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SYMPOSIUM: MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF THE MODERN BUSINESS CORPORATION
February 2002



Published in The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 69, pp. 733-1270 (2002)


KEYNOTE ADDRESS


Derivative Securities and
Corporate Governance
Frank H. Easterbrook


EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION & TAKEOVERS


Managerial Power and Rent
Extraction in the Design
Of Executive Compensation
Lucian Arye Bebchuk,
Jesse M. Fried &
David I. Walker


Explaining Executive Compensation:
Managerial Power versus the
Perceived Cost of Stock Options
Kevin J. Murphy


How I Learned to Stop Worrying
And Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law
Marcel Kahan &
Edward B. Rock


Designing Mechanisms to Govern
Takeover Defenses: Private
Contracting, Legal Intervention, and
Unforeseen Contingencie
Jennifer Arlen


Comment:
The Best of All Possible Worlds
(or Pretty Darn Close)
Reinier Kraakman


CORPORATE CONTROL TRANSACTIONS


Market Evidence in Corporate Law Daniel R. Fischel


Commentary on Fischel Isaac Corre


The Case Against Board Veto
In Corporate Takeovers
Lucian Arye Bebchuk


Pills, Polls, and Professors Redux Martin Lipton


The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging The Conceptual Divide William T. Allen,
Jack B. Jacobs &
Leo E. Strine, Jr.

CORPORATE SPEECH AND CITIZENSHIP


Corporate Political Speech, Political
Extortion, and the Competition
For Corporate Charters
Robert H. Sitkoff


Commentary on Sitkoff Omri Yadlin


Corporate Charitable Giving Victor Brudney &
Allen Ferrell


Commentary on Brudney and Ferrell Richard W. Painter


CLOSING REMARKS


What Enron Means for the Management
and Control of the Modern
Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections
Jeffrey N. Gordon


Can Culture Constrain the Economic
Model of Corporate Law?
Mark J. Roe