp. 502-28 (Bouckaert & DeGeest, eds.; Edward Elgar, 2000). [WWW]

Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income (with Steven Shavell). 29 Journal of Legal Studies 821 (2000). [WWW] [Olin Center WP]

The Conflict between Notions of Fairness and the Pareto Principle (with Steven Shavell). 1 American Law and Economic Review 63 (1999). [WWW] [Olin Center WP]

Accuracy, Complexity, and the Income Tax. 14 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 61 (1998). [NBER WP]

Accuracy in Adjudication, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law (Newman, ed.; Macmillan, 1998), pp. 1-7.

Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages (with Steven Shavell). 39 Journal of Law and Economics 191 (1996). [NBER WP]

Property Rules versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis (with Steven Shavell). 109 Harvard Law Review 713 (1996).

How Tax Complexity and Enforcement Affect the Equity and Efficiency of the Income Tax. 49 National Tax Journal 135 (1996). Reprinted in Tax Policy in the Real World (Slemrod, ed.; Cambridge University Press, 1999). [NBER WP]

Do Liability Rules Facilitate Bargaining? A Reply to Ayres and Talley (with Steven Shavell). 105 Yale Law Journal 221 (1995).

A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules. 11 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 150 (1995). [NBER WP - A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Rules ]

Optimal Insurance Contracts When Establishing the Amount of Loss is Costly. 19 Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory 139 (1994). [NBER WP]

Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior (with Steven Shavell). 102 Journal of Political Economy 583 (1994). [NBER WP]

Accuracy in the Determination of Liability (with Steven Shavell). 37 Journal of Law and Economics 1 (1994). [NBER WP]

The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis. 23 Journal of Legal Studies 307 (1994).

Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income (with Steven Shavell). 23 Journal of Legal Studies 667 (1994). [NBER WP - The Efficiency of the Legal System versus the Income Tax in Redistributing Income ]

Shifting Plaintiffs' Fees versus Increasing Damage Awards. 24 RAND Journal of Economics 625 (1993). [NBER WP]

An Ex Ante Perspective on Deregulation, Viewed Ex Post. 15 Resource and Energy Economics 153 (1993).

Optimal Sanctions and Differences in Individuals' Likelihood of Avoiding Detection (with Lucian Bebchuk). 13 International Review of Law and Economics 217 (1993). [NBER WP - Optimal Sanctions When the Probability of Apprehension Varies Among Individuals ]

Rules Versus Standards. 42 Duke Law Journal 557 (1992).

Government Relief for Risk Associated with Government Action. 94 Scandinavian Journal of Economics 525 (1992). [NBER WP]

The Optimal Probability and Magnitude of Fines for Acts That Definitely Are Undesirable, 12 International Review of Law and Economics 3 (1992). [NBER WP]

Private Versus Socially Optimal Provision of Ex Ante Legal Advice (with Steven Shavell). 8 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 306 (1992). [NBER WP]

Optimal Sanctions When Individuals Are Imperfectly Informed About the Probability of Apprehension (with Lucian Bebchuk). 21 Journal of Legal Studies 365 (1992). [NBER WP]

Incentives and Government Relief for Risk. 4 Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 167 (1991). [NBER WP]

Optimal Taxation with Costly Enforcement and Evasion. 43 Journal of Public Economics 221 (1990). [NBER WP]

Legal Advice about Acts Already Committed (with Steven Shavell). 10 International Review of Law and Economics 149 (1990). [NBER WP]

Optimal Deterrence, Uninformed Individuals, and Acquiring Information about Whether Acts Are Subject to Sanctions. 6 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 93 (1990).

A Note on the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions. 42 Journal of Public Economics 245 (1990).

Legal Advice about Information to Present in Litigation: Its Effects and Social Desirability (with Steven Shavell). 102 Harvard Law Review 565 (1989).

Antitrust, Law & Economics, and the Courts. 50 Law and Contemporary Problems 181 (1987).

An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions. 99 Harvard Law Review 509 (1986).

Private Versus Social Costs in Bringing Suit. 15 Journal of Legal Studies 371 (1986).

Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage. 85 Columbia Law Review 515 (1985).

The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal. 97 Harvard Law Review 1813 (1984).

The Accuracy of Traditional Market Power Analysis and A Direct Adjustment Alternative. 95 Harvard Law Review 1817 (1982).

Rethinking Counterplans: A Reconciliation with Debate Theory. 17 Journal of the American Forensic Association 215 (1981).

Comment, Statutory Preferences for Minority-Owned Businesses: Fullilove v. Klutznick. 94 Harvard Law Review 125 (1980).

Note, The Theoretical Foundation of the Hearsay Rules. 93 Harvard Law Review 1786 (1980).