Assistant Professor Matthew Stephenson

Matthew Stephenson Home Page

Assistant Professor of Law

Office:	Griswold 509
Assistant:	Sarah Davitt 617/496-1716
Phone:	(617) 495-9863
Email:	mstephen@law.harvard.edu

Biographical Statement

Matthew Stephenson is Assistant Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, where he teaches administrative law, environmental law, and legislation. His research focuses on the application of positive political theory to public law, particularly in the areas of administrative procedure, judicial institutions, and separation of powers. He has served as a consultant to the World Bank and as Special Rapporteur for the Commission on the Legal Empowerment of the Poor. Prior to joining the Harvard Law School faculty, Professor Stephenson clerked for Senior Judge Stephen Williams on the D.C. Circuit and for Justice Anthony Kennedy on the Supreme Court. He received his J.D. and Ph.D. (political science) from Harvard in 2003, and his B.A. from Harvard College in 1997.

Publications

The Price of Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs 118 YALE LAW JOURNAL (forthcoming 2008)

Evidentiary Standards and Information Acquisition in Public Law 10 AMERICAN LAW & ECONOMICS REVIEW (forthcoming 2008)

Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy 107 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW (forthcoming 2008)

The Administrative Law of Borrowed Regulations: Legal Questions Regarding the Bankruptcy Law's Incorporation of IRS Standards 1 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW ADVISER 1 (2008) (with Kristin E. Hickman)

The Strategic Substitution Effect: Textual Plausibility, Procedural Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretations 120 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 528 (2006)

"Bureaucratic Decision Costs and Endogenous Agency Expertise," 23(2) JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS & ORGANIZATION 469 (June 2007)

"Regulatory Quality under Imperfect Oversight,"(with Ethan Bueno de Mequita) 101(3) AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWw (August 2007)

Judicial Reform in Developing Countries: Constraints and Opportunities, in Francois Bourguignon & Boris Pleskovic eds., ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS: BEYOND TRANSITION (World Bank, 2007)

A Costly Signaling Theory of "Hard Look" Judicial Review, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW, 2006; 58 (4) 753-814

Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 1036 (2006)

Legal Institutions and Informal Networks, 18 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 40 (2006) (with Ethan Bueno de Mesquita)

Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 93 (2005)

Court of Public Opinion: Government Accountability and Judicial Power, 20 JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS & ORGANIZATION 379 (2004)

Mixed Signals: Reconsidering the Political Economy of Judicial Deference to Administrative Agencies, 56 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW 657 (2004)

"When the Devil Turns...": The Political Foundations of Independent Judicial Review, 32 JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 59 (2003)

Informative Precedent and Intrajudicial Communication, 96 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 755 (2003) (with Ethan Bueno de Mesquita) (reprinted in John R. Bond et al. eds, INSTITUTIONAL GAMES AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press) (forthcoming 2006))

A Tale of Two Theories: The Legal Basis for the EPA's Proposed Revision to the Routine Maintenance, Repair, and Replacement Exemption, 33 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER 10789 (2003)

A Trojan Horse Behind Chinese Walls?: Problems and Prospects of U.S.-Sponsored "Rule of Law" Reform Projects in the People's Republic of China, 18 UCLA PACIFIC BASIN LAW JOURNAL 64 (2000) (updated and reprinted in Thomas Carothers ed., PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006))

Japan's Export Control Initiatives: Meeting New Nonproliferation Challenges NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 30 (Fall 1996) (with Bates Gill and Kensuke Ebata)

Work in Progress

Legal Realism for Economists

Political Accountability Under Alternative Institutional Regimes (with Jide Nzelibe)

Chevron Has Only One Step (with Adrian Vermeule)

The Lobbyist-Constituent Agency Problem: Implications for the Legislative Process (with Howell Jackson)

Statutory Interpretation by Administrative Agencies (chapter in Research Handbook in Public Law and Public Choice (Daniel Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell eds.))