Abigail Moncrieff

Academic Fellow, 2007-09

Abigail Moncrieff has written on how to interpret Medicaid’s equal access provision for the University of Chicago Law Review and on the “major questions” exception to Chevron deference in an article that won the Casper Platt Award for Outstanding Paper by a Law Student at the University of Chicago Law School.

During her fellowship, she is writing on the federal government's proper role in medical malpractice reform. Although conventional wisdom holds that malpractice reform is a paradigmatic case for state sovereignty, Ms. Moncrieff argues that federal intervention is, in fact, functionally justified. Because the federal government pays for 40% of total American healthcare costs through spending programs like Medicare and Medicaid and through tax subsidies like the exemption for employer sponsored insurance, individual states can gain the benefits of inefficient malpractice laws without suffering the full cost of those inefficiencies. This story is in one sense a classic spillover story; the states externalize the costs of their regulatory choices. In terms of causation, however, this story is importantly different from classic spillover stories; the externalization effect here arises solely from prior decisions to federalize healthcare spending. Federalization of healthcare regulation has thus snowballed into a functional need for federalization of medical malpractice policy.

Bibliography

Federalization Snowballs: The Need for Federal Action in Medical Malpractice Reform (article in progress).

Reincarnating the "Major Questions" Exception to Chevron Deference as a Doctrine of Non-Interference (Or Why Massachusetts v. EPA Got It Wrong), 60 Admin. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2008).

Comment, Payments to Medicaid Doctors: Interpreting the "Equal Access" Provision, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 673 (2006).

Research Interests

Health Law (including Health Policy, Insurance Law, Health Law & Economics, ERISA, and Food & Drug Law)
Administrative Law
Legislation
Structural Constitutional Law

Education

University of Chicago, J.D., with honors, 2006
- Member, University of Chicago Law Review
- Casper Platt Award for Outstanding Paper by a Law Student
- Joseph Henry Beale Prize for Legal Research and Writing
- Bell, Boyd, & Lloyd Prize for Outstanding Brief in the Bigelow Moot Court Competition
Fulbright Full Grant, Geneva, Switzerland, 2003
Wellesley College, B.A. (English and Political Science), cum laude, 2002

Previous Experience

2006-2007 Law Clerk to Judge Sidney R. Thomas, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

2005-2006 Legal intern in the Office of General Counsel, Department of Health and Human Services

"Because medical, legal, and insurance practices are highly localized, most legal scholars have long assumed that medical malpractice law is a perfect example of non-federal policy that can and should be left to state-by-state determination. But that view misses the effect of federal spending programs like Medicare and Medicaid on the states' incentives to regulate. The federal government's responsibility for one-third of healthcare spending means that the states can gain the benefits of their inefficient malpractice laws without suffering the full cost of the inefficiencies."

Abigail Moncrieff

Academic Fellow 2007-09


	Abigail Moncrieff Academic Fellow, 2007-09 Abigail Moncrieff has written on how to interpret Medicaid’s equal access provision for the University of Chicago Law Review and on the “major questions” exception to Chevron deference in an article that won the Casper Platt Award for Outstanding Paper by a Law Student at the University of Chicago Law School. During her fellowship, she is writing on the federal government's proper role in medical malpractice reform. Although conventional wisdom holds that malpractice reform is a paradigmatic case for state sovereignty, Ms. Moncrieff argues that federal intervention is, in fact, functionally justified. Because the federal government pays for 40% of total American healthcare costs through spending programs like Medicare and Medicaid and through tax subsidies like the exemption for employer sponsored insurance, individual states can gain the benefits of inefficient malpractice laws without suffering the full cost of those inefficiencies. This story is in one sense a classic spillover story; the states externalize the costs of their regulatory choices. In terms of causation, however, this story is importantly different from classic spillover stories; the externalization effect here arises solely from prior decisions to federalize healthcare spending. Federalization of healthcare regulation has thus snowballed into a functional need for federalization of medical malpractice policy. Bibliography Federalization Snowballs: The Need for Federal Action in Medical Malpractice Reform (article in progress). Reincarnating the "Major Questions" Exception to Chevron Deference as a Doctrine of Non-Interference (Or Why Massachusetts v. EPA Got It Wrong), 60 Admin. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2008). Comment, Payments to Medicaid Doctors: Interpreting the "Equal Access" Provision, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 673 (2006). Research Interests Health Law (including Health Policy, Insurance Law, Health Law & Economics, ERISA, and Food & Drug Law) Administrative Law Legislation Structural Constitutional Law Education University of Chicago, J.D., with honors, 2006 Member, University of Chicago Law Review Casper Platt Award for Outstanding Paper by a Law Student Joseph Henry Beale Prize for Legal Research and Writing Bell, Boyd, & Lloyd Prize for Outstanding Brief in the Bigelow Moot Court Competition Fulbright Full Grant, Geneva, Switzerland, 2003 Wellesley College, B.A. (English and Political Science), cum laude, 2002 Previous Experience 2006-2007 Law Clerk to Judge Sidney R. Thomas, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 2005-2006 Legal intern in the Office of General Counsel, Department of Health and Human Services "Because medical, legal, and insurance practices are highly localized, most legal scholars have long assumed that medical malpractice law is a perfect example of non-federal policy that can and should be left to state-by-state determination. But that view misses the effect of federal spending programs like Medicare and Medicaid on the states' incentives to regulate. The federal government's responsibility for one-third of healthcare spending means that the states can gain the benefits of their inefficient malpractice laws without suffering the full cost of the inefficiencies." Abigail Moncrieff Academic Fellow 2007-09

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