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GO-SHOPS REVISITED

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Go-Shops Revisited

Guhan Subramanian* & Annie Zhao**

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A go-shop process turns the traditional M&A deal process on its head: rather than a pre-signing market canvass followed by a post-signing “no shop” period, a go-shop deal involves a limited pre-signing market check, followed by a post-signing “go shop” process to find a higher bidder. A decade ago one of us published the first systematic empirical study of go-shop deals. Contrary to the conventional wisdom at the time, the study found that go-shops could yield a meaningful market check, with a higher bidder appearing 13% of the time during the go-shop period. In this Article, we compile a new sample of M&A deals announced between 2010 and 2018. We find that go-shops, in general, are no longer an effective tool for post-signing price discovery. We then document several reasons for this change: the proliferation of first-bidder match rights, the shortening of go-shop windows, CEO conflicts of interest, investment banker effects, and collateral terms that have the effect of tightening the go-shop window. We conclude that the story of the go-shop technology over the past ten years is one of innovation corrupted: transactional planners innovate, the Delaware courts signal qualified acceptance, and then a broader set of practitioners push the technology beyond its breaking point. In view of these developments in transactional practice, we provide recommendations for the Delaware courts and corporate boards of directors.

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Introduction.....	2
I. Background.....	5
A. The Development of Go-Shops	5
B. Delaware Case Law	7
C. Literature Review.....	8
D. New Empirical Evidence	11
II. Explaining the Decline of Go-Shop Effectiveness.....	16
A. Match Rights.....	17
B. Shorter Go-Shop Windows.....	21
C. CEO Incentives to Discourage Third-Party Bids.....	22
1. CEO as Net Buyer.....	23
2. CEO Incentives Induced by Buy-Side Compensation	26
3. Absence of Special Committees.....	32
D. Banker Effects.....	33
1. Conflicts With Buy-Side Clients.....	33
2. Interference with Go-Shop Process.....	35
E. Collateral Terms.....	36
III. Implications.....	42
A. For Boards.....	42
B. For Courts	45
IV. Conclusion	50

Introduction

Until approximately 2005, the traditional sale process for U.S. public companies involved a broad market canvass and a merger agreement with the winning bidder, followed by a “no shop” obligation for the seller between the signing and the closing of the merger. In the mid-2000s, however, the introduction of the “go-shop” technology turned

this standard deal template on its head. In its purest form, a go-shop process involves an exclusive (or nearly exclusive) negotiation with a single buyer, followed by an extensive post-signing “go shop” process to see if a higher bidder could be found.

The first go-shop transaction appeared in Welsh, Carson, Anderson & Stowe’s buyout of U.S. Oncology in March 2004.¹ Go-shops proliferated quickly after that, particularly in private equity (PE) buyouts of public companies. Many commentators at the time were skeptical of go-shops.² The conventional wisdom held that go-shops amounted to nothing more than a fig leaf to provide cover for management to seal the deal with its preferred bidder, while insulating the board against claims that it failed to satisfy its obligation to maximize value for the shareholders in the sale of the company.

A decade ago, one of us published the first systematic empirical assessment of go-shops (the “Original Study”).³ The sample included all PE buyouts announced between January 2006 and August 2007 (n=141), including 48 deals that involved go-shop processes. In contrast to practitioner and academic commentary at the time that was generally skeptical of go-shops, the Original Study found that go-shops frequently led to higher bidders during the go-shop period, and that sellers extracted slightly higher prices from the original bidder in exchange for pre-signing exclusivity.⁴ Subsequent studies have generally confirmed these empirical findings.

Today, go-shops are a common tool for PE buyouts of public companies. In view of the earlier empirical findings and the general view today that go-shops can be meaningful, the continued deployment of go-shops might be viewed as a positive development in the evolution of public-company mergers & acquisitions (M&A). However, in this Article we present new evidence suggesting that go-shops have become less effective as a tool for price discovery since the timeframe of our earlier empirical analysis. The Original Study, which examined deals announced in 2006-07, reported that a higher bid emerged during the go-shop period 12.5% of the time (6 instances out of 48 go-shop deals).⁵ Using a new database of M&A transactions over the past nine years, we find that the jump rate in the 2010-2018 timeframe was 5.6% (6 out of 108 go-shops), declining to 2.5% (1 out of 40) in the period 2015-2018. The last successful go-shop in our sample occurred approximately three years ago, in January 2016, when II-VI Inc. successfully jumped GaAs Labs’ offer for ANADIGICS, Inc. during a 25-day go-shop period.

This decline in jump rates cannot be explained by straightforward factors, such as uniformly shorter go-shop periods, an increase in go-shop termination fees, or a tightening of Excluded Party definitions. Delaware courts have emphasized the importance of these factors for structuring a meaningful go-shop process, and practitioners, not surprisingly,

¹ Mark A. Morton & Roxanne L. Houtman, *Go-Shops: Market Check Magic or Mirage?*, Potter, Anderson & Corroon memorandum to clients (May 2007).

² See *infra* note 10 and accompanying text.

³ Guhan Subramanian, *Go-Shops vs. No-Shops in Private Equity Deals: Evidence & Implications*, 63 BUS. LAW. 729 (2008) (hereinafter “ORIGINAL STUDY”)

⁴ ORIGINAL STUDY at 741-755.

⁵ *Id.* at Tables 2 & 3.

have taken that guidance. As with other areas of transactional practice, the lawyers, bankers, and principals are far better than that in burying their handiwork. The real explanation requires deeper digging into structural and contextual factors involving go-shops.

Match rights, for example, which were just beginning to appear at the time of the Original Study, are now ubiquitous. Basic game theory indicates that match rights will deter prospective third-party bidders. Go-shop windows are no longer as sensitive to deal size as they were in the Original Study. The result is shorter go-shop windows in larger deals, which amplifies information asymmetries and “winner’s curse” concerns. Shorter go-shop windows also make consortium bids more difficult, which are particularly important for larger deals. These developments reduce the effectiveness of go-shops as a tool for price discovery.

Conflicts of interest for management also hinder the effectiveness of go-shop processes. CEO’s often have a financial incentive to keep the deal price down, which means discouraging potential third-party bids during the go-shop process. And in some instances, CEOs have undisclosed qualitative reasons for discouraging third-party bids.

Conflicts of interest among the investment bankers can also reduce the effectiveness of go-shops. For example, in the incestuous world of private equity, the sell-side banker’s financial incentives to please the buyer (who does not want an overbid) may be larger than the banker’s financial incentives to find a higher bidder during the go-shop period. Alternatively, or in addition, the buyer’s bankers may discourage prospective buyers from meaningful participation in the go-shop process. This Article presents a taxonomy of these conflicts and provides examples of each. This Article also documents how boards fail to form special committees that might adequately cleanse these conflicts.

A final category of reasons that can reduce the effectiveness of the go-shop process involves the technical details of the go-shop itself. Through a complex interaction of deal terms, some buyers have achieved a “back door” tightening of the “Superior Proposal” and “Excluded Party” definitions, so as to effectively require potential third-party buyers to make a full-blown acquisition proposal during the go-shop period. These seemingly technical adjustments to the legal terms of go-shop can significantly reduce the effectiveness of the go-shop as a tool for price discovery.

At the highest level, the story of the go-shop technology over the past ten years is one of innovation corrupted: transactional planners innovate, the Delaware courts signal qualified acceptance, and then a broader set of practitioners push the technology beyond its breaking point. This trajectory has a venerable pedigree. Mortgage securitization unquestionably created enormous value for society in the 1970s and 1980s, but practitioners pushed this technology too far by the 2000s, leading to the financial crisis of 2008-2009. Likewise the proliferation of derivatives unquestionably created enormous value in the 1980s and 1990s, but the distortion and eventual corruption of this new technology led to the Enron debacle of 2003. In view of this (no doubt) eternal dance between practitioners and their regulators, this Article concludes with specific recommendations for the Delaware courts and transactional planners in the realm of go-shop processes.

At stake are general policy goals involving allocational efficiency in the M&A marketplace. Economists generally agree that social welfare is maximized when assets flow to their highest and best use; while lawyers, bankers, and principals on the buy-side (and sometimes on the sell-side) want to maximize deal certainty rather than allocational efficiency. Corporate law must therefore police the deal process to ensure that business objectives and professional interests do not crowd out desirable policy goals. Go-shops can facilitate allocational efficiency if (but only if) they are structured properly. This Article presents evidence that the go-shop deal technology has moved away from fulfilling its potential as a tool for allocational efficiency over the past ten years. It also proposes specific interventions for practitioners and courts to set things back on course.

I. Background

A. The Development of Go-Shops

In 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court held in *Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.*, that when a “sale or break-up” of the company becomes “inevitable,” the directors’ duties shift from “defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders in the sale of the company.”⁶ Virtually all PE buyouts of public companies are subject to examination under the *Revlon* standard because target shareholders are typically getting cashed out of the company. The traditional way in which sell-side boards fulfill this “*Revlon* duty” is by canvassing the market, then signing a merger agreement with the highest bidder.⁷ Historically, public companies would canvass the market in a “pre-signing” process, then announcing the deal with the winning bidder. Once the deal is announced, the merger agreement typically includes a “no shop” (sometimes called a “window shop”) clause, in which the target agrees to not actively solicit other buyers during the 3-6 month window between the signing and closing. The target board will nevertheless insist on a “fiduciary out,” which allows the board to negotiate with a third-party who might be able to make a superior offer. If a higher bidder emerges during this post-signing period, the target will be required to pay the initial bidder a breakup fee (a.k.a. “termination fee”), typically amounting to 2-4% of the deal value.⁸

Enter the go-shop clause. In the purest form of a go-shop, a buyer approaches the target with an indication of interest. Rather than canvassing the marketplace at this point, the target will negotiate exclusively, in exchange for confidentiality and standstill agreements. If the parties reach agreement during this period, the deal is announced. The go-shop provision in the merger agreement allows the seller to affirmatively solicit other buyers for 20-60 calendar days, in sharp contrast to the traditional “no shop” deal. The merger

⁶ *Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.*, 506 A.2d at 182.

⁷ For more detail on the traditional deal process, see Guhan Subramanian, *Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses*, 113 YALE L. J. 621 (2003).

⁸ See John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, *A Buy-Side Model of M&A Lockups: Theory & Evidence*, 53 STAN. L. REV. 307 (2000) (providing empirical evidence on the magnitude of breakup fees in a sample of public-company acquisitions announced between 1988 and 1998).

agreement will usually include a “bifurcated” breakup fee: a lower amount, typically 1-3% of the deal equity value, if a higher offer emerges during the go-shop period; and a higher amount, typically 2-4% of the deal value, if a higher offer emerges after the go-shop period expires but before the initial deal closes.

If a higher offer emerges before the go-shop period expires, the target board will designate the new bidder an “Excluded Party” (“excluded” because it is exempt from paying the higher breakup fee if it reaches a deal to buy the target). If the initial buyer gets a “match right” (which, today, is almost always the case), the target board must then negotiate for 3 to 5 business days, “in good faith,” with the initial bidder to see if the initial bidder can match the terms offered by the Excluded Party. The seller may go back and forth several more times, but each new bid by the Excluded Party will typically trigger a new 3-5 day match right for the initial bidder. If the Excluded Party ultimately wins the auction, the target board will pay the reduced breakup fee to the initial bidder. The length of the go-shop period and the size of the two breakup fees are heavily negotiated points between the PE buyer and the target during the pre-signing phase.

At the highest level, in both the no-shop and go-shop processes, the target canvasses the market to see if there is a higher-value bidder. The critical difference lies in when this market check takes place: in the traditional no-shop route, the market check takes place before signing; while in the go-shop process the market check takes place after the deal is signed and announced. The timing difference has important implications for price discovery. In the pre-signing process, all bidders are (at least theoretically) on a level playing field. In a post-signing go-shop process, the initial bidder has a favored position but (if the go-shop is structured well) serves as a “floor bid” (a.k.a., “stalking horse”) for potential third-party bidders.⁹ In exchange for providing a floor bid the first bidder will get a modest breakup fee (1-3%) in the event the transaction is taken away by a higher bidder.

When go-shops first appeared, some commentators argued that go-shops were a manifestation of seller bargaining power in a world of frenzied buy-side competition.¹⁰

⁹ See, e.g., *Go-Shop Provisions: A New Trend?*, DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL MEMORANDUM TO CLIENTS (Dec. 2006) (“From a seller’s standpoint, a go-shop provision is desirable for a number of reasons. The initial buyer serves as a stalking horse to potentially make the seller more attractive to other buyers, and its purchase price sets a floor for other potential buyers to top.”); *In re Lear, Corp. Shareholder Litig.*, 926 A.2d 94, 112 (Del. Ch. 2007) (noting that Carl Icahn, the initial bidder, “was not willing to be an amateur stalking horse”); Brian JM Quinn, *Omnicare: Coercion and the New Unocal Standard*, 38 J. CORP. L. 835, 844 (2013) (describing that in a go-shop process “the seller will treat the initial bidder as a stalking horse to generate an active post-signing auction”).

¹⁰ See, e.g., *Why More Sellers Are Using a “Go-Shop” Clause*, CAPITALEYES (May/June 2007) (“M&A lawyers say [go-shop clauses] are likely to remain popular as sellers seek to include this provision in more deals.”); Steve Rosenbush, *Private Equity Slugfest*, BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 13, 2007) (“Target companies are figuring out ways to elicit more competition. One technique is the so-called ‘go-shop’ provision.”); Mark W. Peters et. al, *The Increasingly Popular ‘Go-Shop’ Provision – Why Now?*, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS (May 2007) (“The

Under this view, the go-shop clause was seller-friendly because it replaced the usual “no shop” with a “go shop,” which would only work to the seller’s advantage. Others, however, claimed that that go-shop clauses worked primarily to the buyer’s advantage, because the addition of a go-shop clause gave the target board an excuse to curtail (or eliminate completely) shopping during the critical pre-signing phase, and the subsequent go-shop period was illusory.¹¹ These competing theories would be examined by the Delaware courts in their examination of go-shop processes.

B. Delaware Case Law

When go-shops first emerged in the mid-2000s, two decisions in the Delaware Chancery Court squarely addressed their effectiveness. In *In re Topps Company Shareholders Litigation*,¹² then-Vice Chancellor Leo Strine held that a 40-day go-shop period, despite the existence of a match right and a 4.3% breakup fee after the go-shop

existing seller’s market environment may help account for the recent popularity of the go-shop provision.”); *A Review of Merger Agreement Provisions in Going Private Transactions*, MERGERMETRICS.COM (March 23, 2007) (arguing that proliferation of go-shop clauses indicates “a strengthening of the target’s negotiating position”). See generally DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON PRIVATE EQUITY REPORT (Fall 2006) (“The business press perceives go-shop provisions as another example of how the competitive M&A market is changing acquisition agreements in favor of targets.”).

¹¹ See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, *Looking for More Money, After Reaching a Deal*, NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 26, 2006) (“The question, though, is why a company wouldn’t hold an open auction to begin with? . . . [M]ore often than not, it would seem that an open auction is the best way to go. . . . [T]he biggest problem with a go-shop provision is that by default, other potential bidders start at a huge disadvantage.”); Christina M. Sautter, *Shopping During Extended Store Hours: From No Shops to Go-Shops – the Development, Effectiveness, and Implications of Go-Shop Provisions in Change of Control Transactions*, 73 BROOKLYN L. REV. 525 (2008); Steven M. Davidoff, M&A Law Prof Blog (April 26, 2007) (“[I]nvestors have increasingly come to see ‘go-shop’ provisions as cover for unduly large break-up fees and the significant advantage and head-start provided by management participation.”), available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mergers/2007/04/harmans_shoppin.html; Tom Taulli, *ACS Buyout: A Second Bite at the Apple?*, BLOGGINGBUYOUTS (June 12, 2007) (“[I]t’s usually the case that a ‘go shop’ doesn’t amount to much anyway.”), available at <http://www.bloggingbuyouts.com/2007/06/12/acs-buyout-a-second-bite-at-the-apple>. Cf. Mark A. Morton & Roxanne L. Houtman, *Go-Shops: Market Check Magic or Mirage?*, Potter, Anderson & Corroon memorandum to clients (May 2007) (“[O]ur practical experience suggests that while go-shops may be beneficial in some circumstances, they may serve as mere window dressing in other cases. . . . [W]hy should one assume that a go-shop will serve to canvass the market . . . if no one ever makes a competing bid?”). See generally M. Lipton, T.N. Mervis & P.K. Rowe, *Private Equity and the Board of Directors*, WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ MEMORANDUM TO CLIENTS, at 4 (noting that “some skepticism has been expressed about the effectiveness of go-shops given a perception that private equity buyers may be reluctant to compete against signed-up deals.”).

¹² 2007 WL 1732586 (Del. Ch. June 2007).

period expired, did not violate the target board's *Revlon* duties. ("For 40 days, the Topps board could shop like Paris Hilton."¹³). In contrast, in *In re Lear Corporation Shareholder Litigation*,¹⁴ issued just one day later, Vice Chancellor Strine looked far more skeptically on the go-shop provision because the Lear go-shop required the board to "get the whole shebang done [i.e., discovery of a Superior Proposal, expiration of the 10-day match right, termination of the initial agreement, and a signed-up agreement with the new bidder] within the 45-day window."¹⁵ In both *Topps* and *Lear*, the Court refused to grant a preliminary injunction against the deal on the *Revlon* claims, but granted the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction until certain disclosure problems were cured.¹⁶ Taken together, *Topps* and *Lear* signaled qualified acceptance of go-shops as a means for target boards to satisfy their *Revlon* duties.

The endorsement by the Delaware courts made go-shops a permanent feature in practitioners' deal toolkit. Go-shops appear disproportionately in PE deals, because PE buyers, with their portfolio of deals, are more likely to be willing to take the "option" on the deal that comes from giving the seller the right to go shop.¹⁷ The Original Study reported that 34% of PE deals (48 out of 141) included a go-shop. A combined search of the Thomson Platinum M&A database and MergerMetrics database from January 2010 to June 2018 finds that 24% of PE deals (108 out of 442) included a go-shop.¹⁸ Go-shop incidence has fluctuated annually between 20-35%, with no consistent trends over time.

C. Literature Review

Subramanian (2008) presents the first systematic empirical examination of go-shops (the "Original Study").¹⁹ The sample included all PE buyouts announced between January

¹³ *Id.* at *26.

¹⁴ 926 A.2d 94 (Del. Ch. 2007).

¹⁵ *Id.* at 119. Vice Chancellor Strine continued in his usual entertaining way: "It is conceivable, I suppose, that this could occur if a ravenous bidder had simply been waiting for an explicit invitation to swallow up Lear. But if that sort of Kobayashi-like buyer existed, it might have reasonably been expected to emerge before the Merger Agreement with Icahn was signed based on Lear's lack of a rights plan and the publicity given to Icahn's prior investments in the company."

¹⁶ *See*, *In re Topps Company Shareholders Litigation*, 2007 WL 1732586 at 3 (Del. Ch. June 2007); *In re Lear Corporation Shareholder Litigation*, 926 A.2d 94, 123 (Del. Ch. 2007).

¹⁷ *See* ORIGINAL STUDY at 742 (finding that go-shops are disproportionately used in PE deals); Sridhar Gogineni & John Puthenpurackal, *The Impact of Go-Shop Provisions in Merger Agreements*, 46 FIN. MGMT. 289 (2016) (same).

¹⁸ We examined deals over \$50 million in value and excluding deals with controlling shareholders (with control defined as a 35% threshold).

¹⁹ Subramanian, *supra* note 3. This article was selected by academics as one of the "top ten" articles published in corporate & securities law for 2008, *see* CORPORATE PRACTICE COMMENTATOR ANNUAL POLL OF BEST CORPORATE & SECURITIES ARTICLES (2008), and was reprinted in a volume of "seminal" articles from the past 45 years, *see* STEVEN DAVIDOFF

2006 and August 2007 (n=141), including 48 deals that involved go-shop processes. In contrast to practitioner and academic commentary at the time that was generally skeptical of go-shops,²⁰ the Original Study found that go-shops frequently led to higher bidders during the go-shop period, and that sellers extracted slightly higher prices from the original bidder in exchange for pre-signing exclusivity.²¹

In the context of “pure” go-shops (which were defined as a deal “in which the target negotiated exclusively with a single bidder, then conducted a market canvass during a post-announcement ‘go-shop’ period”²²), the Original Study reported that sell-side bankers contacted 39.6 potential buyers during the go-shop phase on average, and 3.2 of these signed confidentiality agreements. With “add-on” go-shops (which were defined as a deal “in which the target conducted a market canvass pre-announcement but also engaged in a post-announcement market canvass pursuant to a go-shop clause”²³), the Original Study reported that the sell-side bankers contacted 15.9 potential buyers on average, and 2.7 of these signed confidentiality agreements. The Original Study further reported that “the go-shop successfully generates another offer 5% of the time in an add-on go-shop and 17% of the time in a pure go-shop, consistent with the intuition that the go-shop should yield a higher-value buyer more often when there has been no pre-signing shopping.”²⁴ The Original Study concluded from these findings that “a pure go-shop can be a valuable tool for extracting the highest possible price in the sale of the company.”²⁵

The intuition for these findings is that the initial buyer serves as a “bird in hand” so that the seller can safely see if a higher-value “bird in the bush” can be found. That is, a go-shop process can mitigate the seller’s risk of a busted sale process while simultaneously permitting the sell-side board to execute a meaningful market canvass. And on the buy-

SOLOMON & CLAIRE A. HILL, LAW & ECONOMICS OF MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS (2011). The article has also been cited regularly by the Delaware courts. *See, e.g.*, In re Del Monte Foods Shareholder Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 840 n.5 (Del. Ch. 2011); In re Appraisal of Dell, Inc., 2016 WL 3186538 at *36 n.35 (Del. Ch. 2016); Blueblade Capital Opportunities, LLC v. Norcraft Companies, Inc., 2018 WL 3602940 at *36 n.263 (Del. Ch. 2017).

²⁰ For practitioner commentary, *see* sources cited *supra* note 11. For academic commentary, *see, e.g.*, J. Russel Denton, *Stacked Deck: Go-Shops and Auction Theory*, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1548 (2008) (“Auction theory predicts, regardless of the motivations of the target’s board of directors, that management involvement, information-sharing rights, matching rights, and termination fees that are typically present in goshop deals, all create a stacked deck in favor of the initial bidder.”); Christina M. Sautter, *Shopping During Extended Store Hours: From No Shops to Go-Shops – the Development, Effectiveness, and Implications of Go-Shop Provisions in Change of Control Transactions*, 73 BROOKLYN L. REV. 530 (2008) (arguing that these effects make go-shops no more effective than a passive market check achieved through a no-shops with a fiduciary out).

²¹ ORIGINAL STUDY at 741-755.

²² ORIGINAL STUDY at 745 (Table 2).

²³ *Id.*

²⁴ *Id.* at 747.

²⁵ *Id.* at 755.

side, PE buyers at the time might have been willing to pay a premium for pre-signing exclusivity in order to deploy their massive pools of committed but unallocated capital (a.k.a. “dry gunpowder”). The Original Study concluded: “The narrow (doctrinal) implication of these findings is that go-shop provisions, appropriately structured, can satisfy a target board’s *Revlon* duties [to maximize value in the sale of the company]. The broader (transactional) implication is that go-shop provisions can be a ‘better mousetrap’ in deal structuring – a ‘win-win’ for both buyer and seller.”²⁶

However, the Original Study cautioned that this sanguine view only held if the go-shop process was structured properly, so that the post-signing market canvass was conducted on a level playing field.²⁷ For example, the Original Study recommended that Delaware courts should look for “a longer (fifty to sixty day) window to shop” and “information rights . . . rather than the increasingly commonplace match right.”²⁸ The concern for a level playing field was particularly acute in management buyouts (MBOs), because management would have informational and other structural advantages over other potential bidders.²⁹

Subsequent empirical studies of go-shops have generally confirmed the positive view provided in the Original Study. Jeon & Lee (2014) examined 1,706 transactions from 2004 through 2010, of which 140 deals were go-shops.³⁰ Using multiple regression analysis and instrumental variables to control for go-shop endogeneity, this study confirmed that go-shops increased initial deal premiums,³¹ increased the probability of a jump bid,³² and decreased the likelihood of deal completion.³³ Gogineni & Puthenpurackal (2017) examined a sample of 2,996 mergers announced between 2003 and 2012, including 145 go-shop deals.³⁴ This study similarly found that go-shops were positively associated with measures of sell-side shareholder interests. Specifically, this study found a statistically significant positive association between go-shops and the probability of a competing bid, the likelihood and magnitude of an upward revision of the initial offer, and the final offer premium.³⁵ The authors concluded that “the inclusion of go-shop provisions in merger agreements has been beneficial for target shareholders, on average.”³⁶

²⁶ *Id.* at 731.

²⁷ *Id.* at 755-760.

²⁸ *Id.* at 757-758.

²⁹ *Id.* at 756-757.

³⁰ Jeon & Lee, *supra* 3, at 214. *See also id.* at 213 (“Subramanian (2008) is the first study that empirically examines the go-shop provision in takeover agreements.”).

³¹ *Id.* at 228.

³² *Id.* at 230.

³³ *Id.* at 232.

³⁴ Sridhar Gogineni & John Puthenpurackal, *The Impact of Go-Shop Provisions in Merger Agreements*, 46 FIN. MGMT. 289 (2016).

³⁵ *Id.* at 289-305.

³⁶ *Id.* at 311.

Antoniades, Calomiris & Hitscherich (2016) examined 306 cash transactions announced between 2004 and 2011 with a public U.S. target and a financial acquirer.³⁷ Noting the tension between their study, on one hand, and Subramanian (2008) and Jeon & Lee (2014), on the other, they report that a go-shop resulted in a statistically significant reduction in the initial offer premium.³⁸ Jump bids during the go-shop process did not make up for this difference, because the incidence of deal jumpers was so low that they “would need to generate unrealistically high increases in premia to offset the large decrease in the initial offer premium.”³⁹

The following table summarizes the prior academic literature on go-shops:

Study	Sample Timeframe	Go-Shop Sample Size	Go-Shop Generally Improves Target Shareholder Value?
Subramanian (2008)	2006-2007	48	Yes
Jeon & Lee (2014)	2004-2010	140	Yes
Antoniades, Calomiris & Hitscherich (2016)	2004-2011	85	No
Gogineni & Puthenpurackal (2017)	2003-2012	145	Yes

The table highlights the mixed empirical results, with the general weight of the empirical evidence in favor of the idea that go-shops increase target shareholder value, but a potential inflection point in this assessment arising from the fact that one out of three of the most recent studies finding that go-shops do not create value. The table also shows that no study has examined go-shops over the past six years. In view of the potential inflection point suggested by the prior literature, this omission is surprising. The next Part seeks to fill the empirical gap.

D. New Empirical Evidence

We assembled a new database of PE deals to assess the development of go-shops, and deal processes more generally, since the timeframe examined in the Original Study and other prior literature. We use the Thomson Platinum M&A database, supplemented by

³⁷ Adonis Antoniades, Charles W. Calomiris, & Donna M. Hitscherich, *No Free Shop: Why Target Companies Sometimes Choose Not to Buy ‘Go-Shop’ Options*: 88 J. ECON. & BUS. 39, (2016).

³⁸ *Id.* at 58. (“In contrast to previous studies – Subramanian, 2008; Jeon and Lee, 2014 – we find that the inclusion of a go-shop provision results in a statistically significant reduction in the initial offer premium – defined as the percentage difference of the offer price from a reference pre-offer price.”).

³⁹ *Id.* at 39.

data from the MergerMetrics database, to identify all public-company deals larger than \$50 million in value, involving a financial buyer and with a go-shop provision, announced between January 2010 and June 2018.⁴⁰ We exclude deals in which the acquirer is a controlling shareholder (with control defined as a 35% threshold), because such transactions are subject to a different doctrinal regime.⁴¹ The resulting sample includes 108 transactions (the “New Sample”).

For each deal in the New Sample, we examined the Background of the Merger section of the proxy statement (or Schedule 14D-9 for deals executed pursuant to a tender offer) to code certain aspects of the pre-signing and post-signing processes. We supplemented our review of the SEC filings with news reports. We then tabulated key features of the deal process, and compared these features to the findings from the Original Study. Summary statistics from the Original Study are reported in **Table 1**; summary statistics from the New Sample are reported in **Table 2**.

⁴⁰ The combined Thomson Platinum and MergerMetrics database included two deals incorrectly coded as having a financial buyer. Shuanghui Intl., which acquired Smithfield Foods, Inc. in 2013, and Hudson's Bay Co., which acquired Saks Inc. in 2013, were strategic acquirors. We excluded these deals from the New Sample.

⁴¹ For a summary, see Fernan Restrepo & Guhan Subramanian, *Freezeouts: Doctrine and Perspectives*, in STEVEN DAVIDOFF SOLOMON & CLAIRE A. HILL, *HANDBOOK OF MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS* (2015).

Table 1: Summary Statistics from Original Study (2006-2007)

Mean (Median)	No-Shop (n=93)	Add-on Go-Shop (n=19)	Pure Go-Shop (n=29)	All Deals (n=141)
Deal characteristics:				
Deal Size (\$MM)	\$2,914.1 (\$910.3)	\$5,835.0 (\$3,608.6)	\$4,207.8 (\$1,479.9)	\$3,574.1 (\$1,193.2)
Buyout group includes management	12.9%	15.8%	24.1%	15.6%
Initiated by buy-side?	53.3%	68.4%	93.1%	63.8%
Pre-signing solicitation process:				
# of potential buyers contacted	31.6 (15)	15.9 (5.5)	1.0 (1)	22.4 (7)
# signing confidentiality agreements	16.1 (8.5)	7.8 (4)	1.0 (1)	11.7 (5)
# making bids	3.9 (3)	2.7 (2)	1.0 (1)	3.1 (2)
Post-signing solicitation process:				
# of potential buyers contacted	0.0 (0)	33.0 (27)	39.6 (40)	12.3 (0)
# signing confidentiality agreements	0.07 (0)	1.5 (0)	3.2 (2)	0.90 (0)
# making bids	0.08 (0)	0.05 (0)	0.17 (0)	0.10 (0)
Go-shop structuring:				
Bifurcated termination fee?		84.2%	88.9%	87.0%
Breakup during go-shop period (% of equity value)		1.65% (1.54%)	1.45% (1.41%)	1.53% (1.41%)
Breakup fee after go-shop period (% of equity value)		2.82% (2.91%)	2.62% (3.02%)	2.70% (3.01%)
Right to match third-party bidder?		78.9%	59.3%	67.4%
Length of go-shop period (days)		33.7 (30)	41.2 (45)	38.4 (40)

Table 2: Summary Statistics from the New Sample (2010-2018)

Mean (Median)	Add-on Go-Shop (n=81)	Pure Go-Shop (n=27)	All Go-Shops (n=108)
Deal characteristics:			
Deal Size (\$MM)	\$1,699 (\$748)	\$3,267 (\$455)	\$2,091 (\$642)
Buyout group includes management	12.3%	11.1%	12.0%
Initiated by buy-side?	74.1%	96.3%	79.6%
Pre-signing solicitation process:			
# of potential buyers contacted	13.8 (8)	1.0 (1)	10.6 (5)
# signing confidentiality agreements	6.9 (4)	1.0 (1)	5.4 (3)
# making bids	3.2 (2)	1.0 (1)	2.6 (2)
Post-signing solicitation process:			
# of potential buyers contacted	52.3 (47)	55.4 (43)	53.1 (46)
# signing confidentiality agreements	4.1 (2)	6.7 (3)	4.7 (3)
# making bids	0.05 (0)	0.08 (0)	0.06 (0)
Go-shop structuring:			
Bifurcated termination fee?	87.7%	96.3%	89.8%
Breakup during go-shop period (% of equity value)	1.98% (1.74%)	2.08% (1.86%)	2.01% (1.74%)
Breakup fee after go-shop period (% of equity value)	3.55% (3.36%)	3.79% (3.28%)	3.61% (3.31%)
Right to match third-party bidder?	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Length of go-shop period (days)	35.1 (34)	40.3 (40)	36.4 (37.5)

Table 2 shows that conditional on using a go-shop, the pre-signing phase is virtually unchanged since the Original Study: sell-side advisors contact roughly the same number of potential buyers, approximately the same number sign confidentiality agreements, and approximately the same number make offers for the target company. During the post-signing phase, Table 2 indicates that sell-side bankers contact significantly more potential buyers than reported in the Original Study. For example, in an add-on go-shop, sell-side bankers contacted 52.3 potential buyers on average, compared to 33.0 potential buyers, on average, that were contacted in the Original Study. Similarly, for a pure go-shop, sell-side

bankers contacted 55.4 potential buyers on average, compared to 39.6 potential buyers, on average, reported in the Original Study. These differences are statistically significant at 95% confidence. Not surprisingly, in view of the broader market canvass, Table 2 also reports that a larger number of potential buyers sign confidentiality agreements, on average, in order to gain access to due diligence on the target company.

Table 2 shows a slight increase in average termination fees since the Original Study, but this difference can be explained entirely by the slightly smaller average deal size in the New Sample. This (non)finding is consistent with earlier work by one of us, indicating an end to “termination fee creep” since approximately 2010.⁴² However, it represents a shift from earlier deal protection work, which emphasized the growing size of termination fees as a key factor in predicting bidder deterrence.⁴³

Despite the broader market canvass and no increase in termination fees, the jump rate has diminished significantly. The Original Study reported that a higher jump bid emerged during the go-shop period 12.5% of the time (6 instances out of 48 go-shop deals).⁴⁴ This has dropped to what initially appears to be a 6.5% jump rate (7 out of 108 go-shop deals) in the New Sample. Bifurcating the New Sample reveals a starker difference: a 7.4% jump rate (5 out of 68) during the period 2010-2014, and what initially appears to be a 5% jump rate (2 out of 40) during the period 2015-2018.

The last successful go-shop in the New Sample occurred two years ago, in June 2016, when Skullcandy, the headphone manufacturer, accepted an offer from Incipio for \$5.75 per share. During the go-shop period, Mill Road Capital made a bid for Skullcandy, and after a multi-round bidding contest with Incipio, Mill Road Capital ultimately won Skullcandy for a price of \$6.35 per share. However, Mill Road already held a 9.8% stake in Skullcandy at the time the initial deal with Incipio was announced and had offered to buy Skullcandy for \$6.05 per share (i.e., higher than Incipio’s \$5.75 per share announced deal) during the pre-signing phase.⁴⁵ Rather than providing an example of a successful go-shop, the Skullcandy case study seems to be an example of a flawed and/or conflicted pre-signing sale process.

Putting aside Skullcandy, then, the jump rate in the 2010-2018 timeframe was 5.6% (6 out of 108 go-shops), declining to 2.5% (1 out of 40) in the latter part of the New Sample (2015-2018). The decline in jump rates from the Original Study to the full New Sample is

⁴² Fernan Restrepo & Guhan Subramanian *The New Look of Deal Protection*, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1013, 1030 (2017).

⁴³ See, e.g., Coates & Subramanian, *supra* note 8.

⁴⁴ ORIGINAL STUDY at 745 (Table 2) & 749 (Table 3).

⁴⁵ Laura Berman, *Mill Road Capital Victorious in Skullcandy Bidding War*, THESTREET.COM (Aug. 24, 2016), available at <https://www.thestreet.com/story/13684595/1/mill-road-capital-victorious-in-skullcandy-bidding-war.html>.

statistically significant at the 10% level, and the decline in jump rates from the Original Study to the last four years is statistically significant at the 5% level.⁴⁶

The last successful go-shop involving a PE buyer occurred approximately three years ago, in January 2016, when II-VI Incorporated successfully jumped GaAs Labs, LLC's offer for ANADIGICS, Inc. during the go-shop period. And prior to that, the last successful go-shop involving a PE buyer was in July 2013, when billionaire investor John Paulson successfully jumped Kohlberg & Co.'s offer for Steinway Musical Instruments, Inc. during the go-shop period. With no discernible change in the pre-signing deal process, and a significant increase in the number of bidders contacted during the post-signing phase, the absence of successful competing bids against PE deals presents something of a puzzle. The pre-signing market canvass in go-shop transactions is *unchanged*, and the post-signing market canvass is significantly *up*, yet jump rates have dropped to nearly zero.

We believe the explanation can be found in the Original Study's cautious endorsement of go-shop processes. Go-shops could be effective, the Original Study concluded, but only if they were "appropriately structured."⁴⁷ The next Part offers structural and contextual features indicating that go-shops are no longer appropriately structured. The result has made go-shops less meaningful as a mechanism for price discovery since the timeframe of the Original Study.

II. Explaining the Decline of Go-Shop Effectiveness

The most straightforward potential explanation for the decline in go-shop jump rates would be higher prices from first bidders. Law & economics theory would predict that first bidders, understanding (implicitly or explicitly) the high jump rates documented in the Original Study, would simply pay more in their initial bid to avoid being jumped. However, we do not find evidence to support this hypothesis in our data. After controlling for deal size, we find no difference in deal premiums or shareholder returns between the Original Study and the New Sample.⁴⁸

Another potential explanation are soft factors regarding PE attitudes toward deal jumping. The Original Study quoted Robert Friedman, then Chief Legal Officer of Blackstone, as follows:

⁴⁶ We run a one-sided 2-sample test for equality of proportions (without continuity correction) in R. Comparing the Original Study to the 2010-2018 period, we find a p-value of 0.06982. Comparing the Original Study to the 2015-2018 period, we find a p-value of 0.04215.

⁴⁷ ORIGINAL STUDY at 731.

⁴⁸ Specifically, we assembled a sample of the largest go-shop deals in the New Sample that collectively had an average value of \$5.7 billion, which was the average size in the Original Study. We run both two-sided and one-sided Welch 2-sample t-tests comparing cumulative abnormal returns from 30 days before the announcement of the deal to 30 days after announcement. None of the premium differences between this subset of the New Sample and the Original Study (for add-on go-shops, pure go-shops, or all go-shops) are statistically significant.

Go-shops are totally meaningful. . . . Both the strategic universe and the private equity universe would be reticent to come in during a classic no-shop process [after a signed deal is announced]. We just wouldn't do it. But when you put a 'For Sale' sign on the door [through a go-shop], and say come get me, then people drop everything and look because they are being invited in.⁴⁹

Over the ensuing decade since the Original Study was published, some PE practitioners have expressed to us an opposing point of view, that PE buyers are generally reluctant to participate in go-shop processes, because jumping a PE deal signals to the market (and, more importantly, to the PE firm's limited partners) that the firm is unable to "source" its own deals. This signaling explanation might partially explain the decline in jump rates since the Original Study. To the extent it is correct, it would support the conclusion that go-shops used to be a meaningful mechanism for price discovery but are less meaningful today.

However, the signaling explanation cannot be a complete one, because our data indicates that strategic buyers are deterred as well, once a PE deal has been announced. The absence of strategic buyers is particularly puzzling because strategic buyers, unlike PE buyers, bring synergies to the deal. The conventional wisdom among practitioners is that synergies generally should beat financial engineering.⁵⁰ The remainder of this Part offers structural and contextual explanations that, we believe, offer a more complete explanation on the decline of go-shop effectiveness over the past decade.

A. Match Rights

The first and most straightforward explanation for the decline of go-shop effectiveness is the proliferation of match rights. A match right requires the target to negotiate "in good faith" with the first bidder, typically for 3-5 business days, to see if the first bidder can match the third-party bid. In the Original Study, match rights appeared in approximately two-thirds of the sample.⁵¹ Over the past decade, however, match rights have become ubiquitous in PE deals, and M&A deals more generally.⁵² Nearly all of these are "unlimited" match rights, meaning that the initial bidder gets an additional 3-5 days each time the third party makes an overbid. In contrast, the far less common "one time" match rights only permit a single match by the initial bidder, though nothing would prevent the initial bidder from negotiating for an additional match right each time it matched.

⁴⁹ *Id.* at 750.

⁵⁰ *See, e.g.,* Leonce Bargerona, et. al., *Why Do Private Acquirers Pay So Little Compared To Public Acquirers?* 89 J. FIN. ECON. 390 (2008).

⁵¹ ORIGINAL STUDY at 745 (Table 2).

⁵² *See supra* Table 2; Restrepo & Subramanian, *supra* note 42, at 1032 (Fig. 2 Panel A) (documenting increased incidence of match rights from approximately 60% in 2003 to 100% by 2015).

In the absence of a match right, a third-party bidder might make a bid with a “short fuse” that cannot be shopped back to the first bidder. But with a match right there is no obvious pathway to success in making an overbid – either the first bidder will match (in which case the third-party has nothing to show for its efforts) or the first bidder will not match (in which case, absent bidder-specific synergies, the third-party has likely overpaid).⁵³ First bidders generally know more about the target than prospective go-shop bidders, because the pre-signing phase, with no “ticking clock,” will invariably be longer than the go-shop period. The match right therefore fuels the winner’s curse problem: In any scenario where a third-party bids and wins, it would know that a better-informed party (namely, the initial bidder) thought that the price was too high.⁵⁴ Looking forward and reasoning back, a third-party would be unlikely to bid.

When the first bidder has an unlimited match right, the only way a third-party will bid is if it believes it can win a bidding contest against the first bidder. That is, the third-party must believe that it can pay more than the full willingness-to-pay of the first bidder, not just the first bidder’s current bid on the table.⁵⁵

The deterrent effect of an unlimited match right is amplified by risk aversion, because the bid on the table is a known quantity while the full willingness-to-pay of the first bidder is an unknown quantity.⁵⁶ Even seemingly innocuous announcements of “synergies” and “fit” can signal to potential third-party bidders about a very high willingness-to-pay.⁵⁷

⁵³ See, e.g., *In re Appraisal of Dell, Inc.*, C.A. No. 9322-VCL (Del. Ch. 2016) at 88 (quoting Subramanian trial testimony at 811) (“[I]n this chess game of M&A, most of these parties being very sophisticated, don’t just think incrementally one step ahead. They’re thinking two, three, four, five moves ahead. Any third party looking at this would say, ‘What is my pathway to success?’ So even if you value this thing at a very high number, you might reasonably say there’s no pathway to success and, therefore, I’m not going to start on this process because there’s no finish line.”).

⁵⁴ See GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, *DEALMAKING: THE NEW STRATEGY OF “NEGOTIAUCTIONS”* (2011), at 172-73 (analyzing the Toys “R” Us LBO, which included a 4% termination fee and a 3-day match right, as follows: “What have you learned if you make a bid in this situation, three days pass, and you win? You’ve learned, three days too late, that some really smart people at KKR, Bain Capital, and Vornado didn’t want to match your offer. The combination of the breakup fee and the so-called matching right meant that winner’s curse concerns ran rampant for a third party considering whether to enter the deal. The potent combination of deal terms effectively shut down the negotiauction for Toys ‘R’ Us.”) (citations omitted).

⁵⁵ See, e.g., *Merion Capital LP v. Lender Processing Services, Inc.*, C.A. No. 9320-VCL (Del. Ch. 2016) ([T]he existence of an incumbent trade bidder holding an unlimited match right was a sufficient deterrent to prevent other parties from perceiving a realistic path to success. Put differently, for another bidder to warrant intervening, the bidder would have had to both (i) value the Company more highly than [the current bid] and (ii) believe that it could outbid [all subsequent bids from the first bidder].”) (citations omitted).

⁵⁶ Restrepo & Subramanian, *supra* note 42, at 1059.

⁵⁷ See, e.g., PRESS RELEASE: MILLARD DREXLER WILL REMAIN AS CHAIRMAN AND CEO AND SIGNIFICANT SHAREHOLDER TRANSACTION VALUED AT \$3.0 BILLION (November 23, 2010) (quoting Carrie Wheeler, Partner of TPG Capital: “We are proud of our 13-year history with

When a first-bidder match right is coupled with second-bidder risk aversion, even the possibility that the first bidder's willingness-to-pay might be large would deter bids.⁵⁸

Our interactions with transactional lawyers over the past decade confirm this analysis: match rights are put in merger agreements not only to give the bidder a relatively leisurely look at any third-party bid (i.e., *ex post* effects), but also to deter third-party bidders from emerging in the first place (*ex ante* effects). This conclusion is also supported by standard economic analysis and game theory. As described by one commentator: “[T]here are no two-handed economists when it comes to the incentives generated by matching rights. Matching rights work to deter subsequent bids when held by an initial bidder.”⁵⁹

To the extent that economic theory should be supplemented with empirical evidence, the horse race can no longer be run because match rights are ubiquitous in M&A deals; therefore, there is no longer any variation in the variable of interest. However, the Original Study was conducted in an era when match rights were not ubiquitous. That study reported six jump bids in a sample of 48 go-shop transactions. Among these six jumped deals, three did not have match rights. Therefore: the jump rate when the initial bidder did not have a match right was 20% (3 out of 15), while the jump rate when the initial bidder did have a match right was 9% (3 out of 33). This would seem to be at least suggestive empirical evidence that match rights deter prospective go-shop bidders. It would also seem difficult to explain the rapid proliferation of match rights if they did not have a substantive effect on deal dynamics.⁶⁰

J.Crew since our investment in the company in 1997 and the success it has achieved ... We are looking forward to working with Mickey and his exceptional team and are excited by the prospect of continuing to expand the business.”); PRESS RELEASE: EXAMWORKS ENTERS INTO DEFINITIVE AGREEMENT TO BE ACQUIRED BY LEONARD GREEN & PARTNERS FOR \$35.05 PER SHARE IN CASH (April 27, 2016) (quoting John Baumer of Leonard Green & Partners: “We are excited to partner with ExamWorks’ management team and organization.”); PRESS RELEASE: QUALITY DISTRIBUTION AGREES TO BE ACQUIRED BY FUNDS ADVISED BY APAX PARTNERS FOR \$16.00 PER SHARE IN ALL CASH (MAY 6, 2015) (“Having followed Quality for several years, we have been impressed with the strategy and vision articulated by the Company’s management team,” said Ashish Karandikar, a Partner on Apax’s Services team. “As the leading logistics platform in the bulk chemical transportation industry, Quality is well positioned to take advantage of both organic growth opportunities and strategic acquisitions while benefiting from the financial and operational flexibility of operating as a private company.”) PRESS RELEASE TEAMHEALTH COMPLETES PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED TRANSACTION WITH BLACKSTONE, CDPQ, PSP INVESTMENTS AND NPS AND BECOMES A PRIVATE COMPANY (February 6, 2017) (quoting Bruce McEvoy, a Senior Managing Director at Blackstone: “TeamHealth has built an industry leading physician services platform that is ideally positioned to enable its hospital partners and clinicians to navigate the evolving healthcare landscape while providing outstanding service to its patients. We are excited to help the Company continue its long track record of organic and acquisition driven growth.”).

⁵⁸ Restrepo & Subramanian, *supra* note 42, at 1060.

⁵⁹ See Brian J.M. Quinn, *Normalizing Match Rights*, HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE, 7, 9 (2010).

⁶⁰ See also PETITIONER’S OPENING POST-TRIAL BRIEF, BLUEBLADE CAPITAL V. NORCRAFT COMPANIES, INC. (August 16, 2017) at 33 (quoting one buy-side deal team member who

The Delaware Chancery Court has endorsed the idea that match rights deter bids. Vice Chancellor Laster has expressed the view that “an unlimited match right . . . is a powerful disincentive,”⁶¹ and Vice Chancellor Slight found in a recent deal that “[the] board did not understand what an unlimited match right was much less how that deal protection might work to hinder the go-shop.”⁶² Vice Chancellor Slight even quoted (with apparent approval) testimony from one of us that “[e]verybody agrees that match rights deter bids. It [is] not even a debated question.”⁶³

While the Delaware Supreme Court has not explicitly rejected the (straightforward) idea that match rights deter bids, the Court has expressed the view that prospective third-party bidders are only deterred when the deal is already fully priced: “If a deal price is at a level where the next upward move by a topping bidder has a material risk of being a self-destructive curse, that suggests the price is already at a level that is fair.”⁶⁴ Under this view, the only time the winner’s curse applies is when the seller has already extracted full value from the first bidder. Therefore, winner’s curse concerns are in fact desirable because they deter prospective third-parties from overpaying for the target.

In fact, this characterization of the winner’s curse is not correct. When an initial bidder has an unlimited match right (which is typical), a potential third-party bidder will not know how many bids it will take to win. This means that a third-party might not bid even if the immediate offer on the table is below fair value. It is simply incorrect that the winner’s curse deters bidders only when the deal price already represents fair value. Sophisticated bidders “look forward and reason back” to identify a pathway to success before bidding in the first place. The Delaware Supreme Court’s apparent tolerance of match rights is inconsistent with basic game theory, conventional wisdom among M&A practitioners, and Chancery Court pronouncements on the same question.

And so we are in the unusual situation in which the Chancery Court is on stronger theoretical and empirical ground, yet the Supreme Court’s view must necessarily prevail. Future case law will hopefully un-muddy the waters on the deterrent effect of match rights. We return to this point in Part III.B below. For present purposes, the more basic point is

observed that “the team at Fortune understood that unlimit[ed] matching rights would discourage potential bidders in a go-shop process.”)

⁶¹ *In re Appraisal of Dell Inc.*, 2016 WL 3186538 at *91 (Del. Ch. 2016) (citations omitted). *See also* *Lender Processing Services*, 2016 WL 7324170, at *25 (“[A]n unlimited match right was a sufficient deterrent to prevent other parties from perceiving a realistic pathway to success.”).

⁶² *Blueblade Capital Opportunities v. Norcraft Companies, Inc.*, C.A. No. 11184-VCS at 58 (Del. Ch. 2018).

⁶³ *Id.* at 57 (quoting Subramanian testimony).

⁶⁴ *Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd.*, 177 A.3d 1, 33 (Del. 2017). *See also* *DELL ORAL ARGUMENT*, transcript at 15 (in which Chief Justice Leo Strine stated: “[I]f you think the next move in a deal dynamic is that the next person who makes the price move will hurt themselves, is what you’re saying that means you’re already at fair value?”. To which Appellants’ counsel Greg Williams responded: “It certainly is.”).

that the proliferation of match rights since the timeframe of the Original Study might provide some of the explanation for the decline in the effectiveness of go-shops.

B. Shorter Go-Shop Windows

Tables 1 and 2 show that the average length of go-shop periods has decreased only slightly over the past decade: from 38.4 calendar days, on average, in 2006-07, down to 36.4 days, on average, in 2010-2018. While some might consider this to be a meaningful decline, particularly when combined with match rights that trigger exclusive negotiating periods, we do not put great weight on this difference in explaining the decline of go-shop effectiveness. Go-shop bidders have always understood that post-signing due diligence is a sprint, not a leisurely stroll. A two-day difference does not change the nature of the sprint in any meaningful way.

Peeling the onion reveals a slightly larger relative decline in go-shop windows for larger deals. In the Original Study, the average length of the go-shop period for deals larger than \$1 billion was 39.2 days, compared to 36.3 days for smaller deals. In the 2010-2018 sample, however, even this modest sensitivity to deal size decreased: the average go-shop window for deals larger than \$1 billion was 37.9 days, compared to 35.5 days for smaller deals. Simple regression analysis confirms that the length of the go-shop window was 23% more sensitive to deal size in the Original Study as in the New Sample.⁶⁵ And in the second half of the New Sample period (2015-2018), the average go-shop window for deals larger than \$1 billion was 35.2 days, which was 2.7 days *shorter* than the average go-shop window for smaller deals.

When go-shop first appeared, practitioners correctly understood that larger deals would require longer go-shop windows in order to have a meaningful post-signing market canvass. This is true for at least two reasons. First, larger companies are more complicated, and require more due diligence. Second, and less obviously, larger deals are more likely to require a consortium bid – either due to diversification requirements for prospective bidders, financing constraints, or just to share the risk of such a massive investment. Of course, arranging a consortium bid takes time. The internal negotiation among the consortium members regarding financing, governance, and exit rights can take weeks or even months, putting aside the time it would take for due diligence on the actual target company.

Practitioners understood these points in the early days of go-shops. A 30-day go-shop window in a \$500 million deal might no longer be appropriate in a \$5 billion deal. But with time, the data shows that practitioners were less likely to adjust to the length of the go-shop window to reflect the complexity of the target company and/or the likelihood of requiring a consortium bid.

In our experience, this is a common development in transactional practice: initial deal technology innovations are built “from scratch,” with little precedent, and therefore are

⁶⁵ Regressing length of go-shop window on the natural log of deal value (in \$ millions), the coefficient for the Original Study was 1.83 while the coefficient for the New Sample is 1.49.

typically tailored to the relevant structural and contextual factors. But over time, these benchmarks provide guideposts, and practitioners who have less experience with the technology will use these guideposts without a full understanding of those structural and contextual factors that motivated them in the first place.⁶⁶ We have observed banker presentations that present “typical” go-shop periods in “benchmark” transactions, with no reference to deal size in those allegedly comparable transactions; we have also observed director testimony relying on such presentations in determining that their particular go-shop was structured appropriately.

Of course, banker ignorance of deal size can be convenient: by presenting benchmark transactions with no reference to deal size, the average length of go-shop periods for larger transactions will naturally move downward, consistent with what we find in our data. Shorter go-shop periods in larger deals means that bankers can deliver a truncated go-shop, and therefore, greater deal certainty, to their buy-side clients. This can be useful even for sell-side bankers, who may have significant buy-side interests.⁶⁷

Delaware courts have sporadically commented on deal size as a relevant factor in determining the appropriate length of a go-shop window. In the Dell management buyout, for example, Vice Chancellor Laster noted that a 45-day go-shop period was longer than average, but potentially not sufficient for a \$26 billion deal.⁶⁸ However, our data indicates that these occasional hints from the Delaware courts have not been sufficient to overcome the one-size-fits-all approach in transactional practice that has emerged over the past decade with respect to the length of go-shop windows. While we do not consider it a major factor, the slight shortening of go-shop windows in larger deals may have contributed at least in part to the overall decline in effectiveness of go-shops over the past decade.

C. CEO Incentives to Discourage Third-Party Bids

The CEO of any public company, of course, has a fiduciary duty to the corporation that he or she runs. In a sale of the company for cash, this means that the CEO must maximize the value that shareholders receive.⁶⁹ But in any transaction, the personal incentives of the CEO can distort or outweigh the CEO’s legal obligations. Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo Strine approvingly quoted one “M&A specialist” as follows:

⁶⁶ See, e.g., *Blueblade Capital v. Norcraft Companies et al.*, C.A. No. 11184-VCS (Del. Ch. July 2018) at 37 (noting that the Citigroup banker who ran Norcraft’s go-shop had never run a go-shop before).

⁶⁷ See *infra* Part II.D.

⁶⁸ *In re Appraisal of Dell, Inc.*, C.A. No. 9322-VCL (Del. Ch. 2016) at 92 (“The main structural problem that Subramanian identified did not result from the terms of the go-shop in the abstract, but rather stemmed from the size and complexity of the Company. The Merger was twenty-five times larger than any transaction in Subramanian’s sample of ‘jumped’ deals, meaning that a successful topping bid literally would have been unprecedented.”).

⁶⁹ *Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes, Inc.* (Del. 1985).

I do not think there has been enough focus on the fact that management has “conflicts” in every M&A deal that happens or doesn't happen. The “conflict” relates to what the “motivation” is of the CEO. Is the CEO selling the company because he or she is approaching retirement and does not want to hand over the reigns to a successor (or wants a payout on change of control)? Or is the CEO resisting a hostile bid because he or she wants to keep running a public company? Or is a friendly stock deal with huge synergies not happening because of the “social issues:” e.g., the CEO will not be running the combined company? So many deals happen or don't happen because of the ego or motivation of the CEO.⁷⁰

Our experience is consistent with this observation. Specifically, in the context of go-shops, we believe that the CEO's incentives to discourage third-party bids may be the single most important explanation for the overall decline in go-shop effectiveness over the past decade. In this Part we document two kinds of distortions: the CEO as net buyer; and the CEO's incentives induced by buy-side compensation.

Not only can these distortions exist exogenously, independent of the deal, but they can be created endogenously as well: that is, PE firms will create financial interests for the CEO as part of the deal, precisely in order to dampen competition during a go-shop process. One PE investor in a Harvard Business School executive education course told one of us that his firm tries to “corrupt” (his word) management whenever possible, to favor his firm over other firms in a sale-of-the-company transaction. While this comment is admittedly anecdotal, it squares with our observation of the PE industry and competitive strategy in general. With PE firms running roughly the same financial models and hiring its associates from the same business schools, how would it be possible to create consistent “alpha” (abnormal returns) for PE limited partners if every deal were subject to full and fair competition from all possible buyers? Professor Michael Porter of the Harvard Business School famously identified the five forces of competition, and observed that “competitive advantage” (which yields sustainable profitability) comes from creating imperfections in the marketplace that dampen one or more of these five forces from working effectively.⁷¹ The same holds true in PE deals. We document the various methods in the remainder of this Part.

1. CEO as Net Buyer

A CEO can be both a seller and a buyer in a PE deal. On the first, a CEO will always hold at least some sell-side equity. This factor is well-understood and courts and commentators often point to the CEOs “skin in the game” as evidence that the CEO's

⁷⁰ “M&A Specialist,” quoted in Leo Strine, *Documenting the Deal: How Quality Control and Candor Can Improve Boardroom Decision-Making and Reduce the Litigation Target Zone*, 70 BUS LAW. 679, 685 n.9 (2015).

⁷¹ MICHAEL E. PORTER, *COMPETITIVE STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING INDUSTRIES AND COMPETITORS* (1980).

interests are aligned with shareholders. In addition, however, the CEO can have buy-side equity, either by “rolling over” sell-side equity and/or receiving equity from the PE partner as part of the deal. This factor can diminish or even outweigh the CEO’s alignment with his own shareholders.

As the deal price goes up, the CEO gets more money for his shares as a seller, but he also pays more for the shares as a buyer. The CEO’s overall financial incentive will depend on whether he is a net buyer or net seller of his company’s stock in the transaction.⁷² Net sellers will generally want a higher price, all else equal, while net buyers generally will generally want a lower price. For example, a CEO who rolls over his entire stake and then contributes additional equity capital on the buy-side is a net buyer of shares in the transaction. This CEO would have an incentive to keep the price down because he is a net buyer.

This analysis has implications for the CEO’s receptivity to engage with potential third-party bidders during a go-shop process. If the CEO is a net buyer in the transaction, the CEO will have personal financial incentives to discourage overbids, which push the price up. A well-advised CEO would of course make representations of being willing to work with prospective go-shop bidders, but these representations will have limited credibility when the CEO is a net buyer.⁷³ And if the CEO is valuable for the ongoing value of the enterprise, no go-shop bidder would want to partner with a reluctant CEO.

For this reason, prospective go-shop participants are caught in a Catch-22: without partnering with the CEO, they do not realize the value that comes from such partnership, but partnering with a reluctant CEO may destroy the very value that prospective bidders are seeking to achieve in the first place. Recognizing this problem, they will rationally be deterred from bidding. The magnitude of the deterrent effect will depend on the magnitude of the value that the CEO and management bring to the table, as well as the magnitude of the CEO’s financial incentive on the buy-side of the transaction.

Management buyouts (MBOs) can present the most extreme version of the net buyer problem, because management invariably will become a major shareholder on the buy-

⁷² Guhan Subramanian, *Deal Process Design in Management Buyouts*, 130 HARV. L. REV. 590, 624-629 (2016).

⁷³ Cooperation commitments with senior managers typically only require them to work with the board and/or Special Committee to facilitate due diligence, and to consider working with all potential buyers. *See, e.g.*, J.CREW GROUP, INC. COOPERATION AGREEMENT (Form 8-K) Ex. 2.2, at 1 (Nov. 23, 2010) (requiring CEO Mickey Drexler’s “[1] participation in meetings, presentations, due diligence sessions and other sessions with persons interested in making a takeover proposal; [2] assistance in the preparation of solicitation materials, offering documents and similar documents to be used in connection with such efforts; and [3] cooperation and assistance in obtaining any consents, waivers, approvals and authorizations for and in connection with any takeover proposal.”); HCA, INC. DEFINITIVE PROXY STATEMENT (Schedule 14A) (Oct. 17, 2006) at 15 (“As instructed by the special committee, the management discussions were conditioned on management’s agreement that it would not commit to be exclusive to the sponsors, and accordingly would be available to enter into similar discussions and arrangements with any subsequent bidder for the Company.”).

side. In earlier work, one of us quantified the net buyer problem for Michael Dell in the management buyout of Dell, Inc. In that deal Mr. Dell rolled over his entire 16% equity stake into the new company; in addition he contributed \$750 million of new equity on the buy side.⁷⁴ Therefore, Mr. Dell was a net buyer of shares, which means he would have a financial incentive to push the deal price down rather than up.

Some numbers highlight the magnitude of the problem. If (hypothetical) deal price increases over Mr. Dell's initial bid of \$13.65 per share were funded proportionally with debt and equity so as to keep the overall leverage unchanged, our calculations indicated that each dollar increase in the deal price would cost Michael Dell an additional \$263 million.⁷⁵ If instead an overbid was funded entirely with equity, each dollar increase in the deal price would cost Michael Dell an additional \$1.1 billion.⁷⁶ If instead Michael Dell kept his equity commitment the same and his PE partner (Silver Lake) contributed the additional equity, he would lose voting control at any deal price above \$15.70.⁷⁷ For example, at a \$20/share deal price, he would own 28% of the post-MBO company – far less than the 75% controlling interest that he held under the original deal structure.

Regardless of what lever was pulled, any overbid structured similarly to the Dell/Silver Lake Offer (i.e., with Michael Dell as a net buyer of shares) could only cost him more. Foreseeing all of this, third-party bidders considering an overbid would understand that Michael Dell would be a reluctant partner in their bid. Not surprisingly, no overbids emerged during the 45-day go-shop period.

Sometimes the net buyer aspect of the deal is not even disclosed to shareholders. In the buyout of Fresh Market by Apollo Global Management, for example, the company did not disclose that founder and CEO Ray Berry had an agreement to roll over all of his shares into an Apollo-sponsored transaction as early as October 2015, a full six months before the deal was announced in March 2016. Instead, the Schedule 14D-9 only stated that Mr. Berry “would consider” such a rollover.⁷⁸ The Schedule 14D-9 also did not disclose the degree to which Mr. Berry was disinclined to work with other potential PE buyers. Putting these points together: Mr. Berry preferred a deal with Apollo, was indifferent to the price Apollo paid (because of his 100% rollover), and did not want to work with other buyers. Not surprisingly (like Dell), no other buyers for Fresh Market emerged during the 25-day go-shop period.

Fresh Market shareholders brought suit challenging the transaction for inadequate disclosures, but the Delaware Chancery Court (surprisingly, in our opinion) granted the defendants' motion to dismiss.⁷⁹ In June 2018, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Chancery Court's dismissal, agreeing with the plaintiffs that Mr. Berry's buy-side financial

⁷⁴ In re Appraisal of Dell, Inc., C.A. No. 9322-VCL (Del. Ch. 2016) at 96.

⁷⁵ Subramanian, *supra* note 72, at 627.

⁷⁶ *Id.*

⁷⁷ *Id.*

⁷⁸ FRESH MARKET INC. SCHEDULE 14D-9 at 17 (March 25, 2016).

⁷⁹ Morrison v. Berry, C.A. No. 12808-VCG (Del. Ch. 2017).

interests were material and not adequately disclosed.⁸⁰ The case is currently pending in the Delaware Chancery Court.

While Fresh Market's inadequate disclosures were pursued by dogged plaintiffs' attorneys, one wonders how many CEOs have softer undisclosed commitments that give them significant post-closing buy-side interests. In prior work, one of us finds that management was net buyers or neutral in 10 out of 41 (24%) MBO transactions announced between 2006 and 2015.⁸¹ The Fresh Market example suggests that this 24% figure might underestimate the degree to which CEOs have buy-side interests that outweigh their sell-side interests. These interests, of course, would make the go-shop period less meaningful as a mechanism for price discovery, because management would have financial incentives to *not* find a higher bidder.

2. CEO Incentives Induced by Buy-Side Compensation

The prior Part focuses on the subset of PE deals in which management rolls over or buys so much equity as to become a net buyer in the transaction. The Fresh Market transaction suggests that observable "net buyer" situations may underestimate the number of PE deals where this happens, but the analysis in the prior Part still applies to only a subset of all PE deals. In this Part, we focus on a factor that we believe is far more pervasive, namely, the CEO's incentives induced by buy-side compensation.

In most PE deals, the PE firm will want to retain management, at least initially. The "disciplinary" takeovers of the 1980s, which were motivated by the idea of removing underperforming management, are not common today.⁸² In fact, many PE firms advertise (publicly or privately) their general practice of retaining management, presumably as a way of inducing management to come to the table in the first place.⁸³ The PE firm cannot

⁸⁰ Morrison v. Berry, 2018 WL 3339992 (Del. July 9, 2018).

⁸¹ Subramanian, *supra* note 72, at 627. This prior work also reports that when management are net buyers the prices paid to target shareholders are significantly lower than when management are net sellers. *See id.* at 627-629

⁸² Wayne Mikkelson & Megan Partch, *The Decline of Takeovers and Disciplinary Managerial Turnover*, 44 J. FIN. ECON. 205 (1997); Peter Lattman & Dana Cimilluca, *Court Faults Buyouts*, WALL ST. J. (July 12, 2007) ("The issues raised by Mr. Strine differ from the legal concerns that emerged with the buyout boom of the 1980s. That era was marked by so-called corporate raiders. They offered shareholders rich premiums for their companies and vowed to remove existing management and boards. In those deals, Delaware courts examined shareholder allegations that company management and boards had rejected rich, hostile bids to keep their jobs. In the current buyout craze, many buyout firms retain the management by offering rich pay packages and a stake in the newly private entity.") available at <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB118420528127564278>.

⁸³ *See, e.g.*, LEONARD GREEN & PARTNERS HOME PAGE ("Our firm partners with experienced management teams and often with founders to invest in market-leading companies."), available at <http://www.leonardgreen.com/>; ACCEL-KKR – APPROACH ("Accel-KKR partners with management teams to accelerate organic growth and take advantage of targeted M&A opportunities."), available at <https://www.accel-kkr.com/approach/>; BAIN CAPITAL PRIVATE

formally negotiate employment agreements with management until the major terms for the shareholders are worked out.⁸⁴ But the PE firm will invariably give guidance early in the process as to what their typical compensation package for the CEO and senior management looks like.⁸⁵

Management, in turn, will often investigate a PE firm's track record for management compensation soon after initiating conversations about selling the company. What they will discover will generally please them. Academic research shows that PE buyouts, on average, double management's equity stake in the company.⁸⁶ This means that a successful PE buyout can create "generational wealth" – in contrast to just everyday wealth – for the CEO and top management team. In our observation, management will quickly understand this, and/or an initial PE buyer will make it known, very early in the conversation.

The structure of this compensation is critically important. PE buyers will invariably tie management's post-buyout compensation to their own financial return.⁸⁷ Before the

EQUITY HOME PAGE ("Our globally integrated teams leverage deep vertical expertise and partner with management teams around the world to accelerate growth.") available at <https://www.baincapitalprivateequity.com/>; TPG INVESTMENTS HOME PAGE ("TPG Capital Partners makes both control and minority equity investments in partnership with proven managers in manufacturing and business services companies with revenues generally between \$15 million and \$50 million.") available at <https://tpginvestments.com/>; VECTOR CAPITAL – INVESTMENT SOLUTIONS ("We partner with management teams and align incentives to transform businesses and create value.") available at <https://www.vectorcapital.com/about#investment-solutions>.

⁸⁴ See ORIGINAL STUDY at 757.

⁸⁵ See, e.g., EXAMWORKS PROXY STATEMENT (June 23, 2016) at 42 (noting that the PE buyer, Leonard Green Partners, raised with certain ExamWorks officers the "typical structure of rollover arrangements in LGP's transactions, particularly as related to certain members of management" on April 5, 2016, four weeks after LGP's initial indication of interest and three weeks before the deal was finalized and announced).

⁸⁶ See, e.g., Steve Kaplan, *The Effects of Management Buyouts on Operating Performance and Value*, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 217-54 (1989) at 220 (finding that the equity holdings of the management team increase from a median of 5.88% to 22.63%); Chris J. Muscarella, & Michael B. Vetsuypens, *Efficiency and Organizational Structure in Reverse LBOs*, 45 J. FIN. 1389-1413 (1990) at 1395 (finding post-acquisition, "officers and directors of these firms had a mean (median) ownership of 62.3% (58.0%), nearly double the pre-buyout level"); Phillip Leslie & Paul Oyer, *Managerial Incentives and Value Creation: Evidence from Private Equity*, NBER WORKING PAPER (2013) at 2. See also PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS, GREATER SHARING—EVEN GREATER EXPECTATIONS: PWC'S 2016 PRIVATE EQUITY PORTFOLIO COMPANY MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION SURVEY (2016) at 2 (median pool size for managers in PE-backed companies had increased from 10% to 12%, between 2010 and 2016, in addition to time-based and performance-based compensation).

⁸⁷ See, e.g., PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS, GREATER SHARING—EVEN GREATER EXPECTATIONS: PWC'S 2016 PRIVATE EQUITY PORTFOLIO COMPANY MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION SURVEY (2016) at 4 (reporting that 83% of PE-backed companies in their

financial crisis of 2008-09, the most common metric was Internal Rate of Return (IRR). IRR implicitly pushes the performance bar higher every year. For example, if the PE firm requires a 15% IRR in order for management to receive significant performance-based pay,⁸⁸ and if management has a 0% return in Year 1, it must achieve a 32.3% return in Year 2 to “catch up” to a 15% IRR across the two years.⁸⁹ For this reason, IRR is a demanding metric. If the company underperforms for the first few years after the buyout, management’s financial incentives based on IRR might become impossible to achieve. This is exactly what happened during the financial crisis: management incentives based on IRR went significantly “underwater.” This is of course not a good outcome for managers; but it also does not serve PE firms’ long-term interests because managers no longer have significant financial incentives to perform well.

Perhaps in response to this experience, the most common metric for management compensation in the aftermath of the financial crisis shifted from IRR to Multiple of Invested Capital (MOIC).⁹⁰ MOIC is a much more forgiving metric than IRR, because it represents a fixed hurdle, rather than a bar that goes up every year. For example, if the PE firm requires a 2.0x MOIC in order for management to receive significant performance-based pay,⁹¹ management could have 2-3 bad years and still have some chance of delivering a 2.0x MOIC on exit. The main question for management is not *if* the MOIC multiple will be achieved, but *when*.

This difference between IRR and MOIC has implications for management’s incentives in the deal. While management might reasonably view IRR-based compensation as speculative, they are far more likely to factor MOIC-based compensation into their decision-making at the buyout stage. This means that managers in PE-backed companies can have a financial incentive to keep the deal price *low*, because a lower deal price increases the MOIC on exit.

sample tied a portion of management compensation to the company’s performance). Among these companies, 70% used exit-based performance metrics such as the multiple on invested capital (MOIC) or internal rate of return (IRR). *Id.* at 5.

⁸⁸ *See id.* at 5 (“[C]ompanies with IRR performance metrics generally allow for partial vesting at 15% and maximum vesting only when a return of 25% is achieved.”).

⁸⁹ Calculated as: $1.15 * 1.15 - 1$.

⁹⁰ *See* MELISSA HENDERSON, FINANCIAL STRATEGIES AND INCENTIVES FOR THE PORTFOLIO COMPANY MANAGEMENT TEAM (March 9, 2016) (“Choosing the right performance metric is essential to align the incentives of private equity Operating Partners and C Suite leadership. Before 2008, private equity firms were more likely to use internal rate of return (IRR) metrics. Following the financial crisis which resulted in longer holding periods and lower IRR, there was a shift to using a Multiple of Invested Capital (MOIC) metric as the primary return measure.”), available at <http://summitexecutiveresources.com/blog/financial-strategies-and-incentives-for-the-portfolio-company-management-team/>.

⁹¹ *See* PWC STUDY at 5 (“[F]or companies with MOIC plans, vesting may begin with a MOIC of 2.0x, but maximum vesting does not occur unless a MOIC of 3.0x is achieved.”).

Consider a typical compensation structure in a PE deal, in which management buy-side equity vests 1/3 each at MOIC multiples of 2.0, 2.5, and 3.0x. If the deal price goes up through the go-shop process, management would face two competing financial effects: (1) they would receive more on the shares they sold into the deal; but (2) the increase in the sale price would cause the PE firm's MOIC on exit to go down (because the sale price is the "IC" of MOIC, i.e., it represents the denominator of MOIC). This second effect would reduce the likelihood that management would achieve the requisite MOIC thresholds. In particular, by pushing the deal price up, the expected MOIC would go down, which means that management would have a lower likelihood of achieving the MOIC thresholds that trigger the vesting of their equity. Economic modeling (on file with the authors) indicates that this is a first-order effect: the buy-side incentives to keep the deal price *down* (which drives the MOIC at exit *up*) dominate the sell-side incentives to maximize value for the exiting shareholders. Management's economic interest, then, directly conflicts with the interests of their shareholders.

This effect has gone unnoticed by prior commentators,⁹² yet empirical evidence and practitioner anecdotes seem to indicate that it is commonplace if not ubiquitous in PE deals. The effect has obvious implications for management's receptivity to engage with third-party bidders. Specifically, management will have personal financial incentives to discourage overbids, which would push the purchase price up. The (hypothetical) overbidder might not offer management the same "generational wealth" financial incentives as the initial PE buyer; or the initial buyer might exercise its match right, which would drive the price up and the MOIC on exit down. Because senior managers are central to the due diligence process, they can easily deter prospective third-parties in subtle (and not so subtle) ways.

PE firms, in general, are sophisticated investors. As Delaware Chief Justice Leo Strine would say, they did not just fall off "the proverbial turnip truck."⁹³ They are no doubt

⁹² In prior work, one of us has observed the "net buyer" effect that can create perverse effects for management in MBOs. See Subramanian, *supra* note 72, at 624-629. The analysis here expands this prior work by indicating how the perverse effect is not limited to net-buyer situations and is not limited to MBOs. In general, economists tend to focus on whether management had a larger aggregate equity interest on the sell-side or the buy-side. But the correct question, for purposes of determining management's financial incentives in the deal, is this: would management benefit or lose from increasing the deal price? That is, economists focus on the stock of assets held on the sell-side and the buy-side (a static analysis), when the correct analysis would focus on the marginal impact on those assets from increases in the deal price (a dynamic analysis).

⁹³ See, e.g., *Sodano v. American Stock Exchange LLC*, No. 3418-VCS, 2008 WL 2738583, *12 (Del. Ch., July 15, 2008) ("Sodano would have had to have fallen off the proverbial turnip truck to have given up his right to advancement from the NASD at that point. And doing so would have been a big deal to both Sodano and the NASD. The evidence does not support such a momentous event.") (Strine, V.C.); *Milford Power Co., LLC v. PDC Milford Power LLC*, 866 A.2d 738 (Del. Ch. 2004) ("To a judge who handles a lot of business cases, the picture that is painted seems intuitively implausible. It presupposes that El Paso, which had put up substantial

aware that their MOIC-based compensation structure helps them (in the words of the PE executive education participant) “corrupt” management. While every deal is different, PE investors typically anticipate a 15-20% annualized return, which translates into a 2.3 to 3.0 MOIC on exit.⁹⁴ It is no coincidence that the typical vesting triggers for management compensation are right around the same levels. In effect, PE firms position their equity package at the edge of a cliff (in the form of a MOIC thresholds), knowing that if management raised the deal price even slightly through an overbid they would materially impair the expected value of their incentive packages.

In an article in *Buyouts* magazine entitled “Slicing Up the Pie: The Role of Incentive Equity in Winning Deals,” the PE practice leaders at Goodwin Procter LLP recommend that PE firms should structure their management equity incentive plans to “help . . . convince a CEO or founder to choose its proposal over competing bids.”⁹⁵ Although they do not get to the level of detail presented in this Article, the authors offer specific examples of how PE firms can structure management compensation to appeal to managers. Notably absent from Goodwin Procter’s analysis is any reference to what the exiting shareholders receive in the deal.⁹⁶

We close this Part with a general observation. The Original Study observed that:

While the data suggests a positive overall assessment of go-shops from the perspective of target shareholders, there is cause for concern in the subset of go-shops in which current management is part of the buyout group. The fact that no higher bidder has emerged in a go-shop MBO to date . . . suggests that third parties may be wary of entering a bidding contest, or that

cash equity and which owned a 95% interest in Milford Power, made a completely irrational decision to not only give up its interest but to pay additional cash to do so, even though the power plant had a sale value that would easily pay off the debt and produce a huge upside. In fact, in its papers, PDC argues that its 5% interest was worth \$9 million. When I asked for clarification, I was told that this was the value assuming a full pay off of the over \$250 million owed to the Lenders. If that is true, PDC is alleging that Milford Power has an enterprise value of \$430 million and therefore that El Paso had, in fact, fallen off the proverbial turnip truck before it decided to exit its investment in Milford Power.”) (Strine, V.C.).

⁹⁴ Assuming typical PE exit after 6 years, $1.15^6 = 2.3$; $1.20^6 = 3.0$.

⁹⁵ JOHN LECLAIRE, MIKE KENDALL & CHRIS NUGENT, SLICING UP THE PIE: THE ROLE OF INCENTIVE EQUITY IN WINNING DEALS, REUTERS BUYOUTS (Mar. 10, 2014).

⁹⁶ *Id.* (“[A]ssume that two sponsors are bidding to acquire a company, which we’ll call ‘Hotco.’ Sponsor A offers a basic, time-vesting incentive plan that entitles the management team to 8 percent of any increase in the equity value of Hotco over Sponsor A’s investment amount. Sponsor B offers an incentive plan that entitles the management team to 6 percent of increases in equity value under time-based vesting, plus an additional 3.5 percent, 3.0 percent and 2.5 percent if and when the sponsor realizes cash-on-cash returns of 2x, 3x and 4x, respectively. . . . If you were Hotco’s CEO, which would you favor?”).

bankers might not conduct as thorough and energetic a search, when management has already picked its preferred buyout partner.⁹⁷

The analysis presented in this Part indicates that the “cause for concern” is not limited to MBOs, where management holds significant buy-side equity. It can also include situations where PE firms structure management compensation to achieve the same result. In the timeframe of the Original Study, the primary compensation metric was IRR. IRR was an unforgiving metric, and so management might reasonably have viewed IRR-based compensation as potential “upside” in the deal, but not something that should drive decision-making. In the New Sample, however, the primary metric has shifted from the unforgiving IRR to the much more tolerant MOIC. Our analysis indicates that this form of compensation can swamp management’s sell-side interests. To use the economics terminology, the “high-powered incentives” of MOIC-based buy-side compensation can dominate the “low-powered incentives” of sell-side equity.⁹⁸

The result is that management is, in effect, nearly always a *de facto* net buyer. The concern expressed in the Original Study regarding MBOs is far more pervasive today. Management in PE deals no longer wants overbids because it hurts them financially. The “For Sale” sign that Robert Friedman from Blackstone described in 2008⁹⁹ has turned into a “Go Away” sign due to management’s financial incentives. Chief Justice Strine’s observation quoted at the beginning of this Part rings even more true once the mask is pulled back on management compensation in PE deals.¹⁰⁰ We believe that this phenomenon presents an important explanation for the significant decline in go-shop jump-rates in our timeframe of analysis.¹⁰¹

⁹⁷ ORIGINAL STUDY at 756-757.

⁹⁸ See Edward P. Lazear, *The Power of Incentives*, 90 AMER. ECON. REV. 401 (2000) (describing “high-powered” and “low-powered” incentives).

⁹⁹ ORIGINAL STUDY at 750.

¹⁰⁰ See *supra* note 70.

¹⁰¹ While this Part has focused on the top managers’ financial interests, qualitative CEO interests can diminish the effectiveness of a go-shop as well. For example, in the 2015 sale of Norcraft, Inc., the buyer (Fortune Brands) gave assurances to the seller’s CEO (Mark Buller) that they would negotiate the sale of the Canadian division of the company (called Urban Effects) back to him post-closing. See PETITIONER’S OPENING POST-TRIAL BRIEF, BLUEBLADE CAPITAL V. NORCRAFT COMPANIES, INC. (August 16, 2017) at 22 (“On March 25, Reilly e-mailed Buller that ‘[Klein] is going to offer to provide you some meaningful comfort around Canada.’ . . . On March 27, Buller e-mailed that he ‘[g]ot good comfort on [Norcraft Canada].’ That same day, Reilly e-mailed that Buller: ‘will live with a trust me I will sell Canada to you.’”). See also SUBRAMANIAN NORCRAFT TRIAL DEMONSTRATIVES at 30 (quoting email: “Buller had a call with Chris Klein . . . Klein reiterated Canada and it was a good call.”). Clearly, Mr. Buller would not be interested to sell to a go-shop bidder, even if it could offer significantly more, because that bidder might not provide the same assurances regarding the sale back of the Canadian division. Not surprisingly, no bidders emerged during the 35-day go-shop period. The Delaware Chancery Court determined that the overall deal process was “shambolic,” see

3. Absence of Special Committees

In corporate law, it is well-understood that special committees can cleanse conflicts of interest.¹⁰² In the context of a sale of control, the board can appoint a special committee, typically consisting 2-4 independent directors, to negotiate and recommend (or not) the terms of the deal to the full board. In our New Sample, the board formed a Special Committee in 59% of deals. In the remaining 41%, the CEO typically would lead the negotiation with potential buyers. The logic, presumably, is that the CEO does not have a conflict of interest as long as the CEO is not rolling over shares or receiving buy-side equity. To the contrary, the CEO is thought to be highly motivated to get the highest possible price, because he or she will have sell-side equity that goes up in value as the deal price goes up.

Our analysis indicates that this logic is flawed. Even if CEOs are not getting buy-side equity, CEOs are generally conflicted because of their MOIC-based buy-side compensation. This conflict is generally known from the outset, because the PE firm will typically announce its intention to retain management in its initial approach to the company. Our analysis indicates that when the board receives such an indication of interest, the board should form a special committee to cleanse the perverse interests created by MOIC-based compensation.¹⁰³ Yet our data indicates that 40% of boards do not.

To the extent that the prospective buyer needs access to management in order to conduct due diligence, such meetings should be “chaperoned,” typically by outside counsel.¹⁰⁴ And even in chaperoned meetings, the board should prohibit management from discussing their own employment arrangements until the Special Committee has reached an agreement in principle on behalf of shareholders. These procedural safeguards are intended to cleanse the taint of conflict in the deal, in order to ensure that shareholders receive the benefit of an arms-length negotiation and a fair price.

By failing to cleanse management’s conflict of interest, boards permit managers to pursue their own interests. In particular, management will often have incentives to discourage third-party bidders, who might not assure them of employment, might not have given them large compensation packages post-closing, and/or might cause the deal price to go up, which (if the initial PE buyer matches) would cause the MOIC at exit to go down.

Blueblade Capital Opportunities v. Norcraft Co. Inc., C.A. No. 11184-VCS, at 63 (Del. Ch. 2018), and that the 35-day go-shop process was ineffective for price discovery, in part because of Mr. Buller’s undisclosed interest to acquire Norcraft Canada, *see id.* at 65-66.

¹⁰² *See* Subramanian, *supra* note 72, at 631-634.

¹⁰³ It does not matter whether management actually receive MOIC-based compensation. What is relevant is what top managers expect to receive, either through their discussions with the PE buyers or their general awareness of the structure of PE compensation, when they are negotiating the deal.

¹⁰⁴ Subramanian, *supra* note 72, at 640.

D. Banker Effects

Investment bankers regularly have conflicts of interest. Rob Kindler, Global Head of Mergers & Acquisitions and Vice Chairman of Morgan Stanley, once famously acknowledged: “We are all totally conflicted — get used to it.”¹⁰⁵ Senior practitioners sometimes observe an inflection point in investment banker behavior in the mid-1990s, when many of the larger investment banks went public.¹⁰⁶ Before, some claim, bankers perceived that they had a professional obligation to render unbiased advice to their client, similar to (in theory, at least) doctors, lawyers, and other professionals. But after banks went public, the profit-seeking motive supplanted professional obligations.

Investment bankers particularly value their PE firm clients, because PE firms are repeat-players in the deal marketplace, and therefore generate enormous fees. Even a large and acquisitive public company might do one or two significant deals a year. A PE firm, between acquisitions and divestitures, might do five. The implication is that, while investment bankers regularly have conflicts of interest (as Mr. Kindler admits) these conflicts can be particularly pronounced in PE deals.

In the context of go-shops, investment banker conflicts can manifest themselves in at least two ways, one on each side of the table. First, the sell-side investment banker, whose job is to run the go-shop process, might have incentives to *not* find a higher bidder, in order to please their “real” client, the PE buyer. Second, the buy-side investment banker, trying particularly hard to please their (real) PE buyer client, might discourage prospective go-shop bidders from participating in the go-shop process. The remainder of this Part describes each of these in turn. The net effect, consistent with the overall empirical evidence presented in this Article, is that go-shops will be less meaningful as a mechanism for price discovery.

1. Conflicts With Buy-Side Clients

Sell-side investment bankers typically receive a 1-2% fee for their work, with the percentage fee generally going down as the deal size goes up.¹⁰⁷ The fee is calculated as a percentage of deal value, so if the deal price goes up, the banker’s fee goes up. In theory, this pay arrangement aligns the bankers with the goal of maximizing shareholder value. In practice, however, the upside from finding a higher go-shop bidder is trivially small: for example, a 10% overbid during a go-shop process (which is a typical overbid) would yield a 0.15% higher fee for the investment bank.¹⁰⁸ In a billion dollar deal this standard overbid during the go-shop process would add \$1.5 million to the bankers’ fee.

¹⁰⁵ Quoted in Andrew Ross Sorkin, *Conflicted, and Often Getting a Pass*, NEW YORK TIMES DEALBOOK (Mar.12, 2012), available at <https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/03/12/conflicted-and-often-getting-a-pass/>.

¹⁰⁶ Alan Morrison & William Wilhelm, *The Demise of Investment Banking Partnerships: Theory and Evidence*, 63 J. FIN. 311 (2008)

¹⁰⁷ M&A FEE GUIDE 2017, FIRMEX AND DIVESTOPEDIA (2017).

¹⁰⁸ Using a typical banker fee of 1.5% of deal value, $1.5\% * 10\% = 0.15\%$.

Compared to this small amount of upside opportunity on the sell-side, investment bankers would no doubt consider their future potential relationship with their PE firm buyer. This buy-side interest can easily swamp any interest that the bank might have on the sell side. Consider, for example, the 2016 buyout of ExamWorks by Leonard Green Partners (LGP), a well-known PE firm. Goldman Sachs, the banker for the seller, had received \$53 million in fees from LGP in the prior two years.¹⁰⁹ Goldman received four times less – \$13 million – for its sell-side work on ExamWorks.¹¹⁰ It would be reasonable for Goldman to believe that it would continue to receive fees from LGP if it did a “good job” on the ExamWorks deal, in which a “good job” would mean not finding a higher bidder during the go-shop period.

The ExamWorks Proxy Statement acknowledged Goldman’s conflict of interest, but dismissed it because Evercore, another investment bank, was also involved as an advisor to the company.¹¹¹ But this reliance on Evercore to cleanse the Goldman Sachs conflict was also unwarranted because of Evercore’s own conflict of interest. William Shutzer was a director of ExamWorks and a Senior Managing Director at Evercore at the time of the deal. In the final deal, Mr. Shutzer contributed \$11 million of his own money on the buy side.¹¹² Mr. Shutzer also continued on the board as a director of ExamWorks post-closing, for which he would naturally receive board fees.¹¹³ While running the go-shop, therefore, the Evercore bankers would have known that: (a) Mr. Shutzer, their Senior Managing Director, was making an \$11 million investment on the buy-side, alongside LGP; (b) Mr. Shutzer might not have the opportunity to make the same investment if Evercore found a higher bidder during the go-shop period; and (c) Evercore stood to receive a \$13 million fee in part because Mr. Shutzer’s \$11 million investment helped finance the deal. To the extent that the Evercore bankers were trying to please (or thank) their Senior Managing Director, they too would want the LGP deal to close, which would mean *not* finding a higher bidder. These incentives were in direct conflict with the interests of the ExamWorks shareholders. Consistent with this analysis, no higher bidder emerged during the 35-day go-shop period.

As the ExamWorks example illustrates, sell-side investment banker conflicts of interest can be subtle and complex. But in our experience observing numerous deals, they are

¹⁰⁹ EXAMWORKS PROXY STATEMENT (June 23, 2016) at 68 (disclosing fees “for financial advisory and/or underwriting services provided to Leonard Green and its affiliates and portfolio companies of approximately \$53.2 million in the aggregate”).

¹¹⁰ *Id.* (disclosing fees “for its services in connection with the proposed merger an aggregate fee currently estimated to be approximately \$13,080,000”).

¹¹¹ *Id.* at 41 (“The Board also determined that while Goldman Sachs had been involved in transactions with LGP or its affiliates in the last two years, those engagements should not impact a Company transaction with LGP and even were that not the case, any potential conflict would be mitigated by, among other things, Evercore’s involvement in the transaction.”).

¹¹² *Id.* at G-24 (disclosing rollover investors).

¹¹³ *Id.* at 7 (noting “the expectation that Mr. Shutzer will serve as a director of the surviving company”);

commonplace if not ubiquitous – we concur with Mr. Kindler’s candid statement that “[w]e are all totally conflicted.” Even in situations where sell-side advisors do not have ongoing relationships with the PE firm buyer, as Goldman did in the case of LGP, sell-side advisors will certainly be aware of the possibility of future business. Bankers regularly keep lists of “possible,” “likely,” and “highly likely” prospective future clients. PE firms are generally very high on their list.¹¹⁴ Therefore, even though their formal obligation is to the sell-side, as a practical matter the sell-side bankers may have strong allegiances to the buy-side. An important manifestation of this effect would be reduced effectiveness of go-shop processes.

2. Interference with Go-Shop Process

Investment bankers can also distort go-shop processes from the buy-side, by interfering with prospective go-shop bidders. Zealous investment bankers, trying to please their high-rolling PE clients, would have strong incentives to deter prospective third-party bidders as much as possible. In the Fortune Brands acquisition of Norcraft, for example, Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) advised Fortune. Although Fortune Brands was a strategic buyer, not a PE firm (and therefore the deal is not included in the New Sample), Fortune was highly-acquisitive, which means the same repeat-buyer dynamic was at play.¹¹⁵

Robert Biggart, the Fortune Brands General Counsel, testified at trial that his CEO, Christopher Klein, did not like the fact that the merger agreement provided Norcraft a 35-day go-shop:

[Chris Klein] really didn't like the go-shop provision. . . . [H]e wanted to buy the company. And he didn't see how it [the go-shop] was in his interest. . . I spent a lot of time explaining to him that we needed to do the go-shop on this thing. Not because it was helping Fortune Brands, but it . . . allowed the Norcraft board to satisfy their fiduciary duties. . . I spent a lot of time convincing Mr. Klein. He didn't like the idea. He didn't want to be embarrassed, because once you announce the deal -- he's the CEO. He didn't like the idea that he could have potentially been embarrassed and somebody else could have bought it out from under him.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁴ LILY FANG, VICTORIA IVASHINA, & JOSHUA LERNER, UNSTABLE EQUITY?: COMBINING BANKING WITH PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTING, HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL WORKING PAPER (2010) (“The major independent private equity groups are ‘fantastic’ clients for the major banks due the frequent loan syndication, underwriting, and placement business they generate, so keeping these entities happy is important.”).

¹¹⁵ See MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS HISTORY, FORTUNE BRANDS (March 2017) (providing a timeline of Fortune Brands’ M&A transactions).

¹¹⁶ NORCRAFT TRIAL TESTIMONY, transcript at 135-136.

RBC, no doubt, understood that their client did not like the go-shop, and therefore took the unusual step of discouraging prospective go-shop bidders, in order to make the go-shop as ineffective as possible:

RBC to Mr. Klein: “We’ve [already] spoken to several private equity firms (Onex, AEA, American Securities).”

Mr. Klein to RBC: “The trick . . . is not to make Norcraft sound very interesting for [prospective bidders],” and to “shut[] the door on them and their willingness to look at it.”

RBC to Mr. Klein: “We are on the same page. . . .”¹¹⁷

Mr. Biggart later testified that “[T]here’s no way a banker should be doing this. . . . Chris [Klein] had a lapse in judgment.”¹¹⁸ Fortune’s CFO Lee Wyatt agreed: “[M]y view was I wouldn’t do this for multiple reasons, one of which is it’s probably not appropriate.”¹¹⁹ In reviewing the overall “shambolic” process in the sale of Norcraft, the Delaware Chancery Court described it as well: “In an effort to ensure that Fortune would reap the benefits of its hard-fought bargain, RBC and Klein devised a strategy to dissuade potentially interested parties from engaging with Norcraft [during the go-shop period]. . . . When Fortune’s general counsel, Biggart, learned of this correspondence, he nearly had ‘a heart attack in [his] office.’”¹²⁰

Notwithstanding the after-the-fact hand-wringing, it is not clear what law (or even norm) Fortune Brands violated by interfering with Norcraft’s go-shop process. Absent any prohibition, overzealous bankers, trying to please their high-roller PE clients, might readily engage in such behavior. We have no systematic evidence on how pervasive the phenomenon of buy-side banker interference is. But we do know that it exists, that there are no obvious impediments to its proliferation, and that it would be difficult to detect in the absence of litigation. This phenomenon would again diminish the effectiveness of go-shops as a mechanism for price discovery.

E. Collateral Terms

Finally, we observe that the structure of the go-shop can sometimes reduce its effectiveness as a mechanism for price discovery. The structuring impediments are rarely found in individual terms – rather, it is the interaction of the various terms, rather than any particular term on its own, that reduces the effectiveness of the go-shop.¹²¹

¹¹⁷ *Quoted in* SUBRAMANIAN NORCRAFT TRIAL DEMONSTRATIVES at 21.

¹¹⁸ *Id.*

¹¹⁹ *Id.*

¹²⁰ *Blueblade Capital Opportunities v. Norcraft Co. Inc.*, C.A. No. 11184-VCS, at 39-40.

¹²¹ *Cf.* Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, *The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence & Policy*, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887

For example, we do *not* find go-shop windows of (say) 15 days in the New Sample, or go-shop termination fees of (say) 6%, for the simple reason that the Delaware courts would be highly skeptical that go-shops with such features could yield a meaningful market canvass. Similarly we do not see a general tightening of “Excluded Party” definitions -- virtually all go-shop provisions in the New Sample define an Excluded Party as a prospective bidder whose bid “constitutes or is reasonably likely to result in a Superior Proposal.”¹²² Delaware courts have signaled the importance of the “reasonably likely” language,¹²³ and practitioners, not surprisingly, have generally taken the hint.

Transactional attorneys, particularly in the high-stakes world of corporate M&A, have better methods for burying their handiwork. Rather than focusing on obvious go-shop features, buy-side practitioners have achieved a “back door” tightening of the go-shop period by requiring a control stake is required to be tendered before, or around the same

(documenting how the interaction among takeover defenses, rather than any particular defense on its own, determines the overall vulnerability of a target company).

¹²² Most merger agreements achieve this result directly, by requiring only a reasonable likelihood of a Superior Proposal in order to achieve Excluded Party status. *See, e.g.*, CKE RESTAURANTS MERGER AGREEMENT § 5.2(j) (Feb. 26, 2010) (“‘Excluded Party’ shall mean any Person . . . from whom the Company or any of its Representatives has received a Takeover Proposal after the execution of this Agreement and prior to the No-Shop Period Start Date that . . . the Board of Directors of the Company determines in good faith. . . constitutes or is reasonably expected to lead to a Superior Proposal . . .”). Some merger agreements achieve this result indirectly, by requiring only an Acquisition Proposal to achieve Excluded Party status, and defining an Acquisition Proposal to include an “inquiry” regarding a merger or other business combination. *See, e.g.*, BWAY HOLDING CO. MERGER AGREEMENT § 8.12(a) (Mar. 29, 2010) (“Exempted Person means any Person, group of Persons or group of Persons that includes a Person from whom the Company has received a written Acquisition Proposal after the execution of this Agreement and prior to the No-Shop Period Start Date.”); *id.* at § 8.12(a) (“Acquisition Proposal’ means (i) any inquiry, proposal or offer relating to a merger, joint venture, partnership, consolidation, dissolution, liquidation, tender offer, recapitalization, reorganization, share exchange, business combination or similar transaction involving more than 20% of the total voting power of the capital stock. . . .”).

¹²³ *See, e.g., In re Lear Corp. Shareholder Litig.*, 926 A.2d 94, 119-120 (Del. Ch. 2007) (Strine, V.C.) (“This was not a [go-shop] provision that gave a lower break fee to a bidder who entered the process in some genuine way during the go-shop period – for example, by signing up a confidentiality stipulation and completing some of the key steps toward the achievement of a definitive merger agreement at a superior price. Rather, it was a provision that essentially required the bidder to get the whole shebang done within the 45-day window.”). *See also* *In re Appraisal of Dell Inc.*, 2016 WL 3186538 at *90 (Del. Ch. 2016) (“More flexible go-shops only require an acquirer to provide a non-binding indication of interest in a transaction that could lead to a Superior Proposal, and they define the concept of ‘Superior Proposal’ broadly. More restrictive go-shops demand more, such as a *bona fide* offer that qualifies as a Superior Proposal, a fully financed bid, or even a fully negotiated merger agreement. A nominally shorter go-shop that requires less to qualify as an Excluded Party may be more open as a practical matter than a nominally longer go-shop that imposes tougher criteria for Excluded Party status.”).

time, that the go-shop period expires, such that the acquirer can close its tender offer and gain voting control before the target can exit the merger agreement.

An example illustrates the point. In Fortune Brand's acquisition of Norcraft, previously discussed in Part II.D.2 above, the merger included Support Agreements from Mr. Buller (the CEO), his family, and other large shareholders (collectively, the "Covered Shares").¹²⁴ The Covered Shares constituted approximately 54% of the Norcraft shares outstanding.

The go-shop period ran 35 days, beginning on March 30th and ending on May 4th, 2015. By the end of the go-shop period, the Norcraft board would have the right to identify any Excluded Party, defined as a prospective bidder whose bid "constitutes or is reasonably likely to result in a Superior Proposal."¹²⁵ This means that a third-party bidder did not have to get to a full-blown Superior Proposal by the end of the go-shop period. So far, so good.

However, the interaction of the Support Agreements with the go-shop period served as a "back door" shortening of the Go-Shop Period and tightening of the Superior Proposal language. The tender offer period began on April 14th,¹²⁶ in the middle of the Go-Shop Period, and it expired exactly 20 business days later, on Monday, May 11th. The Support Agreements specified that the Covered Shares had to be tendered "promptly following" the initiation of the tender offer, and in any event no later than two business days prior to the expiration of the initial tender offer.¹²⁷ This means that the Covered Shares had to be tendered no later than May 7th at the latest (May 9th and 10th were a Saturday and Sunday in 2015), which is just three days after the go-shop period expired.

Once the Covered Shares had been tendered, they could not be withdrawn from the offer "unless and until . . . the Offer shall have been terminated in accordance with the terms of the Merger Agreement."¹²⁸ But the merger agreement could only be terminated by the Norcraft board to accept a Superior Proposal, not just the likelihood of a Superior Proposal.¹²⁹ In addition, the Norcraft board could only terminate the merger agreement after giving Fortune Brands its four-day match right.¹³⁰ Putting it all together, a prospective third-party bidder would have to make a full-blown Superior Proposal (not just get to a

¹²⁴ See, e.g., BULLER FAMILY TENDER AND SUPPORT AGREEMENT § 3(a), available at <https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1519751/000119312515121348/d905834dex993.htm>. The other support agreements were substantively identical.

¹²⁵ NORCRAFT MERGER AGREEMENT § 8.2 (defining "Excluded Party").

¹²⁶ NORCRAFT MERGER AGREEMENT § 1.1(a).

¹²⁷ BULLER FAMILY TENDER AND SUPPORT AGREEMENT § 3(a).

¹²⁸ *Id.* at § 3(b). Section 3(b) further provided that the Covered Shares could be withdrawn if the Termination Date had occurred. The Termination Date was defined as: the termination of the merger agreement; the closing of the Merger; any change to the terms of the Offer; or mutual written consent. See *id.* at §10(a); MERGER AGREEMENT § 1.4 (defining "Effective Time" as the closing date and time of the Merger).

¹²⁹ NORCRAFT MERGER AGREEMENT § 7.1(c)(ii) (permitting Norcraft to terminate the Merger Agreement in order to "enter into a definitive agreement with respect to a Superior Proposal").

¹³⁰ *Id.* at § 5.4(g).

reasonable likelihood of making a Superior Proposal) well before the go-shop period expired.

To see why, imagine that the Norcraft Board determined that Bidder X was an Excluded Party at the end of the go-shop period (May 4th), because Bidder X was “reasonably likely” to make a Superior Proposal. One day later, on May 5th, Bidder X in fact made a Superior Proposal. Fortune Brands would now have four business days to match Bidder X’s offer before Norcraft could terminate the Merger Agreement. This would give Fortune Brands through May 11th “to negotiate . . . in good faith . . . to make such adjustments in the terms and conditions of this [Merger] Agreement intended to cause such Superior Proposal to cease to constitute a Superior Proposal.”¹³¹

But no later than May 7th, the Support Agreements (which could not be terminated at this point because the merger agreement is not yet terminated) required that the Covered Shares must be tendered to Fortune Brands. On May 11th, Fortune Brands would close its tender offer for the Covered Shares,¹³² and would decline to match Bidder X’s Superior Proposal. Norcraft would terminate the Merger Agreement immediately, but at this point it would be too late: Fortune Brands would own 54% of the Norcraft shares pursuant to the Support Agreements. As a controlling shareholder, Fortune could at that point freeze out the remaining (non-tendering) shareholders at the same deal price.¹³³

Figure 1 summarizes the point in visual form.¹³⁴


¹³¹ *Id.*

¹³² Norcraft did not have a poison pill, and the Merger Agreement specified that Norcraft would not put in any poison pill or “similar stockholder rights plan” while the Merger Agreement was in effect. MERGER AGREEMENT § 5.1(a). Norcraft also made a representation in the Merger Agreement that it had waived Section 203 of the Delaware corporate code. *Id.* at § 3.24.

¹³³ See Guhan Subramanian, *Fixing Freezeouts*, 115 YALE L. J. 1 (2005). Entire fairness would not apply, provided that Fortune paid the same \$25.50 deal price in the freezeout, because the freezeout price had been negotiated at arms-length, before Fortune became a controlling shareholder. *See id.*

¹³⁴ This figure comes from SUBRAMANIAN NORCRAFT TRIAL DEMONSTRATIVES at 17.

Figure 1: Back-Door Shortening of Go-Shop Window and Tightening of Superior Proposal Definition



Looking forward and reasoning back, the only way that a prospective third-party bidder could avoid this sequence of events would be to make a full-blown Superior Proposal no later than Thursday, April 30th – which was five days before the Go-Shop Period actually expired and only 30 days after the Go-Shop Period began.¹³⁵

This scenario assumes that Fortune Brands did not exercise its unlimited match right. Each time that Fortune Brands exercised its match right, the third-party bidder would have to make its original Superior Proposal two business days earlier than the April 30th date calculated above. For example, if Fortune Brands exercised its match right just once, a

¹³⁵ If a proposal were made on Thursday, April 30th, 2015, the Norcraft board would have two business days (through Monday May 4th) to convene and determine that it was a Superior Proposal. *See* NORCRAFT-FORTUNE BRANDS MERGER AGREEMENT § 5.4(c). Fortune Brands would then have four days to determine whether it wanted to match (May 5th – May 8th). The Covered Shares would have to be tendered on May 7th, but Fortune could not close the tender offer until Monday, May 11th. On Friday, May 8th, Fortune would decline to match (by assumption), which means that that Norcraft could terminate the merger agreement and the Covered Shares could be withdrawn from the tender offer on May 11th, before Fortune could close its tender offer at the end of that business day. *See also* Blueblade Capital Opportunities LLC v. Norcraft Co., Inc., C.A. No. 11184-VCS (Del. Ch. 2018) at 56 (“[A]ny potential bidder contemplating whether to participate in the go-shop could wait no longer than April 30 – what Subramanian terms the ‘last clear chance’ date – to make its superior proposal.”).

prospective third-party would have to make a Superior Proposal no later than Tuesday April 28th – just 28 days after the Go-Shop Period began.

Of course, the number of times that Fortune Brands would exercise its match right would be unknown at the time when the third-party made its initial bid. This means that a third-party could make a full-blown Superior Proposal as early as (say) Friday, April 24th – just 24 days after the Go-Shop Period began – and still not be assured of winning the inevitable bidding contest (even if the bidder knew that it was the high bidder), if Fortune Brands exercised its Match Right twice and then closed its tender offer for the Covered Shares before the third-party could bid again.¹³⁶

To summarize: the interaction between the Support Agreements, Fortune Brands' match right, and the go-shop period had two effects. First, it shortened the Go-Shop Period, from 35 days to 30 days or even shorter (depending on a third-party's expectation about Fortune Brands' willingness and ability to match). Second, it tightened the Excluded Party definition, requiring a third-party to make a full-blown Superior Proposal (not just demonstrating a reasonable likelihood of a Superior Proposal) within this 30-day period (or less).

The Delaware Chancery Court agreed with this assessment in reaching its overall conclusion that the Norcraft go-shop period was not effective for price discovery.¹³⁷ The Court further found that the Fortune team knew exactly what it was doing in insisting on this exceedingly buyer-friendly structure for the go-shop, while the Norcraft side did not. Mr. Klein, the Fortune Brands CEO, touted Fortune's match right as a factor that would discourage other bidders, and demanded that he should be able to begin his tender offer soon after the go-shop began.¹³⁸ Jason Baab, head of Fortune's M&A team, testified that Fortune understood that its unlimited match right and ability to start its tender offer during Norcraft's go-shop period made it less likely that Norcraft would have a successful go-shop process.¹³⁹ In contrast, the Norcraft team demonstrated limited awareness of even the more basic features of the go-shop process.¹⁴⁰ The Court quoted (with apparent approval) testimony from one of us that "it seems like . . . the Fortune side was playing chess and the Norcraft side was playing checkers."¹⁴¹

¹³⁶ The conflicts of interest described in Part II.C.2 of this Article would interact with this analysis. For example, if Mr. Buller wished to thwart a third-party bidder that made a Superior Proposal on April 28th, he could wait two business days before officially informing Fortune Brands of the Superior Proposal. The four-day match right window would start to tick only on May 4th, and the Covered Shares would have to be tendered on May 7th, on the last day of Fortune Brands' Match Right.

¹³⁷ *Blueblade Capital Opportunities LLC v. Norcraft Co., Inc.*, C.A. No. 11184-VCS at 55.

¹³⁸ SUBRAMANIAN TRIAL DEMONSTRATIVES at 9 (quoting JX149).

¹³⁹ *Id.* (quoting JX12 at 100-02).

¹⁴⁰ *Id.* (quoting Mr. Buller, CEO of Norcraft: "Q: What is your understanding of Fortune's rights during the go-shop period? A: I don't recall.>").

¹⁴¹ *Blueblade Capital Opportunities LLC v. Norcraft Co., Inc.*, C.A. No. 11184-VCS at 58 (quoting Subramanian trial testimony at 269:8-11).

Fortune Brands was not the first buyer to use a tender offer to effectively shorten and tighten the go-shop period. In the New Sample, described in Part I.D. above, 25 deals were executed pursuant to a tender offer, and several of these tender offers expired around the end of the go-shop window. For example, in Ares Management's acquisition of Global Defense Technology & Systems in March 2011, 41.9% of the Global Defense shares had to be tendered pursuant to support agreements ten business days after the commencement of the tender offer.¹⁴² The go-shop period and the tender offer both ended on April 1, 2011, and Ares had a four-day match right. Therefore, a Superior Proposal would have had to emerge at least four business days before the end of the go-shop period in order for Global Defense to give Ares its four-day match right and then exit the merger agreement.

Similarly, in TransDigm Group's acquisition of Breeze-Eastern in November 2015, 54.7% of the Breeze-Eastern shares had to be tendered pursuant to Support Agreements no later than ten business days after the tender offer began.¹⁴³ The go-shop period ended on December 28, 2015, and the tender offer expired on December 31, 2015. If a Superior Proposal were submitted on December 28, at the end of the go-shop period, TransDigm had a three-day match right. In theory, Breeze-Eastern could identify a Superior Proposal at the end of the go-shop period (on December 28th), give TransDigm three days to match, and terminate the merger agreement on December 31st, before the tender offer expired. But if the prospective third-party thought that TransDigm would match even once, it would shorten and tighten the go-shop period in the same way as described above.

III. Implications

This Article began by identifying an empirical puzzle: relative to the Original Study, the pre-signing market canvass in go-shop transactions announced between 2010 and 2018 is *unchanged*, and the post-signing market canvass is significantly *up*, yet jump rates have dropped to effectively zero. This Article then presents several explanations for this change: the proliferation of matching rights, the shortening of go-shop windows in larger deals, CEO conflicts of interest, investment banker effects, and collateral terms that have the effect of shortening and tightening the go-shop window. We now turn to implications of these developments for corporate boards and the Delaware courts.

A. For Boards

In this Article we affirm the core conclusion from the Original Study, that a go-shop can be an effective tool for conducting a meaningful market canvass and achieving price

¹⁴² See TENDER AND VOTING AGREEMENT (Mar. 2, 2011) at § 3, available at <https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1471038/000095012311021762/0000950123-11-021762-index.htm>.

¹⁴³ See TENDER AND SUPPORT AGREEMENT (Nov. 19, 2015) at § 1, available at <https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/99359/000119312515381410/0001193125-15-381410-index.htm>.

discovery, if – but only if – it is “appropriately structured.”¹⁴⁴ When go-shops were first invented, they were indeed structured appropriately. But with time, it is perhaps not surprising that practitioners have pushed the limits of the technology, and go-shop structuring has correspondingly deteriorated. Our updated evidence suggests that corporate boards should be more skeptical today of using go-shops to fulfill their obligation to maximize value in the sale of their company.

More specifically, boards should not allow a post-signing go-shop to crowd out a pre-signing market canvass. If the board is going to truncate pre-signing competition, the board should make sure that it gets something in exchange – ideally, a price bump. The Original Study documented several examples where the seller extracted a price bump in exchange for pre-signing exclusivity.¹⁴⁵ We find fewer instances of this kind of quid pro quo in the New Sample. Indeed, the reverse seems to be more often true, in that more buyers are conditioning their bids on exclusivity.¹⁴⁶ Rather than conceding a go-shop as “market” or

¹⁴⁴ ORIGINAL STUDY at 731.

¹⁴⁵ *See, e.g.*, ORIGINAL STUDY at 754-755 n. 108 (citing deals: AEROFLEX DEFINITIVE PROXY STATEMENT (June 22, 2007) at 24 (“After discussion, the special committee asked TWP [its bankers] to communicate to the initial bidding group that . . . Aeroflex was likely to engage in a pre-signing ‘market check’ of the proposed transaction price but might be prepared to forgo this if the proposed share per share price were to be revised to \$16.50 or more.”); JAMESON INNS INC. DEFINITIVE PROXY STATEMENT (June 29, 2006) at 18 (“JMP Securities [investment bankers for the seller] further indicated that there was a direct correlation between the purchase price the board of directors would be willing to accept and our opportunity to solicit or receive a competing offer superior to the terms of the merger agreement that may be agreed by the board and JER.”); HUB INTERNATIONAL DEFINITIVE PROXY STATEMENT (May 4, 2007) at 10 (“[R]epresentatives of Apax explained that they did not want to participate in an auction process. . . . At the end of the meeting, representatives of Apax advised Mr. Hughes that, subject to further due diligence, they were prepared to present Hub a proposal within ten business days. In addition, Apax requested that for the remainder of the week, Mr. Hughes not contact any other party regarding a potential transaction. Mr. Hughes agreed that he would not make any such solicitations with the view that this would improve Apax’s proposal.”); NUVEEN INVESTMENTS DEFINITIVE PROXY STATEMENT (Aug. 14, 2007) at 29 (“[The special committee] informed Madison Dearborn that the special committee might be willing to consider an offer in the range of \$62.00 to \$65.00 per share subject to a concurrent market check, but if Madison Dearborn wished to negotiate a transaction on an exclusive basis for a limited period of time, Madison Dearborn would have to increase its proposed purchase price to at least \$65.00 per share. [Two days later], Madison Dearborn delivered a revised indication of interest to the special committee that included a proposed purchase price of \$65.00 per share.”); SPIRIT FINANCE DEFINITIVE PROXY STATEMENT (June 1, 2007) at 19 (“[T]he Company advised Macquarie that the [\$14.16] offer price would likely be viewed by its board of directors to be insufficient to grant Macquarie the requested exclusive negotiation period and other terms requested, and suggested that a price of \$15.00 per share would be more likely to be acceptable to the Company’s board of directors. [Three days later] Macquarie submitted a revised draft MOU indicating . . . a price of \$14.50 per share.”)).

¹⁴⁶ *See, e.g.*, INVENTIV HEALTH INC. DEFINITIVE PROXY STATEMENT (June 71, 2010) at 23 (“Bidder A submitted a letter indicating that Bidder A would not be willing to participate in a

“standard practice,” boards should go back to the old-time religion that go-shops are a second-best solution and should only be adopted in exchange for something else, ideally a price bump.

To the extent that boards agree to a go-shop, they should understand that the structure of the go-shop matters. This means that the details of the go-shop must be a board-level issue, and not one to be delegated to the bankers and lawyers. Boards should “stress test” the structure of the go-shop, making sure that they understand the specific design and implications of, e.g., match rights, concurrent tender offers, and Excluded Party definitions. At the very least, such awareness would allow them to avoid embarrassing testimony if the adequacy of their price is challenged by dissenting shareholders.¹⁴⁷

Finally, boards should be aware that management may be conflicted in virtually any PE deal, even if management holds significant sell-side equity, because the buy-side incentives (actual or anticipated) can swamp that sell-side equity. As a result, boards should be more inclined to establish a Special Committee even when management seems to be aligned through significant sell-side “skin in the game.”

In general, boards should be aware that the modern playbook for PE deals seems to go as follows:

Step 1: PE firm approaches a target company and threatens to walk away unless the target negotiates exclusively.

public or private auction of the Company. Bidder A requested that the Company negotiate a binding acquisition agreement with Bidder A providing for a post-signing market check.”); HEALTHGRADES OPERATING CO. SCHEDULE 14D-9 (August 10, 2010) at 14 (“Mr. K. Hicks reported to the Board that Vestar had indicated that it would either withdraw its indication of interest or significantly reduce its price if the Company engaged in a process that involved other bidders, including a ‘go shop’ provision.”); BLACKHAWK DEFINITIVE PROXY STATEMENT (Mar. 2, 2018) at 31 (“The Blackhawk board of directors also discussed whether to solicit other proposals to acquire the Company and the benefits and risks inherent in undertaking an auction process, but ultimately determined not to do so because of the risk of losing the Sponsors' proposal if the Company elected to solicit other proposals, the risk that the Sponsors might lower their proposal if the Company elected to solicit other proposals and little to no competitive bidding emerged, and the potential significant harm to the Company's business if it became known that the Company was seeking to be sold (without assurance that a financially superior proposal would be made or consummated).”)

¹⁴⁷ See, e.g., TESTIMONY OF NORCRAFT DIRECTOR (“Q: Do you recall reading any literature or studies or that type of information about how go-shop processes can and should be structured during your consideration of this go-shop structure? A: No.” “Q: And what was the time [period for] this go-shop process? A: I can’t recall.” “Q: Did you personally ever consider what effect the tender and support agreements would have on the go-shop process? A: I can’t recall.” “Q: What are matching rights? A: I have no idea.”); TESTIMONY OF NORCRAFT DIRECTOR & CEO (“Q: What is your understanding of Fortune’s rights during the go-shop period? A: I don’t recall.”), *quoted in* PETITIONER’S OPENING POST-TRIAL BRIEF, BLUEBLADE CAPITAL V. NORCRAFT COMPANIES, INC. (August 16, 2017) at 19-20.

Step 2: The target board caves to this threat, assured by their bankers that they can always canvass the market and fulfill their fiduciary obligation through a post-signing go-shop.

Step 3: The PE firm implicitly or explicitly offers management significant buy-side incentives, such that senior managers have incentives to keep the deal price down and to discourage overbids.

Step 4: The board does not adequately cleanse this conflict of interest.

Step 5: The parties agree on a deal, and the sell-side bankers launch a go-shop process.

Step 6: Due to the various factors enumerated in this Article, the go-shop process turns up empty, and management closes its deal with its favored buyer.

If all of this sounds too simplistic, consider the fact that PE firms continue to achieve “alpha” (i.e., positive abnormal returns) despite massive competition for PE deals.¹⁴⁸ This is only possible if there are structural defects in the way that companies are sold. This Article identifies several such defects. Forming a Special Committee, and making sure that it functions well, would be an important inoculation against defective sell-side processes.

B. For Courts

With the near-death of post-closing damages actions under *Revlon* in the aftermath of *Corwin*,¹⁴⁹ appraisal actions have been the primary venue in which go-shops have been assessed by the Delaware courts.¹⁵⁰ Appraisal entitles shareholders who dissent from a deal to obtain a judicially-determined “fair value” for their shares.¹⁵¹ In recent years, Delaware courts have held that “fair value” should be the deal price if the deal process is

¹⁴⁸ Frank Fan, Grant Fleming, & Geoffrey Warren, *The Alpha, Beta, and Consistency of Private Equity Reported Returns*, 16 J. PRIVATE EQUITY 21, 21 (2013) (“Further, we estimate that Buyout generated significantly positive alpha of about 5.6% per annum, relative to passive investments.”).

¹⁴⁹ *See Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC*, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015).

¹⁵⁰ *See, e.g.*, INTERVIEW WITH STUART GRANT, CORPORATE CONTROL ALERT (Aug./Sept. 2018) at 10, 12 (“The world has shifted. There are effectively no more breach of fiduciary duty cases in deal litigation because of *Corwin* and the other doctrines. Appraisal has become the new breach of fiduciary duty.”).

¹⁵¹ *See* DEL. GEN. CORP. L. ¶ 262(h).

sufficiently good such that price discovery was achieved in the marketplace.¹⁵² If instead the deal process is not good, deal price should receive limited or no weight, and courts should rely on other methods (such as discounted cash flows) to determine fair value.¹⁵³ Vice Chancellor Laster recently summarized the appropriate deference to deal price as follows:

- **Band 1:** A sale process is so well-constructed and well-executed that a trial court would err by not giving the deal price heavy, if not dispositive, weight.
- **Band 2:** A sale process is sufficiently good that the trial court would err by not treating the deal price as a reliable valuation indicator, but the trial court would not commit error by failing to give the deal price heavy, if not dispositive, weight.
- **Band 3:** The sale process is sufficiently flawed that the trial court could determine without erring that the deal price was not a reliable valuation indicator.
- **Band 4:** The sale process is so flawed that the trial court would err by treating the deal price as a reliable valuation indicator.¹⁵⁴

We agree with Vice Chancellor Laster’s formulation of existing Delaware doctrine. As a matter of policy, we further believe that this is a sound formulation, because it encourages good deal processes. The key question, of course, is what deals should go in each band.

On that key question, we are not suggesting that go-shops are categorically bad, i.e., automatically pushing the deal into Band 3 or Band 4. There may be good reasons for sellers to want to limit pre-signing competition (e.g., to avoid leaks, grab the “bird in hand,” etc.). However, the key doctrinal takeaway from this Article is that the use of a go-shop in lieu of a traditional pre-signing market canvass (particularly a “pure” go-shop) should generally push the deal down on this spectrum, but this presumption of a downward nudge can be overcome by a properly structured go-shop.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵² See, e.g., *Merion Capital LP v. Lender Processing Services, Inc.*, C.A. No. 9320-VCL (Del. Ch. 2016); *In re Appraisal of PetSmart, Inc.*, C.A. No. 10782-VCS (Del. Ch. 2017).

¹⁵³ See, e.g., *Blueblade Capital Opportunities v. Norcraft Companies, Inc.*, C.A. No. 11184-VCS (Del. Ch. 2018); *In re Appraisal of AOL, Inc.*, C.A. No. 11204-VCG (Del. Ch. 2018).

¹⁵⁴ *Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. et al. v. Aruba Networks, Inc.*, C.A. No. 11448-VCL (Del. Ch. May 21, 2018) at 42.

¹⁵⁵ In a recent memorandum to clients, Wachtell, Lipton proposed a different kind of post-signing market canvass: “Post-deal market checks can be an attractive tool for maximizing value, providing the benefits of an ‘auction with a floor.’ A no-shop coupled with a two-tiered break fee (low for an initial period and then climbing to market) is sometimes a helpful compromise between go-shops and high-break-fee no-shops.” ADAM O. EMMERICH ET AL., REIT M&A IN 2019 (Jan. 2, 2019). In our opinion, this compromise approach can also be effective in satisfying a target board’s fiduciary duties, if structured appropriately, but should be treated

In determining whether a go-shop is properly structured, courts should of course continue to take note of straightforward metrics, such as the length of the go-shop window and the magnitude of the go-shop termination fee. In addition, this Article highlights other structural and practical impediments to a prospective third-party bid. Unless courts take note of these factors as well, practitioners will continue to exploit them to diminish the effectiveness of go-shops.

Specifically, the Delaware Supreme Court should squarely endorse what game theorists have known for a long time: match rights deter bids. Unless courts flag their bid deterrence effect, and penalize the go-shop accordingly for determining what band to put it in, practitioners will continue to use match rights with impunity. The Delaware Supreme Court should also renounce the idea that there must be actual evidence of deterred bidders in order to conclude that a go-shop was not effective.¹⁵⁶ With some rare exceptions, deterred bidders are unobservable, because bidders will decline to participate in a go-shop process at the outset if they perceive no pathway to success.

We close this Part with an observation on the comparative advantages of relying on deal price rather than a discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis. Although DCF is probably the most authoritative method used among valuation experts, commentators, including one of us, have observed that the methodology is highly sensitive to the inputs, in particular the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) and terminal value assumptions.¹⁵⁷ In view of the malleable nature of DCF, some have argued that the deal price should be given greater presumptive weight – i.e., in choosing between a price that results from an imperfect deal process and a price that results from an imperfect valuation method, courts should rely more on the former.¹⁵⁸

However, in our observation, DCF valuations in the Delaware Chancery Court have been more imprecise than necessary. The starting point is the way that valuation experts seem to view their own role. In a recent appraisal decision, Vice Chancellor Slight observed in dicta that the valuation experts were simply advocates for their respective sides:

even more skeptically than a standard go-shop because of the inability to affirmatively solicit potential buyers during the post-signing phase.

¹⁵⁶ See *Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd.*, 177 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. 2017) (reversing the Chancery Court’s determination that the deal price should receive no weight in the fair value determination, in part because “the [Chancery] court did not identify any possible bidders that were actually deterred because of Mr. Dell’s status.”).

¹⁵⁷ See Guhan Subramanian, *Appraisal After Dell*, forthcoming in *THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES: IS THE LAW KEEPING UP?* (2018), manuscript at 10 (describing DCF as “notoriously imprecise”). See also William T. Allen, *Securities Markets as Social Products: The Pretty Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis*, 28 J. CORP. L. 551, 560 (2003) (noting that “the DCF method is [] subject to manipulation and guesswork.”).

¹⁵⁸ See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge et al., CORRECTED BRIEF OF LAW AND CORPORATE FINANCE PROFESSORS AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF REVERSAL, *DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P.* (Jan. 6, 2017) (on behalf of nine corporate law and finance professors)

It is accepted in Delaware appraisal litigation that paid valuation experts have assumed more of an advocacy role, and less of a traditional expert witness role (as illustrated by the wide deltas we regularly see in their valuation conclusions). Despite the repeated expressions of frustration by our courts, the practice continues. When a rushing river flows against a resisting rock, eventually the river wins out. Perhaps that is the hope among appraisal advocates and the valuation experts they engage to sponsor their positions.¹⁵⁹

But the wildly divergent testimony on valuation is not inherent in the DCF methodology. DCF is malleable, but not *that* malleable. Petitioners and respondents stake out radically different opinions on fair value for one simple reason: they believe that it works in the Delaware Chancery Court. This conclusion is not inevitable. Delaware courts could signal in numerous ways that they want reasonable valuation testimony, not valuation experts who merely “advocate their side’s position on fair value.”

For example, Delaware courts have the authority to retain their own valuation expert.¹⁶⁰ Judges might use this card in situations where the experts are too far apart on valuation – thereby creating *ex ante* incentives for the valuation experts to come in more reasonably so that they are not collectively rejected by the court.

Second, and not necessarily mutually exclusive, Delaware courts could engage in closer scrutiny of the valuation experts’ expertise – not disqualifying experts for lack of expertise (which would be radical), but making clear that not all valuation experts are equally qualified. In every case that we are aware of, courts have not differentiated between the valuation experts’ qualifications to opine on value, nor have they declared the experts on both sides to be anything less than eminently qualified.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁹ Blueblade Capital v. Norcraft Companies et al., C.A. No. 11184-VCS (Del. Ch. July 2018) at 42 n. 179 (citations omitted).

¹⁶⁰ See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213, 1222 (Del. 1992) (recommendation from the Delaware Supreme Court that the Chancery Court should consider appointing its own valuation expert in appraisal proceedings). In fact, the original appraisal statute, promulgated in 1899, provided for a three-member panel of experts to determine the fair value of the shares. In 1943 the statute shifted to a single court-appointed expert, and in 1976 the statute shifted again to our current system of opposing valuation experts. See FERNAN RESTREPO, APPRAISING APPRAISERS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF EXPERT VALUATIONS IN APPRAISAL PROCEEDINGS (working paper 2017).

¹⁶¹ See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 2016 WL 3186538 at *46 (Del. Ch. 2016) (noting that the opposing valuation experts were “[t]wo highly distinguished scholars of valuation science”); Blueblade Capital v. Norcraft Companies et al., C.A. No. 11184-VCS (Del. Ch. 2018) at 42 n. 179 (“By any measure, both experts are well qualified.”); In re Appraisal of SWS Group, Inc., C.A. No. 10554-VCG (Del. Ch. 2017) (noting that petitioners’ expert was “a well-seasoned valuation expert” and the respondents’ expert was a “Corporate Finance Professor with substantial experience in expert testimony.”).

Professional courtesy has many virtues, of course, particularly in the small world of Delaware corporate law practice. However, by not differentiating among different degrees of valuation expertise, Delaware judges implicitly declare valuation expertise to be a commodity, which then causes potential valuation experts to “compete” (in the form of more extreme valuation outcomes) in order to be retained in a particular matter.

Rather than declaring bewilderment by the wide disparity in the valuations, Delaware judges should realize that it is a natural (and perhaps inevitable) consequence of declaring that valuation expertise is undifferentiated. But extreme valuation opinions do not have to be a “rushing river flow[ing] against a resisting rock,” in which “eventually the river wins out.”¹⁶² Scrutinizing and differentiating among the expertise of the valuation experts would allow valuation experts to develop differentiated reputations on qualifications and credibility, which would create less divergence in valuation opinions and would allow the Delaware judges (who, after all, are generally untrained in finance) to rely more heavily on their opinions.¹⁶³

Finally, Delaware courts have the ability to mandate baseball-style appraisals, in which each side offers a valuation and the court must pick one or the other.¹⁶⁴ Basic game theory indicates that this will cause both sides to behave far more reasonably, in order to maximize the odds that the court would accept their valuation.¹⁶⁵ With this one small adjustment to appraisal, DCF valuations that look so malleable today would magically appear in a much tighter band. Courts would have better guidance from their valuation experts, which would allow them more comfort relying on DCF when the deal process is not sufficiently good to warrant reliance on the deal price. In turn, deal processes would become more buttoned up, because they would be competing for the court’s attention with a more reliable DCF

¹⁶² Blueblade Capital v. Norcraft Companies et al., C.A. No. 11184-VCS (Del. Ch. July 2018) at 42 n. 179.

¹⁶³ In the Dell Appraisal, Vice Chancellor Laster recently ordered the expert reports from both sides to be filed publicly. *See* In re Appraisal of Dell, Inc., C.A. No. 9322-VCL (Del. Ch. Nov. 2018). Vice Chancellor Laster noted that “expert witnesses [are] acting as advocates rather than advisors to the court,” and directed that the expert reports should be made public in that case in support of “the broader goal of transparency.” *See id.* We applaud the Vice Chancellor’s approach, and urge the Chancery Court to adopt it more broadly. However, in our opinion, it is unlikely to solve the underlying problem of experts acting as advocates. Rather than exposing (e.g.) different assumptions on discount rates and terminal values used by a particular expert, transparency would merely cause valuation experts to sort into solely defendant-side and plaintiff-side. That is, by staying on one side of the “v,” experts would be able to maintain consistency among different valuation reports but still act as advocates.

¹⁶⁴ JENNIFER ARLEN ET AL., BRIEF OF LAW AND CORPORATE FINANCE PROFESSORS AS AMICI CURIAE, DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P. (Feb. 3, 2017) at 23 (“[T]he trial judge could employ approaches that incentivize greater moderation among competing experts (such as ‘baseball arbitration’ mechanisms), thereby narrowing the valuation gaps between their analyses.”) (citations omitted).

¹⁶⁵ *See, e.g.,* Christian J. Henrich, *Game Theory and Gonsalves: A Recommendation for Reforming Stockholder Appraisal Actions.*, 56 Bus. Law. 697 (2001).

methodology. We predict that go-shops structuring would improve, including the elimination of many of the phenomena that we document in this Article.

IV. Conclusion

At the highest level, the story of go-shops over the past ten years is one of innovation corrupted. In the mid 2000s, transactional planners created a new deal technology that benefitted their buy-side and sell-side clients. As one of us concluded in the Original Study, “go-shop provisions can be a ‘better mousetrap’ in deal structuring – a ‘win-win’ for both buyer and seller.”¹⁶⁶ However, over the ensuing decade, a broader set of transactional planners distorted the go-shop technology in ways that achieve their clients’ objectives but no longer satisfy broader corporate law objectives of promoting allocational efficiency in the M&A marketplace.

This trajectory has a venerable pedigree. In the 1970s, for example, the invention of mortgage securitization unquestionably created enormous value for society. But by the 2000s, practitioners had pushed this technology too far, which led to the financial crisis of 2008-2009. Likewise the proliferation of derivatives unquestionably created enormous value in the 1980s and 1990s. But the distortion and eventual corruption of this new technology led to the Enron debacle of 2003.¹⁶⁷

The corruption of the go-shop technology does not rise to the same scale as the financial crisis or Enron. But the stakes are still large: allocational efficiency in the M&A marketplace, and the overall protection of capital markets, are critical goals of corporate law. Small investors put their money into the U.S. capital markets at levels far beyond their European and Asian counterparts, in part because corporate law assures them of value maximization if and when they exit their investment. Indeed, an influential stream of research, known as the “law & finance” literature, finds a connection between legal protections for minority owners and the development of capital markets around the world.¹⁶⁸ Our research shows that the evolution of the go-shop technology over the past ten years has worked against these desirable and important policy goals. We offer in this Article specific recommendations for corporate boards and the Delaware courts to counteract this trend.

¹⁶⁶ ORIGINAL STUDY at 731.

¹⁶⁷ See MALCOM SALTER, *INNOVATION CORRUPTED: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF ENRON’S COLLAPSE* (2008).

¹⁶⁸ See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny (“LLSV”), *Law and Finance*, 106 J. POL. ECON. 113 (1998); LLSV, *Corporate Ownership Around the World*, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999); LLSV, *Investor Protection and Corporate Governance*, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2000).