ISSN 1936-5349 (print)
ISSN 1936-5357 (online)

HARVARD

JOHN M. OLIN CENTER FOR LAW, ECONOMICS, AND BUSINESS

ON THE INVENTION OF IDENTITY POLITICS: THE BURAKU OUTCASTES IN JAPAN

J. Mark Ramseyer

Discussion Paper No. 964

06/2018

Harvard Law School
Cambridge, MA 02138

Keywords: Ethnicity, Extortion, Outcastes, Discrimination
JEL Numbers: H30, I26, I38, J49, K14, K38, K42

Draft of June 20, 2018

J. Mark Ramseyer
Harvard Law School
ramseyer@law.harvard.edu

On the Invention of Identity Politics:

The Buraku Outcastes in Japan

By J. Mark Ramseyer*

Abstract: Using fourteen government censuses and a wide variety of quantitative historical sources, I trace the origins of the Japanese putative outcastes. Sympathetic scholars have long described the group -- called the burakumin -- as the descendants of a 17th century leather-workers' guild. Members of the group suffer discrimination because their ancestors handled dead animals, they write, and ran afoul of a distinctively Japanese religious obsession with ritual purity.

In fact, the burakumin are not descended from leather-workers. They are descended from poor farmers. Eighteenth-century Japanese would not have discriminated against them out of any concern for ritual purity. They would have discriminated against them because they were poor.

The burakumin identity as we know it dates instead from the early 20th century. In 1922, self-described Bolsheviks from the buraku upper class lauched a "liberation" movement. To fit their group within Marxist historiography, they created for it a fictive identity as a leather-workers' guild. Within a few years, however, criminal entrepreneurs from the urban slums had hijacked the new movement. They embarked on full-scale identity politics, and generated the public hostility that has plagued the group ever since.

The criminal leadership used discrimination claims to shake down local (and eventually the national) governments for ever-increasing transfer payments. Before the 1920s, prosperous member of the buraku had stayed and helped to build its social and economic infrastructure. After the 1920s, those burakumin who hoped to capitalize on the shakedown strategies continued to stay. Given the public hostility that the criminal leadership generated, however, those who preferred mainstream careers increasingly left and merged into the general public.

* Mitsubishi Professor of Japanese Legal Studies, Harvard Law School. I gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments and suggestions of Christina Davis, Maren Ehlers, Yoshitaka Fukui, Colin Jones, Curtis Milhaupt, Yoshiro Miwa, Richard Samuels, Richard Sander, Henry Smith, Masanori Takashima, Frank Upham, and David Weinstein.

I. Introduction

The Japanese "burakumin," according to most accounts, trace their ancestry to a guild of 17th century tanners and leather-workers.[1] By Japanese religious strictures, these ancestors had worked within a ritually unclean world. Given pervasive but rarely articulated Japanese obsession with purity (these conventional accounts explain), modern Japanese continue to discriminate against their present-day descendants. Centuries later, they still shun marriages with the burakumin and avoid hiring them when they can.

The "burakumin" (i.e., people of the "buraku") do not differ visually from any other Japanese. They do not speak a separate language. They do not live within a distinctive culture, follow idiosyncratic habits, or worship a private deity. Solely out of this centuries-old concern for ritual purity, we are told, secular and educated Japanese continue to shun the group. For intellectuals in modern American universities, it seems a story tailor-made to confirm the eternal plasticity of social norms and the boundless human capacity for exclusion and ethnic cruelty.

In fact, the ancestors to most modern burakumin did not tan animal skins or work in the leather trade. They did not work in a guild. And we have no reason to think anyone today avoids hiring or marrying a burakumin out of any concern for ritual purity. Instead, most burakumin trace their ancestry to poor farmers. Many modern burakumin do come from poor communities with dysfunctional families, extraordinarily anti-social behavior, and very high rates of violent crime. Burakumin who prefer to invest in mainstream careers regularly leave the group and merge into general Japanese society. When Japanese avoid the burakumin who choose to remain, they follow a more prosaic logic: they avoid people from a violent, anti-social, crime-ridden community.

The birth of the buraku as a sharply defined ethnic group dates from the early 1920s. These were years of revolutionary ardor for intellectuals. In 1922, young men from the buraku upper class launched for themselves a "liberation" movement. Their commoner friends were creating Bolshevik and Anarcho-Syndicalist cells. They created one for the buraku. Marxist historians were characterizing the earlier Tokugawa period as feudal, and in German Ideology Marx himself had placed feudal workers in guilds. For their own group, the young burakumin intellectuals dutifully invented a fictive legacy as a leather workers' guild.

The buraku intellectuals who lauched this movement ran it only briefly. By the end of the decade, they had lost control to criminal entrepreneurs from the urban slums. Those entrepreneurs then paired the buraku's new ethnic identity with their own -- very real -- threats of violence and embarked on straightforward shake-down politics. Through relentless accusations of bias and discrimination (bias and discrimination they generated in part through their own violence), they extorted massive funds from local firms and governments.

Public hostility ensued, of course. Prior to the 1920s, prosperous burakumin had stayed within the community and helped to build its social and economic infrastructure. After the 1920s, those burakumin who perceived a comparative advantage in criminal careers continued to stay, and diverted the government subsidies to their private accounts. Given the public hostility that the

---

[1] The politically correct term in Japanese is "dowa"; the standard English language term seems to remain "burakumin."

criminal leadership had brought upon the buraku, however, those who hoped for mainstream careers increasingly chose to merge into mainstream Japanese society instead.

In the article that follows, I alternate between a qualitative, discursive account, and a serial examination of the available quantitative evidence. After surveying the English-language literature on the buraku (Section II), I trace its connection to organized crime and shake-down politics (Section III). I explore its roots in the 17th to 19th centuries, and note its barely tenuous connection to the leather industry (Section IV). I explain how the burakumin moved in massive numbers to the cities during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, many to the new slums (Section V).

In Section VI, I turn to the pivotal moment: to the creation of the buraku as a sharply defined ethnic group, and to the inauguration of burakumin identity politics. In the 1920s, fringe-left burakumin redefined the buraku as a leather workers' guild. The history was largely fictitious -- they had created it to fit the demands of Marxist historiography (Section VI). But criminal entrepreneurs commandeereed the group and used this new ethnic identity for full-scale shake-down tactics (Section VII). Public hostility followed, and burakumin hoping for mainstream careers left the group en masse (Section VIII).

II. The Buraku in Western Scholarship

English-language scholars tell a remarkably consistent story about the buraku. During the Tokugawa shogunate (1600-1868), the predecessors to the burakumin worked within a guild that skinned animal carcasses, tanned hides, and crafted leather. The members called themselves "kawata"; others sometimes called them by the pejorative "eta." The work with dead animals left them ritually unclean, so other peasants forced them to live apart. Those other peasants refused to let them engage in other work, to marry outside the group, or even to dress like other peasants. Writes legal scholar Frank Upham (1988, 79), these kawata "were forbidden to marry commoners, to live outside their designated ghettos, or even to serve as commoner's servants. They could not eat, sit, or smoke in the company of commoners, dress their hair in the conventional manner, wear geta (wooden sandals), or cross a commoner's threshold."

Historian Ian Neary (1989, 2) reflects the conventional accounts when he assigns the biases religious roots. Some of them "derived from concepts found in the Shinto or Buddhist religions but included other, more bizarre aspects," he writes. As historian David Howell (1996, 178) put it, the burakumin were "the descendants of outcaste groups dating at least to the Tokugawa period ..., if not earlier." Granted, Howell continues, even "then many Burakumin had little everyday engagement with 'unclean' professions," but the burakumin "generally engaged in occupations that were considered to be unclean, especially those that entailed the pollution of death."[2]

The burakumin purportedly faced discrimination, in other words, because of their guild. "Their outcaste status was largely based on occupation rather than ethnic or cultural differences," writes Upham (1988, 79). They held, in anthropologist Joseph Hankins' (2014, 2-3) words, "an occupational, a spatial, or a genealogical relationship to historically stigmatized labor such as meat and leather production."

---

[2] Note that Hatanaka (1990), McCormack (2013), and Ehlers (2018) all carefully describe the way that the notion of the burakumin changed over time, explore the lack of continuity within the buraku community over time, and note the changing character of bias and discrimination.

Western scholars place this buraku guild within a rigidly class- (even caste-) based Tokugawa order. As historian Timothy Amos (2011, 3) put it, the government rooted that order in a "[Neo-] Confucian ideology stressing rigid hierarchical relations," and fashioned "a highly stratified social structure reminiscent of a caste system." Within this society, it created four classes: samurai, farmers, artisans, and merchants. The burakumin it placed outside (below) this order as a group not even quite human. Upham (1988, 79), again, captures this orthodoxy: "The more than 250 years of internal stability during this [Tokugawa] period," explains Upham (1988, 79), "rigidified a formerly somewhat fluid occupational and feudal hierarchy and led to the legal delineation of the outcastes as a separate segment of society ...."

In 1868, samurai from several outlying domains engineered a coup (called the "Meiji Restoration"), and three years later officially "liberated" the burakumin. It was, western scholars insist, at best a mixed blessing. For one, the burakumin lost their occupational monopoly in the leather trade. Along with legal emancipation, writes Upham (1988, 80), "came the loss of feudal occupational monopolies." At least, claims he (1988, 79), those monopolies "did give the outcastes an economically stable base on which to build their own society ...." For another, the burakumin now paid taxes. Under the Tokugawa regime, asserts Hankins (2014, 21), they had enjoyed "tax-exempt status."

As a consequence of all this, write western scholars, late 19th and early 20th century burakumin led a demeaning and impoverished life. Some members of the community worked in the tanning sector or the newly created butchering industry. Many did not, modern scholars continue, but faced discrimination all the same. Mainstream Japanese forced them into crowded and unsanitary urban ghettos. They barred them from their firms. They refused to let their children marry them. Destitute and isolated, the burakumin eked out their lives on the social periphery.

In the early 1920s, the conventional account continues, a courageous group of outcastes - now numbering 3 million -- organized themselves into the "Suiheisha," or "Levellers." They adopted a policy of collective denunciation (kyudan). Faced with an expression of prejudice, they would together "denounce" the perpetrators. Through their united pressure, they would force the speakers to come to terms with their own privilege and prejudice. They would insist that the local governments recognize the systemic and institutional bias, and their moral responsibility to rectify the structural inequity that they had created. They would demand the water supplies, sewage, fire truck access, and schools that the brutally discriminatory state had denied them.

World War II came and went, western observers write, and in the new environment the "Buraku Liberation League" (BLL) inherited and continued the Suiheisha's pioneering mission on behalf of human rights. Mainstream Japanese still discriminated. Yet by relentlessly attacking expressions of bias through group denunciation, the BLL largely eliminated open prejudice from polite discourse. From the local and eventually national governments, it extracted the infrastructural investments enjoyed by other Japanese. It fostered pride among the buraku community. And in time it would come to work with its international counterparts to promote a more broadly inclusive and "multicultural Japan" (Hankins, 2014).

Still, insist western writers, systemic bias persists. "Discrimination against Burakumin was (and indeed still is) common everywhere in Japan," declares historian Ian Neary (1989, 2). As late as the 1960s, reports the Tokyo-based Japan Times (Osaki 2016), burakumin found themselves plagued by "high illiteracy rates, dire poverty and rampant illness." They remained "effectively barred from ordinary jobs or any life outside the slums," insists N.Y. Times columnist Nicholas Kristof (1995). They lived in "dilapidated hovels [that] leaned over tiny alleys, open sewers carried

waste water into the rivers, and old people blinded by contagious disease sat hopelessly in the open doorways."

To discriminate as they do in marriage or employment, explain Western scholars, modern Japanese identify the burakumin by residence. A burakumin is a person who lives (or whose family once lived) in an identifiable buraku district. To discriminate, mainstream Japanese trace (or hire a detective to trace) a person's origins back to his or his natal home, and determine whether that home lay in a traditional buraku area.

Given that Japanese purportedly discriminate by residence, a burakumin ought logically to be able to escape the bias by moving. This the burakumin find too hard, contend most western scholars. It simply "has not been the case," writes Howell (1989, 179). As anthropologists George de Vos and Hiroshi Wagatsuma (1967, 241) put it, a burakumin can do so only by abandoning his identity:

> If he seeks this, a complete loss of former identity, he must stop all overt contact with family and community by means of geographic as well as occupational mobility. He has to forge for himself an entirely new identity and in some cases fabricate a past so that he will not be disadvantaged by his lack of ancestry.

The burakumin who attempt this feat, continue de Vos and Wagatsuma (1967, 242) live in "constant fear of exposure." De Vos and Wagatsuma (1967, 252) recount one informant who had "a friend who had tried to pass as a government officer but had somehow failed, left his job, and though a university graduate, is now running a store in a Buraku." He had tried several times to pass, but each time he had returned. Each time, "[t]he friend would somehow let those around him know about his background ...." Haunted by his past, "when drunk, he would hint in various ways about his outcaste origin, or he would confide in someone whom he had no cause to trust."

III. The Modern Buraku

A. Introduction:

As a description of the modern buraku, all this badly misleads. The burakumin number about 1 million, and have since the 1930s (Subsec. B). They live primarily in a few prefectures in western Japan. Although they tend to be poor, their poverty does not -- and never did -- distinguish them. They do not reside in the poorest Japanese prefectures, and are not the poorest residents of those prefectures in which they do reside (Subsec. C).

Yet many burakumin do live profoundly fractured lives. Non-marital childbirth is far more common than among other Japanese. Drug use is more widespread. Crime is more virulent, organized crime is primarily a buraku phenomenon, and the ties between the BLL and the mob run deep.

The BLL's famous denunciation sessions were not just about fighting discrimination, if they ever were much about that at all. They were about shaking down local governments. Through their aggressively brutal attacks, buraku leaders kept their threat of violence central and credible, and used it to obtain massive government subsidies. Through their systematic corruption, they then diverted large amounts of those funds to their personal accounts (Subsec. D).

The question of anti-buraku animus is simply over-determined. Perhaps at one time, some Japanese discriminated against some burakumin because of an aversion to ritually unclean occupations -- after all, one interpretation of the Tokugawa pejorative term "eta" is indeed "very unclean." But one hardly needs any peculiar theory of a religiously based aversion to explain why a modern Japanese might avoid marrying or hiring burakumin. The burakumin are a dysfunctional,

high-crime group with visible ties to the mob. Many Japanese probably do avoid marrying or hiring people from such a group; so would many people anywhere else (Subsec. E).

B. The Location of the Modern Buraku:

1. National totals. -- Over the last one-and-a-half centuries, the Japanese government -- either alone or in collaboration with several affiliated organizations -- has compiled at least 14 censuses of the burakumin population. I give the national totals in Table 1. The government has kept all data below the prefectural level rigidly confidential. The neighborhood-level data from the 1935 census has apparently been available to BLL-allied researchers for some time. They are now available more broadly (and were used in Ramseyer & Rasmusen 2018) only because a buraku activist opposed to the League briefly posted the census on the internet in 2015.

[Insert Table 1 about here.]

Readers should take the numbers with caution. No one offers a precise definition of the "burakumin" -- or anything close. Although some detectives may try to trace a person's ancestry back to the late 19th century (Ramseyer & Rasmusen 2018), most people just ask whether someone comes from a family with long ties to an identifiable buraku district. One journalist asked a detective how he decided whether someone was a burakumin. They are burakumin "if their parents were burakumin," he replied, "or if they came from a buraku." After all, he explained, "if they're currently living in a buraku, then they're burakumin" (Kadooka 2005, 50;). A 2005 Osaka survey asked the same question. Of the respondents, 50.3 percent replied that they looked at a person's address, 38.3 percent that they looked at the person's recorded home (i.e., registry) address, and others looked at the address of a person's parents or grandparents (Tominaga 2015, 35). Despite the detective's self-confident reply, some families without burakumin ancestry in the Tokugawa period have lived in classic buraku districts for decades, and other non-burakumin regularly move into those districts for the low rent -- raising obvious definitional problems (Ramseyer & Rasmusen 2018).

Qualifications aside, Table 1 outlines the general pattern. From a total of about 500,000 at the outset of the Meiji era (1868-1912), the number of burakumin (as counted by the various census-takers appointed by the national or local governments) climbed to about 1 million by 1935. It rose to 1.2 million in the late 1950s, but climbed no further. By the 1990s, it had fallen back below 1 million. The 1942 numbers are an obvious outlier: most likely, they reflect either wartime disruption or badly flawed census-taking procedures.

The BLL itself claims that the burakumin number 3 million. From time to time, scholars have given some credence to the number. Hankins (2014, 3), for example, proclaims that the BLL "estimates [the] number at 3 million" because:

> [T]he BLL extrapolates a number from historical records, tracing lineages of "outcastes" from the Tokugawa period. ... The BLL's standard is one of lineage and residence and sits within the imperatives of liberation ....

With more restraint, Amos (2011, 7) writes that the BLL:

> has almost universally opted for a figure of about three million people. This figure relies on extremely old and unreliable documentation, problematic counting methods, and a basic assumption about a universal historical continuity between premodern outcaste and modern buraku communities.

Even Amos gives the number more credence than it deserves. The 3 million estimate is not a modern estimate. It dates instead from the founding of the BLL's predecessor in 1922. The organizers founded the organization -- called the Suiheisha -- in March. Already by that April,

they had included the number in a manifesto (Keiho kyoku 1922, 54), and soon were adding it to their anthems besides (Keiho kyoku 1922, 68-69). The best-known of their hymns to liberty proclaims:[3]

Shouldering the burdens of mission and light,
Three million brothers break the shackles of slavery ...

Ethnographer Yutaka Honda (1991, 14) recounts how the number came to be. As the Suiheisha organizers met in 1922, he writes, they wondered how many burakumin there might be. The government had just counted them for the 1921 census, and found 830,000 burakumin in 4900 districts. Reasoning that it must have missed some burakumin, Shoken Hirano -- at the time a self-declared anarchist, but one whom the organization would soon expel (nominally for spying for the police for money), and who would transform himself into a right-wing nationalist by the end of the decade -- suggested they adopt "6,000 districts, 3 million people." The number has remained an article of faith ever since.

2. Prefectural shifts. -- Over the course of the last 150 years, burakumin have moved. Japanese have moved generally, of course, and so have the burakumin. To explore the regional shifts, in Table 2 I report the prefecture-level totals for each of the 14 censuses.

[Insert Table 2 about here.]

Note parenthetically that Tokyo has several buraku. It never had many, but has claimed since the 1950s that it has none. The claim reflects municipal politics rather than demographic change.

To facilitate comparisons over time, I index the prefectural totals by the 1921 census. To facilitate comparisons across prefectures, I include the absolute numbers for the 1868, 1921, and 1993 censuses. Obviously, the indexed numbers are most reliable for those prefectures with large numbers of burakumin. Where a prefecture has fewer than 10,000 burakumin, the census takers can cause large percentage changes just by missing a few districts. Following standard Japanese practice, I list the prefectures roughly from the northeast to the southwest.

The buraku have long been a regional rather than national phenomenon, but the shifts since 1868 have concentrated the burakumin population still further. When the Meiji government took power in 1868, burakumin tended to live in the west. From 1868 to the founding of the Suiheisha in 1922, the number of burakumin grew massively in Kyoto, Osaka, Nara, and Hyogo (site of Kobe), in the inland-sea-adjacent prefectures of Okayama, Hiroshima, Ehime, and Kochi, and in the northern Kyushu prefecture of Fukuoka. Since 1922, the buraku have grown more spectacularly still in Osaka and Fukuoka. In 1868, 29 percent of the burakumin lived in the five prefectures of Osaka, Nara, Hyogo, Okayama, and Fukuoka. By 1993, 46 percent of the burakumin lived in these five.

3. Some implications of the location-based definition. That Japanese define burakumin primarily by residence has several straightforward preliminary implications. Most basically, burakumin can and do exit the group. Echoing BLL assertions, modern Western scholars claim they could not. Ethnographers de Vos & Wagatsuma claim the same. Obviously, however, they capture an artifact of sample bias: if one researches the subject by interviewing buraku residents, he will not meet many who left and never returned.

For in massive numbers, Buraku leave. As Figure 1 shows, they have been leaving the buraku since the 1930s. From 1921 to 1993, the Japanese general population increased from

[3] Kaihoka [Song of Liberation], https://ehime-c.esnet.ed.jp/jinken/09kaihouka.pdf.

56,665,900 to 124,937,786 -- a growth of 124 percent. During the same period, the number of burakumin grew from 829,675 to 892,751 -- a growth of 7.6 percent. Had the buraku grown at the same rate as the rest of the Japanese population, by 1993 its population would have reached 1,862,141. In effect, over the intervening 72 years 1 million burakumin vanished into the general population.

[Insert Figure 1 about here.]

What is more -- again as a simple artifact of the group's geographical definition -- the buraku will necessarily include farmers and exclude professionals. Farmers invest in land, and land is of course location-specific. Should a farmer want to leave the buraku, he can do so only by liquidating his business. By contrast, an upper-middle-class professional will have little choice but to leave the buraku. The phenomenon does not turn on the strength of any Japanese bias (contra Bayliss 2013, 115). Instead, it simply turns on the group's definition. Whether in the U.S. or Japan, university-educated professionals have mobile careers. To exploit their educational investments, they follow the jobs. Whether in the U.S. or Japan, virtually no professional lives within ten blocks of his natal home. If a burakumin moves more than those ten blocks, however, he ceases to be a burakumin. That the buraku includes farmers and excludes professionals, in short, does not reflect discrimination. Instead, it follows automatically from the group's geographically based definition.

C. Social Dysfunction:

1. Slums. -- Visitors to the modern buraku have every right to express surprise. Given the standard western accounts, the most notable aspect of the modern buraku is how notable they are not. They are not impoverished. They are not dirty. They do not lack in-door plumbing, adequate space, fire protection. They are not distinctive at all. Given the accounts, a visitor might expect a slum. Primarily only in Osaka -- and only in one spot in Osaka -- will he find one.

The infamous Japanese slum lies in the Kamagasaki district of Osaka's Nishinari ward. Euphemistically renamed Airin in 1966 after a series of violent riots on hot summer nights, the district contains day laborers, but also flop houses, homeless alcoholics, and drug addicts. With 20,000 to 30,000 heavily burakumin residents, it serves as the center for mostly male day workers. Several organized crime syndicates locate their headquarters there. Contractors recruit clean-up crews for the Fukushima reactors.

Tokyo contains no Kamagasaki. San'ya in the northeastern section of Taito ward serves as the gathering spot for the unemployed and the day-laborers. Anthropologist James Fowler (1996, 15) does suggest that "a disproportionate number of ... the descendants of the outcastes" live in San'ya. Unlike Kamagasaki, however, the district is not a traditional buraku, and does not appear on the 1935 buraku census (the only one of the 14 censuses with neighborhood-level data). At the start of the 20th century, Tokyo did contain three large slums (or four, in some accounts -- Shiomi 2008, 118): Shitaya mannen cho (in Taito ward), Shiba shinmo cho (in Minato ward), and Yotsuya samegabashi (in Shinjuku ward). By 1935, none appeared in the buraku census. Should a visitor try to locate the three today, in none will he find a slum.[4]

[4] All three had roots in Tokugawa-era hinin (see Sec. IV.F., below) communities. Their absence from the 1935 census is thus consistent both with Honda's (1991, 14) hypothesis that the 1935 census-takers counted kawata districts but ignored the hinin, and with Matsuoka & Yokota's (1975, 127-28) hypothesis that the former hinin more readily integrated themselves into the commoner community than did the former kawata. See Sec. IV.F.2.

2. Incomes. -- Aggregate data suggest that modern burakumin tend to be poorer than other Japanese on average, but only modestly so. For want of any burakumin population figures below the prefectural level (other than for 1935), I use prefecture-level data. The risk of ecological fallacy is obviously real. With that caveat, however, consider the correlation between the fraction of burakumin in a prefecture and several indices of personal welfare. For burakumin concentration, I use the most recent of the 14 censuses -- the 1993 census (Somu cho 1995).

I construct the following prefecture-level variables:

Burakumin PC, 1993: The number of burakumin in 1993 (Somu cho 1995), divided by total population.

Density, 1993: Total population in 1993, divided by area (100 sq. km)

Prefectural Income PC, 1993: Total prefectural income (kenmin so shotoku; Naikakufu 1994), divided by total population.

Sewage rate, 2010: Number of people served by sewage facilities in 2010 (Nihon gesui 2011), divided by total population.

Poverty rate, 2007: The fraction of households in 2007 living below the minimum cost of living. Tomuro (2016) calculates the number by first estimating the minimum cost of living per prefecture, and then assessing the number of households with income below that measure.

HS-College Rate, 2010: Students proceeding to college in 2010, divided by total number of high school graduates (Monbu kagaku sho 2011a}.

Life Expectancy, F 2010: Life expectancy of women, 2011 (Kosei 2011b).

Height, Grade 5 F, 2010: Average height of girls in 2010, grade 5 (Monbu kagaku sho 2011b).

Infant Mortality, 2010: New born deaths in 2010, divided by total births (Kosei rodo sho 2011).

I include selected summary statistics in Table 3. For the convenience of the reader, I repeat these and all later variable definitions in Table 4.

[Insert Table 3 about here.]

[Insert Table 4 about here.]

First, at the prefectural level (a coarse measure to be sure) burakumin concentration does not significantly correlate with reported per capita income (to the extent burakumin work in illegal industries, my income figure understates their real income) in simple pairwise correlation, but does correlate with the fraction of the population living below the poverty line. To explore this and other questions of correlation (obviously not causation), in Table 5 I hold constant population density and prefectural income. Importantly, the fraction of burakumin in a prefecture does correlate with the fraction of households below the poverty line (Table 5, Panel A, Regression (2)). Even with population density and per capita income held constant, prefectures with more burakumin do have a higher fraction of people in poverty.

[Insert Table 5 about here.]

Second, far more non-burakumin live in poverty than burakumin. Where Kensaku Tomuro (2016) estimates a 2012 national poverty rate of 18.3 percent, by the 1993 census only 0.71 percent of all Japanese were burakumin. Consider Kochi, the rural prefecture with the highest fraction of burakumin -- 4.3 percent of households, or 13,800. With a poverty rate of 23.7 percent, 76,300 of the households live in poverty. Even if all Kochi burakumin lived below the poverty level (which they do not), the great majority of the poor would not be burakumin. Or consider Fukuoka, an urban prefecture with a relatively high fraction of burakumin -- 2.3 percent, or 48,500 households.

With a poverty rate of 20.6 percent, 435,000 households are in poverty. Again, even if all burakumin lived in poverty, most of the poor families in Fukuoka would not be burakumin.

Third, none of the other regressions give any sense that burakumin live poorly. As an index of public infrastructure, take sewage: centralized sewage facilities are more widespread in the cities than in rural villages, but population density held constant, burakumin are not associated with lower access to sewage lines (Part A, Reg. (1)). Neither -- in unreported regressions -- are they associated with less access to running water. As an index of educational access, take university education: burakumin are not associated with lower rates of college attendance. They are actually associated with significantly higher rates (Reg. A(3)). As an index of public health, take life expectancy: burakumin are not associated with lower life expectancy for women (Reg. A(4); the adjusted R2 is not even positive). Neither are they associated with lower life expectancy for men (unreported regression). They are not associated with lower heights for 5th grade girls (Reg. A(5); again, the adjusted R2 is not even positive). Neither are they associated with lower heights for boys (unreported regression). They are not associated with higher infant mortality rates (but rural villages do have higher mortality rates; Reg. A(6)). Neither are they associated with higher unemployment rates (unreported regression).

3. Troubling markers. -- Yet the fraction of burakumin in a prefecture is associated with several indices of more troubling, dysfunctional behavior. I use the following variables:

Crimes per capita, 2010: Number of Criminal Code violations (Keisatsu cho 2011), divided by total population.

Meth crimes per capita, 2011: Number of crimes involving methamphetamines in 2011 (Keisatsu cho 2011), divided by total population.

Welfare dependency, 2010: Number of households on public assistance in 2010 (seikatsu hogo; Kosei 2011a), divided by number of households.

Illegitimacy rate, 2009: Number of non-marital births in 2009, divided by total births (Kosei 2010).

Divorce rate, 2010: Number of divorces in 2010, divided by number of marriages (Kosei 2011b).

In simple pair-wise correlation, the concentration of burakumin is significantly associated with the number of methamphetamine crimes per capita, the fraction of the population on public assistance, the fraction of non-marital births, and the divorce rate. In Table 5 Panel B, I hold constant population density and per capita income, and use simple OLS regressions to explore these associations (again, not causation) further. The concentration of burakumin is correlated -- significantly -- both with the total crime rate (Panel B Reg. (1)), and specifically with the rate of methamphetamine crimes (Reg. B(2)). Methamphetamines are the drugs most widely abused in Japan, and ones whose distribution is heavily tied to the organized crime syndicates. The burakumin concentration rate is also correlated significantly with the fraction of people on welfare (Reg. B(3)), with the rate of children born to unmarried parents (Reg. B(4)), and with the divorce rate (Reg. B(5)).

4. Alternative evidence. -- In Table 6, I examine the social structure of the burakumin community more directly. In Table 5, I explored that social structure indirectly through the correlation between burakumin concentration and social phenomena at the prefectural level. In this Table 6, I report summary statistics that compare various rates directly between burakumin and non-burakumin, again at the prefectural level. I take the statistics from the 1995 government

survey that yielded the 1993 census (Somu cho 1995), and additional material published by the BLL (Zenkoku buraku 1998). The survey was at least nominally national, but compiled from prefecture-level sub-surveys. The burakumin are not a nation-wide phenomenon, of course (see Table 2), and on most of the measures only about half of the prefectures submitted reports.

[Insert Table 6 about here.]

Table 6 confirms the broad message of the correlations reported in Table 5: burakumin are poorer than the general public. Burakumin are more likely to be on welfare. Despite having much the same percentage of workers in agriculture (8.43 percent of the burakumin, 8.42 percent of the general public), they have less access to municipal sewage networks (a point that did not appear in Table 5). They are more likely to be earning very low income, and less likely to earn high incomes. Consistent with the data on illegitimacy in Table 5, burakumin are also more likely to raise children in broken homes.

D. Corruption:[5]

1. Intimidation. -- For years, the Japanese media kept quiet about the corruption within the burakumin leadership. Western scholars seem not to have noticed the corruption at all, but they did notice the media silence. Sociologist Christopher Bondy (2015, 6) implies that the media silence itself reflected prejudice. By their very reticence, he writes, the "media are agents that silence public exposure to buraku issues."

In fact, Japanese editors and reporters avoided the issue out of simple self-interest: the risk of retaliation was just too large. Under the rubric of "denunciation," buraku leaders responded with tactics that were both brutal and violent. When the mainstream Asahi Shimbun -- the closest thing to a newspaper of record in Japan -- detailed BLL corruption in Fukuoka, it steadfastly refused to name any of its reporters (Asahi 1982).

Buraku leaders could also punish through the judicial apparatus. When in 2015 a burakumin critic of the League posted the 1935 census on the internet, they sued him for 270 million yen damages (Tottori 2016). As of early 2018, the case was still pending. When an unemployed young man posted photographs on the internet that he had taken while bicycling through several buraku, they initiated criminal prosecution. Bizarrely, the court complied and sentenced him to a year in prison (suspended; Tominaga 2015, 42).

When a question involving burakumin arises, many mainstream Japanese instead defer comment with the simple "burakumin are frightening" (dowa wa kowai). In 1989, for example, a Matsuzaka city council representative observed that many residents objected to buraku subsidies (detailed below) as "reverse discrimination" but were "too frightened to say so because they were afraid of being harassed by burakumin." "I'm frightened too," he added.

To BLL activists, the representative was perpetuating the "stereotype that the burakumin are 'frightening'" (Miyamoto 2013, 91-96). With no apparent sense of irony, they marched into city hall and demanded he be punished. The city council meekly convened a disciplinary committee, and declared the comment about being frightened "discriminatory." Thereupon, the representative duly thanked the burakumin for doing what they did. "If this problem had not occurred, I do not believe I would have had the opportunity to study the buraku problem," he explained. "From now on, I would like to study the buraku problem as intently as possible, and to dedicate my life to the realization of the goal of 'Matsuzaka: The city that protects human rights.'"

---

[5] This Section D borrows from Ramseyer & Rasmusen (2018).

To justify their feral control over public speech, BLL activists rely on two principles. Postwar BLL leader Zennosuke Asada (1979, 251) articulated the first as a formal proposition at the 1956 BLL annual meeting: "Every day-to-day problem that occurs in the buraku -- everything disadvantageous to burakumin -- results from discrimination." The second principle is not one the BLL ever formally adopted, but plays an equally central role and is similarly attributed to Asada: only a burakumin has the authority to decide what constitutes discrimination (Fujita, 1988; 1987, 57). The relentless accusations of discrimination and violent denunciations follow.

2. Subsidies. -- From 1969 to 2002, the national government distributed 15 trillion yen ($125 billion at the 2002 exchange rate) in subsidies to the burakumin, mostly through construction projects. Recall that the putative discrimination against burakumin occurs only when someone knows whether another person comes from a buraku. Yet most buraku neighborhoods are not well-known. In effect, by building a buraku community center or subsidized housing project, the government posts a concrete signpost declaring to the world that burakumin live here. Under the BLL's militant pressure, however, build those signposts is exactly what the governments did.

In most areas the government gave the BLL the power to allocate the construction contracts as it wished (the "one window policy," see Sec. VII.D., below). The BLL then awarded the construction contracts to firms that joined its Buraku Construction Association (BCA; the Dowa kensetsu kyokai). In return, the firms paid the BCA 0.7 percent of the contract amount. To some BLL leaders, the firms paid tribute beyond the 0.7 percent fee (Mori 2009, 78, 180). One prominent burakumin, for example, apparently demanded 3 to 5 percent of the contract (Kadooka 2012, 96).

Nominally, only burakumin firms joined the BCA. In practice, mainstream firms joined too. Profits on the government-funded buraku construction contracts were high enough, in other words, that mainstream firms paid to become burakumin firms. Sometimes a firm paid a well-known burakumin leader to serve as president; other times, it simply paid a bribe (Mori 2009, 180-83).

Prominent burakumin also diverted subsidies to themselves through shell companies. To do so, they first formed a corporation. The corporation joined the BCA and partnered with a mainstream construction firm. The two firms then bid on the government contract together, and on winning the bid the shell corporation took its cut and left the mainstream firm to do the work. Additionally, well-connected burakumin could -- and did -- sell the land for the projects to the government at inflated prices.[6]

3. Organized crime. -- The corruption surrounding the subsidy program made clear what many Japanese understood but rarely said in public, and what Western scholars (e.g., Hankins 2014; Bayliss 2013; Bondy 2015; McLaughlin 2003; Neary 2010; Upham 1980, 1984) almost entirely missed or ignored: the mob was a prominent part of the buraku. "The great majority of the minority groups earn an honest living," writes burakumin journalist Nobuhiko Kadooka (2012,

[6] See generally Ramseyer & Rasmusen (2018). Honda (1991, 20-21) writes that power companies sited their Fukui reactors on buraku land. The claim is plausible, but BLL corruption patterns suggest that if the power companies did site the reactors on buraku land, they did not do so out of contempt for burakumin. More plausibly, they sited them there under pressure from buraku leaders who saw a chance to sell them the land at high prices.

28). "But most men in the organized crime syndicates are members of minorities like the Koreans or the burakumin."[7]

Incendiary as Kadooka's statement may seem, members of the burakumin community, the syndicates, and the police consistently report that burakumin men comprise a large fraction of the syndicates. Most of the rest of the members have come from among the long-time resident-Koreans -- a group that traditionally lived in the same neighborhoods as the burakumin. One senior member of the Fukuoka-based Kudokai (as of 2018, the most violent of the Japanese syndicates) noted in a documentary that 70 percent of his group's members were either burakumin or Koreans.[8] Kadooka himself cites the don of the Kyoto-based Aizu-kotetsu-kai mob for the estimate that half of its 1,300 members were from the buraku as of 1996 (Kadooka 2009, 115; 2005, 82-83). Burakumin poet Yasutaro Uematsu (1977, 166-67) noted that 70 percent of the massive Yamaguchi-gumi were burakumin. And burakumin journalist Manabu Miyazaki (Miyazaki & Otani (2000, 162) wrote that 90 percent of the mob were "minorities" (burakumin and Koreans).[9] The police confirm these observations. In 1986, two American journalists reported that the police told them that 70 percent of the Yamaguchi-gumi came from the burakumin.[10] And in 2006, a former official of the Public Security Intelligence bureau gave the Foreign Correspondent's Club a figure of 60 percent.[11]

The most troubling aspect of the overlap between the burakumin and the criminal syndicates -- so inflammatory that academic accounts never mention it -- lies in the fraction of burakumin men who chose to join the mob. The size of that fraction during the years of the targeted subsidies discloses an enormous diversion of young talent -- a diversion from life in the legal sector into fundamentally criminal behavior. Suppose the burakumin comprised only half of the mob. Suppose further, following Table 1, that the buraku numbered about 1.1 million. At the height of the mob in the late 1980s, police reported that 23,000 men in their 20s and 27,000 men in their 30s were part of one of the gangs (Keisatsu hakusho, 1989). If the age composition of the burakumin tracked the general population,[12] 21.4 percent of the 20-29 year old burakumin men would have been part of the mob, and 25.2 percent of men in their 30s. "The buraku," as Kadooka (2012, 20) put it, was "for a long time ... the hotbed of the mob."

---

[7] Although often critical of the BLL, Kadooka remains part of the burakumin intellectual leadership. He apparently retains enough goodwill within the BLL itself to be invited to contribute to BLL symposia -- see Kadooka (2014).

[8] See http://blog.livedoor.jp/takeru25-6911/archives/2057059.html

[9] Rankin (2012) describes Miyazaki as someone who "knows the situation well," but apparently misses Miyazaki's statement that the mob is composed overwhelmingly of "minorities." See note xx, infra.

[10] Kaplan & Dubro (1986, 145). The Japanese Wikipedia entry for the two authors notes that the discussion was excised from the Japanese translation, presumably because the publisher feared BLL attacks.

[11] Lecture by Mitsuhiro Suganuma. In 2014, the lecture was available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wNAJVnjlR2g. It has since been taken down, nominally over "copyright" concerns, though it was still available elsewhere on YouTube as of 2016. The statement comes from a senior member of the Yamaguchi-gumi. Rankin (2012) dismisses Suganuma's account as "distasteful insinuation," but apparently (given his praise of Miyazaki in note x, supra) misses Miyazaki's own statement about the buraku domination of the mob.

[12] In fact, the 1993 government survey indicated that the burakumin were older than the general population. Of the burakumin living in the designated districts, 15.5 percent were 65 or older. Of the general Japanese population, 13.5 percent were 65 or older. See Naikaku (1995).

E. Implications for Discrimination:

All this obviously puts a different spin on why other Japanese might discriminate against the group. Recall the usual claims by western scholars: Japanese object to their children marrying a burakumin, and firms hesitate to hire burakumin. They discriminate, explain the scholars, out of an obsession with ancestry and a bizarre concern for ritual cleanliness. They discriminate because modern burakumin trace their ancestry to 17th and 18th century tanners and leather workers. Nicholas Kristof (1995) summarized the prevailing western scholarship when he wrote: the burakumin are "discriminated against simply because they were the descendants of people whose jobs were considered ritually unclean, like butchering animals, tanning skins, making leather goods, digging graves and handling corpses."

If ever a question were overdetermined, this would be one. Burakumin communities are heavily associated with drug abuse, welfare dependency, and births to unmarried mothers. They are the source of high rates of violent crime. The leaders of their "human rights" group systematically diverted massive wealth from the government's targeted subsidies program ("affirmative action" programs, as Upham [1980] referred to them). So tied to the mob was the community in the 1980s, that 20-25 percent of young burakumin mem were members of an organized crime syndicate.

IV. Pre-Modern Antecedents.

A. Introduction:

Although western scholars and buraku activists ascribe the putative modern prejudice to ritually unclean jobs that buraku ancestors held in the 17th century, the vast majority of those ancestors held no ritually unclean jobs at all. They were simply poor farmers. Before turning to the 17th century antecedents to the buraku (Sec. F, below), consider the general regional (Sec. B) and temporal (Sec. C) variation within pre-modern Japan, the economic growth during the period (Sec. D), and the social fluidity (Sec. E).

B. Regional and temporal variation:

1. Geographic diversity. -- Tokugawa Japan was a world of both massive regional variation and change over time. Despite the easy references in the English-language literature to groups locked within a rigid social order, the easy references are wrong, and belie enormous variation. They belie both the geographical differences across Japan, and the change that occurred over the two-and-a half centuries of Tokugawa rule.

The Tokugawa poor were anything but a coherent group. The reasons lie in basic geography. Japan is a mountainous volcanic chain comprised of four major islands and dozens of smaller ones. During the Tokugawa period, the regime's control extended over three of the four islands. Driving by modern highway from the southernmost Kyushu to the northern end of Honshu is 1,900 km. Driving from Tokyo to Niigata along the Japan Sea is only 316 km by modern highway, but requires climbing a mountain range 2,400 meters high. By contrast, the trip from San Diego to Portland, Oregon, is about 1,300 km. Southern California's highest peak -- the Bear Mountain ski resort -- is 2,700 meters high.

But Tokugawa Japan was not home to highways and ski resorts. These were the days before the communication and transportation networks, when Japan was simply a brutally impassable volcanic mountain range. In time, the Tokugawa regime would build several roads to link together the most major of the cities. But even over those roads, the trip from Edo (Tokyo) to Kyo (Kyoto)

that Hiroshige immortalized in his woodblock prints took two weeks. The trip from Edo to Nagasaki -- the only port open to western traders -- took 30 days. And when haiku poet Basho circumnavigated the northern half of Honshu for his epic Narrow Road to the Deep North, he walked for half a year.

2. Administrative diversity. -- During the 16th century, rival warlords ravaged the countryside in relentless efforts to control ever-larger swaths of land. By the last decades of the century, several successive warlords managed to acquire near-total control. In 1600, Tokugawa Ieyasu defeated his remaining rivals and established a new national government (called a bakufu) in Edo.

Ieyasu and his successors never directly ruled the entire country. Instead, they ran what one could politely call a "federal" government. He and his predecessors had cobbled together their fiefs by defeating rival warlords, and combining increasingly larger portfolios of distinct domains (called han). By the time Ieyasu established his government, the country remained divided among 270 domains ruled by hereditary warlord families. The extended Tokugawa family itself directly governed only 10-20 of the domains. The rest they left to the leaders of the other warlord families (called daimyo). These leaders all formally answered to the Tokugawa family, but varied widely in their loyalty to the center.

All this matters in understanding the reach of Tokugawa decrees (detailed in Secs. F. & G., below). The Tokugawa government focused primarily on two things: on monitoring its nominally subordinate warlords for signs of disaffection, and on collecting tribute. It did rule its own domains. It did adjudicate disputes between people from different domains. It issued orders on which it expected the other domains to model their own decrees. But over people in the domains not controlled by the Tokugawa family, it largely deferred to the warlord in power.

C. Demographic Change:

Take several demographic facts relevant to buraku history. First, during the Tokugawa period, the population grew. From 17 million at the start of the era, the national population grew by over 80 percent during the first 120 years to 31.3 million (Table 7). The population then stayed relatively constant until the last decades of the regime when it began to grow again. From 17 million in 1600 to 34.5 million in 1874, over the Tokugawa period as a whole the Japanese population doubled (Saito & Takashima 2015a, 8).

[Insert Table 7 about here.]

Second, as the population grew, Tokugawa peasants migrated. Daughters and second or third sons without a farm to inherit left their villages. Some apprenticed themselves to a trade. Some left for distant villages with unclaimed land. Bands of poorer farmers left en masse to build new paddies and start new villages.

The government did not stop this migration. Mid-20th-century scholars sometimes claimed the contrary. They sometimes wrote that the Tokugawa regime tied peasants to their farms and artisans to their trade. The regime ran so repressive a regime, they explained, that people could not -- and did not -- move (e.g., Watanabe 1965, 414; Furushima 1991, 483-85). In making the claim, they quoted Tokugawa decrees banning migration. Yet in fact, the decrees did not bind. Explains distinguished modern economist Osamu Saito (2009, 184-185):

> [The a]ctual policies taken by domain lords varied from province to province and also from period to period, but the administrations' attitude became unmistakably permissive towards individual mobility. ... [T]he incidence of out-migration increased

over time and, ... the rural-urban flow of people became substantial in the latter half of the Tokugawa period.

Third, as the people migrated, first metropolitan centers and then secondary rural towns grew and flourished. During the first half of the Tokugawa period, farmers moved to the large cities like Osaka and the newly established political capital of Edo. Estimates Akira Hayami (2009, 102), the pioneer of modern Japanese demography, "perhaps 70-80 thousand people were pulled to the cities each year" during the 17th century. From 60,000 in 1600, by 1721 the population of Edo had reached 1.1 million (Saito & Takashima, 2015a, 16). What is more, by then, "Osaka's and Kyoto's populations had each reached 400,000" (Hayami 2009, 102). More generally, write Saito and economic historian Masanori Takashima (2015a, 10), from 6.1 percent in 1600, the fraction of people living in cities of at least 10,000 doubled by 1721 to 12.6 percent (Saito & Takashima 2015a, 10).

After the mid-18th century, farmers continued to migrate, but now to smaller regional centers (Saito & Takashima 2015a, 7). The population of the very largest cities actually fell slightly during this period. The thriving industry and commerce in the regional centers drew people there instead (Takashima 2017, 192-93, 198).

D. Economic Growth:

1. Agriculture. -- Before turning to burakumin agriculture, note several characteristics of Tokugawa farming more generally. The 16th century civil wars dramatically spurred agricultural growth. To be sure, the wars devastated much of the country. They also, however, gave local cultivators effective control over the land. Prior to the wars, the title to much of the land had been divided among multiple claimants, both local and distant.

By stripping the distant claimants of their interests, the wars consolidated title in the local cultivator and his regional daimyo. This cleaner title and larger fractional ownership, in turn, gave farmers stronger incentives to increase production. By the 17th century, wrote historian Osamu Wakita (quoted in Yamamura 1981, 343-44):

> [T]he peasants' rights of ownership were in fact property rights in land ... Inheritance, acquisition, and alienation of land by sale were all determined by the peasants' own volition. The political authority of the early period [from the early 16th to mid-17th century] did not impose any restrictions concerning these matters.

The localization of control matters because it created the incentives for what economic historian Kozo Yamamura (1981, 334) called an "agricultural revolution." Estimate Saito & Takashima (2015, 9; see Table 7), from 30 million koku (about 150 kg of rice) in 1600, farmers more than doubled rice production to 76 million by the end of the period.

To be sure, the Tokugawa government eventually purported to limit land transfers. Yet it tried to do so only during the second half of its rule, and never effectively. Wakita again (in Yamamura 1981, 343-44):

> We know that decrees were issued prohibiting the alienation and division of land..., but such limitations on the peasants' rights were exercised only after the mid-seventeenth century .... However, it is evident that these decrees had little effect even during the half-century following their promulgation.

When the late Tokugawa government did try to limit transfers, farmers simply negotiated transactions that circumvented the limits. Saito (2009, 171; ital. orig.) explains how they did this:

> Tokugawa peasants were not allowed to sell land if the sale were made "in perpetuity." This ban on the permanent sale was interpreted by contemporaries to mean

that peasants were allowed to sell a parcel of land for a limited period of time, which in practice meant 'pawning' (shichiire).

In part, farmers and rural entrepreneurs engineered their agricultural revolution by increasing acreage. Over the course of the 17th century, they carved ever-increasing numbers of paddy fields out of the hills and mountains. From 1,635,000 cho (1 cho roughly equals 1 hectare) in 1600, paddy area reached 3,050,000 cho by 1874 (Yamamura 1981, 334).

And in part, farmers innovated with the land that they had. From each paddy, they extracted ever-increasing amounts of produce. Writes Yamamura (1981, 336):

> [They brought to their work the] more effective use of water resources, the creation and dissemination of higher-yielding varieties of rice, the availability of low-cost hoes suitable for small-scale farming, the increased application of fertilizers, and a more efficient allocation and application of labor due to the greater contiguity of landholdings and the emergence of more efficient labor units.

2. Commerce and industry. -- Not only did farmers now hold effective title to their rice paddies, they also owned the product of any other investments they made. They could grow vegetables for specialized markets. They could weave cloth in the evening, and sell it to travelling wholesalers. And they could move -- either for several years or permanently -- to nearby towns, and work in the non-agricultural sector full-time.

In substance, young peasants faced a thriving alternative market for their work. If their parents lacked the land to support them, they could leave -- and they did. Write historians Nobuhiko Nakai and James McClain (1991, 539), they "often moved into the growing castle towns, where they could hope to find work as day laborers or unskilled artisans ...." There, in the towns and cities, as Yamamura (1981, 352) put it, the "migrating peasants were welcomed to work the land and to people the cities."

As farmers found by-employment and artisans expanded into small-scale manufacturing, merchants created increasingly wider and more sophisticated markets. A "spectacular expansion in the volume of commercial exchange" followed, write Nakai & McClain (1991, 542). That commerce, in turn, let farmers (id., at 544) "concentrate more profitably their energies on growing commercial crops, such as cotton, tea, hemp, mulberry, indigo, vegetables, and tobacco, for sale to the urban markets."

As men and women left the farming villages for the cities and rural centers, the secondary and tertiary sectors boomed. When the Tokugawa period began, write Saito & Takashima (2015b, 22), the primary sector accounted for 72.2 percent of Japanese economic production, the secondary sector 7.6 percent, and the tertiary 20.3. Recall that agricultural production doubled during the Tokugawa period. Notwithstanding that expansion, as a fraction of total output the primary sector dwindled. By 1874, the primary sector represented only 58.7 percent of total output. The secondary sector had risen to 10.9 percent and the tertiary to 30.4 percent (Saito & Takashima 2015b, 22). From 2.5 koku in 1600, per capita GDP over all sectors reached 3.7 koku by 1874 (see Table 7).

The new-found prosperity reached all social levels. The growth turned in part on specialization. The Tokugawa period harbored, in Saito's words (2005, 39), "an unmistakable trend towards an increased division of labour." Yet it was a division of labor that increased welfare at all levels. Concludes Saito (2005, 5), "wage growth went hand in hand with output growth" during the period. As a result (id., 40), "Japan's pre-modern growth ... was not associated with increased income inequality among the social classes."

E. Social Structure:

In stressing the rigidly hierarchical Tokugawa social structure, mid-century scholars of the buraku misconstrued Tokugawa society. The daimyo did indeed pass their status to their children. But the rest of the population -- including the ancestors of the modern burakumin -- lived, moved, and worked within a mobile and flexible world.

This is not the society that most mid-century (and a few later) historians described. The Tokugawa regime imposed on its citizens a rigidly hierarchical four-plus-outcaste class structure, mid-century historians wrote: samurai, farmer, artisan, merchant, and eta-hinin (what modern scholars call burakumin; see Sec. F.2., below). People were born into a class, they claimed, stayed within it, and lived at the level appropriate to their place in the hierarchy (e.g., Watanabe 1965; Ozaki 1982; Wakita 1991, 123).

These mid-century scholars, modern Japanese historians now conclude, took far too seriously the philosophical treatises of the mid-Tokugawa neo-Confucian advisers. The Tokugawa officials themselves said virtually nothing about any four-class hierarchy before the mid-18th century. They never pursued it at a more than superficial level (Saito & Oishi 1995, 20). They never even purported to regulate "outcaste" behavior until 1778 (Watanabe 1977, 6-7). And even their neo-Confucian advisers themselves did not formulate a four-class ideal until well into the 18th century.

What is more, continue social historians Yoichi Saito and Shinzaburo Oishi (1995, 32-33), the Tokugawa government never used the four-class formula with an "eta-hinin" suffix at all. The first reference to this ostensibly Tokugawa phrase instead appears in 1874, and for half a century thereafter rarely reappeared. Rather, write Saito & Oishi (1995, 34), the four-plus-outcaste formula came into wide use -- ostensibly to describe Tokugawa government policy -- only in the 20th century.

The four-plus-outcaste formula first began to appear widely in late 1920s government histories, explain Saito & Oishi (1995). It appeared as a form of appeasement. Young burakumin men were beginning to create a violent and militant political movement (discussed in Section VI, below), and wanted a peculiar history of the buraku. For the public schools, they demanded a history that characterized the burakumin as descended from victims of a brutally oppressive Tokugawa regime. The government acquiesced, and described Tokugawa society as four classes plus the outcastes. The Tokugawa, in short, did not use any four-plus-outcaste formula. Militant burakumin invented it in the 1920s to buttress their claims of Tokugawa oppression.

F. The Tokugawa Buraku:

1. Variation. -- Within this steadily prospering (with periodic downturns, to be sure) world, the identifiable predecessors to the modern burakumin were among the poorer groups. These predecessors date back only to the 15th century. Poor people lived during earlier periods too, of course, but in locations that only occasionally matched those of the Tokugawa buraku antecedents.[13]

Even within the Tokugawa period, however, the many lower-class groups did not much resemble each other, either across the country or over time. Recall the inaccessibility of many of the domains, and the lack of any common political control over most. The resulting geographical diversity generated lower class communities that faced widely varying circumstances. Members

[13] Usui (1991, 69); Teraki (1997, 23, 43); Watanabe (1963, 14).

of the most common of the burakumin's predecessor groups went by the term "kawata" in western Japan, "chori" in the east, and faced the pejorative epithet of "eta" (e.g., Saito & Oishi 1995, 52). A smaller distinct group went by the term "hinin." And in some communities at some times, itinerant beggars, peddlers, and entertainers went by still other terms (e.g., Ohnuki-Tierney 1989).

Members of these lower-class groups faced widely varying sources of income and wealth, and types and level of prejudice.[14] Even the terminology varied. Aside from kawata, chori, and hinin, historian Minoru Watanabe (1965, 101, 338; see also Saito & Oishi 1995, 62) catalogs nearly forty different names for the various lower-class groups. About the many groups, writes historian Hisamitsu Usui (1991, 77):

> It is absolutely crucial to stress the enormous differences by domain and region. They are differences born of the differing strengths of the local daimyo, the differing rates of social and economic development, and the differing kinds of outcastes themselves.

2. Kawata and hinin. -- At the level of broad generalities, mid-20th century writers described two distinct Tokugawa outcaste groups: the kawata and the hinin (Ehlers, forthcoming). Conventionally, they asserted that the kawata skinned dead cattle and horses and worked in the leather trade; the hinin policed villages, manned the jails, and carried out punishments (e.g., Minegishi 1996, 44-46). The kawata were born into their group; the hinin could fall into the status out of poverty or be sentenced to it as criminal punishment.[15] The hinin sometimes exited their status; the kawata never could (e.g., Hasegawa 1927, 10).

In practice, the distinctions were far less clear. Most importantly, most kawata never skinned carcasses and had nothing to do with the leather trade (see Subsection 3, below). Governments often did assign hinin policing duties, but they could assign kawata policing, fire-fighting, and jail-guarding responsibilities too (Sansai 1961, I-491; Ozaki 1982).

To be sure, many hinin did not inherit their status. Although some did, others either found themselves assigned the status as criminal punishment or descended into the status as vagrants (Takayanagi 1979, 20; Minegishi 1996, 129-30). And under specified conditions, some of the hinin could return to the status of ordinary peasants.[16]

Yet, commoners could acquire kawata status too. Some joined the group by happenstance. They were poor, moved to the city, rented rooms in a kawata neighborhood, and found a job with a kawata employer. In time, they and their descendants became kawata. Other commoners became kawata by choice. Sometimes, industries controlled by kawata in an area became very profitable. When they did, some commoners deliberately adopted kawata status in order to enter the industry.[17]

And some kawata exited their status and became commoners. As historian Noah McCormack (2013, 53) put it:

> Status was hereditary in principle, but at ground level, the law was quite flexible. The separation between outcaste and commoner, never absolute, became increasingly ambiguous as the Tokugawa period progressed.

---

[14] McCormack (2013, 51); Hatanaka (1997, 87; 2004, 66, 80-81); Minegishi (1996, 16); Tsukada (2001, 2).

[15] E.g., Minegishi (1996, 56); Watanabe (1977, 135, 335); Tsukada (2007). On the hinin more generally, see Ehlers (2018); Tsukada (2007).

[16] Ishii (1994, 91); Tsukada (2001, 3); Sansai (1961, I-444); Ozaki (1982, 154).

[17] Hatanaka (1997, 110-11). And in other places, hinin became kawata over time, or no one distinguished the two groups at all (Watanabe 1977, 63, 127; Hatanaka 1997, 110-11)).

Sometimes and in some communities, kawata could apply for a formal change of status (Watanabe 1977, 127; Hatanaka 1997, 69-80). More commonly, they simply acquired the skills and economic means to thrive outside the kawata community. They left their homes, and moved to a new city. Upon arrival, they rented rooms in a commoner section of town, and took jobs with a commoner firm. They and their descendants were now commoners (Hatanaka 1997, 110-11).

3. Occupation. -- (a) Farming. Perhaps the fact most fatal to modern accounts of the buraku is this: the vast majority of the kawata never dealt with dead animals at all. Instead, they farmed. As Usui (1991, 20) put it in his prefectural study:

> In Hyogo, the business of the buraku was agriculture. Overwhelmingly, the members of the buraku did the same work as the other townspeople and farmers.

Among farmers, the kawata tended to approach the poorer end of the income distribution. The data being what they are, historians of the kawata tend to focus on one or several villages at a time. In the course of their essay, they detail village landholdings. Generally, they find that the kawata tended to be among the poorer villagers. The kawata sometimes supplemented their farm income with by-employment, though rarely in the leather industry (Watanabe 1975, 105-06). But they were not the very poorest farmers in the village. Instead, they earned incomes that substantially overlapped with those of their commoner peers.

For example, historian Yukiya Ozaki (1982, 89-92) assembles records of rice production in a Nagano village in 1736. The village contained 27 kawata and 23 commoner families. They produced (one koku equaled 180 liters):

	Less than 1 koku	1-3 koku	Over 3 koku	Total
Kawata	11	12	4	27
Others	10	3	10	23

Historians have compiled a wide variety of these village land-holding and rice-production surveys, but they almost always tell the same story: the average kawata was poorer than the average commoner, but the wealthiest kawata could be rich even by commoner standards.[18]

(b) Guilds. Buraku activists and western scholars routinely assert that upon liberation the kawata (i.e., those pejoratively called "eta") lost their Tokugawa guild monopolies. Gilbert Rozman (1989, 526) reports that the kawata lost “monopolies of occupation” upon liberation. Neary (1989, 18) places the Edo kawata in "guild-like bodies." And Upham (1988, 79) writes that "the monopolies [gave] the outcastes an economically stable base on which to build their own society."

In truth, the kawata never constituted a guild and had no monopolies to lose.[19] Some did work in tanning or leatherworking, but none held any monopoly on either. In many leather-related sectors (e.g., leather-backed sandals) the kawata competed fiercely with commoner firms. Buyers regularly switched their orders between kawata and commoner sellers, and workers themselves migrated among the two types of firms (Minegishi 1996, 120; Matsuoka 1975, 16, 41).

---

[18] E.g., Hatanaka (1990, 84); Teraki (1997, 75, 111); Usui (1991, 162, 176-77, 285); Minegishi (1996, 30-31).

[19] To be sure, reading the literature leaves one with a nagging suspicion that lawyers and economists on the one hand, and modern historians on the other, may have a somewhat different sense of what the term "monopoly" means.

(c) Skinning. Rather than any sectoral monopoly, upon liberation a few (disproportionately wealthy) kawata lost a property right to skin dead horses and cattle within a delineated area. The scope of this property right varied over time and geography (Saito & Oishi 1995, 72). Typically, one or several households in a village held the right to skin all horses and cattle that died within a given community.[20]

This skinning right did not inhere in the kawata as a group; instead, it constituted a transferrable property right owned by a few. Farmers bought, sold, and pledged the "shares" (kabu) giving a holder a right to the proceeds of the skinning.[21] In most the villages, the farmers who held the shares tended to be among the wealthier kawata. Some acquired shares when a borrower defaulted on a loan (Mae 1975, 225). Some bought them outright. And historians Matsuoka (1975, 24-25) and Usui (1991, 205) both report that the shares could be -- and occasionally were -- transferred to commoner villagers.

The men who skinned the dead animals rarely tanned the hides. Few farmers had the expertise or equipment necessary for the task. Those who held the shares entitling them to participate in the skinning instead sold the hides (and other byproducts) to specialty tanners in neighboring towns. These were the men who had invested in the skills and equipment necessary to turn the skin into leather. Some of them were indeed kawata, but others were not.[22]

4. Land ownership and taxes. -- Successful kawata routinely owned much of the land they farmed. Despite occasional assertions otherwise (e.g., Watanabe 1965, 934-37), kawata owned land. The contrary claims, explains Usui (1991, 22), derive from "two or three [Tokugawa] bakufu decrees and assorted domainal edicts." Decrees and edicts notwithstanding, the kawata farmed, and like their commoner neighbors owned much of the land that they tilled.[23] As noted earlier (Subsection D.1.), commoners routinely transferred their paddies by sale or pledge, and so did the kawata. As Usui (1991, 20) put it, "land ownership and agriculture were widespread in the buraku."

The increased land holdings brought conflict over the village commons, but not conflict because of any kawata status. Rights to the village commons mattered because they brought access to fertilizer and irrigation water. From time to time, scholars have tried to attribute the conflicts to bias (e.g., Upham 1988, 80). In fact, however, the conflicts occurred when kawata developed new land, and increased the demands on village resources. As the BLL-sponsored Kyoto research institute noted, commoners did not object to kawata who had owned land for generations using the village commons. They complained only when those who constructed new paddies wanted access (Kyoto buraku 1995, 393).

On what they raised, kawata paid taxes. Again, scholars and buraku activists have routinely claimed the contrary. Reflecting that conventional wisdom, Rozman (1989, 526) asserts that upon liberation the burakumin lost their "nontaxed status." Wakita (1991, 124) writes that commoners paid an "annual land tax," while "[o]utcasts, on the other hand, were charged with such duties as keeping up the castle grounds, tanning hides, cleaning prisons, and carrying out the punishment of

---

[20] Watanabe (1997, 104); Mae (1975, 217-18); Saito & Oishi (1995, 67).

[21] Watanabe (1977, 114, 304); Matsuoka (1975, 19-20); Mae (1975, 204); Saito & Oishi (1995, 120).

[22] Minegishi (1996, 226); Watanabe (1977, 191); Saito & Oishi (1995, 124).

[23] Usui (1991, 20); Hatanaka (1997, 10); Kyoto buraku (1995, 305); Minegishi (1996, 32, 330).

criminals." In truth, the kawata paid taxes on their harvest.[24] They paid taxes at the same rates as everyone else.

5. Urban kawata communities. -- Although most kawata farmed, some moved to the regional towns and cities (Kyoto buraku 1995, 364-67). During the first half of the Tokugawa period, they migrated to the major cities; during the second half, they migrated to smaller regional centers. And as they did, they created their own distinctive neighborhoods on the urban periphery (Usui 1991, 27; Watanabe 1997, 166-67).

Whether commoner or kawata, the farmers moved to the towns and cities to exploit the opportunities created by economic growth. Japanese farmers tilled small plots. The smaller of these farms could only support one nuclear family. Once the towns and cities began to offer industrial and commercial opportunities, those children who would not inherit the family farm found in these urban environments the economic means by which to start families of their own. Historian Noah McCormack (2013, 20) describes the migration:

> [U]ncounted peasants, especially second and third sons who were unlikely to inherit land, moved to Japan's rapidly growing towns and cities from the late seventeenth century into the eighteenth century and beyond, becoming de facto and often, over time, de jure townspeople.

Within this massive migration, the kawata joined their commoner peers. From the villages, writes historian Takashi Tsukada (2001, 11, 14-15, 30), the kawata migrated to the towns and cities in massive numbers. As Hiroshi Watanabe (1977, 154) put it, "the movement of people into and out of the unliberated [i.e., kawata] villages during the late Tokugawa period was enormous." Notes McCormack (2013, 51): "Many Kawata people [left] their home communities and head[ed] for the city, where they could often pass as commoners and where they lived as de facto or sometimes de jure townspeople."

Historian Hisamitsu Usui (1991, 77) attributes the concentration of urban kawata communities near Kyoto, Osaka and Kobe to the relative economic advance of the area. Throughout the three Tokugawa centuries, these regions lay at the economic forefront. As such, they offered the best opportunities to migrants from the countryside.

The urban kawata neighborhoods arose in the places where the poorest of the rural immigrants settled. As farmers -- whether kawata or commoner -- moved to the urban centers, many would have settled initially in the poorer sections of town. They would have taken the best jobs available to them. For some immigrants, that would have meant jobs that others found unclean or unpleasant (Usui 1991, 30-31, 98). With its acrid smells, tanning was one such job.

G. Sumptuary Decrees:

On the advice of their neo-Confucian scholars, late 18th and early 19th century Tokugawa elites periodically ordered the kawata to live lives befitting a low status. The Tokugawa elites issued a wide variety of sumptuary decrees. Through these edicts, they purported to regulate what people would wear and what they would do. Most commonly, they targeted wealthy merchants. These successful men and women were badly out-of-step with their newly theorized social status below farmers and artisans, and government officials tried to restrain their conspicuous

[24] Hatanaka (1997, 10); Watanabe (1997, 189); Minegishi (1996, 330); Kyoto buraku (1995, 275); Usui (1991, 22).

consumption. Wealthy kawata were out-of-step with their theorized status too, and from time to time government officials tried to curb their conspicuous behavior as well.

Over the course of the regime's last century, Tokugawa elites became increasingly desperate in these decrees. By the 1840s, writes historian Marius Jansen (2000, 255):

> The bakufu warred more vigorously than ever before against unseemly mores and morality .... Frugality was enjoined as seldom before; a stream of edicts warned against luxurious living and tried to regulate deportment with rules affecting Edo hairdressers, commoners' clothing, specialty foods, and festival toys. .... Farmers were warned against moving to cities. Everyone, in short, was ordered to resume or maintain a proper station and status.

The officials did not issue the sumptuary decrees out of an excess of repressive power. They issued them in a desperate attempt to slow the pace of social change.

Mid-century scholars routinely quoted these sumptuary decrees as evidence of anti-buraku government brutality. In fact, the decrees reflected the wealth of the more entrepreneurial kawata. Assigned by the official neo-Confucian philosophers to the bottom of the social structure, they lived lives entirely out of step with their theorized role (Watanabe 1977, 126; Kyoto buraku 1995, 376-79). Had merchants lived impoverished lives, no government official would have bothered to tell them to live modestly. Had kawata lived immiserated lives, no government official would have bothered to tell them to live modestly either. Late Tokugawa officials ordered merchants and kawata to stay within the bounds dictated by their newly hypothesized metaphysical inferiority precisely because so many so conspicuously overstepped those bounds.

Successful kawata generally maintained harmonious relations with their commoner peers. "Documentary records of adoptions, marriages, love affairs, trade and service reveal the existence of close and sometimes friendly relations between outcastes and people of different status," writes McCormick (2013, 50). According to the Kyoto Buraku History Research Institute (1995, 384):

> At first glance, these [decrees] look like the strengthening of discrimination. In truth, however, they arose from the fact that kawata were breaking through the barriers of status. The bakufu was trying to drag the world back to the old order.

The late-Tokugawa bans on kawata land ownership reflect the same phenomenon. As historian Toshiyuki Hatanaka (1997, 11) explains it, the government tried to ban kawata from owning land precisely because the kawata owned it on so a wide scale. Not only did ordinary kawata farmers own their own farms, the more successful kawata owned extraordinary amounts of land.[25] Some had acquired their land from other kawata, and others had acquired it from commoners. Some had operated as village financiers, and others had made their fortune in industry and commerce. Whatever the source, they channeled their wealth into large-scale landholdings (Kyoto buraku 1995, 375). As Watanabe (1977, 156) puts it:

> Large landlords emerged within the buraku. ... This emergence of the large landlords is because of their involvement in commerce and high-interest lending.

Like wealthy merchants, the richest kawata also found themselves subject to the occasional large-scale confiscation. Insolvent late-Tokugawa daimyo periodically ordered wealthy merchants to "lend" them large sums of money (Bolitho 1989, 136). They did not order the loans because the merchants stood at the bottom of the social hierarchy; they ordered the loans because the merchants had wealth they could take. During the last century of the Tokugawa period, insolvent

---

[25] Watanabe (1977, 189); Saito & Oishi (1995, 156-58); Usui (1991, 22); Uchida (1975, 310).

daimyo ordered wealthy kawata to "lend" money as well -- on the same terms, and for the same reason (Uchida 1975, 304).

H. Making Sense of the Buraku's Tokugawa Antecedents:

As this account makes clear, most burakumin do not trace their ancestry to people who specialized in ritually unclean jobs. Most do not trace their lineage to tanners, executioners, or leather workers. A few do, but not most. Most burakumin instead trace their ancestry to poor farmers. Most commonly called "kawata" (but occasionally "eta"), these farmers seem not to have faced discrimination because of any job they held. Neither, apparently, did they live as outcastes. They simply lived – to borrow a 20th century American expression – "on the wrong side of the tracks."

At root, the kawata faced bias because they were poor. Since the 1920s, most Japanese historians of the kawata have interpreted the "kawa" to refer to leather. The Japanese term for leather is indeed "kawa," so when writing "kawata" these scholars used the Chinese character (kanji) for leather. Yet "kawa" also refers to river. The characters assigned to leather and river differ, of course, but homonyms are common in Japanese and 17th century peasants rarely wrote. For them, "kawata" was not a written term; it was spoken.

Historian Hiroshi Watanabe (1977, 257-58) explains the likely etymology. Suppose, he writes, that several Tokugawa-era impoverished families decided to leave their homes. They would have relocated near a village with unclaimed land. During the first half of the Tokugawa period, large swaths of potential paddy land remained undeveloped (Watanabe 1977, 120).

At their eventual destination, the migrants would have settled on unused parcels. Because of the risk of floods – particularly during the autumn typhoon season – farmers often left land along the river undeveloped. Migrants looking for unclaimed land near a town or village would have found it on the river banks. There, they would have settled and built their paddies.

And indeed, modern burakumin often still live along a river. They live there because when their impoverished ancestors migrated to the area, the available (cheapest, if not free) land lay by the river. As they settled in the dry river bed (called kawara) or along the river banks, they became "kawara mono" – people of the river bank.[26] Because "ta" refers to rice paddies, once they built paddies by the river they became "kawata" -- farmers with paddies along the river (Hasegawa 1927, 28). The original villagers would have discriminated against these new arrivals for the same reason traditional agrarian communities everywhere often discriminate against poor strangers: they were poor, and they were strangers.

Kawata, in other words, referred to relatively poor, recent arrivals in a village. They were not defined by work, because they did the same work as everyone else. But they were poor. At least initially, they had settled on the least desirable land -- typically along the river. And they were relatively recent arrivals. They were not the "outcastes." To borrow yet another American idiom, they were the people who lived in the trailer park on the edge of town.[27]

Some poor farmers migrated not to another farming village but to a more urban area. Again, however, they would have settled along the river at the outskirts of town. There, they would have

---

[26] Watanabe (1977, 122); Usui (1991, 63); Saito & Oishi (1995, 64-66).

[27] Some kawata lived in kawata-only villages (Usui 1991 39). For the most part, these were villages that had been newly created in the Tokugawa period. There, they exploited new paddies (Usui 1991, 144-45, 354-56). Enough land had remained unfarmed at the start of the Tokugawa period, notes Watanabe (1977, 120) that the kawata who created these paddies sometimes acquired very fertile land.

taken the least attractive jobs. If only because of the foul smells, tanning jobs would have been among those undesirable jobs. For that elementary reason, some of these recent arrivals became tanners.

V. The Transitional Decades, 1868-1922

A. Introduction:

In the wake of their 1868 coup, military leaders from the winning coalition installed the Kyoto-based emperor as titular head of state, and governed directly from Tokyo. Upon taking control, they ran a census and counted 439,000 "eta" and 53,000 hinin (Table 1). They voided these categories as legal distinctions three years later, and counted 34,806,000 total citizens in 1872 (Ohsato 1966, 12).

Coups being what they are, residents in several areas remained uneasy. During the first few years, some rioted over the changes. They rioted over taxes, the draft, prices, school tuition. In some places, they rioted over the 1871 eta-hinin edict as well (Takayama 2005, 27; Kobayashi 1985, 297).

The burakumin would not organize as a political group until 1922. During the interim, the term kawata disappeared from popular usage. Eta remained its pejorative alternative, but people in polite speech used either "tokushu buraku" (special village) or simply "buraku" (village).

Over the course of the half century from 1871 to 1921, the burakumin continued to move. They did not jettison their buraku identity. But like other farmers, they left their villages in massive numbers and moved to the city (Subsec. B). Many burakumin did extremely well. They remained within their community, and thrived. Some of the more prosperous buraku merchants in Kyoto for example, created the Yanagihara Bank in 1899 and continued to run it until 1927 (Shigemitsu 1991). By choosing to stay within the community, these most successful of the burakumin helped to create and maintain the social and economic infrastructure that the group would have needed to thrive.

"Would have needed," that is, if events had not taken a different turn. They did take a different turn. Other burakumin did less well. And in many urban areas, the the less successful buraku came to include a criminal fringe (Subsec. C), and by 1920 the poorer burakumin had become closely associated with crime (Subsec. D). Unfortunately, this -- not the buraku entrepreneurs with the Yanagihara Bank -- was the association that would so decisively determine the direction the buraku community would take in the 20th century.

B. Migration:

From 1868 to 1921 the number of burakumin grew in tandem with the rest of the population. In Figure 1, I index the number of burakumin and of the general population by 1921 values. Over the course of these five decades, the two populations increased at roughly the same rate. From 1868 to 1921, the number of total burakumin grew by about 70 percent to 830,000. From 1872 to 1921, the general population grew by 60 percent.

Over those five decades, in other words, few burakumin jettisoned their status. To be sure, perhaps some commoners joined the community and replaced those who left. But that caveat aside, the fact that the aggregate number of burakumin grew at the same rate as the general population suggests -- as a first approximation -- that people born burakumin tended to stay in the community.

People moved during these decades. Japanese moved massively from the countryside to the towns and cities during the Tokugawa period too, but they continued to move during the half century from 1868 to 1921. In the urban centers, they found (what were for them) well-paying

jobs in a thriving economy. In 1878, they had faced per capita income of 11.5 yen. By 1921, that figure (in constant yen) had soared to 199 yen (Ohsato 1966). Some of the people who arrived in the cities found jobs in the enormous and diverse universe of small firms. Others worked in the massive new textile factories. In 1898, 30.5 million people (71 percent of the population) had lived in towns of fewer than 5,000 people. By 1920, only 27.1 million still lived in towns that small, and the number constituted but 48.9 percent of the population. Of the 85,000 factory workers in Osaka city in 1925, fewer than 20,000 had come from elsewhere in Osaka prefecture (Suzuki 2016, 37).

Burakumin moved in parallel with the rest of the population -- from the countryside to the cities, and from the farms to the factories.[28] Some burakumin found jobs at smaller firms owned by other burakumin. Belying claims of pervasive employment discrimination, others worked in the enormous new factories (Watanabe 1977, 168; Bahara 1984, 138). The most prosperous built homes in comfortable neighborhoods and ran thriving businesses. The poorest settled in city slums (Buraku 2018, 27, 30, 43).

Over the course of this migration, the center of burakumin activity shifted westward. From 1868 to 1921, burakumin communities in northeastern Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, Akita, Yamagata, Fukushima – all small to begin with -- lost population (Table 2). By contrast, over the same five decades, the identifiably burakumin communities in the western commercial and industrial centers grew stratospherically: the burakumin population in Kyoto grew 70 percent to 42,000, in Osaka nearly doubled to 48,000, in Fukuoka more than doubled to 67,000, and in Hyogo more than doubled to 108,000 (Table 2).

C. The Emerging Criminal Nexus:

1. Regressions. -- The urban buraku oiir lived within a violent world. By 1907, the association between these poorer burakumin and crime reached statistically noticeable levels. In Table 8, I regress 1907 total crime rates (Panel A) and murder rates (Panel B) on burakumin density (**Burakumin PC**) and on general population density (**Density**). To capture the level of integration between the burakumin and the general public, I include the rate of intermarriage between the burakumin and commoner populations (**Exogamy**; unfortunately, available only for 1921). To proxy for per capita income levels, I include the fraction of the population paying taxes in 1923 (**Taxpayers PC**):

Total crime PC: Total crimes for given year, as provided in Naimu daijin (appropriate year), divided by total population.

Murders PC: Total murders for given year, as provided in Naimu daijin (appropriate year), divided by total population. For 1886, murders include battery.

Exogamy: Number of marriages between burakumin and commoners in 1921, divided by all marriages involving burakumin in 1921, as provided in Naimu sho (1921).

Taxpayers PC: Number of taxpayers in 1923, divided by the total households, as provided in Okura sho (1923).

[Insert Table 8 about here.]

Although burakumin concentration did not correlate with observable crime in 1868, by 1907 the two variables correlated strongly (again, bear in mind the risk of ecological fallacy). As in 2010 (see Table 5.B., above), crime rates tracked urbanization: the higher the population density, the higher the rate of crime. Crucially, however, in 1907 they also tracked the relative number of

[28] Watanabe (1977, 168); Suzuki (2016, 27); Nara ken (1970, 102).

burakumin in a community. In the first column of Table 8 Panels A and B, I regress (with OLS) 1886 crime rates (the first available year) on burakumin density, population density, the exogamy rate, and the number of taxpayers per capita.[29] The coefficient on burakumin density is not statistically significant for either total crimes or the murder rate. In the second column, I add the rate of population growth since 1884, and conduct the same exercise for 1907. Note:

Population growth: fractional growth in total prefectural population since 1884.

In 1907, the coefficient on **Burakumin PC** is significantly positive: the higher the fraction of burakumin in a prefecture, the higher the rates both of total crimes generally and of murders specifically. Note that total crimes are a distinctly urban phenomenon: the coefficient on population density is positive and significant. The significance of the **Burakumin PC** variable is robust to serially dropping **Taxpayers PC**, **Exogamy**, and **Population growth**.

Whether burakumin choose to leave the community or to remain burakumin may plausibly depend in part opportunities in the criminal sector. If so, **Burakumin PC** is endogenous to **Total crime PC** and **Murders PC**. To address this phenomenon, in the third column of Panels A and B, I instrument the 1907 value of **Burakumin PC** with its 1868 predecessor, with a proxy for the location of Tokugawa-era buraku communities (**Shirayama shrines**), and with the fraction of burakumin in 1868 with hinin backgrounds (**Hinin fraction**). I thus add:

Shirayama shrines: The number of Shirayama shrines (said to have been a marker of the traditional location of burakumin communities), from Kikuchi (1961, 691).

Hinin fraction: Fraction of hinin among the 1868 burakumin, as given in Buraku mondai (1980). Note that the hinin are said to have migrated out of the buraku communities during the late 19th century.

The coefficient on the instrumented **Burakumin PC** for 1907 is significantly positive for both **Total crimes PC** and **Murders PC**.

2. Rice riots. -- By 1918, this association between the burakumin and crime was public information. That year, farmers in several prefectures organized massive, violent riots over the price of rice. Rice prices had indeed trebled in a year. Importantly, however, the riots did not entirely reflect impoverishment. In part, they reflected a newfound affluence.

For poorer farmers, rice had only recently become a staple. Traditionally, many of the poorest had eaten barley and millet, and sold their rice as a luxury good. During the first decades of the century, however, the economy had boomed. Young men and women moved to the city and earned high wages. Farmers added profitable textile-related by-employment. Those burakumin in the leather industry discovered that the war-related demand boosted market wages (Harada 1989, 90-91). Enjoying this newfound prosperity, famers and urban workers shifted a larger and larger share of their diet from barley to rice (Harada 1989, 87). And the army bought rice for the 72,000 soldiers it sent to attack the Bolsheviks on the eastern front besides (Takayama 2005, 66).

In response to this new demand, the price of the luxury-turned-widespread-staple soared. Yet supply was fixed, at least in the short-run. With their children earning high wages in the city, farmers lacked the labor with which to expand production. (Takano 2013).

The urban working class rioted and pillaged stores and warehouses. Leading the riots were the burakumin. Contemporary journalists identified them among the principal riot leaders, and modern scholars confirm the tie (Takayama 2005, 66-69). The Osaka police reported upwards of 9,300 burakumin participating in the riots, and in Kyoto, Osaka, Hyogo and Nara, 30 to 40 percent

[29] I use the exogamy rate in 1921 and the taxpayer fraction in 1923 because of data availability.

of the rioters were burakumin (Mitani 1985, 82). If the public had not earlier tied the burakumin to crime, the newspapers now did it for them.

D. The Buraku in 1920:

1. Incomes. – In the 1920s (and 1930s), burakumin were still poorer on average than the general public. As during the Tokugawa period, they were not all poorer; the burakumin and the general public overlapped considerably. But take the 1920 Diet election. Eligibility to vote turned on tax liability, and over the country as a whole 5.42 percent (3.07 million) of the population voted. Within the buraku, eligibility rates ranged from Ishikawa where 0.17 percent of the burakumin voted, to Chiba's 3.32 percent. The mean of buraku eligibility rates across the prefectures came to 1.55 percent.

Similarly, take the size of farms. Historian Hideo Haraguchi (2014, 393) reports the following distribution of farm sizes across Japan in the mid-1930s:

	Under 1/2 cho	1/2 to 1 cho	1 cho & over
Buraku	51%	32%	9%
All Japan	34	34	32

Note that one cho equals 9,917 square meters. As the voter eligibility data suggest, burakumin farmers tended to be somewhat poorer than their commoner peers.

Historian Takaju Aoki (1998, 21) compares the area cultivated within Nagano prefecture by burakumin and all farmers in 1931:

	All Nagano Households	%	Burakumin Households	%
less than 1/2 cho	74,880	36.3	1,761	72.9
1/2 to 1 cho	79,162	38.4	460	19.0
1 to 3 cho	49,532	24.1	183	7.6
3 cho & over	2,443	1.2	13	0.5
Total	206,017	100	2,417	100

The farm sizes for the Nagano public track the numbers in Haraguchi's national totals, while buraku farmers in Nagano tilled smaller farms than burakumin elsewhere. Other scholars (e.g., Yoshida 1978, 82-85) survey still more locations, but reach a similar general conclusion: burakumin farmers tended to be poorer than the general public, but not uniformly; many burakumin were richer than the poorest of their neighbors, and a few were actually quite wealthy.

2. Other indices. By other observable indices, however, the burakumin as a whole in the 1920s and 1930s did not face observably worse circumstances than their non-buraku counterparts. In Table 9, I regress various prefecture-level indices of social welfare on the number of burakumin per capita, on population density, on the exogamy rate (as an index of burakumin-commoner interaction), and on the number of taxpayers per capita (as an index of income). I create the following dependent variables:

Suicide rate: Number of suicides in 1934, divided by the total population, from Naikaku (1935).

Dysentery rate: Number of deaths from dysentery in 1933, divided by the total population, from Naimu sho (1933).

Tuberculosis rate: Number of deaths from tuberculosis in 1933, divided by the total population, from Naimu sho (1933).

Height: Height of boys and girls at age 7, 1933, as reported in Monbu sho (1937).

Weight: Weight of boys and girls at age 7, 1933, as reported in Monbu sho (1937).

Chest circumference: Chest circumference of of boys and girls at age 7, 1933, as reported in Monbu sho (1937).

[Insert Table 9 about here.]

Consider the regression results on Table 9. At the prefectural level, infant mortality is correlated with population density (it is an urban phenomenon), but not with the fraction of burakumin in either 1921 or 1935 (Panel A). Suicide rates are not correlated with the density of burakumin (Panel B). Death rates from dysentery are correlated with population density (again, it is an urban phenomenon), but not with the fraction of burakumin (Panel B). Death rates from tuberculosis are not associated with the fraction of burakumin (Panel B).

In general, the average size of children will reflect their nutritional history. Yet burakumin density is not negatively associated with the heights, weights, or chest circumferences of seven year-old boys and girls. Instead, it is significantly positively associated with the chest circumferences of the boys (Panel C).

3. Non-marital births. -- Despite no observable signs of poor public health (by these measures), by 1922 the burakumin were indeed associated with the most basic characteristic of community dysfunction -- the fraction of non-marital births. At the prefectural level, the fraction of burakumin in both 1921 and 1935 were positively correlated with illegitimacy rates (Table 9 Panel A).

Similarly, take the illegitimacy rates specifically for burakumin and for the general public (Naimu sho 1921). Among the public in 1920, prefecture-level illegitimacy rates ranged from 0.54 percent in Miyagi to 15.9 percent in Osaka, with the prefectural numbers averaging 8.1 percent. Among burakumin in 1921, those prefecture-level rates ranged from 2.01 percent in Shizuoka (with 14,000 burakumin residents) to 60.7 percent in Okayama (43,000 burakumin), with the prefectural numbers averaging 19.6 percent. If we compare the illegitimacy rates for several key prefectures (1920 for the general public, 1921 for the burakumin), those numbers were:

	General public	Burakumin
Fukuoka	7.2%	14.8% (69,000 burakumin)
Hyogo	10.0	19.3 (108,000)
Osaka	15.9	22.5 (48,000)
Hiroshima	7.3	13.0 (40,000)
Okayama	10.6	60.7 (43,000)
Kyoto	13.4	21.7 (42,000)

4. Crime rates. – During the 1920s and 1930s, the burakumin were also prominently associated with crime. In 1921 the burakumin were only 1.46 percent of the general population. Even in the large urban centers of Kyoto, Osaka, Hyogo and Fukuoka, they comprised less than 3 percent of the population. Nonetheless, even at the prefectural level, higher percentages of burakumin were indeed associated with significantly higher rates of crime.

In the fourth and sixth regressions of Table 8 Panels A and B, I use OLS. The coefficient on the density of burakumin (**Burakumin PC**) is positive and significant for both 1922 and 1935 for both total crimes and the murder rate. Because -- as described earlier -- burakumin density is plausibly endogenous to the crime rate, I use the instrumented values of burakumin concentration in the fifth and seventh regressions. The coefficient on the instrumented **Burakumin PC** is

positive and significant for both 1922 and 1935. For the murder rates, the coefficient on the instrumented **Burakumin PC** is significantly positive for both 1922 and 1935.

From these prefecture-level crime rates, turn to the rate of crime specifically among the burakumin (Naimu sho 1921). For the general public in 1922, the combined battery-murder rates (the buraku data offer only the sum of the two) ranged from 15.8 per 100,000 population in Okinawa to 95.8 in Fukuoka, with a prefectural mean of 41.7. Among burakumin in 1921, the combined battery-murder rate ranged from 6.9 per 100,000 in Shizuoka (with 14,000 burakumin) to 231.7 in Miyazaki (2,600 burakumin), with a prefectural mean of 74.7. If we compare six key prefectures (1922 for the general public, 1921 for the burakumin), the combined battery-murder rates per 100,000 population were:

	General public	Burakumin
Fukuoka	95.8	103.8 (69,000 burakumin)
Hyogo	76.7	36.2 (108,000)
Osaka	73.4	225.4 (48,000)
Hiroshima	36.5	49.8 (40,000)
Okayama	40.3	42.0 (43,000)
Kyoto	48.9	52.2 (42,000)

Among the six key buraku prefectures, only in Hyogo was the battery-murder rate lower in the buraku than among the general public.

E. Conclusion:

As the 1910s closed, the burakumin were poor but not destitute. They tended to farm smaller plots than others. They tended to earn lower incomes. But not all burakumin were poor, and those doing well continued to identify with the community and to contribute to its social and economic infrastructure. At the prefectural level the buraku were associated with higher rates of crime and illegitimacy than the general public, but not with noticeably higher rates of suicide, diphtheria, tuberculosis, or malnutrition.

VI. The Invention of Identity Politics, 1922-1945

A. Introduction:

Within this -- poor but not destitute -- community, identity politics aggressively broke out into the open in 1922. Over the course of the decade, young intellectuals from the buraku upper class and criminal buraku entrepreneurs would create for the group a new and largely fictive collective persona. With it, they inaugurated an identity politics that would thrust the group violently into the public eye, and launch a lucrative shake-down strategy that would last eight decades.

In 1922, the young intellectuals joined to create for their community a "liberation" movement. Their commoner peers were forming a wide swath of Bolshevik and Anarcho-Syndicalist groups, and these young men wanted one for their buraku as well. To do so, they transformed the buraku into a self-defined "outcaste" community with roots in a leather-workers' guild and a history of unmitigated discrimination.

Within a few years, however, these young intellectuals would lose control to criminal entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurs, in turn, would use the fictive history to extort increasingly large sums from private firms and local governments. Burakumin interested in participating in this new criminal enterprise stayed. Many of those unwilling to accept their new identity left, and migrated into the general public.

B. The Suiheisha:

In November of 1921, several young burakumin from the Nara town of Kashiwabara banded together to launch a liberation organization. They would call it the Zenkoku Suiheisha, they declared: the National Levellers. Come next March, they held a 4,000-strong rally in Kyoto and announced its formation. Obviously echoing the Communist Manifesto, they urged their cohort to action: "Burakumin of the nation, unite!" (Kyoto 1922, 3; Hasegawa 1927, 12-13, 17).

The young men immediately established a central office in Kyoto. Over the course of the first year, they would form offices in eight of the more prominent burakumin prefectures, including Osaka, Hyogo, and Nara. Over the next several years, they would establish still more.

To all slurs everywhere, the young men vowed to respond with "tettei kyudan," or "total denunciation" (Kyoto 1922; Hasegawa 1927, 17). They had in fact invented the term "kyudan," but apparently meant to evoke by it something close to the "self-criticism" that the Red Guards and Khmer Rouge would later enforce in the P.R.C. and Cambodia. Should anyone insult a burakumin, they would rally their cohort to mob violence. If lucky, the speaker would escape with no more than ritual self-abasement. Occasionally, he would face brutal violence and a financial shakedown.

The term was new, but the strategy was not. Burakumin had been using the tactic for several years. In 1909, they attacked a village mayor in Okayama over a claimed slur (Watanabe 1965, 717). In 1916, they rioted over a demeaning local newspaper article near Fukuoka (Takayama 2005, 53-58; Fukuoka 2003, 58-60). And in 1910, they took offense at what a Kyoto village mayor had called them, and promptly beat him to death (Kyoto buraku 1995).

As the allusion to the Communist Manifesto suggests, the founders of the group placed their loyalty in the fringe left. The Bolsheviks had taken power in Russia in late 1917. By the early 1920s, a large assortment of groups on the far left were trying to organize workers and (in many cases) foment revolution in Japan. Police did their best to monitor them all. They watched the Suiheisha as one of the many.

By 1924, self-styled Bolsheviks seemed to have taken over the Suiheisha. As in many of the 1920s fringe groups in Japan, relative moderates, Anarcho-syndicalists, and Leninist Bolsheviks had fought for control over the Suiheisha. And as in so many other such groups, it was a fight the Bolsheviks at least initially seemed to have won (Hasegawa 1927, 93-94, 102-03, 148; Takayama 2005, 199-204). The event that precipitated the Bolshevik takeover involved a purported police spy. Among the moderates, declared insurgents in late 1924, was a paid police informant. In the ensuing chaos, the Bolsheviks purged the incumbents and took control.

C. The Ideological Origins of the Fictive Past:

The orthodox buraku history of itself -- the history (detailed in Section II, above) on which virtually all western accounts rely -- dates from this period. In the 1920s and 30s, Japanese intellectuals sought to write histories that fit within the elaborate schematic that Marx and Engels had outlined. Those most loyal to the party sought to meet the more detailed instructions emanating from the Comintern as well. Historian John Whitney Hall (1991, 24) describes the effect of this Marxist obsession on Tokugawa history more generally:

> From the 1920s, Marxist theory had had a strong influence on Japanese interpretations of Edo history. ... According to this view, the daimyo, conceived of as "feudal lords," enforced a harsh exploitive policy from above, whereas at the village level, "parasitic" landlords joined with samurai administrators to squeeze out whatever surplus

might remain after payment of annual land dues. Thus, it was explained, conditions inevitably worsened as time passed, forcing the peasantry to use protest and mass demonstration to express their grievance.

It was within this historiographical bubble that mid-century activists and scholars approached buraku history.

Note first, as Hall explained, that for most scholars the Marxist schematic entailed describing the Tokugawa period as one or another variant of feudalism. Necessarily, this required characterizing the Tokugawa government as a rigidly hierarchical regime. The description of the social order as incorporating a pervasively binding four-class-plus-outcaste formula followed: the Tokugawa regime enforced a fixed status hierarchy, and consigned the kawata to the bottom of the ladder.

Second, again as Hall explained, the schematic entailed describing the regime as ruthlessly exploitative, and the peasants as bleakly immiserated. Toward this end, writers characterized the Tokugawa economy (see Sec. IV.D., above) as contracting, and the kawata as the most destitute of all. The Tokugawa regime left farmers brutally impoverished, in other words, and the kawata poorer still.

Third, ideological fidelity also entailed describing the Tokugawa industrial and commercial world by the guilds Marx had placed at the heart of German Ideology. That Suiheisha activists and allied intellectuals defined the buraku through an imagined ancestry in the leather-working craft, explains historian Kentaro Minegishi (1996, 224-25), reflects this importance of German Ideology. To fit the history Marx had outlined in the essay, in other words, activists and writers transformed the kawata into the leather-working guild. A few village kawata had indeed handled dead carcasses. A few town kawata had tanned leather. Marx required guilds, so guilds it would be: the kawata became the leather-worker's guild.

Starting in the 1920s, historians of the buraku tracked this Marxist schema. Sadakichi Takahashi began the enterprise, writes Midori Kurokawa (1989, 92-97), with his 1924 history of the group. Takahashi had helped found the Suiheisha. Soon thereafter, he would travel secretly to the U.S.S.R. where he would join the Soviet Communist Party and serve on Comintern. Of the academic historians, continues Kurokawa, University of Kyoto historian Kiyoshi Inoue was easily the most prominent. So loyal was he that he worked not just to describe a buraku experience that followed traditional Marxist principles, but to create a buraku history that fit within the confines of Comintern's 1932 mandates to boot.

To modern scholars, the mid-century Marxist premises can lead to what seem odd debates. Marx traced peasants to serfs, and serfs to slaves. Can the burakumin trace their ancestors to prehistoric slaves (e.g., Watanabe 1965, 16-18; Sansai 1961, I-56)? Answer: no. Sixteenth century warlord Oda Nobunaga faced several violent peasant rebellions. Might he have banished buraku ancestors to outcaste status as punishment for participating in the rebellions (e.g., Funakoshi 1976; Teraki 1997, chs. 4-5)? Answer: again, no. Nobunaga usually just slaughtered his opponents. And did the class hierarchy come first, and assignment to the despised occupation follow? Or did the occupation come first, and the class structure follow (Teraki 1996, 19-20; Watanabe 1963, 8-9)? Answer: Marxism faded from the universities before anyone reached a consensus.

From time to time, the most militant of the buraku activists (e.g., Asada 1979, 297-98) claimed that the Tokugawa government deliberately consigned their ancestors to outcaste status in order to let it oppress the broader peasant class more effectively. As Neary (1989, 18; see also Ohnuki-Tierney 1987, 94) articulated it (apparently with approval), the regime treated the

burakumin badly so that "the rebelliousness of the peasants and urban dwellers would be reduced with the reminder that there was a group which was even worse off than they were." This seems not, however, to have been a theory that many serious Japanese scholars ever endorsed (see Saito & Oishi 1995, 56)

D. From Bolsheviks to Opportunists:

If the anarchists were no match for the Bolsheviks, the latter would soon prove no match for the criminal entrepreneurs. Over the next several years, control over the Suiheisha would shift again, this time from the Bolsheviks to a largely apolitical criminal cohort. In early 1923, the head of a construction firm in Fukuoka, Jiichiro Matsumoto, organized an all-Kyushu branch of the Suiheisha (Hasegawa 1927, 52; Fukuoka 2003, 67). His was a meteoric rise. By early 1925, he chaired the national Suiheisha Central Committee (Hasegawa 1927, 84).

Recall the 1924 discovery of a "police spy." Obviously, the police might indeed have paid an insider to monitor the fringe-left group. Obviously too, the Bolsheviks might have used the story of a police spy to purge their moderate rivals. Nei Hasegawa (1927), however, thought a police informant unlikely. Hasegawa served as a career prosecutor -- probably within an elite cohort. Apparently, he had worked extensively on Suiheisha crime. In the mid-1920s, the central personnel office seems to have seconded him to a research post, and commissioned him to compile the information available on the group into a book-length reference for prosecutors nation-wide. Hasegawa produced an astonishingly perceptive text. He did not dismiss outright the possibility that the police might have paid an insider. He thought it more likely, however, that Matsumoto and his allies had invented the story to take control themselves.[30]

Historian Ian Neary (2010, 1) tells us that 1970s burakumin families kept Matsumoto's portrait on their "god shelf" next to the photographs of their dead ancestors. To be sure, no one so dominated the pre-war buraku movement as this flamboyant, bombastic, and sometimes bizarrely violent Matsumoto. Yet no one epitomized so totally the buraku criminal underworld either. Hasegawa (1927, 181) himself remarked in 1927 that "many people think of him as the don of an organized crime syndicate." Consistent with that description, he noted that Matsumoto had already bought out a local geisha from her employment contract and installed her as his mistress (Hasegawa 1927, 181).

Born in 1887 to a buraku farm family near Fukuoka, at age 16 Matsumoto left Kyushu for middle school in Kyoto. Ordinarily, children would have left at age 13. Matsumoto might have left for Kyoto voluntarily, observes his otherwise sympathetic biographer Fumihiko Takayama. But he suspects that -- for whatever reason -- he left because he no longer could safely stay (Takayama 2005, 29).

A few years later, Matsumoto sailed for north China. He loaded drugs onto a pull-cart, and declared himself a peripatetic "First Class Japanese Military Physician." He conducted tests, he diagnosed, and he sold his patients medicine. Demand was high. "The stuff sold," his later secretary exclaimed. "You could put tooth-brushing powder in a packet and call it stomach medicine. It'd still sell." Unfortunately for Matsumoto, fake doctors peddling fake medicines gave Japan a bad name. In 1910, the Japanese consulate threw him out of the country (Takayama 2005, 38-39).

Back in in Fukuoka, in 1911 Matsumoto organized a construction firm. His older brother managed the business, and he coordinated the workers. Much of the work he did for the local

[30] Hasegawa (1927, 77-78, 84); for a more conventional interpretation, see Bayliss (2013, 207n.93).

railroad (Takayama 2005, 46). The bidding could cause disputes, and in March 1923 Matsumoto's workers quarreled with employees from the rival Matsuo construction firm. Both firms worked for the local railroad. But the custom, according to the BLL's otherwise hagiographic account (Buraku 1987, 74), was for the firms to rig the bid with the understanding that the winning firm would share its profits with the losers. The Matsumoto firm had won the bid, and now refused to share the profits.

Later on the night of the quarrel, three Matsumoto workers went to the inn at which Kotaro Matsuo, owner of the rival firm, was staying. When Matsuo came to the door, they beat him. They grabbed a bicycle that was there and beat him with the bicycle. Other Matsumoto workers joined the fray and attacked Matsuo with swords. By midnight, he was dead.

While the Matsuo employees were attending his wake the next day, fifty Matsumoto workers again stormed the group. They threw rocks, trampled doors, and drew swords. They left three of the Matsuo group badly injured. The police arrested thirty Matsumoto employees. They arrested Matsumoto himself too, but eventually discharged him on grounds that he had not been at the scene of the murder.[31]

Heading the new Kyushu branch of the Suiheisha, Matsumoto announced that the heir to the Tokugawa shogunate, Prince Iesato Tokugawa, should return his imperial peerage. The burakumin suffered because of his ancestors' brutal reign, declared Matsumoto. In remorse for their ruthless oppression, he should resign. Tokugawa would have none of it, so Matsumoto sent a young Suiheisha member to Tokyo with a gun and a knife. When the police stopped the would-be assassin, they discovered Matsumoto's role. Matsumoto acknowledged his part in the assassination attempt, and served four months in prison. In fact, however, the attack continued anyway: another of Matsumoto's followers travelled to Tokyo, broke into Tokugawa's estate, and burned his house down.[32]

The Suiheisha seem to have had rare access to guns. Matsumoto procured the handgun for Tokugawa's planned assassin. Other Suiheisha sometimes brought guns to their kyudan (Hasegawa 1927, 47-49). Post-war BLL leader Zennosuke Asada (1979, 34-35, 52) recalled carrying guns to Suiheisha events; his colleagues carried guns. Perhaps tied to the number of construction firms in the buraku, the Suiheisha also had access to explosives. Asada recalled bringing dynamite to events. When Matsumoto started a dispute with local reservists in 1926, the fight quickly escalated. Matsumoto and his colleagues decided to blow up the base, and Matsumoto obtained the dynamite for the occasion.[33]

The Suiheisha's kyudan (denunciations) shaded into simple extortion from the start. Once Matsumoto took control of the national Suiheisha, members of his Kyushu branch began shaking down local firms. From 1925 and into 1926, police counted eight times that the Fukuoka Suiheisha threatened kyudan and settled for cash (Hasegawa 1927, 56-62). For the Suiheisha more generally, however, the local governments promised the easiest money. Very few kyudan involved actual discrimination. Most just concerned pejorative epithets, and many were schoolyard taunts among children. But from 69 kyudan in 1922, the number reached 1,046 in 1924 and 1,025 in 1925

---

[31] Takayama (2005, 144-47); Buraku (1987, 74); Fukuoka (2003, 68).

[32] Hasegawa (1927, 29, 43-45); Takayama (2005, l82-198, 203); Fukuoka (2003, 68).

[33] BLL-oriented scholars claim the police planted the dynamite (e.g., Bayliss 2013, 208n.995). Hasegawa (1927, 30, 38) writes that the Suiheisha coerced a colleague into confessing that the police paid him to plant the dynamite. Consistent with this narrative, the government prosecuted the Suiheisha member for coercing that colleague into confessing.

(Hasegawa 1927, 1-2). In the typical case, one child would call another "eta." The burakumin child would complain to his parents. The parents would obtain an apology from the other child's parents. They and others from the buraku would then demand an additional apology from the teacher for not teaching the children properly. They would demand an apology from the school principal for not supervising the teachers properly. They would attack the police for not stopping the taunts. Finally, they would turn to the local government for not administering the schools appropriately -- and settle for subsidies to the local buraku (Aoki 1998, 143).

The criminal turn in the self-appointed buraku leadership obviously increased the wariness with which members of the public eyed the buraku. Faced with the violent and extortionate tactics that characterized that leadership, they responded by doing their best to stay out of the way. With the growth of the Suiheisha, reported the Kyoto police (Kyoto fu 1924, 258), commoners stopped distinguishing among burakumin. Instead, they now viewed all burakumin suspiciously. "Never mind that most burakumin opposed the Suiheisha," the police reported. "The violent tactics of the Suiheisha eliminated that sympathy."

What is more, employers who had earlier hired burakumin began to discharge them. Kyoto police described the development in 1924 (Kyoto fu 1924, 260):

> Large and small factories for fabric weaving, for spinning, for dying, for electrical goods, for steel, for ceramics; road crews; gardeners; various merchants -- all these employers had been hiring ordinary citizens and burakumin alike. Since the Suiheisha movement began, however, disputes over claimed discrimination have begun to arise between employees and employers. Many employers have responded by not hiring any burakumin. In fact, in order to discharge the burakumin they have, some employers announce that they face a business downturn and lay off all of their employees. They then hire back only the ordinary citizens."

E. The Geography of the Suiheisha:

1. The exercise. To examine which communities organized Suiheisha branches, I begin with simple OLS. I find that burakumin formed the branches: in communities where the concentration of burakumin was high; in urban areas; in areas with a cohort of wealthy burakumin; and in areas with relatively less interchange with the general population. Consider briefly the locations that chose to organize Suiheisha branches.

As dependent variable, I take the number of Suiheisha branch offices in a prefecture in 1933, a decade after its formation:

> **Suiheisha BO 1933**: The number of branch offices of the Suiheisha, as given in Watanabe (1965).

As controls, I take the values of the explanatory variables immediately prior to the Suiheisha's national formation. For the basic model, I posit that the number of branch offices would reflect the fraction of burakumin in the population (**Burakumin PC 1921**), the extent of the group's integration into the general population (**Exogamy 1921**), the urbanization of the prefecture (**Density 1921**), and the fraction of wealthy families within the buraku. As a proxy for the fraction of wealthy burakumin, I create:

> **Buraku prefectural voters PBC (per burakumin capital) 1921**: The number of burakumin eligible to vote in the prefectural elections (suffrage depended on income), divided by the number of burakumin, as given in Naimu sho (1921).

Additionally, I construct:

Buraku crime rate, PBC: Number of burakumin committing a crime in 1921, divided by the number of burakumin, as given in Naimu sho (1921).

Buraku public assistance, PBC: Number of burakumin on public assistance in 1921, divided by the number of burakumin, as given in Naimu sho 1921).

Buraku agricultural ratio: Number of burakumin households engaged in agriculture in 1935, divided by the number of burakumin households, as given in Chuo yuwa (1936).

Anti-liberation riots: 1 if the prefecture experienced any riots opposed to the 1871 liberation edict, 0 otherwise, as given in Inagaki, et al. (1993). The variable proxies for the extent of local hostility toward the buraku at the close of the Tokugawa period.

2. Results. -- I report the resulting regressions in Table 10. They suggest a couple of straightforward conclusions. First, the coefficient on the number of burakumin per capita is positive and significant: burakumin tended to organize Suiheisha branches in areas with relatively high concentrations of the group. Second, the coefficient on population density is positive and significant: the Suiheisha were a urban phenomenon.[34]

[Insert Table 10 about here.]

Turn to two somewhat more curious observations. First, the coefficient on the fraction of burakumin rich enough to vote is positive and significant: Suiheisha branches were more common where wealthy burakumin formed a larger fraction of the buraku. Recall the early disputes within the Suiheisha between the Bolsheviks and Anarcho-Syndicalists. Engaging in a debate along those lines entails at least a passing acquaintance with Trotsky, Lenin, Kropotkin, and Proudhon. Necessarily, a familiarity with those names and ideas entails a background in a home with a commitment to education.

Second, the coefficient on the exogamy rate is insignificant: the number of branches seems not to have been correlated with the level of interaction with the general population. In fact, however, the observation misleads. The pairwise correlation between the exogamy rate and the number of branches was -.26, almost significant at the 10 percent level. Burakumin, in other words, were indeed less likely to establish Suiheisha branches in areas where they openly mingled with the population. The coefficient is statistically insignificant in the regression only because of the strong correlation among the independent variables.

None of the following independent variables is associated with the establishment of a Suiheisha branch (see Panel B). With buraku income (proxied by the fraction of voters) held constant, Suiheisha branches were not associated with crime rates. Similarly, they were not associated with buraku illegitimacy rates, buraku divorce rates, or welfare dependency in the buraku. They were not associated with the fraction of burakumin in agriculture or with the size of the buraku. They bore no relation to the ratio of hinin to kawata in the buraku in 1868. And they were not associated with any anti-buraku riots in the wake of the 1871 liberation decree.

VII. The Shake-down Politics of the Post-war Buraku

A. Introduction:

The Suiheisha's ties to the criminal underworld began with Matsumoto's ascendance in the 1920s, but those ties turned central after the war. The group's post-war successor BLL retained its

[34] If I instead use the number of burakumin (rather than the number of burakumin per capita), then the coefficient on the number of burakumin is strongly significant, and the coefficient on density is no longer significant.

fringe-left patina, but only as a patina. First and foremost, the BLL was an organization dedicated to using the threat of violence to shake down governments and extract buraku-specific subsidies. By manipulating construction and land-sale contracts, the League's leaders then diverted large fractions of those subsidies to their private accounts.

In early 1946, several former Suiheisha leaders -- prominently including Matsumoto and Asada -- reconstructed the group. They jettisoned the earlier name, and formed the new organization as the Buraku Liberation National Committee. Matsumoto himself had won election to the Diet in 1936. He now won election again in 1947, this time under the Japan Socialist Party. In 1955, the group renamed itself the Buraku Liberation League.

The BLL was about identity politics. It was not about class politics, and the distinction matters. The defining characteristic of the BLL was its relentless focus on subsidies specifically for the buraku. It did not push for subsidies to the poor. Many people were poor in 1950s Japan, and most were not burakumin. A substantial minority of burakumin were not poor at all.

Bear in mind that the burakumin were not descended from any ritually unclean pre-modern guild. Instead, they were simply descended from one group -- a group largely limited to the areas adjoining the inland sea -- of poor farmers. But if many Japanese avoided marrying or hiring them in the early post-war years, the reason for the bias is over-determined. Given the place of violent crime, illegitimacy, and the criminal syndicates in buraku, one does not need any notion of religious uncleanness to understand why some Japanese might not have wanted to marry or hire a person from the group.

Bear in mind too the opportunity for corruption that municipal construction projects afforded. By the 1980s, it was an opportunity that had become brutally clear (except to western observers; see Sec. III.D.2., above). "It wasn't unusual for BLL members to be current or former members" of the mob, wrote buraku journalist Nobuhiko Kadooka (2012, 53-54). "Some people marched into battle under the [Suiheisha-BLL's distinctive emblem of a] crown of thorns out of anger toward discrimination. Others marched with plans to make a buck through the [government-funded] buraku [construction] projects. In any case, there was a time when the historic anti-discrimination group had current or former members of the yakuza holding important positions."

B. All Romance:

BLL leader Zennosuke Asada led the first major post-war government shakedown. In 1951, the All Romance pulp magazine published a short story called "Special Buraku." Written by one pseudonymous Seiichi Sugiyama (1951), the story told of the tender (if somewhat maudlin) love between an idealistic young physician and the daughter of a Korean moonshine brewer in a Kyoto buraku. Sugiyama described the plight of the burakumin with sympathy and compassion. Despite its poverty, he found in the buraku a cohesive community tied together by deep, tender, and compassionate human bonds. And in the love across class lines, he located the promise of reconciliation between the Korean and buraku communities, and of the redemptive power of love.

For Asada, the story offered the chance to monetize the identity politics that the Suiheisha had invented. The key lay in the fact that the author worked as an interim employee in the Kyoto sanitation department. His article was flagrantly "discriminatory," declared Asada (1979, ch. 7; Morooka 1980, ch. 8). Given that he worked for the city, Kyoto was responsible for the outrage. Buraku militants attacked the mayor. They attacked the sanitation department. They attacked from one department to another.

And by all this, Asada and his cohorts were spectacularly successful. In 1951, the Kyoto governments had spent 11.4 million yen on the buraku. In 1952, they spent 46.5 million (Zenkoku

1998, tab. 12). The buraku budget in adjacent Osaka went from 2.4 to 4.1 million; Hyogo's went from 0 to 8 million; Wakayama's went from 8.5 to 24.4 million; and Shiga, Okayama, Hiroshima, Yamaguchi, Ehime, and Fukuoka all began lavishing substantial sums on buraku where before they had spent nothing at all (id.).

The hapless Sugiyama was apparently so much collateral damage. The mayor quickly promised Asada he would fire him (Asada 1979, 184). The sanitation department assured buraku leaders that he obviously deserved criminal punishment (Kyoto 1991, 474-75). Sugiyama never published another story. An official "outrage" his apparently seldom-read love story has remained ever since.

C. The Sayama Murder:[35]

To extort successfully, the criminal wing of the buraku needed to be able visibly to threaten extreme violence. The role of the "denunciation" sessions lay in the way that they enabled that wing to keep the threat both visible and credible. Most sessions were relatively small-scale campaigns, but a few took public stage. Perhaps the most bizarrely violent of the denunciations involved a rape and murder in suburban Tokyo.

In 1963, a family in the town of Sayama found a ransom note in their front door. Their high school daughter Yoshie had not returned home, and her kidnapper (or kidnappers) demanded money. The family tried to contact the kidnapper, but found their daughter raped, murdered, and buried in a shallow grave instead. Three weeks later, the police arrested a young unemployed burakumin named Kazuo Ishikawa. He ran with a bad crowd, had a criminal history, and lied to the police. After long interrogation (but not torture), he confessed to the kidnapping, rape and murder. The court sentenced him to death (commuted to life in prison on appeal), he served time, and in 1994 the government released him on parole.

The BLL transformed Ishikawa into a buraku hero, an innocent victim of police bias. In fact, Ishikawa fairly obviously played a key part in the rape-murder. By making him a celebrity, the BLL ensured that a curious scholar could easily locate the ransom note and Ishikawa's handwritten confession (e.g., Kanno 2009). The curiously distinctive handwriting and illiteracy patterns in the two documents indicate that the police almost certainly found the right man. Given the higher rate of violent crime among the burakumin, they probably did focus first on the buraku through a Japanese variant of racial profiling. They may well have planted other evidence. They interrogated him for an astonishing month and a half without an attorney present. They may even have tricked him into making the confession that he did. But they fairly obviously had the right man.

Other circumstances do suggest that Ishikawa may not have raped and killed her alone. Two days after the police located the girl's body (May 6, 1963), one of the workers on her family farm was found dead in an empty well. The police called it a suicide, and explained that he had drunk pesticide and dived into the well. Five days later, a farmer who had reported a group of three suspicious men to the police on the evening of her kidnapping ended up dead too. The police called this one a suicide as well: he had stabbed himself through the heart with a knife. Four months after the district court sentenced Ishikawa to hang, Yoshie's older sister was found dead. She had drunk poison (maybe agricultural pesticide), concluded the police. In 1966, a laborer on the Sayama pig farm where Ishikawa had once worked lay dead on the train tracks. In 1977, one of Yoshie's brothers was found hanged. And again in 1977, unidentified assailants beat to death a

[35] See generally Ramseyer (forthcoming); Kanno (2009).

journalist covering Ishikawa's case.[36] But the handwriting and illiteracy patterns in the ransom demand and Ishikawa's other writings leave little doubt that he was at least part of a gang that raped and killed the girl.

Guilty as the evidence seems to indicate he was, the BLL declared Ishikawa innocent anyway, and turned the rallying crime into a national movement. With allies among 1960s Trotskyite New Left, buraku leaders made their threats of violence as credible as could be.[37] In 1969, demonstrators threw Molotov cocktails at the Urawa District Court and occupied the building. In 1974, they organized a 110,000-strong mob in support of Ishikawa; broke into the Tokyo High Court; attacked the court staff with steel pipes; and tried to fire bomb the home of the judge presiding over the high court appeal. In 1976, they attacked that high-court judge in his car with bats, and in 1977 tried to fire bomb the home of the judge handling the Supreme Court appeal. In 1979 they tried to firebomb a Ministry of Justice housing complex. In 1990 they did firebomb the home of the district court judge who initially sentenced Ishikawa to death. And in 1995 the home of the high-court presiding judge finally burned to the ground.

D. The Communist Purge:

Through the All Romance dispute, BLL leaders decisively raised the level of funds the Kyoto government spent on the buraku. They soon realized, however, that there were limits to how much they could redistribute from non-buraku Kyoto residents. To raise the subsidies further, they needed to tap the national government.

Toward that end, the BLL began a strenuous decade-and-a-half campaign. The process involved many steps, but the group reached its goal in 1969. That year, the national government enacted a program to direct massive funds specifically to the buraku. By the time the government terminated the program in 2002, it had spent 15 trillion yen on buraku projects.

Having obtained this national program, BLL leaders now needed to control its allocation. The largest share of the funds would go toward construction projects. To divert that money to their private accounts, they needed to control the distribution of the contracts. They needed, as they would put it, to be the "one window" for the funds. Necessarily, they also needed to exclude all other potential intermediaries. In particular, they needed to exclude their rivals in the Japan Communist Party (JCP).

To acquire control over the allocation of the construction contracts, BLL leaders attacked city governments in sequence. They began with the city of Suita in Osaka prefecture. In June of 1969, they demanded that the city government give them exclusive control over the money. When the city government balked, according to BLL critics, they sent 300 BLL members. For three days, report BLL critics, they surrounded the mayor's house. They banged drums through the night. They cut his gas, water, and telephone lines. They scaled his wall and climbed onto his grounds. Eventually, the mayor acquiesced (Nakahara 1988, 128-29; Ichinomiya & Group K21 2013, 270).

The BLL moved from city to city. As necessary -- again, according to its critics -- it repeated the tactics. When it faced the Habikino city government (in Osaka prefecture), BLL members occupied city hall for 122 hours, and confined the mayor for 22.[38] They did not obtain

---

[36] See, e.g., Kanno, supra note, at 301-03; Jiken kankeisha ga 6nin jisatsu, henshi shita Sayama jiken [The Sayama Case in which 6 People Connected with the Case Committed Suicide or Died Under Mysterious Circumstances], available at: http://ww5.tiki.ne.jp/~qyoshida/jikenbo/057sayama.htm.

[37] See, e.g., Kanno (2009, 298-299), and a variety of other sources on the internet.

[38] Nakahara (1988, 128-29); Ichinomiya & Group K21 (2013, 96-97, 270).

control everywhere, and when challenged they could lose in court.[39] In time, most (not all) cities dismantled the one-window policies, but the BLL continued to push for the control.

Simultaneously, the BLL needed to exclude the JCP from the money. The most decisive break came immediately in 1969, when the BLL broke with JCP-allied teachers in the city of Yata. There, they harangued the JCP teachers in front of 200 burakumin for 12 hours. But if these Yata "denunciations" were the best known, the 1974 "denunciations" against JCP teachers in Yoka were perhaps the most cruel. The JCP has never been the most reliable of sources, but when burakumin writer Yoshihiro Uehara (2014, ch. 3) travelled to Yoka decades later to interview those involved in the event, he found reports of extensive violence. Anthropologist Thomas Rohlen (1976, 685-86) was in the area doing field work at the time. According to his account, by the time the denunciations were over, twelve of the JCP teachers had broken bones, including broken vertebrae. Thirteen of them needed at least six weeks of hospitalization. Five more were hospitalized for a month, 15 for from two to three weeks, and 15 more for over a week.

VIII. Out-Migration and Subsidies

A. Introduction:

By raising the level of income a young burakumin male could earn by joining the mob, the subsidies lowered his incentive to stay in school, leave for university, and merge into the Japanese mainstream. In Ramseyer & Rasmusen (2018), we explored this phenomenon through the 2002 termination of the 1969 national subsidies. More specifically, we used the 1935 census (the only one with local data) to construct a municipality-level panel data set and examine the effect of the 2002 subsidy termination on out-migration levels. Because we did not have data on the level of migration specifically out of the buraku, we looked at total migration from cities with high concentrations (based on 1935 data) of burakumin.

In this Section VIII, I exploit the 14 buraku censuses to study changes in the population specifically of the buraku themselves. I begin by using the last four censuses to explore the general determinants of out-migration over the final three decades of the 20th century (Subsec. B.). I then examine the distribution of subsidies among the buraku during the 1947-1969 period (Subsec. C.). Finally, I combine the data on out-migration with the data on the 1947-1969 subsidies to explore the effect of the subsidies on exit specifically from the buraku (Subsec. D.). I find that the subsidies substantially slowed the pace at which burakumin migrated into the general public.

At root, the subsidies provided a fund that the criminal syndicates could divert to their private accounts. By increasing the returns to illegal relative to legal careers, high subsidy levels apparently encouraged young burakumin men to drop out of school and join the mob. In communities with lower subsidy levels, young men earned lower relative returns to criminal careers. Necessarily, they were more likely to stay in school, find a job in the mainstream sector, and leave the buraku.

B. Out-migration:

In Table 11, I use the last four censuses to explore general patterns of burakumin out-migration: in which buraku did population fall, and in which did it increase. I take as the dependent variable the buraku population at the time of the various censuses, indexed by the burakumin population in 1921. The variable thus captures the extent to which burakumin left the

---

[39] E.g., Maeda v. Nishiwaki shi, 887 Hanrei jiho 66 (Kobe D. Ct. Dec. 19, 1977); Fukuoka shi v. Matsuoka, 870 Hanrei jiho 61 (Fukuoka High Ct. Sept. 13, 1977); see generally Upham (1980, 54-62).

communities in the years after 1921 and merged into the general public. As independent variables, I use variables already defined (see Table 4). They capture the extent of burakumin concentration (**Burakumin PC**), the average size of buraku communities (**Buraku size**), the degree of urbanization (**Density**), the extent to which burakumin interacted with the outside community (**Exogamy**), buraku economic welfare (**Burakumin prefectural voters, PBC**), the reliance on agriculture (**Buraku agricultural ratio**), the extent to which the local buraku endorsed the BLL's violent predecessor (**Suiheisha branch offices**), and the presence of a criminal subculture (**Murders PC**). I take values as near as possible to the beginning of buraku militancy in the 1920s.

[Insert Table 11 about here.]

Preliminarily, note that out-migration rates were lower from farming communities: the coefficient on the fraction of burakumin in agriculture in 1935 (**Buraku agricultural ratio**) is positive and significant. This phenomenon is an artifact of the definition of burakumin by location. Human capital is mobile; land is not. Necessarily, those who invest in agricultural real estate will be less likely to move than those who invest in their human capital.

The regressions suggest (obviously do not prove) a troubling message: the burakumin were most likely to move out of the community and join the Japanese mainstream where they faced the lowest costs of investing in a legal relative to an illegal career. On the one hand, burakumin were less likely to leave the buraku where they were at farther social distances from the general public or (what is analytically the same thing) where the buraku provided a relatively all-encompassing social world. Thus, the coefficient on the number of **Burakumin per capita** in 1921 is positive: burakumin were less likely to leave communities with the highest density of burakumin. Similarly, the coefficient on **Buraku size** in 1921 is positive: burakumin were less likely to leave large buraku than small.

On the other hand, burakumin were less likely to leave buraku where they faced greater suspicion from the general public. For example, the coefficient on the 1921 **Exogamy** rate is negative: the burakumin were more likely to leave communities where they intermarried with the general public -- where they had close and harmonious contact with the outside world. Note that the pairwise correlation between the 1993 indexed buraku population and the 1921 exogamy rate is -.52, significant at more than the 1 percent level. Conversely, the coefficient on the 1920 **Murder rate** is positive: burakumin were less likely to leave those buraku with relatively high criminal opportunities. Similarly, the coefficient on the number of **Suiheisha branch offices** in 1933 is positive: burakumin were less likely to leave communities where their predecessors had organized branches of the violent group.

Where the buraku were small and members maintained amicable relations with their neighbors, young burakumin had relatively cheap access to the information, training, and education necessary to build profitable careers in the mainstream sector. Where they lived in large buraku with little contact with the outside world, they had less access to that information. With high rates of violent crime, they had access instead to information about illegal careers.

C. Subsidies:

In Table 12, I explore which communities received the targeted municipal and prefectural burakumin subsidies. As Eric Rasmusen and I investigate the national subsidies in Ramseyer & Rasmusen (2018), I do not repeat the exercise here. Note that the censuses of 1946, 1958, 1963, 1967, and 1971 divide the period prior to the national subsidies into four segments. I use the following dependent variable:

Subsidies PBC: The amount of the pre-1969 prefectural subsidies targeting burakumin (in 10,000 yen) over a given period, divided by the number of burakumin, as provided in Zenkoku buraku (1998). The source does not detail the content of the subsidies further.

As independent variables, I take several values for each prefecture at the time of the formation of the Suiheisha (or shortly thereafter). Among the variables already defined, I use burakumin concentration (**Burakumin PC**), **Exogamy**, population **Density**, the fraction of wealthy burakumin (**Buraku prefectural voters, PBC**), the average size of buraku districts (**Buraku size**), the **Buraku agricultural fraction**, and the number of **Suiheisha branch offices**. I also construct the following new variables:

Buraku illegitimacy rate, 1921: Non-marital burakumin births in 1921, divided by total burakumin births.

Kyudan rate, 1923-24: The number of denunciation sessions in 1923-24, divided by the number of burakumin, as provided in Hasegawa (1927).

[Insert Table 12 about here.]

Urban prefectures distributed the highest subsidies per burakumin capita (Panel A): the coefficient on prefectural **Density** is positive for all periods, and significantly so in three of the four. Prefectures with higher concentrations of burakumin paid higher subsidy levels: the coefficient on **Burakumin PC** is similarly positive for all periods, and significantly so for three. Curiously, all else held equal, the prefectures with more **Suiheisha branch offices** in 1933 paid the least subsidies: the coefficient on the number of branch offices is negative in all periods, and and significantly so in two of the four periods.

In Panel B, I add several other measures that might explain the subsidy patterns. One might, for example, expect that the subsidies would go to the most impoverished buraku. Yet the fraction of buraku on public assistance, the burakumin illegitimacy rates, and the fraction of burakumin with the income entitling them to vote are all insignificantly different from zero.

Note two further observations. First, the governments may have paid the largest subsidies in areas where tensions between the burakumin and the other residents were highest. The factors used in the Panel A regressions held equal, the governments paid higher subsidies where local residents had rioted against buraku liberation in the 1870s (**Anti liberation riots**), and where early Suiheisha members had held the most denunciation sessions (**Kyudan rate**). Second, some writers (e.g., Honda 1991, 30) suggest that the subsidies went to those descended from the kawata rather than the hinin. The **Hinin ratio** in 1868 is not significantly correlated with subsidy levels during any of the four periods in pair-wise correlation, and the coefficient on the hinin ratio in the Panel B regressions is similarly insignificant.

C. Subsidies and Out-migration:

In Table 13, I again exploit the fact that the government conducted five burakumin censuses from 1946 to 1971. I couple those multiple prefecture-level censuses with annual data on the amount of prefectural subsidies, and examine the effect that subsidy levels had on the pace at which burakumin chose to leave buraku and merge into the general public.

[Insert Table 13 about here.]

Consistent with Ramseyer & Rasmusen (2018)'s study of the post-1969 national subsidies, the Table 13 regressions suggest that the earlier prefectural subsidies slowed the pace at which burakumin joined the general public. In the first four regressions in Table 13, I regress the burakumin population indexed by 1921 values on the level of subsidies per burakumin (**Subsidies**

PBC), burakumin concentration (**Burakumin PC**), **Buraku size**, and population **Density**. The resulting coefficients on the subsidy levels are positive for three of the periods, and significantly so in two. The significance levels are sensitive to the independent variables used, but the underlying correlation is extremely strong. The pairwise correlation between the indexed 1958 population and the 1947-57 subsidies is .28, significant at the 7 percent level; between 1963 population and 1947-62 subsidies .33, significant at the 3 percent level; between 1967 population and 1947-66 subsidies .52, significant at the .1 percent level, and between 1971 population and 1947-68 subsidies .55, significant at the .01 percent level.

Subsidy levels are, however, plausibly endogenous to the strength with which burakumin are rooted to their community. Accordingly, I instrument the level of subsidies with **Burakumin PC**, **Buraku size**, **Density**, **Suiheisha branch offices 1933**, **Kyudan rate 1923, Buraku public assistance PBC 1921, Buraku illegitimacy rate 1921, Buraku divorce rate 1921**, **Buraku prefectural voters 1921**, **Anti-liberation riots**, and **Shirayama shrines**. In the last four regressions of Table 12, I report the two-stage least squares results. Here too significance levels and the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistics are sensitive to the variables used. Nonetheless, the coefficients on the subsidy levels are positive and significant in all four regressions,: the higher the rate of subsidies, the lower the level at which burakumin leave to join the mainstream Japanese society.

One can interpret the results in two very different ways. On the one hand, this phenomenon is consistent with a ruthlessly straightforward explanation: if the government subsidizes burakumin who choose to stay in a community but not those who leave, more burakumin will choose to stay. On the other hand, however, as Table 5 shows, more burakumin staying is associated with higher crime rates. And as detailed elsewhere (Ramseyer & Rasmusen 2018), for much of the post-war period the mob dominated the BLL, and used its control over construction contracts to divert large portions of the funds to their private accounts. During the peak of the mob in the 1980s, 20-25 percent of young burakumin men were members of the organized crime syndicates. As a result, the phenomenon fits a far less benign explanation: by raising the relative returns to criminal careers, the subsidies caused young burakumin to drop out of school, join the mob, and pursue buraku-specific criminal careers. Where subsidy levels were lower, young men stayed in school, left the buraku for university, and pursued mainstream careers instead.

IX. Conclusions

The burakumin are not outcastes, and probably never were. With few exceptions, they are not descended from tanners or leather-workers. They are descended from poor farmers.

By the 1920s, the buraku developed a visible criminal fringe. Together with young intellectuals from the burakumin upper class, the criminals fashioned for the group a new and largely fictive identity. To fit within the dictates of Marx's German Ideology, they declared the buraku the descendants of a leather worker's guild. Their ancestors had suffered unrelenting discrimination, the leaders declared, out of a religiously inspired aversion to members of a ritually unclean guild.

Over the course of the rest of the century, criminal leaders within the buraku embarked on full-scale shake-down identity politics. They transformed their claims of pervasive discrimination into violent extortionate tactics that brought ever-increasing amounts of government subsidies. Predictably, they also triggered ever-increasing public hostility. Members of the public now did all they could to keep the group at bay. Prior to the 1920s, prosperous burakumin had stayed within the community and helped to build its social and economic infrastructure. After the 1920s,

they left. Those born into the buraku who chose to capitalize on these illegal opportunities still stayed. Those who preferred mainstream careers, however, increasingly migrated into the general public.

Bibliography

Akisada, Yoshikazu. 1974. Meiji shoki no "senmin" tokeihyo ni tsuite [Regarding the Statistical Table of "Poor People" of the Early Meiji Period], Buraku kaiho kenkyu v. 2: 55-75.

Amos, Timothy D. 2011. Embodying Difference. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Aoki, Takaju. 1998. Buraku mondai no rekishi to undo [The History and Movement Relating to the Buraku Problem]. Nagano: Nagano ken buraku mondai kenkyu kai.

Asada, Zennosuke. 1979. Asada Zennosuke zen kiroku [The Full Record of Zennosuke Asada]. Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha.

Asahi shimbun sha, ed. 1982. Tochi korogashi [Land Sale Manipulation]. Fukuoka: Ashi shobo.

Bahara, Tetsuo. 1984. "Nihon shihon shugi to burakumondai" ron [The Debate over "Japanese Capitalism and the Buraku Problem], at 125-154. In Buraku mondai kenkyu jo, ed., Burakushi no kenkyu [Research in Buraku History]. Kyoto: Buraku mondai kenkyu jo.

Bayliss, Jeffrey Paul. 2013. On the Margins of Empire: Buraku and Korean Identity in Prewar and Wartime Japan. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Bolitho, Harold. 1989. "The Tempo Crisis." In Marius B. Jansen, The Cambridge History of Japan, v. 5, at 116-167. Cambidge: Cambridge University Press.

Bondy, Christopher. 2015. Voice, Silence, and Self: Negotiations of Buraku Identity in Contemporary Japan. Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center.

Buraku kaiho Osaka fu kigyo rengo kai, ed. 1978. Osaka ni okeru buraku kigyo no rekishi to genjo [The History and Present Status of Buraku Firms in Osaka]. Osaka: Buraku kaiho Osaka fu kigyo rengo kai.

Buraku mondai kenkyu jo, ed. 2016. Mibun teki juen to buraku mondai no chiiki shiteki kenkyu [Studies in the Regional History of the Status Environent and the Buraku Problem.] Kyoto: Buraku mondai kenkyu jo.

Buraku mondai kenkyu jo. 1980. Buraku mondai shiryo, vol. 1. Kyoto: Buraku mondai kenkyu sho.

Chuo yuwa jigyo kyokai. 1936. Zenkoku buraku chosa [National Survey of Buraku] (labeled Top Secret).

Cornell, Laurel L. 1996. Infanticide in Early Modern Japan? Demography, Culture, and Population Growth. J. Asian Stud., 55: 22-50.

Ehlers, Maren. 2018. Give and Take: Poverty and the Status Order in Early Modern Japan. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Ehlers, Maren. Forthcoming. Outcastes and their Social Roles. In The Tokugawa World. London: Routledge.

Fujita, Keiichi. 1987. Dowa wa kowai ko [On the Thought that the Burakumin Are Frightening]. Tokyo: Aun sosho.

Fujita, Keiichi. 1988. "Dowa wa kowai" ko tsushin, 13 {"The Burakumin Are Frightening" Message 13. Available at: http://www.geocities.jp/kowaikou/13.htm

Fujita, Tomohiko. 1971. Senzen, sengo no dowa gyozaisei [Buraku Administration and Finance Before and After the War]. Osaka shiritsu daigaku keizaigaku zasshi, 65: 1-35.

Fukuoka ken jinken kenkyujo. 2003. Matsumoto Jiichiro. Fukuoka: Nishi Nihon shinbun sha.

Funakoshi, Masaru. 1976. Hisabetsu buraku keisei shi no kenkyu [Studies in the Formation of the Discriminated-Against Buraku]. Osaka: Kaiho shuppan sha.

Furushima, Toshio. 1991. "The Village and Agriculture During the Edo Period. In John Whitney Hall, ed., The Cambridge History of Japan, v. 4, at 478-518. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hall, John Whitney. 1991. "Introduction." In John Whitney Hall, ed., The Cambridge History of Japan, v. 4, at 1-39. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hankins, Joseph D. 2014. Working Skin: Making Leather, Making a Multicultural Japan. Oakland: University of California Press.

Hanley, Susan & Kozo Yamamura. 1977. Economic and Demographic Change in Preindustrial Japan, 1600-1868. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Harada, Keiichi. 1989. Komesodo no kenkyu no ikkaku [A Perspective on the Study of the Rice Riots]. Buraku mondai kenkyu. 99: 81-94.

Haraguchi, Hideo. 2014. Hisabetsu buraku no rekishi to seikatsu bunka [The History and Life Culture of the Discriminated-Against Buraku]. Tokyo: Meiseki shoten.

Hasegawa, Nei. 1927. Suiheiundo narabe ni kore ni kansuru hanzai no kenkyu [A Study in the Leveler Movement and Associated Crimes]. Shiho kenkyu, 5(4).

Hatanaka, Toshiyuki. 1990. Kinsei sonraku shakai no mibun kozo [The Structure of Status in Tokugawa Village Society]. Kyoto: Buraku mondai kenkyu jo.

Hatanaka, Toshiyuki. 1993. "Buraku shi" wo tou [Questioning "Buraku History"]. Kobe: Hyogo buraku mondai kenkyujo.

Hatanaka, Toshiyuki. 1995. "Buraku shi" no owari [The End of "Buraku History"]. Kyoto: Kamogawa shuppan.

Hatanaka, Toshiyuki. 1997. "Kawata" to heinin ["Burakumin" and Commoners]. Kyoto: Kamogawa shuppan.

Hatanaka, Toshiyuki. 2004. Minbun, sabetsu, aidentiti [Status, Discrimination, Identity]. Kyoto: Kamogawa shuppan.

Hayami, Akira. 2009. Population, Family and Society inPre-Modern Japan. In Collected Papers of Twentieth-Century Japanese Writers on Japan. Kent, U.K.: Global Oriental.

Hirohata, Kenji. 2006. Senzen ki keisatsu kankei shiryo shu, I [Collection of Pre-war Police-Related Documents, Vol. I]. Tokyo: Funi shuppan.

Honda, Yutaka. 1991. Buraku shi wo aruku [Walking Buraku History]. Tokyo: Aki shobo.

Howell, David L. 1996. Ethnicity and Culture in Contemporary Japan. J. Contemporary Hist., 31: 171-90.

Ichinomiya, Yoshinari & Group K21. 2007. Osaka dowa tekoku no shotai [The Truth about the Osaka Burakumin Empire]. Tokyo: Takarajima.

Ichinomiya, Yoshinari & Group K21. 2012. Dowa to boryokudan [The Burakumin and the Mob]. Tokyo: Takarajima sha.

Ichinomiya, Yoshinari & Group K21. 2013. Kansai dowa jinmyaku [Prominent Burakumin of the Kansai Area]. Tokyo: Takarajima sha.

Ichinomiya, Yoshinari & Group K21. 2016. Yamaguchi gumi bunretsu no shinso [The Truth about the Yamaguchi gumi Split]. Tokyo: Takarajima.

Inagaki, Yuichi, Nobuaki Teramoto, Kenji Nakao. 1993. Buraku shi wo do kangaeru ka [How to Think About Buraku History]. Osaka: Kaiho shuppan sha (2d ed.).

Ishii, Ryosuke, ed. 1994. Edo jidai no hisabetsu shakai [Discriminated-Against Society During the Edo Period]. Tokyo: Meiseki shoten.

Ito, Tauya. 2005. Cooperativeness and Buraku Discrimination." Electronic J. Contemp. Japanese Stud. vol. 5

Jansen, Marius B. 2000. The Making of Modern Japan. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Kadooka, Nobuhiko. 2005. Hajimete no buraku mondai [Buraku Issues for Beginners]. Tokyo: Bungei shunju.
Kadooka, Nobuhiko. 2009. Tokoton! Buraku mondai [Tokoton! The Buraku Issue]. Tokyo: Kodansha.
Kadooka, Nobuhiko. 2012. Pisutoru to keikan [A Pistol and a Crown of Thorns]. Tokyo: Kodansha.
Kanno, Ryoji. 2009. Saibanin jidai ni miru Sayama jiken [The Sayama Case, Examined in the Age of Jury Trials]. Tokyo: Gendai jimbun sha.
Kaplan, David & Alec Dubro. 1986. Yakuza: The Explosive Account of Japan's Criminal Underworld. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Keiho kyoku. 1922. Suiheisha undo jokyo [Circumstances of the Suiheisha Movement], Dec. 5, 1922. Reproduced in Hirohata (20xx, 43).
Keisatsu cho, ed. Various years. Keisatsu hakusho [Police White Paper]. Tokyo: Gyosei.
Keisatsu cho. 2011. Hanzai tokei sho [Crime Statistics]. As available on https://www.e-stat.go.jp/regional-statistics/ssdsview/prefectures
Kikuchi, Sansai. 1961a. Nihon no tokushu buraku [The Special Villages of Japan], vol. 1. Tokyo: Tokyo shidan kai.
Kikuchi, Sansai. 1961b. Nihon no tokushu buraku [The Special Villages of Japan], vol. 2. Tokyo: Tokyo shidan kai.
Kobayashi, Shigeru & Yoshikazu Akisada. 1989. Buraku shi kenkyu hando bukku [Handbook on Research on History of the Buraku]. Tokyo: Yuzankaku shuppan, .
Kobayashi, Shigeru. 1985. Buraku sabetsu no rekishiteki kenkyu [Historical Study of Discrimination Against the Buraku]. Tokyo: Meiseki shoten.
Kosei rodo sho. 2010, 2011b. Jinko dotai tokei [Vital Statistics of Japan]. Available at https://www.e-stat.go.jp/stat-search/files?page=1&toukei=00450011&tstat=000001028897.
Kosei rodo sho. 2011a. Hihogosha chosa [Survey of Assisted People]. As available at: https://www.e-stat.go.jp/regional-statistics/ssdsview/prefectures.
Kosei rodo sho. 2011a. Jinko dotai tokei [Vital Statistics]. Available at: https://www.e-stat.go.jp/regional-statistics/ssdsview/prefectures.
Kosei rodo sho. 2011b. Todofukenbetsu seimei hyo [Life Expectancy by Prefecture]. Available at: https://www.e-stat.go.jp/regional-statistics/ssdsview/prefectures.
Kristof, Nicholas D. 1995. Japan's Invisible Minority: Better Off Than in Past, but Still Outcasts. N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1995.
Kurokawa, Midori. 1989. Kindai Nihon to buraku mondai kenkyu no jokyo [Early Modern Japan and the Circumstances of the Study of the Buraku]. In Shigeru Kobayashi & Yoshikazu Akisada, eds., Buraku shi kenkyu hando bukku [Handbook of Buraku Historical Studies]. Tokyo: Yuzankaku shuppan.
Kyoto buraku shi kenkyu jo. 1995. Kyoto no buraku shi [The History of Kyoto Buraku], vol. 1. Kyoto: Kyoto buraku shi kenkyu jo.
Kyoto buraku shi kenkyujo. 1991. Kyoto no buraku shi 2 [The History of the Kyoto Buraku, 2]. Kyoto: Kyoto buraku shi kenkyujo.
Kyoto fu keisatsu bu. 1922. Suiheisha josei ippan [Some Thoughts on the Circumstances of the Suiheisha]. Reproduced in Hirohata (2006).

Kyoto fu keisatsu bu. 1924. Suihei undo no josei [The Circumstances of the Suiheisha Movement]. In Hirohata (2006, 243).

Mae, Keiichi. 1975. Kinsei kawata no heigyuba shori ken [The Right of Tokugawa Period Kawata to Dispose of Dead Cattle and Horses]. In Seiban (1975), at 199.

Matsuoka, Hideo. 1975. Buraku hogo seisaku ron hihan [Critique of Theory of Buraku Protection Policy]. In Seiban (1975), at 13.

McCormack, Noah Y. 2013. Japan's Outcaste Abolition: The Struggle for National Inclusion and the Making of the Modern State. London: Routledge.

Minegishi, Kentaro. 1996. Kinsei hisabetsu min shi no kenkyu [Studies in the History of Discriminated-Against People in Western Japan]. Tokyo: Azekura shobo.

Mitani, Hideshi. 1985. Hi no kusari [Chains of Fire]. Tokyo: Sodo bunka.

Miyamoto, Masahito. 2013. Mirai he tsunagu kaiho undo [The Liberation Movement Tying Us to the Future]. Tokyo: Meiseki shoten.

Miyazaki, Manabu & Akihiro Otani. 2000. Guriko Morinaga jiken [The Guriko Morinaga Case]. Tokyo: Gentosha.

Monbu kagaku sho. 2011a. Gakko kihon chosa hokoku sho [Report of Basic Survey of Schools.] Available at: https://www.e-stat.go.jp/regional-statistics/ssdsview/prefectures.

Monbu kagaku sho. 2011b. Gakko hoken tokei chosa hokoku hyo [Report of Survey into School Insurance]. Available at: https://www.e-stat.go.jp/regional-statistics/ssdsview/prefectures.

Monbu sho. 1937. Gakusei seito jido shincho, taiju, kyoi heikin ruinen hikaku, Meiji 33-Showa 9 nendo [Comparative Annual Averages of the Height, Weight, and Chest Circumferences of Students and Children, 1900-1934]. Tokyo: Monbu sho.

Mori, Isao. 2009. Dowa to ginko [The Buraku and the Bank.] Tokyo: Kodansha.

Morooka, Sukeyuki. 1980. Sengo buraku kaio ronso shi, I [History of the Post-War Debates over Buraku Liberation, I]. Tokyo: Takushoku shobo.

Naikaku tokei kyoku, ed. 1935. Jinko dotai tokei [Vital Statistics]. Tokyo: Tokyo tokei kyokai.

Naikaku. 1995. Naikaku iinkai chiiki kaizen taisaku ni kansuru shoinnkai giroku, No. 1 [Cabinet Committee, Record of Subcommittee on District Renewal Policy], for 132d Parliament, meeting of May 23, 1995.

Naikakufu. 2011. Kenmin keizai keisan nenpo [Prefectural Citizens, Economic Calculations Annual]. Available at: https://www.e-stat.go.jp/regional-statistics/ssdsview/prefectures.

Naimu daijin kanbo bunsho ka. 1888. Dainihon teikoku naimusho dai 2 kai tokei hokoku [2d Statistical Report, Ministry of Interior, Great Japanese Empire].

Naimu daijin kanbo bunsho ka. 1909. Dainihon teikoku naimusho dai 23 kai tokei hokoku [23d Statistical Report, Ministry of Interior, Great Japanese Empire].

Naimu daijin kanbo bunsho ka. 1922. Dainihon teikoku naimusho dai 36 kai tokei hokoku [36th Statistical Report, Ministry of Interior, Great Japanese Empire].

Naimu daijin kanbo bunsho ka. 1924. Dainihon teikoku naimusho dai 37 kai tokei hokoku [37th Statistical Report, Ministry of Interior, Great Japanese Empire].

Naimu daijin kanbo bunsho ka. 1927. Dainihon teikoku naimusho dai 49 kai tokei hokoku [49th Statistical Report, Ministry of Interior, Great Japanese Empire].

Naimu sho, ed. 1933. Kokumin hoken ni kansuru tokei [Statistics Regarding the Insurance of Citizens]. Tokyo: Naimu sho.

Naimu sho. 1921. Buraku ni kansuru shotokei [Statistics Regarding the Buraku]. Tokyo: Naimu sho. Reproduced in Sanichi shobo, ed., Nihon somin seikatsu shiryo shusei [Collection of Materials Regarding the Japanese Poor] (Tokyo: San'ichi Shobo, 1980).

Naimu sho. 1922. Suiheisha undo jokyo [Circumstances of the Suiheisha Movement], Dec. 5, 1922 (labeled Top Secret). Reproduced in Kenji Hirota, ed., Senzenki keisatsu kankei shiryo shu [Collection of Pre-War Police Material] (Tokyo: Funi shuppan, 2006), p. 43.

Nakai, Nobuhiko & James L. McClain. 1991. "Commercial Change and Urban Growth in Early Modern Japan," in John Whitney Hall, ed., The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 4, 519-95. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Nakamura, Kazuo & Atsushi Terazono. 2007. Saraba! Dowa chudoku toshi [Farewell! Buraku Poisoned City]. Kyoto: Kamogawa shuppan.

Nara ken, ed. 1970. Nara ken dowa jigyo shi [History of Burakumin Policy in Nara Prefecture]. Nara: self-pub.

Neary, Ian. 1989. Political Protest and Social Control in Pre-War Japan: The Origins of Buraku Liberation. Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press.

Neary, Ian. 2010. The Buraku Issue and Modern Japan: The Career of Matsumoto Jiichiro. Abingdon, U.K.: Routledge.

Nihon gesui kyokai. 2011. Gesuido kotei [Statistics on Sewage.] Available at: https://www.e-stat.go.jp/regional-statistics/ssdsview/prefectures.

Nihon shakai undo tsushin sha. 1934. Shakai undo dantai gensei ichiran [Strength of Social Movement Groups]. Tokyo: Nihon shakai undo tsushin sha.

Ohnuki-Tierney, Emiko. The Monkey as Mirror: Symbolic Transformation in Japanese History and Ritual. Princeton: Princeton Uiversity Press, 1989.

Ohsato, Katsuma. 1966. Honpo shuyo keizai tokei [Hundred-Year Statistics of the Japanese Economy]. Tokyo: Bank of Japan.

Okazaki, Fumiki. 1950. Nihon jinko no jissho teki kenkyu [Empirical Study of the Japanese Population]. Tokyo: Hokuryukan.

Okurasho. 1923. Shuzeikyoku dai 50 kai tokei nempo sho [50th Annual Report of the Tax Office]. Tokyo: Okurasho.

Osaki, Tomohiro. 2016. New Law to Fight Bias Against 'Burakumin' Seen Falling Short. Japan Times, Dec. 19, 2016.

Ozaki, Yukiya. 1982. Shinshu hisabetsu buraku no shiteki kenkyu [A Historical Study of the Discriminated-against Buraku in Shinshu]. Tokyo: Kashiwa shobo.

Ramseyer, J. Mark & Eric B. Rasmusen. 2018. Outcaste Politics and Organized Crime in Japan: The Effect of Terminating Ethnic Subsidies. J. Empirical Legal Stud., 15: 192.

Ramseyer, J. Mark & Frances M. Rosenbluth. 1995. The Politics of Oligarchy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ramseyer, J. Mark. Forthcoming. Amerika kara mita Nihon ho [Japanese Law from an American Perspective. Tokyo: Yuhikaku.

Rankin, Andrew. 2012. 21st-Century Yakuza: Recent Trends in Organized Crime in Japan (Parts I and II), Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 10 (2012).

Rohlen, Thomas P. 1976. Violence at Yoka High School: The Implications for Japanese Coalition Politics of the Confrontation between the Communist Party and the Buraku Liberation League. Asian Survey, 16: 682-99.

Rozman, Gilbert. 1989. "Social Change." In Marius B. Jansen, ed., The Cambridge History of Japan, v. 5, at 499-568. Cambidge: Cambridge University Press.

Ryosuke, Ishii. 1994. Edo hoken taiseika no sabetsu [Discimination Under the Edo Feudal System]. In Ishii (1994), at 89.

Saito, Osamu & Masanori Takashima. 2015a. Population, Urbanisation and Farm Output in Early Modern Japan, 1600-1874: A Review of Data and Benchmark Estimates. Hitotsubashi University RCESR DP 15-3.

Saito, Osamu & Masanori Takashima. 2015b. Estimating the Shares of Secondary- and Tertiary-Sector Output in the Age of Early Modern Growth: The Case of Japan, 1600-1874. Hitotsubashi University RCESR DP 15-4.

Saito, Osamu. 2005. Moidern Economic Growth Revisited: Japan and the West. LSE Dept. Econ. Hist. Working Paper No. 16/05.

Saito, Osamu. 2009. Land, Labour and Market Forces in Tokugawa Japan, Continuity & Change, 24: 169-196.

Saito, Yoichi & Shinsaburo Oishi. 1995. Mibun sabetsu shakai no shinjutsu [The Truth about the Status-discrimination Society]. Toyo: Kodansha.

San'sai Kikuchi. 1961. Nihon no tokushu buraku [Japan's Special Villages]. 2vols. Tokyo: Tokyo shidankai.

Sato, Tsuneo. 1990. Tokugawa Villages and Agriculture. In Chie Nakane & Shinzaburo Oishi, eds., Tokugawa Japan: The Social and Economic Antecedents of Modern Japan. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press. pp. 37-80.

Seiban chiiki kawata mura bunsho kenkyu kai, ed. 1975. Kinsei burakushi no kenkyu [Studies in the History of Tokugawa Buraku]. Tokyo: Yuzankaku shuppan.

Sengo buraku no sabetsu jotai no haaku ni tsuite [Regarding Grasping the Actual Circumstances of Discrimination Against the Buraku], p. 30. Publication information not given, but posted at: http://www.blhrri.org/old/info/book_guide/kiyou/ronbun/kiyou_0082-15.pdf

Shigemitsu, Minoru. 1991. Yanagihara Ginko shi [History of the Yanagihara Bank]. Available at http://suujin.org/Yanagihara/TimeofYBank3.html.

Shiomi, Sen'ichiro. 2008. Hinmin no teito [The Poor's Capital]. Tokyo: Bungei shunju.

Shiomi, Senichiro. 2011. Shin: Buraku sabetsu wa nakunattaka? [New: Has Buraku Discrimination Disappeared?]. Tokyo: Ryokufu shuppan.

Shiomi, Senichiro. 2012. Do nakusu? Buraku sabetsu [How to Eliminate Buraku Discrimination?]. Tokyo: Ryokufu shuppan.

Smith, Thomas C. 1977. Nakahara: Family Planning and Population in a Japanese Village, 1717-1830. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Somu cho. 1995. Heisei 5 nendo dowa chiku jittai haaku to chosa [Survey to Grasp the True State, Etc., of the 1993 Buraku Districts]. Tokyo: Somu cho, 1995.

Sugiyama, Seiichi. 1951. Tokushu buraku [Special Buraku], Oru romansu, Oct. 1951. Reproduced at: http://muhajirin.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/ee2f1b6fbc8a92429e8c92e641863a50.pdf.

Suzuki, Ryo. 2016. Chiiki shihai kozo no hatten [The Development of the Regional Control Structure]. In Buraku mondai (2016), at 15-46.

Takahashi, Fumihiko. 2005. Suiheiki [Record of the Levellers]. Tokyo: Shincho sha.

Takano, Akio. 2013. Kome sodo kenkyu to jugyo kaihatsu [Studies of the Rice Riots and the Development of the Curriculum]. Kokufudai gakkai keizai kenkyu kai, 123 kai.

Takashima, Masanori. 2017. Keizai seicho no Nihon shi [Economic Growth in the Japanese Past. Nagoya: Nagoya daigaku shuppankai.

Takayanagi, Kaneyoshi. 1979. Edo jidai hisabetsu mibun so no seikatsu shi [A History of the Way of Life for the Discriminated-Against Class During the Tokugawa Period]. Tokyo: Meiseki shoten.

Takeuchi, Yasuto. 2016. Shizuoka ken Suiheisha no rekishi [The History of the Suiheisha in Shizuoka Prefecture]. Osaka: Kaiho shuppan sha.

Teikoku chiho gyosei gakkai. 1922. Chiho gyosei nenkan [Regional Administrative Annual]. Reproduced in Yoshikazu Akisada, et al., eds., Kindai burakushi shiryo shusei 10 [Collected Materials on Early Modern Buraku History, vol. 10].

Teraki, Nobuaki. 1996. Hisabetsu buraku no kigen [The Origins of the Discriminated Buraku]. Tokyo: Meiseki shoten.

Teraki, Nobuaki. 1997. Hisabetsu buraku no kigen [The Origin of Discriminated-Against Villages]. Tokyo: Meiseki shoten.

Terazono, Atsushi, Yoshinari Ichinomiya & Group K21. 2004. Dowa riken no shinso (I) [The Truth of Burakumin Corruption]. Tokyo: Takarajima sha.

Tominaga, Kenzo. 2015. Buraku kaiho wo kangaeru [Thinking about Buraku Liberation]. Osaka: Kaiho shuppan sha.

Tomuro, Kensaku. 2016. Todofukenbetsu no hinkon ritsu, waakingu pua ritsu, kodomo no hinkon ritsu, hosokuritsu no kento [Trends Observed in Poverty Rates, Working Poor Rates, Child Poverty Rates and Take-Up Rates of Public Assistance Across 47 Prefectures in Japan]. Yamagata daigaku jinbungaku kenkyu nempo. 13: 33-53.

Tottori Ruupu saiban de dai ikkai kohan [First Public Hearing in Tottori Loop Trial]. Buraku kaiho domei Osaka fu rengokai. July 13, 2016. Posted at: http://www.hrn.gr.jp/news/1790/.

Tsukada, Takashi. 2001. Toshi Osaka to hinin [The City of Osaka and the Hinin]. Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppan sha.

Tsukada, Takashi. 2007. Kinsei Osaka no hinin to mibunteki shuen [The Early Modern Hinin of Osaka and Their Status Context]. Kyoto: Buraku mondai kenkyujo.

Uchida Kyushuo. 1975. Kawata fugo no jittai to yakuwari [The Truth and Function of Wealthy Kawata]. In Seiban (1975), at 301.

Uehara, Yoshihiro. 2014. Sabetsu to kyoiku to watashi [Discrimination, Education, and I]. Tokyo: Bungei shunju.

Uematsu, Yasutaro. 1977. Ningen kaiho wo mezashite [Toward Human Liberation]. Tokyo: Sokisha.

Upham, Frank K. 1984. Instrumental Violence and Social Change: The Buraku Liberation League and the Tactic of "Denunciation Struggle." L. Japan, 17: 185-205.

Upham, Frank K. 1987. Law and Social Change in Postwar Japan. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Upham, Frank K. 1980. Ten Years of Affirmative Action for Japanese Burakumin: A Preliminary Report on the Law on Special Measures for Dowa Projects. L. Japan, 13: 39.

Usui, Hisamitsu. 1991. Hyogo no burakushi, 1 [The History of the Hyogo Buraku, Vol. 1]. Kobe: Kobe shimbun sogo shuppan sentaa.

Wakita, Osamu. 1991. "The Social and Economic Consequences of Unification." In John Whitney Hall, ed., The Cambridge History of Japan, v. 4, at 96-127. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Watabane, Hiroshi. 1963. Mikaiho buraku no shiteki kenkyu [A Historical Study of the Unliberated Villages]. Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan.

Watanabe, Hiroshi. 1977. Mikaiho buraku no keisei to tenkai [The Structure and Development of the Unliberated Villages]. Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan.

Watanabe, Minoru. 1965. Mikaiho buraku shi no kenkyu [The Study of Unliberated Buraku]. Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan.

Yamamoto, Noboru. 1984. Buraku sabetsu no shakaigaku teki kenkyu [A Sociological Study of Buraku Discrimination]. Tokyo: Meiseki shoten.

Yamamura, Kozo. 1981. Returns to Unification: Economic Growth in Japan, 1550-1650, in John Whitney Hall, Keiji Nagahara & Kozo Yamamura, eds., Japan Before Tokugawa: Political Consolidation and Economic Growth, 1500 to 1650 327-72 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).

Yoshida, Eishi. 1997. Nara ni okeru "buraku shi no minaoshi" ["Reconsidering Buraku History" in Nara]. In Zenkoku buraku shi kenkyu koryu kai, ed., Tayo na hisabetsumin no sekai [The Diverse World of the Discriminated Against People]. 76-104. Osaka: Kaiho shuppan sha.

Zenkoku buraku kaiho undo rengokai. 1998. Zenkoku dowa chiku no nenjibetsu gaikyo chosa narabi ni 1993 nen genzai no fukenbetsu gaikyo chosa kiso shiryo [Survey of Circumstances by Year for All Buraku Districts, Together With the Basic Material of the 1993 Prefectural Circumstances Survey]. Tokyo: Zenkoku buraku kaiho undo rengokai.

Table 1: Burakumin National Population

National Population:

1868	492,409	1958	1,220,157
1907	799,434	1963	1,113,043
1921	829,675	1967	1,068,302
1922	836,568	1971	1,005,129
1935	999,687	1975	1,119,278
1942	550,213	1987	1,166,715
1946	1,004,528	1993	892,751

Sources:

1868

Yoshikazu Akisada, Meiji shoki no "senmin" tokeihyo ni tsuite [Regarding the Statistical Table of "Poor People" of the Early Meiji Period], Buraku kaiho kenkyu v. 2: 55-75 (1974).

Buraku mondai kenkyu jo, Buraku mondai shiryo, vol. 1 (Kyoto: Buraku mondai kenkyu sho, 1980), pp. 296-99.

Shigeru Kobayashi & Yoshikazu Akisada, Buraku shi kenkyu hando bukku [Handbook on Research on History of the Buraku] (Tokyo: Yuzankaku shuppan, 1989), p. 288.

1907

Buraku mondai kenkyu jo, Buraku mondai shiryo, vol. 1 (Kyoto: Buraku mondai kenkyu sho, 1980), pp. 296-99.

Shigeru Kobayashi & Yoshikazu Akisada, Buraku shi kenkyu hando bukku [Handbook on Research on History of the Buraku] (Tokyo: Yuzankaku shuppan, 1989), p. 291.

Zenkoku buraku kaiho undo rengokai. 1998. Zenkoku dowa chiku no nenjibetsu gaikyo chosa narabi ni 1993 nen genzai no fukenbetsu gaikyo chosa kiso shiryo [Survey of Circumstances by Year for All Buraku Districts, Together With the Basic Material of the 1993 Prefectural Circumstances Survey]. Tokyo: Zenkoku buraku kaiho undo rengokai.

1921

Naimu sho, Buraku ni kansuru shotokei [Statistics Regarding the Buraku] (Tokyo: Naimu sho, 1921). Reproduced in San'ichi shobo, ed., Nihon somin seikatsu shiryo shusei [Collection of Materials Regarding the Japanese Poor] (Tokyo: San'ichi Shobo, 1980).

Naimu sho, Suiheisha undo jokyo [Circumstances of the Suiheisha Movement], Dec. 5, 1922 (labeled Top Secret), pp. 61-62. Reproduced in Kenji Hirota, ed., Senzenki keisatsu kankei shiryo shu [Collection of Pre-War Police Material] (Tokyo: Funi shuppan, 2006), p. 43.

Chuo yuwa jigyo kyokai, Zenkoku buraku chosa [National Survey of Buraku] (1936), pp. 335-36.

Nei Hasegawa, Suihei undo narabi ni kore ni kansuru hanzai no kenkyu [A Study of the Suihei Movement and of the Crimes Related to It], Shiho kenkyu, vol. 5 issue 4, 1927.

Kobayashi & Akisada (1989).

Buraku mondai (1980).

(Continued on next page)

Table 1: National Population (Continued)

1922

Teikoku chiho gyosei gakkai, Chiho gyosei nenkan [Regional Administrative Annual] (1922). Reproduced in Yoshikazu Akisada, et al., eds., Kindai burakushi shiryo shusei 10 [Collected Materials on Early Modern Buraku History, vol. 10].

1935

Chuo yuwa jigyo kyokai, Zenkoku buraku chosa [National Survey of Buraku] (1936) (labeled Top Secret).
Zenkoku buraku (1998).

1942

Zenkoku buraku (1998).

1946

Sengo buraku no sabetsu jotai no haaku ni tsuite [Regarding Grasping the Actual Circumstances of Discrimination Against the Buraku], p. 30. Publication information not given, but posted at: http://www.blhrri.org/old/info/book_guide/kiyou/ronbun/kiyou_0082-15.pdf
Zenkoku buraku (1998).

1958

Zenkoku buraku (1998)

1963, 1967

Buraku mondai (1980).
Zenkoku buraku (1998).

1971

Zenkoku buraku (1998).

1975

http://douwachiku.com/wiki/zenkokunodouwachiku. The source attributes the survey to the Naikaku sori daijin.
Zenkoku buraku (1998).

1987

Senichiro Shiomi, Do nakusu? Buraku sabetsu [How to Eliminate Buraku Discrimination?] (Tokyo: Ryokufu shuppan, 2012).
Kobayashi & Akisada (1989).
Zenkoku buraku (1998)

1993

Somu cho, Heisei 5 nendo dowa chiku jittai haaku to chosa [Survey to Grasp the True State, Etc., of the 1993 Buraku Districts] (Tokyo: Somu cho, 1995) p. 18.
Senichiro Shiomi, Shin: Buraku sabetsu wa nakunattaka? [New: Has Buraku Discrimination Disappeared?] (Tokyo: Ryokufu shuppan, 2011).
Shiomi (2012).
Zenkoku buraku (1998).

Table 2: Burakumin Prefectural Population

A. 1868-1958:

Prefecture	1868 Number	1868 Index	1907 Index	1921 Index	1921 Number	1922 Index	1935 Index	1942 Index	1946 Index	1958 Index
Hokkaido	**0**				**0**					
				Tohoku region						
Aomori	**563**	302.7	51.1	100	**186**	120.4				
Iwate	**189**									
Miyagi	**1,138**									
Akita	**534**									
Yamagata	**1,189**	118.9	12.3	100	**1,000**	125				
Fukushima	**1,583**	127.7	99.7	100	**1,240**	93.6	80.5		80.5	60.1
				Kanto region						
Ibaragi	**3,527**	80.8	132.6	100	**4,368**	94.7	122.0	124.7	165.9	
Tochigi	**4,493**	34.3	76.3	100	**13,114**	97.0	121.0	68.4	133.4	124.7
Gunma	**15,627**	63.7	79.6	100	**24.516**	90	122.4	116.2	94.5	94.5
Saitama	**8,599**	30.6	82.9	100	**28,139**	101.3	116.8	85.3	116.8	169.0
Chiba	**9,579**	370.1	149.4	100	**2,588**	100.3	136.5		145.4	57.1
Tokyo	**5,124**	66.9	109.1	100	**7,658**	95.9	94.7	40.7	81.5	
Kanagawa	**7,412**	130.0	113.1	100	**5,712**		94.5	45.0	94.5	
				Chubu region						
Niigata	**3,581**	122.3	122.7	100	**2,929**	12.9	149.0	56.7	197.4	
Toyama	**1,430**	17.4	106.7	100	**8,242**	103.0	98.7		85.6	
Ishikawa	**11,740**	251.4	87.0	100	**4,670**	86.1	57.2	40.8	49.5	
Fukui	**2,242**	96.7	126.8	100	**2,318**	97.1	124.8	127.2	124.8	164.4
Yamanashi	**3,908**	224.0	137.2	100	**1,745**	95.5	104.2	91.2	331.4	
Nagano	**6,080**	31.6	91.5	100	**19,263**	104.5	124.8	78.5	115.4	171.9
Gifu	**975**	21.0	95.6	100	**4,634**	106.9	96.2	77.5	96.6	100.6
Shizuoka	**7,709**	53.3	75.9	100	**14,476**	80.0	111.4	100.8	127.7	149.2
Aichi	**11,128**	160.7	128.0	100	**6,927**	121.3	196.2		145.5	
				Kinki region						
Mie	**13,388**	34.9	89.4	100	**38,383**	99.7	109.2	101.1	109.9	126.8
Shiga	**12,501**	48.4	91.9	100	**25,819**	108.3	109.6	88.6	141.8	156.6
Kyoto	**24,444**	58.0	171.2	100	**42,179**	101.5	119.9	10.7	119.9	135.0
Osaka	**24,265**	50.7	72.8	100	**47,909**	108.3	217.8	97.3	128.5	250.8
Hyogo	**46,189**	42.9	89.2	100	**107,608**	101.5	119.9	10.7	119.9	165.9
Nara	**14,962**	45.8	84.4	100	**32,678**	102.5	114.6	76.0	114.6	169.8
Wakayama	**29,696**	82.3	91.3	100	**36,072**	103.2	134.8	1035	140.1	145.7
				Chugoku region						
Tottori	**4,599**	24.2	88.3	100	**19,022**	97.2	115.7	104.1	132.7	150.0
Shimane	**9,283**	143.0	140.9	100	**6,492**	155.6	120.1	53.9	121.6	110.6
Okayama	**24,278**	56.6	87.9	100	**42,895**	98.8	112.9	74.9	112.7	137.6
Hiroshima	**28,123**	70.1	110.6	100	**40,133**	102.7	118.8	39.2	97.8	118.0
Yamaguchi	**14,174**	71.3	117.0	100	**19,878**	110.5	109.4	65.6	78.0	184.0

(Continued on next page)

Table 2: Burakumin Population (Continued)

A. 1868-1958 (Continued):

Prefecture	1868 Number	1868 Index	1907 Index	1921 Index	1921 Number	1922 Index	1935 Index	1942 Index	1946 Index	1958 Index
				Shikoku region						
Tokushima	**19,232**	86.1	93.6	100	**22,343**	108.9	114.5	114.3	170.5	317.2
Kagawa	**8,649**	87.7	104.7	100	**9,867**	102.6	74.8	68.7	86.6	114.1
Ehime	**27,414**	59.6	99.1	100	**46,015**	102.5	112.9	87.2	176.8	136.7
Kochi	**16,894**	50.7	83.1	100	**33,353**	96.9	103.7	70.2	109.4	151.4
				Kyushu region						
Fukuoka	**32,597**	47.0	87.7	100	**69,345**	96.9	103.7	70.2	109.4	121.0
Saga	**760**	30.3	151.8	100	**2,508**	98.1	94.3	27.0	94.3	59.3
Nagasaki	**3,989**	158.4	158.4	100	**2,519**	112.8	126.6		42.3	
Kumamoto	**7,267**	54.9	91.7	100	**13,240**	88.7	110.4	8.2	63.1	150.5
Oita	**7,989**	112.5	106.9	100	**7,099**	141.3	134.7	86.4	143.6	351.4
Miyazaki	**1,191**	45.9	107.8	100	**2,590**	92.9	40.7		40.7	
Kagoshima	**5,940**	74.2	90.6	100	**8,001**	111.8	124.2	56.7	124.2	131.0
Okinawa	**0**				**0**					

B. 1963-1993:

Prefecture	1921 Number	1963 Index	1967 Index	1971 Index	1975 Index	1987 Index	1993 Index	1993 Number
Hokkaido								
				Tohoku region				
Aomori	**186**							
Iwate								
Miyagi								
Akita								
Yamagata	**1,000**							
Fukushima	**1,240**	21.4						
				Kanto region				
Ibaraki	**4,368**	127.7	108.7	25.8	80.04	156.5	105.4	**4,604**
Tochigi	**13,114**	127.3			159.8	165.6	80.1	**10,508**
Gunma	**24,516**	148.0	133.8	123.9	126.6	127.7	111.2	**27.249**
Saitama	**28,139**	147.5	118.0	130.7	141.8	143.5	124.2	**34.946**
Chiba	**2,588**	168.2	130.4	130.1	123.3	125.8	87.5	**2,264**
Tokyo	**7,658**							
Kanagawa	**5,712**		25.1	29.1	31.6	66.1	53.7	**3,065**

(Continued on next page)

Table 2: Burakumin Population (Continued)

B. 1963-1993 (Continued):

Prefecture	1921 Number	1963 Index	1967 Index	1971 Index	1975 Index	1987 Index	1993 Index	1993 Number
				Chubu region				
Niigata	**2,929**	71.7	61.9	33.6	28.7	35.9	24.7	**724**
Toyama	**8,242**	11.0	40.2					
Ishikawa	**4,670**	8.3						
Fukui	**2,318**	156.5		151.9	152.5	152.5	113.7	**2,636**
Yamanashi	**1,745**	135.5	40.1			20.1	16.8	**293**
Nagano	**19,263**	120.6	105.8	99.3	116.0	116.2	82.3	**15,849**
Gifu	**4,634**	89.5	88.0	93.8	92.8	92.8	83.9	**3,888**
Shizuoka	**14,476**	124.6	25.1	86.7	76.1	76.1	50.0	**7,238**
Aichi	**6,927**	153.9	126.7	95.7	88.9	147.4	128.8	**8,922**
				Kinki region				
Mie	**38,383**	125.7	111.1	111.1	111.8	111.9	93.5	**35,905**
Shiga	**25,819**	151.3	141.3	136.5	139.3	140.3	136.6	**35,277**
Kyoto	**42,179**	131.9	124.4	117.2	122.2	123.0	96.2	**40,561**
Osaka	**47,909**	186.0	274.5	278.6	299.1	299.1	182.4	**87,385**
Hyogo	**107,608**	152.0	151.3	138.9	142.2	142.4	109.0	**117,297**
Nara	**32,678**	171.8	182.9	186.5	190.3	190.6	155.9	**50,933**
Wakayama	**36,072**	128.4	131.3	13.4	130.1	131.8	115.0	**41,465**
				Chugoku region				
Tottori	**19,022**	149.4	134.7	127.5	129.7	132.2	123.9	**23,562**
Shimane	**6,492**	97.5	100.8	74.5	83.1	92.4	49.6	**3,221**
Okayama	**42,895**	136.8	115.2	112.7	130.2	132.2	97.9	**41,986**
Hiroshima	**40,133**	110.6	75.7	99.6	106.9	107.2	82.0	**32,898**
Yamaguchi	**19,878**	125.7	114.7	104.6	99.9	102.7	69.9	**13,898**
				Shikoku region				
Tokushima	**22,343**	159.2	128.2	131.7	142.8	149.4	134.7	**30,103**
Kagawa	**9,867**	104.1	97.8	93.3	85.5	86.2	7.6	**752**
Ehime	**46,015**	97.1	96.3	90.1	94.8	97.8	71.6	**32,923**
Kochi	**33,353**	130.6	121.1	117.9	126.8	133.0	105.1	**35,061**
				Kyushu region				
Fukuoka	**69,345**	165.1	175.9	176.7	191.6	196.1	161.2	**111,784**
Saga	**2,508**	55.7	50.6	60.6	60.3	63.9	50.8	**1,273**
Nagasaki	**2,519**	13.9			4.8	14.2	11.6	**292**
Kumamoto	**13,240**	9.4	88.5	94.8	90.5	95.3	85.4	**11,308**
Oita	**7,099**	130.3	63.7	92.7	94.8	321.2	125.9	**8,935**
Miyazaki	**2,590**					194.4	28.2	**729**
Kagoshima	**8,001**	127.2	109.4	98.0	84.4	103.4	78.0	**6,244**
Okinawa	**0**							**0**

Notes: Actual populations for 1868, 1921, and 1993 (in bold). Intervening populations indexed at 1921 = 100 (in Roman).

Sources: See Table 1.

Figure 1



Note: 1942 Census omitted because an outlier.

Source: See Table 1.

Table 3: Selected Summary Statistics

	n	Min	Mean	Median	Max
Burakumin PC					
1868	44	0	1.182	.840	4.862
1921	46	0	1.605	.912	5.750
1993	46	0	.957	.335	4.289
Density, 1921	46	2859	24,803	16,574	174,998
Pref income PC, 2009	47	2.006	2.606	2.579	4.486
Crimes PC					
1920	47	.005	.013	.011	.037
2010	47	.005	.011	.010	.019
Welfare rate, 2010	47	.007	.024	.021	.054
Illegitimacy rate					
1920	47	.005	.081	.072	.159
2009	47	.013	.022	.021	.040
Taxpayers PC, 1923	47	.009	.030	.028	.059
Exogamy, 1921	42	0	.067	.025	.500
Suiheisha BO, 1933	46	0	7.457	0	45
B pref'l voters, 1921	42	0	.017	.016	.037
Murder rate, 1920	47	4.98e-6	.00003	.00003	.00007
Buraku agri ratio, 1935	41	0	.530	.537	.979
Buraku size, 1921	42	41.2	211.9	168.2	798.5
Subsidies PBC, 1963-66	37	0	.735	.294	7.263

Sources: See text and table 1

Table 4: Variables Used

Anti-liberation riots: 1 if the prefecture experienced any riots against the 1871 liberation edict, 0 otherwise.

Buraku agricultural ratio: Number of burakumin households engaged in agriculture, divided by the number of burakumin households.

Buraku crime rate, PBC (per burakumin capita): Number of burakumin committing a crime, divided by the number of burakumin.

Buraku illegitimacy rate: Non-marital burakumin births, divided by total burakumin births.

Buraku prefectural voters PBC: The number of burakumin eligible to vote in the prefectural elections (suffrage depended on income), divided by the number of burakumin.

Buraku public assistance, PBC: Number of burakumin on public assistance, divided by the number of burakumin.

Burakumin PC: The number of burakumin, divided by total population.

Chest circumference: Chest circumference of of boys and girls at age 7.

Crimes per capita: Number of Criminal Code violations, divided by total population.

Density: Total population, divided by area (100 sq. km)

Divorce rate: Number of divorces, divided by number of marriages.

Dysentery rate: Number of deaths from dysentery, divided by the total population.

Exogamy: Number of marriages between burakumin and commoners, divided by all marriages involving burakumin.

Height, Grade 5 F: Average height of girls, grade 5.

Height: Height of boys and girls at age 7.

Hinin fraction: Fraction of hinin among the 1868 burakumin.

HS-College Rate: Students proceeding to college, divided by total number of high school graduates.

Illegitimacy rate: Number of non-marital births, divided by total births.

Infant Mortality: New born deaths, divided by total births.

Kyudan rate: The number of denunciation sessions, divided by the number of burakumin.

Life Expectancy, F: Life expectancy of women.

Meth crimes per capita: Number of crimes involving methamphetamines, divided by total population.

Murders PC: Total murders for given year, divided by total population.

Population growth: fractional growth in total prefectural population since 1884.

Poverty rate: The fraction of households living below the minimum cost of living. Tomuro (2016) calculates the number by first estimating the minimum cost of living per prefecture, and then assessing the number of households with income below that measure.

Prefectural Income PC: Total prefectural income (kenmin so shotoku), divided by total population.

Sewage rate: Number of people served by sewage facilities, divided by total population.

Shirayama shrines: The number of Shirayama shrines (said to have been a marker of the traditional location of burakumin communities).

(Continued on next page.)

Table 4: Variables (Continued)

Subsidies PBC: The amount of the prefectural subsidies targeting burakumin (in 10,000 yen) over a given time period, divided by the number of burakumin.

Suicide rate: Number of suicides, divided by the total population.

Suiheisha BO: The number of branch offices of the Suiheisha.

Taxpayers PC: Number of taxpayers, divided by the total households.

Total crime PC: Total crimes for given year, divided by total population.

Tuberculosis rate: Number of deaths from tuberculosis, divided by the total population.

Weight: Weight of boys and girls at age 7.

Welfare dependency: Number of households on public assistance, divided by number of households.

Notes: Obviously, these values changed over time. As relevant, I identify the year involved in the text and in the tables below.

Table 5: Modern Buraku

A. Social Welfare:

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable	Sewage	Poverty	HS-CollRate	Life Exp F	Hght Gr5F	Inf Mort
Buraku PC 93	-2.888	.00016**	130.421**	-1.9995	-11.849	-.0022
	(1.845)	(6.52e-5)	(56.224)	(5.106)	(8.454)	(.033)
Density 93	5.90e-7*	-1.32e-12	5.59e-7	-5.33e-7	7.01e-7	1.03e-8**
	(2.98e-7)	(1.05e-11)	(9.08e-6)	(8.25e-7)	(1.37e-6)	(5.37e-9)
Pref Inc PC09	.092	-9.86e-6***	13.739***	.0402	-.3698	-.0074***
	(.083)	(2.92e-6)	(2.520)	(.229)	(.3789)	(.0015)
Adj R2:	.27	.38	.56	-.05	-.00	.36

B. Indices of Dysfunction:

Dependent variable:	Crimes	Meth Crimes	Welfare dep	Illegit	Divorce
Buraku PC 93	.0822***	.00156***	.2585**	.1292**	.7269**
	(.0295)	(.0005)	(.0987)	(.0574)	(.331)
Density 93	1.11e-8**	2.87e-10***	8.05e-8***	3.05e-8***	9.17e-8*
	(4.77e-9)	(8.68e-11)	(1.59e-8)	(9.27e-9)	(5.36e-8)
Pref Inc PC93	.00296**	.00002	-.0184***	-.0110***	-.0762***
	(.00132)	(.00002)	(.0044)	(.0026)	(.0149)
Adj R2	.43	.40	.38	.30	.44

Notes: *, **, ***: Statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. n = 47. OLS regressions. Correlation coefficients, or regression coefficients followed by standard errors. All regressions include a constant term.

Sources: See text and Table 1.

Table 6: Social Welfare, Burakumin and Others, 1993 (Summary Statistics)

	Burakumin					Others			
	n	Min	Median	Mean	Max	Min	Median	Mean	Max
Welfare depend	36	.34	3.055	**4.028**	25	.20	.645	**.684**	1.85
Single Mother HH	20	.8	2.15	**2.09**	3.7	.8	1.15	**1.113**	1.3
Own Home	24	24.8	66.3	69.13	98.6	47.9	67.2	69.25	76.5
Lot Size	24	160	243	271.6	532	119	278	265.1	420
Home Size	23	22.8	32.1	32.66	42.1	25.3	33.7	34.02	42.6
Sewage	36	0	13.7	**21.94**	71.1	4.4	28.35	**31.89**	77.1
Unemployment	22	3	5.35	5.58	12	3.5	4.75	5.05	7
Wages									
Under 1 mill	23	10.7	21.7	**21.2**	28.3	12.7	15.2	**15.23**	17.9
Over 7 mill	23	1.5	2.9	**3.47**	7.2	4.5	7.2	**8**	13.3

Notes: Figures in bold where means of prefectural averages differ significantly at 1 percent level. On other details, see text.

Sources: See Somu cho, Heisei 5 nendo dowa chiku jittai haaku to chosa [Survey to Grasp the True State, Etc., of the 1993 Buraku Districts] (Tokyo: Somu cho, 1995); Zenkoku buraku kaiho undo rengokai, Zenkoku dowa chiku no nenjibetsu gaikyo chosa narabi ni 1993 nen genzai no fukenbetsu gaikyo chosa kiso shiryo [Survey of Circumstances by Year for All Buraku Districts, Together With the Basic Material of the 1993 Prefectural Circumstances Survey] (Tokyo: Zenkoku buraku kaiho undo rengokai, 1998).

Table 7:
Economic and Demographic Growth in Tokugawa Japan

	1600	1721	1804	1846	1874
Population (millions)	17.0	31.3	30.7	32.2	34.5
Total rice production (million koku)	30.7	48.8	58.8	67.0	76.4
Per capita rice production (koku)	1.80	1.56	1.92	2.08	2.21
Per capita GDP (koku)	2.45	2.48	3.07	3.55	3.71

Note: One koku equals about 150 kg of rice.

Source: Masanori Takashima, Keizai seicho no Nihon shi [Economic Growth in the Japanese Past (Nagoya: Nagoya daigaku shuppankai, 2017).

Table 8: Buraku and Crime, Pre-World War II

A. Total Crimes, PC

Dependent variable: *Total crime PC*

	1886	1907		1922		1935	
	OLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Burakumin PC							
1858	3.126e-4						
	(6.91e-4)						
1907		.00272***	.00190**				
		(7.79e-4)	(8.95e-4)				
1921				.00127**	.0099*		
				(5.35e-4)	(.00059)		
1935						.00271*	.00390**
						(.0015)	(.0017)
Density							
1884	5.60e-8						
	(5.93e-8)						
1907		4.78e-7***	4.69e-7***				
		(7.72e-8)	(7.26e-8)				
1921				1.02e-7**	1.00e-7**		
				(4.08-e8)	(3.77e-8)		
1935						1.18e-7	1.13e-7
						(8.48e-8)	(7.89e-8)
Exogamy	.0132*	.0424***	.0389***	.0180**	.0162**	.0185	.0251
	(.0071)	(.0130)	(.012)	(.0084)	(.0079)	(.026)	(.0248)
Taxpayer, PC	.3632***	-.0217	.0311	.1564	.1645	.7026*	.6880*
	(.105)	(.213)	(.202)	(.138)	(.128)	(.411)	(.382)
Population Growth							
1884-1908		-7.78e-4	-.0021				
		(.0070)	(.005)				
1884-1921				1.87e-5	-8.27e-5		
				(.0032)	(.0030)		
1884-1935						.00306	.00380
						(.0064)	(.0060)
n	40	40	40	38	38	40	40
Adj R2	.36	.70	.69	.28	.27	.43	.42
F statistic			21.13		22.76		27.2

(Continuec

Table 8: Buraku and Crime (Continued)

B. Murders:

Dependent variable: *Murders, PC*

	1886	1907		1922		1935	
	OLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Burakumin, PC							
1868	5.27e-6						
	(126e-5)						
1907		3.54e-6**	3.21e-6*				
		(1.60e-6)	(1.81e-6)				
1921				4.15e-6**	4.06e-6*		
				(1.86e-6)	(2.08e-6)		
1935						1.23e-6**	2.10e-6***
						(5.04e-7)	(5.88e-7)
Density							
1884	1.72e-10						
	(1.08e-9)						
1907		-2.05e-11	-2.42e-11				
		(1.58e-10)	(1.46e-10)				
1921				1.94e-10	1.94e-10		
				(142e-10)	(1.30e-10)		
1935						8.72e-12	5.25e-12
						(2.80e-11)	(2.70e-11)
Exogamy	2.62e-5	1.95e-5	1.81e-5	-3.55e-6	-4.04e-6	-9.58e-6	-4.72e-6
	(1.29e-4)	(2.66e-5)	(2.5e-5)	(2.94e-5)	(2.77e-4)	(8.61e-6)	(8.48e-6)
Taxpayers, PC	-3.98e-5	6.278e-4	6.49e-4	3.145e-4	3.177e-4	-9.38e-5	-1.047e-4
	(.0019)	(4.37e-4)	(4.08e-4)	(4.81e-4)	(4.44e-4)	(1.14e-4)	(1.31e-4)
Population growth							
1884-1908		2.07e-5	2.01e-5				
		(1.43e-5)	(1.31e-5)				
1884-1921				1.6e-5	1.6e-5		
				(1.13e-5)	(1.04e-5)		
1884-1935						6.89e-7	1.23e-6
						(2.12e-6)	(2.05e-6)
n	40	40	40	38	38	40	40
Adj R2	-.11	.23	.22	.21	.21	.14	.06
CDW F Statistic			21.13		20.85		22.67

Notes: *, **, ***: Statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Correlation coefficients, or regression coefficients followed by standard errors. All regressions include a constant term.

In the 2SLS estimates, the **Burakumin PC** variable is instrumented by **Burakumin PC 1868**, **Shirayama shrines**, and **Hinin fraction**. 1884 is the earliest national census, and 1886 is the earliest year for which crime data are available. The murders for 1886 include batteries.

Sources: See text and Table 1.

Table 9: Buraku and Social Welfare, Pre-World War II

A. Variables from 1920 and 1935:

Dependent variable:	*Illegitimacy*		*Divorce*		*Infant Mortality*	
	1920	1935	1920	1935	1920	1935
Burakumin PC						
1921	4.70e-7**		-8.98e-8		2.38e-7	
	(2.07e-7)		(1.39e-7)		(2.08e-7)	
...1935		3.11e-7**		1.88e-8		-7.68e-8
		(1.15e-7)		(9.46e-8)		(1.04e-7)
Density						
1920	2.99e-5		-1.58e-5		4.23e-5**	
	(1.7e-5)		(1.14e-5)		(1.71e-5)	
1935		-4.32e-7		-3.74e-6		-4.32e-7
		(6.73e-6)		(5.52e-6)		(6.09e-6)
Exogamy	.00137	.0866**	.02974	.01613	.01595	-.05278
	(.0409)	(.0425)	(.0273)	(.0390)	(.0411)	(.0385)
Taxpayers PC	-.6708	-.6008	.3659	.3587	-1.375*	-.4641
	(.7335)	(.5080)	(.4914)	(.4170)	(.736)	(.460)
n	41	41	41	41	41	41
Adj. R2	.11	.11	-.00	-.08	.07	.05

B. Variables from 1933 and 1934:

	Suicides (34)	Dysentery (33)	Tuberculosis (33)
Burakumin PC 35	-4.09e-10	2.33e-10	1.15e-9
	(2.61e-10)	(6.72e-10)	(2.43e-9)
Density 35	1.28e-8	1.29e-7***	1.13e-7
	(1.52e-8)	(3.92e-8)	(1.42e-7)
Exogamy	-.000415***	-.000158	-.000541
	(9.63e-5)	(.000248)	(.000896)
Taxpayers PC	.000357	.004037	.009489
	(.00116)	(.00296)	(.0107)
n	41	41	41
Adj. R2:	.27	.45	.04

(Continued on next page)

Table 9: Buraku and Social Welfare (Continued)

C. Physical Size, Age 7, 1933:

Dependent variable:	*Height*		*Weight*		*Chest Circumference*	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Burakumin PC 35	3.95e-6	-3.24e-6	1.37e-6	1.45e-6	.001873***	1.07e-6
	(3.36e-6)	(5.20e-6)	(1.51e-6)	(1.22e-6)	(.000405)	(2.03e-6)
Density 35	.0004652**	.0004582	3.22e-6	-.3804	-.0423*	-.000166
	(.000196)	(.000304)	(8.83e-5)	(.4516)	(.0234)	(.000119)
Exogamy	-2.320*	-3.402*	-.3549	-.3804	195.60	1.2402
	(1.239)	(1.919)	(.5577)	(.4516)	(149.31)	(.7505)
Taxpayers PC	16.803	43.488*	4.485	9.500*	1764.6	4.2487
	(14.809)	(22.927)	(6.663)	(5.396)	(1783.9)	(8.967)
	41	41	41	41	41	41
Adj. R2:	.38	.25	-.15	.15	.43	.00

Notes: *, **, ***: Statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Correlation coefficients, or regression coefficients followed by standard errors. OLS regressions. All regressions include a constant term.

Sources: See text and Table 1.

Table 10: The Location of Suiheisha Branches

A. Basic Regression

Dependent variable: *Suiheisha branch offices, 1933*	
Burakumin PC 21	3.760***
	(1.088)
Exogamy 21	10.305
	(18.298)
Density 21	.000112**
	(5.19e-5)
Buraku Pref'l voters	541.60***
	(182.59)
n:	42
Adj. R2:	.36

B. Additional Regressions: Regressions of the number of Suiheisha branch offices in 1933 on the control variables given in Panel A, and the following additional independent variables.

	Murder rate 20	Tot Crime rate 20	Buraku Cr rate 21	B illegit rate 21	B divorce rate 21 .
Coef.	96404	29.194	223.91	6.3198	-11.884
S.e.	(137034)	(336.52)	(225.80)	(13.004)	(24.084)
Adj. R2	.35	.34	.36	.34	.34

	B public assist 21	Buraku agricul	Buraku size 21	Hinin frac	Anti-lib riots .
Coef.	-528.87	.8186	-.0023	-14.444	-.5976
S.e.	(864.44)	(6.202)	(.0130)	(10.921)	(2.447)
Adj. R2	.35	.34	.34	.37	.34

Notes: *, **, ***: Statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. OLS regressions. Regression coefficients followed by standard errors. All regressions include a constant term.

Sources: See text and Table 1.

Table 11: Determinants of Outmigration, 1971-1993 Censuses

Dependent variable: *Buraku population indexed at 1921, for --*	1971	1975	1987	1993
Burakumin PC 21	2.146	2.059	-4.731	2.641
	(5.51)	(4.57)	(6.66)	(3.62)
Buraku size 21	.2075***	.2146***	.2218***	.1644***
	(.054)	(.045)	(.065)	(.035)
Density 21	4.63e-6	4.91e-5	-2.84e-4	-1.13e-4
	(2.50e-4)	(2.07e-4)	(3.02e-4)	(1.64e-4)
Exogamy 21	-147.72	-220.17**	-.9738	-106.38
	(107.84)	(89.36)	(130.38)	(70.78)
B pref voters 21	1122.05	34.230	890.716	808.87
	(834.34)	(691.40)	(1009)	(547.7)
Buraku agri ratio	11.122	55.716***	82.693***	49.850***
	(24.57)	(20.36)	(29.71)	(16.13)
Suiheisha BO 33	1.559**	1.495**	.6798	.6838
	(.67)	(.55)	(.80)	(.44)
Murder, PC 20	-12658.19	400033	2286533***	746935**
	(558979)	(463213)	(675845)	(366915)
n	40	40	40	40
Adj. R2	.57	.71	.51	.69

Notes: *, **, ***: Statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Regression coefficients followed by standard errors. All regressions include a constant term. Regressions are OLS.

Table 12: Buraku-Specific Prefectural Subsidies (1947-1968)

A. Basic regressions:

Dependent variable: *Subsidies per burakumin capita, for years*

	1947-57	1958-62	1963-66	1967-68
Burakumin PC 21	.0300*	.1070*	.4146**	.1369
	(.0150)	(.0573)	(.1810)	(.270)
Exogamy 21	-4.16e-4	-.7363	-2.036	-3.956
	(2.83)	(1.73)	(3.993)	(7.92)
Density 21	4.73e-7	1.34e-5***	6.52e-5***	5.29e-5**
	(6.89e-7)	(4.50e-6)	(1.49e-5)	(2.04e-5)
B pref voters 21	.8612	9.061	25.462	-8.022
	(2.32)	(8.489)	(25.12)	(41.10)
Buraku size 21	1.732e-4	-4.291e-4	-3.46e-4	.0021
	(1.48e-4)	(5.74e-4)	(.0019)	(.0030)
Buraku agri ratio	.0296	-.1177	-.5073	.2059
	(.0679)	(.2250)	(.7251)	(1.10)
Suiheisha BO 33	-5.235e-4	-.0134*	-.0530**	-.0188
	(.0018)	(.0071)	(.0231)	(.0299)
n	40	30	37	33
Adj. R2	.13	.23	.47	.37

B. Additional Independent variables:

To the regressions on **Subsidies, PC, 1963-66,** I add each of the following additional independent variables. The Table gives the resulting coefficient on that additional variable, followed by the standard error and the resulting Adjusted R2.

B Illegit rate 21	B public ass rt 21	Anti lib riots	Hinin frac 68	Kyudan rate 23
.1737	-100.63	.4747*	-.0112	230.34***
(1.75)	(109.21)	(.276)	(1.42)	(80.01)
.46	.47	.51	.46	.58

Notes: *, **, ***: Statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Regressions are OLS. Regression coefficients followed by standard errors. All regressions include a constant term.

Sources: See text and Table 1.

Table 13: Prefectural Subsidy (1947-1968) Levels and Out-migration

Dependent variable: *Buraku population indexed at 1921, for --*	1958 OLS	1963 OLS	1967 OLS	1971 OLS	1958 2SLS	1963 2SLS	1967 2SLS	1971 2SLS
Subsidies, PBC								
1947-1957	-3.150				601.49***			
	(87.70)				(208.62)			
1947-1962		11.84				47.89**		
		(14.09)				(21.80)		
1947-1966			6.271**				9.50**	
			(2.88)				(3.55)	
1947-1968				3.154**				6.173***
				(1.46)				(1.58)
Burakumin PC 21	20.706**	13.975**	19.653***	13.694***				
	(8.51)	(5.46)	(4.71)	(4.92)				
Buraku size 21	.168*	.0800	.0293	.102				
	(.094)	(.067)	(.062)	(.067)				
Density 21	-2.222e-4	-2.138e-4	1.485e-4	-4.25e-5				
	(4.06e-4)	(2.87e-4)	(2.56e-4)	(2.76e-4)				
n	42	42	42	42	40	30	37	37
Adj R2	.25	.27	.49	.46	.06	.06	.24	.30
CDW F Statistic					1.52	2.49	6.66	14.13

Notes: *, **, ***: Statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Regression coefficients followed by standard errors. All regressions include a constant term.

In Panel A, **Subsidies, per burakumin capita** are instrumented with **Total burakumin 35/46/58/63, Suiheisha branch offices 33, Kyudan rate 23, Buraku public assistance PBC 21, Buraku illegitimacy rate 21, Buraku prefectural voters 21, Anti-liberation riots, Suiheisha branch offices 33, Buraku size 35/58/63, Density 35/46/58/63, Buraku Divorce rate 21** and **Shirayama shrines**.

Sources: See text and Table 1.