Kathryn E. Spier
Articles
Should Consumers Be Permitted to Waive Products Liability? Product Safety, Private Contracts, and Adverse Selection (with Albert Choi). The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 30 (2014), forthcoming.
Exclusive Dealing and Market Foreclosure: Further Experimental Results (with Claudia Landeo). The Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 168(1) (2012), pp. 150-170.
Incentives and Contract Frames: Comment (with Claudia Landeo). The Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 168(1) (2012), pp. 83-88.
Product Safety, Buybacks and the Post-Sale Duty to Warn. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 27(3) (2011), pp. 515-539.
Trigger Happy or Gun Shy? Dissolving Common-Value Partnerships with Texas Shootouts (with Richard Brooks and Claudia Landeo). RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 41 (4) (2010), pp. 649-673.
Earlier version available as Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper, No. 630. SSRN: http://ssrn.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/abstract=1372195
Divide and Conquer (with Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule). The Journal of Legal Analysis, Vol. 2(2) (2010), pp. 417-471.
Earlier version available as U. of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 467, Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 09-24. SSRN: http://ssrn.com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/abstract=1414319.
Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities (with Claudia Landeo). The American Economic Review, Vol. 99(5) (2009), pp. 1850-77.
Strategic Judgment Proofing (with Yeon-Koo Che). The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 39(4) (2008), pp. 926-948.
Exploiting Plaintiffs Through Settlement: Divide and Conquer (with Yeon-Koo Che). The Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 164(1) (2008), pp. 4-23.
Economics of Litigation. In Blume and Durlauf, eds., The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd ed., Palgrave McMillan (2008).
Litigation. In A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, eds., The Handbook of Law and Economics, North Holland (2007).
Entry Deterrence in a Duopoly Market (with James D. Dana, Jr.). The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Vol. 7(1) (Advances), Article 19 (2007).
Manufacturer Liability for Harm Caused by Consumers to Others (with Bruce Hay). American Economic Review, Vol. 94(5) (2005), pp. 1700-1711.
Information and Externalities in Sequential Litigation (with Xinyu Hua). Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 161(2) (2005), pp. 215-232.
A Theory of Utilization Review (with David Dranove). Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy, Vol. 2(1) (2003).
The Use of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Settlement of Litigation. The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 34 (1) (2003).
‘Tied to the Mast’: Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Settlement Contracts. The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 32 (1) (2003).
Settlement with Multiple Plaintiffs: The Role of Insolvency. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 18 (2) (2002), pp. 293-323.
Threats Without Binding Commitment (with Steven Shavell). Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy, Vol. 2 (1) (2002).
Revenue Sharing and Vertical Control in the Video Rental Industry (with James D. Dana, Jr.). The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 49 (3) (2001), pp. 223-45.
‘Competition’ Among Employers Offering Health Insurance (with David Dranove and Laurence Baker). The Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 19 (2000), pp. 121-140.
Settlement of Litigation (with Bruce Hay). The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Macmillan Reference Limited, 1998, pp. 442-451.
Capital Structure, Priority Rules, and the Settlement of Civil Claims (with Alan Sykes). The International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 18 (2) (1998), pp. 187-200.
Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic Perspective (with Bruce L. Hay). The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 26(2) (1997), pp. 413 - 431; to be reprinted in The Economics of Evidence, Procedure, and Litigation (Chris W. Sanchirico, ed., Edward Elgar Publishing).
A Note on the Divergence between the Private and the Social Motive to Settle Under a Negligence Rule. The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 26(2) (1997), pp. 613 - 621.
On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated Damages for Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers, Reliance, and Renegotiation (with Michael Whinston). The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 26 (2) (1995), pp. 180-202.
Settlement Bargaining and the Design of Damage Awards. The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 10 (2) (1994), pp. 84-95.
Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules. The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 25 (2) (1994), pp. 197-214.
Retaliatory Mechanisms for Eliminating Trade Barriers: Aggressive Unilateralism vs. GATT Cooperation (with David E. Weinstein). Chapter 14 in Imperfect Competition in International Trade, Winston W. Chang and Seiichi Katayama, eds., Kluwer Academic Publishers (1995).
Designing a Private Industry: Government Auctions with Endogenous Market Structure (with James D. Dana, Jr.). The Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 53 (1994), pp. 127-147.
A Note on Joint and Several Liability: Insolvency, Settlement, and Incentives. The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 23 (1, part 2) (1994), pp.559-568.
Capital Structure as a Bargaining Tool: The Role of Leverage in Contract Renegotiation (with Enrico Perotti). The American Economic Review, Vol. 83 (5) (1993), pp. 1131-1141.
Expertise and Contingent Fees: The Role of Asymmetric Information in Attorney Compensation (with James D. Dana, Jr.). The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 9 (2) (1993), pp. 349-367.
Defense Procurement: Politics, Management, and Incentives: Discussion, in James Leitzel and Jean Tirole, eds., Incentives in procurement contracting. Pew Studies in Economics and Security. Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press, 1993, pp. 22-23.
The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation. The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 59 (1) (1992), pp. 93-108; to be reprinted in The Economics of Evidence, Procedure, and Litigation (Chris W. Sanchirico, ed., Edward Elgar Publishing).
Incomplete Contracts and Signaling. The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 23 (3) (1992), pp. 432-443.