LIABILITY AND THE INCENTIVE TO OBTAIN INFORMATION ABOUT RISK

STEVEN SHAVELL*

1. INTRODUCTION

OPPORTUNITY often exists for parties to obtain information about the risks that they create and thereby to reduce the risks. Firms may study possible product defects and be able to ameliorate them; individuals may investigate various dangers for which they are responsible and act on what they learn. The questions addressed in this article concern the incentives that the prospect of liability creates for potential injurers to obtain information about risks and whether these incentives are socially appropriate.¹

In the model to be considered, information is of a simple character. It reveals either that there is risk or that there is not. (For example, the test of a product reveals whether or not it has a tendency to break apart at a suspected weak point.)

To determine if it is socially desirable for a party to acquire information

* Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School, and Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research. I wish to thank Louis Kaplow and Stephan Panther for comments and the National Science Foundation (grant SES-9111947) for support.

¹ These questions have not been studied systematically to my knowledge, although one may find suggestive discussions in Guido Calabresi & Alvin K. Klevorick, Four Tests for Liability in Torts, 14 J. Legal Stud. 585, 620–24 (1985) (on incentives to acquire new information under ex ante versus ex post standards for liability); Alan Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. Legal Stud. 689, 695–705 (1985) (on socially optimal discovery of information about risk and liability for failure to warn); Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law 77–79, 93 (1987) (on socially optimal discovery of information and incentives under the negligence rule). Also, Stephan Panther, Foresight by Hindsight: Strict Liability as an Instrument to Induce Risk Assessing Research (Working Paper No. 89-05, Univ. Munich, Dep't Economics 1989), analyzes incentives to acquire information under strict liability; and Manoj C. Dalvi, Liability Rules and the Acquisition of Information: An Application to Libel Law (unpublished manuscript, Columbia Univ., Dep't Economics 1991), examines incentives to acquire information, with applications to newspapers and libel law.

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about risk that he may have engendered, the situation with information must be compared to that without information. If a party obtains information and there turns out to be a risk, it will be socially optimal for a party to exercise a "high" level of care, whereas, if there does not turn out to be a risk, it will not be socially desirable for a party to exercise any care. If a party does not obtain information, it will be socially desirable for the party to exercise a "moderate" degree of care, reflecting both the possibility that there is a risk and that there is not.

It follows that the social value of information consists of two probability-discounted benefits: (1) the likelihood that there is a risk, multiplied by the reduction in total social costs associated with the exercise of the high rather than the moderate level of care, and (2) the likelihood that there is no risk, multiplied by the cost of the moderate-level care (for this cost is avoided if information that there is no risk is obtained). It is socially optimal for information to be acquired if the social value of information exceeds the cost of information.

The incentives of parties to obtain information about risk and to exercise care are examined in the model under different rules of liability. Under strict liability, where, by definition, a party is liable for losses caused regardless of his level of care or whether he obtained information about risk,2 parties make socially desirable decisions about obtaining information and about the exercise of care. This outcome is explained by familiar reasoning. Because a party bears the losses he causes and he incurs the costs of obtaining information and of exercising care, his problem becomes the social problem, and he makes socially desirable decisions.

Under the other general form of liability, based on negligence, the outcome depends on which of several possible types of rules applies. The rules differ in whether liability is determined both by a party's decision to obtain information and by his decision about care or whether liability is determined solely by a party's decision about care.

Under the complete negligence rule, a party is liable for losses if he either failed to exercise optimal care or failed to obtain information when he should have done so (even if he exercised optimal care). Here optimal care means the level of care that is socially best given optimal acquisition of information about risk. (If information is optimal to acquire, optimal care is high care when there turns out to be a risk and is zero otherwise. If information is not optimal to obtain, optimal care is moderate care.) Parties make socially optimal decisions about obtaining information un-

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2 For simplicity, both victims' behavior and issues of causation are ignored in the determination of liability under this and other rules of liability.
der this rule and also about the exercise of care. The reason that parties choose optimal care given optimal acquisition of information is the well-known argument showing that the threat of negligence induces optimal care. But the demonstration that parties make optimal decisions about acquiring information is different from the standard argument about the negligence rule.

Under the other types of negligence rule, liability depends only on the level of care. One such rule is the negligence rule based on the level of care that is optimal given optimal acquisition of information. Under this rule, as under the complete negligence rule, parties are led to make optimal decisions about both obtaining information and the exercise of care. In particular, a party will obtain information if that is optimal—even though he will not be found liable for failure to obtain information per se—for, if he does not obtain information, he will not know whether he needs to exercise (high) care to avoid liability or whether it is unnecessary to exercise care.

Another version of the negligence rule depending only on the exercise of care is the negligence rule based on the level of care that is optimal given the information that a party actually possesses. Under this rule, parties are led to exercise optimal care given their information, but they may decide not to obtain information whenever doing so is optimal because they can always escape liability if they do not obtain information by exercising moderate care.

A third type of negligence rule depending only on the level of care is the negligence rule based on the level of care that is optimal assuming that a party has obtained information (whether or not obtaining information is optimal). Under this rule, if parties do not obtain information about risk, they may exercise excessive (high) care to avoid liability; moreover, they may be induced to obtain information when doing so is not optimal.

After analyzing these rules, the article closes with several remarks.

II. The Model

Risk-neutral parties are engaged in an activity that may involve a risk of accident losses for others. By making an expenditure on information, a party can determine whether or not there is a risk. The exercise of care lowers this risk; if there is no risk, there will be no losses and care has no effect. The following notation will be used:

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3 This formulation can be generalized by allowing different levels of expenditure on information and multiple types of information given any level of expenditure. I comment on these generalizations in Section III infra.
\[ c = \text{cost of acquiring information—of learning whether there is a risk}; \quad c \geq 0; \]
\[ p = \text{probability that there is a risk}; \quad 0 < p < 1; \]
\[ x = \text{level (and cost) of care}; \quad x \geq 0; \text{ and} \]
\[ h(x) = \text{expected accident losses given } x \text{ if there is a risk}; \quad h(x) > 0; \]
\[ h'(x) < 0; \quad h''(x) > 0. \]

The social-welfare criterion is minimization of total costs: the sum of the cost of acquiring information (if that is done), the cost of care, and expected accident losses.

\[ \text{A. Socially Optimal Behavior} \]

If information is not acquired, total costs are
\[ x + ph(x) \]
(1)
because \( p \) is the probability that there is a risk and \( h(x) \) are the expected losses if there is a risk. The socially optimal \( x \), which will be assumed to be positive, is determined by the first-order condition
\[ 1 = -ph'(x). \]
(2)
This \( x \) will be denoted \( x_0^* \) (it is the "moderate" level of care mentioned in Section 1). If information is acquired and it is learned that there is no risk, the optimal \( x \) is obviously zero. If it is learned there is a risk, total costs are
\[ x + h(x), \]
(3)
and the optimal \( x \), to be denoted \( x^* \), is determined by
\[ 1 = -h'(x). \]
(4)
It is clear from (2), (4), and the assumption that \( h''(x) > 0 \) that
\[ x^* > x_0^* \]
(5)
(\( x^* \) is the "high" level of care mentioned in Section 1). The explanation for (5) is that, if a party knows that there is definitely a risk, the exercise of care will be more worthwhile than if he faces the chance that there is no risk and that the cost of care will be a waste.

The value of information, denoted \( v \), equals total costs if there is no information minus total costs if there is information. Thus,
\[ v = [x_0^* + ph(x_0^*)] - p[x^* + h(x^*)] \]
\[ = p[x_0^* + h(x_0^*)] - [x^* + h(x^*)] + (1 - p)x_0^*. \]
The first term in the latter expression is positive and equals the advantage of having information when there is a risk: the difference between total costs when the level of care is only \( x^*_0 \) and total costs when the level of care is \( x^* \). The second term represents the advantage of having information when there is not a risk: the savings of \( x^*_0 \) in the cost of care. It is socially optimal to acquire information when

\[
v > c. \tag{7}\]

**B. Behavior under Strict Liability**

Under strict liability, a party is liable for any losses that may occur. Hence, a party will minimize the cost of obtaining information plus the cost of care and expected accident losses, which is the social objective. Therefore, an individual will act socially optimally.

**PROPOSITION 1.** Under strict liability, a party's decision whether to obtain information about risk and his decision about the level of care to exercise will be optimal.

**C. Behavior under Negligence Rules**

As indicated in Section 1, I consider the negligence rule depending on both the decision about acquisition of information and the exercise of care and versions of the negligence rule depending only on the exercise of care.

Under the complete negligence rule, a party who causes losses\(^4\) will be liable if and only if he either fails to obtain information when doing so is optimal or exercises less than the optimal level of care. Specifically, if it is not optimal to acquire information, a party will be liable if and only if \( x < x^*_0 \); and, if it is optimal to acquire information, a party will be liable for an accident if either he does not obtain information or he does, there is a risk, and \( x < x^* \). Under this rule, we have the following result.

**PROPOSITION 2.** Under the complete negligence rule, a party will obtain information about risk if and only if that is optimal and will exercise optimal care given his information.

**REMARKS.** That a party will exercise optimal care, given that he has made the optimal decision about obtaining information, follows from the standard argument that a party will be led to exercise optimal care under the negligence rule. That a party will be induced to obtain information if

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\(^4\) Hereafter, I will not repeat that, for a party to be held liable under a negligence rule, he must cause losses.
and only if doing so is optimal is explained by reasoning different from that in the standard argument.\textsuperscript{5}

\textit{Proof.} Suppose first that it is not optimal to acquire information, that is, \( v \leq c \). If a party does not acquire information, then he will choose \( x_0^* \), as is apparent from the standard proof about the negligence rule:\textsuperscript{6} if the individual were to choose \( x < x_0^* \), he would be liable for losses, meaning that he would choose \( x \) to minimize \( x + ph(x) \); but this function is minimized at \( x_0^* \); hence, he would be better off choosing \( x_0^* \), in which case, he would not be negligent; and, clearly, he would not choose \( x > x_0^* \), for this costs more than \( x_0^* \) but yields no benefit; hence, he will choose \( x_0^* \). If a party does acquire information and learns that there is no risk, he will exercise no care (for he will cause no losses and, therefore, never be found liable). If he learns that there is a risk and chooses \( x < x_0^* \), he will face liability, so he will choose \( x \) to minimize \( x + h(x) \); but, since this function is strictly decreasing over the range \([0, x^*]\), he will be better off choosing \( x_0^* \) than being negligent, and, certainly, he will not choose \( x > x_0^* \); thus, he will choose \( x_0^* \). The value to him of information is thus \((1 - p)x_0^*\). This is less than \( v \) because it excludes the reduction in expected total costs if there is a risk; see (6); and, since \( v \leq c \), the individual will not obtain information.

Now suppose that it is optimal to obtain information, so that \( v > c \). If a party does not obtain information, he will be liable for failure to obtain information regardless of his level of care, so his expected liability will be \( x + ph(x) \), which is minimized at \( x_0^* \); he will thus choose \( x_0^* \). If he obtains information, the standard proof about the negligence rule shows that he will choose \( x^* \) if there is a risk and that he will choose zero if there is not a risk; thus, he will act optimally. The value of information to him is, therefore,

\[ p[x_0^* + h(x_0^*) - x^*] + (1 - p)x_0^* > v. \]  

(8)

The inequality follows from (6). (The reason that the private value of information is higher than the social value \( v \) is that the individual, unlike society, escapes having to pay for losses if there is a risk and he chooses \( x^* \).) Since \( v > c \), the individual will obtain information. Q.E.D.

\textsuperscript{5} The standard argument about care under the negligence rule includes the obvious point that a party will not exercise more than optimal care, for he escapes liability merely by exercising optimal care. The analogue of this point with regard to information, however, is not obvious because obtaining information when doing so is not optimal (that is, obtaining more than optimal information) \textit{does} do a party good: it may reveal that there is no risk, in which case he need not exercise any care and need not fear liability.

\textsuperscript{6} This proof is due to John Prather Brown, Towards an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 323 (1973).
Consider next the negligence rule based on the level of care that is
optimal, given optimal acquisition of information about risk. That is, if
information is not optimal to acquire, a party is liable for losses if and
only if $x < x^*_{0}$; and, if information is optimal to acquire, a party is liable
for losses if and only if there is a risk and $x < x^*$. Under this rule, we
have the following conclusion.

**Proposition 3.** Under the negligence rule based on the optimal level
of care given optimal acquisition of information about risk, a party will
obtain information if and only if that is optimal and will exercise optimal
care given his information.

**Remarks.** Under this rule, as under the last, it is clear that a party
will exercise optimal care given that he has made the optimal decision
whether to obtain information about risk. The reason why he will obtain
information about risk if that is optimal is not that he will be found negli-
gent for failure to do so (which was the case under the last rule). Rather,
it is that, if he does not obtain information, he will not know whether
there is a risk and, thus, whether he need not exercise care or must
exercise $x^*$ to avoid negligence. That he will not obtain information if
this is not optimal is true for the reasons given in the proof of proposi-
tion 2.

**Proof.** If it is not optimal to obtain information, then under this rule a
party’s situation will be identical to his situation under the previous rule,
so he will not obtain information and will choose $x^*_{0}$.

Now suppose that it is optimal to obtain information, so that $v > c$.
On one hand, if a party does not obtain information and chooses $x < x^*$,
he will be liable if there is a risk. Hence, his expected liability will be
$x + ph(x)$, which is minimized at $x^*_{0}$. If he chooses $x^*$, he will escape
liability for sure (clearly, he will not choose $x > x^*$). Since $x^*$ may exceed
or be exceeded by $x^*_{0} + ph(x^*_{0})$, there are two cases to consider if he does
not obtain information: where he chooses $x^*$ and where he chooses $x^*_{0}$.
If, on the other hand, a party does obtain information, the standard argu-
ment about the negligence rule shows that he will choose $x^*$ if there is a
risk and zero if there is not a risk. The value of information to him if he
would choose $x^*_{0}$ without information is therefore the same as in the last
case and exceeds $v$ (see [8]); and since $v > c$, he would be led to obtain
information. The value of information to him is different if without infor-

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Note that, from the fact that a loss occurred, a court knows that there was a risk; the
court need not know whether a party obtained information and what the information was
to determine whether there was a risk.
mation he would choose \( x^* \); it is \((1 - p)x^* \). But

\[
(1 - p)x^* = (1 - p)(x^* - x_0^*) + (1 - p)x_0^*
\]

\[
> p([x_0^* + h(x_0^*)] - [x^* + h(x^*)]) + (1 - p)x_0^* \tag{9}
\]

\[
= \nu.
\]

The inequality in equation (9) clearly holds if \((1 - p)(x^* - x_0^*) > p([x_0^* + h(x_0^*)] - [x^* + h(x^*)])\), which is equivalent to \(x^* + ph(x^*) > x_0^* + ph(x_0^*)\). The latter inequality is true because \(x_0^*\) minimizes \(x + ph(x)\). Since, then, the value of information to the individual exceeds \(\nu\) and \(\nu > c\), he would again be led to obtain information. Q.E.D.

Consider now the negligence rule based on the level of care that is optimal given the information about risk that a party actually possesses. Thus, if a party does not obtain information, he will be liable for losses if and only if \(x < x_0^*\), and, if he does obtain information, he will be liable for losses if and only if there is a risk and \(x < x^*\). Under this rule, we have the next proposition.

**Proposition 4.** Under the negligence rule based on the optimal level of care given the information about risk that a party actually possesses, a party will not obtain information about risk when information is not optimal to acquire and may not obtain information when it is optimal to acquire. His level of care will be optimal given his information.

**Remarks.** The standard argument about the negligence rule again explains why a party will exercise optimal care given the information that he possesses about risk. To understand the conclusions about acquisition of information, observe that the consequence of obtaining information is either that the party will learn there is a risk and will be led to choose \(x^*\) rather than the lower \(x_0^*\)—in which case he will be worse off—or he will find that there is no risk and will not exercise care—in which case he will be better off because he will avoid incurring the cost \(x_0^*\). In the latter case, a party is made better off by the same amount that society is. But, in the former case, a non-negligent individual is worse off, while society is better off. (Society, unlike a private party, bears losses and thus benefits by reducing them when it learns that there is a risk.) Evidently, then, the private value of information is less than the social value of information, and, consequently, a party will not obtain information when doing so is not optimal and may decide not to obtain information when it is optimal to acquire. (Indeed, it will be seen from [10] that the private value of information may be negative. Thus, a party may decide not to obtain information no matter how cheaply it can be done.)

**Proof.** If a party does not obtain information, the standard proof of
optimality under the negligence rule shows that he will exercise optimal care of $x^*_0$; and, if he does obtain information and there is a risk, the standard proof shows that he will exercise care of $x^*$; whereas, if there is no risk, he will exercise no care. The value of information to a party is therefore

$$p(x^*_0 - x^*) + (1 - p)x^*_0 < v.$$  \hspace{1cm} (10)

Thus, it is possible that $v > c$ but that a party will not obtain information, and, if $v \leq c$, the party will not obtain information. (Note that the first team in [10] is negative; it is the extra cost of care borne if a party learns that there is a risk; this may make the private value of information negative.) Q.E.D.

Finally, consider the negligence rule based on the level of care that is optimal, presuming that information about risk is obtained—whether or not it is optimal to obtain the information. Under this rule, a party is liable for losses if and only if there is a risk and $x < x^*$. We have the last proposition.

**Proposition 5.** Under the negligence rule based on the optimal level of care, presuming that a party obtains information about risk, a party may obtain information about risk when doing so is not optimal. If he obtains information about risk, he will exercise optimal care given this information, but, if he does not obtain information, he may exercise excessive care.

**Remarks.** The standard argument about the negligence rule explains why a party will exercise optimal care if he obtains information about risk. A reason that a party may decide to obtain information when doing so is not optimal is that he needs to know if there is a risk to knowing when he must choose $x^*$ to escape liability. (More precisely, his benefit from learning that there is a risk and choosing $x^*$ is escaping liability. This exceeds society's benefit: if society learns that there is a risk, society does not escape losses if $x^*$ is chosen but only reduces them. Hence, the private value of information exceeds the social.)$^8$ When a party does not obtain information, he may be led to exercise care of $x^*$, which is excessive since it exceeds $x^*_0$, in order to be sure to escape liability.

**Proof.** If a party does not obtain information and chooses $x < x^*$, he will be liable for losses if there is a risk, so he will choose $x$ to minimize $x + ph(x)$, which is minimized at $x^*_0$. He will not choose $x > x^*$ since this can do him no good. If he chooses $x^*$, he will not be liable if there

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$^8$ Dalvi, *supra* note 1, independently obtains a related result: that a newspaper may invest too much in acquisition of information about the truthfulness of a story under the negligence rule for libel.
is a risk. Hence, as in the proof to proposition 3, there are two cases to examine if a party does not obtain information: where he chooses \( x_0^* \) and where he chooses \( x^* \). If a party obtains information, the standard proof shows that he will choose \( x^* \) if there is a risk and zero otherwise. The value of information to a party exceeds \( v \) in both cases; this is evident from (8) and (9). Therefore, a party may obtain information even though \( v < c \). Q.E.D.

III. Concluding Remarks

1. The model of acquisition of information studied above is special in two respects: there is only one possible level of investment in information, and the character of information is simple—either there is a risk, or there is none. A generalization of the model would relax both of these simplifying assumptions. Propositions 1, 2, and 3 would still hold true in such a generalization: optimality would still be achieved under strict liability, under the complete negligence rule, and under the negligence rule based on the optimal level of care given optimal acquisition of information. The nature of suboptimality under the other two negligence rules, however, may be different from what is described here.

9 Specifically, suppose that there are \( n \) levels of investment in information: \( 0 < c_1 < \ldots < c_n \). Assume that associated with an investment of \( c_i \), in information is a partition of the set \( S \) of states of the world into \( n \) subsets \( S(1), \ldots, S(n) \); what is observed is one of the \( S(j, i) \). Let \( p(j, i) \) be the probability of \( S(j, i) \) and \( h(x, i) \) be expected accident losses given \( x \) conditional on \( S(j, i) \). Assume furthermore that higher levels of investment in information correspond to more information, in the sense that the \( S(j, i) \) constitute a finer partition of \( S \) than the \( S(j, k) \) for any \( i > k \).

In this model, the optimal level of care given observation of \( S(j, i) \) is the \( x \) minimizing \( x + h(x, i) \), denoted \( x^*(j, i) \); total costs given \( c_i \) are thus \( E[x^*(j, i) + h(x^*(j, i))], \) where \( E \) is the expectation over \( j \) and the optimal level of investment \( c_i^* \) minimizes \( E[x^*(j, i) + h(x^*(j, i)) + c_i \) over \( i \).

10 It is clear that optimality results under strict liability since the private problem is the same as the social problem. And straightforward modifications of the proofs of propositions 2 and 3 show that they continue to hold.

11 For example, proposition 4 shows that a party will acquire information less often than is optimal because the private value of information is less than the social. In the generalized model, however, the private value of information can exceed the social (so that a party may obtain information when doing so is not optimal). To demonstrate this possibility, suppose that there is one level of investment in information and two equally probable types of information: if information is type 1, care is extraordinarily valuable in reducing risk, and the optimal care level is \( x_1^* \); if information is type 2, care is only moderately valuable in lowering risk, and the optimal level of care is \( x_2^* \); where \( 0 < x_2^* < x_1^* \). Because care is so valuable if information is type 1, optimal care in the absence of information, \( x_0^* \), is close to \( x_1^* \). The social value of information is

\[
v = .5[(x_0^* + h_1(x_1^*)) - (x_1^* + h_1(x_1^*))] + .5[(x_0^* + h_2(x_2^*)) - (x_2^* + h_2(x_2^*))].
\]

(Expected accident losses are \( h_i(x) \) if information is type \( i \).) Since \( x_1^* \) is close to \( x_1^* \), \( v \) is
2. It should be noted that the different liability rules considered in this article impose varying informational requirements on the courts. To employ strict liability, courts need only to ascertain the extent of losses. They do not need to inquire whether information should have been obtained, whether it actually was obtained, or whether the level of care was appropriate.\(^\text{12}\) To apply the complete negligence rule, by contrast, courts must make all three of these inquiries. Yet, to administer the negligence rule based on the level of care, assuming optimal knowledge of risk, courts need only make two of the inquiries. A court does not have to know whether information about risk was obtained in fact. (This can be a significant advantage; exactly what a defendant knew about risk may be hard to establish even when what he should have known and his level of care can be fairly well determined.) To employ the negligence rule based on the level of care that is optimal given information actually possessed, courts do not have to determine what information should have been obtained; and to employ the negligence rule based on the optimal level of care presuming that information about risk was obtained also does not require courts to determine whether the information should have been obtained.

3. The theoretical results suggest that, other things being equal, decisions about obtaining information and about the exercise of care will tend toward the optimal if courts employ either strict liability, the complete negligence rule, or the negligence rule under which the level of care presumes optimal knowledge about risk. If, however, courts base their findings on the negligence rule using the level of care that is optimal assuming actual knowledge of risk, the incentive to obtain information may be inadequate. And, if courts employ the negligence rule using the level of care that would be optimal if parties had knowledge of risk (whether or not it is optimal to obtain), the incentive to obtain information about risk as well as the incentive to exercise care may be socially excessive.

4. All but one of the rules of liability examined in this article are, or have sometimes been, employed by courts. In particular, strict liability determines liability in certain areas of accident (notably, for extrahazard-

\(^\text{12}\) The courts, however, may need to inquire whether victims know or should have known about the risks that they faced.
ous activities). In most areas, the negligence rule governs, and, in determining the level of care that should have been exercised, courts usually appear to assume that parties possess optimal knowledge of risk. They state, for example, that parties “know or should have known” certain facts or that they are “deemed” to know facts concerning risk whenever these facts were easily ascertainable or the cost of obtaining them was justified by the benefits that knowing them would bring about. One supposes, though, that courts sometimes base negligence on customary or actual, rather than optimal, knowledge of risk whenever they have difficulty in determining what level of knowledge about risk was optimal. And one also supposes that courts sometimes assume parties have a certain degree of information about risk, without inquiring into whether the information was optimal to obtain. Courts, however, do not ever seem to apply the complete negligence rule. Under that rule, recall, a person is liable if he merely fails to obtain information about risk when he should have done so, but courts will not in fact find such a person liable if he exercised proper care.

14 Id. at 182–85; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 290 (1965).
15 For example, some commentators suggest that, in determining liability for defective products, certain courts have employed ex post standards—based on knowledge of risk and technology at the time of an accident—rather than ex ante standards—based on the possibilities for and costs of obtaining information at the time products are manufactured. See Gary Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 Cal. L. Rev. 435 (1979); and Robert L. Rabin, Indeterminate Risk Reform: Comment of Calabresi and Klevorick, 14 J. Legal Stud. 633 (1985), for critical assessment of this view; and see Richard A. Epstein, Modern Products Liability Law, at ch. 7 (1980), for general discussion of design defects and product liability.
16 This article appeared in an earlier version as Steven Shavell, Liability and the Incentive to Obtain Information about Risk (mimeographed, Harvard Law School 1989).