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THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
November 17, 1983
Sanders Theater
President Attwood:
Good Afternoon, may I have your attention please? I'd like to make
just a few announcements before we begin.
As I said before, my name's Jim Attwood and I'm President of the Harvard Law
School Forum and I welcome you to the Forum. We have been spending the
better part of 36 years bringing discussion to this campus and I think we've
succeeded in doing that today. Let me make two announcements before we
begin. First, a late-breaking bulletin for us: On Wednesday, November
30th, in the afternoon at 3:00 p.m. we will be hosting Senator Alan Cranston.
Senator Cranston will be appearing in the Ames Courtroom located. in the Law
School campus and he will be delivering a major policy address. On
Monday, December 5th, we are pleased to announce that we have rescheduled the
appearance of Mr. Shimon Peres, the chairman of the Israel Labor Party.
That will take place at 1:00 p.m. also in the Ames Courtroom on the Law School
campus. As I mentioned before, the format of today's program allows for
a question and answer period following the Secretary's remarks. We have
two microphones on the floor, we will have two Forum members at each
microphone and we'll request once we get to the Q and A period that you line
up behind the microphones and we will take them at alternate order. I
emphasize at this point questions should
be brief, concise and to the point. It is a question and answer period.
Let me now turn over the microphone to Roger Fisher, the Samuel Williston
Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, who will introduce this afternoon's
most distinguished guest and alumnus. Thank you.
Professor Fisher:
A few minutes ago when at lunch one of my colleagues heard I was going to
introduce our speaker. Knowing my views on our military policy and
foreign policy -- knowing the views -- he said, "Boy, have you got a
problem!". When I heard that, I was reminded of the last time I
worked full-time for the Pentagon as a weather observer in World War II.
We were test-flying a plane over Newfoundland -- one engine was new; the
hotshot pilot feathered three engines to see how it would do on one engine and
we were all duly impressed -- that is, scared to death. Just for a lark
he then feathered the fourth engine. Now, that really is impressive.
The airplane was gliding somewhat like a rock toward the hills of
Newfoundland. As we were wondering what in hell to do, the pilot
confidently came over and pushed the buttons to re-feather the blades back
into the wind and nothing happened! He started pushing every button in
the plane and only then did he remember that you couldn't re-feather the
engine without power and you had no power
unless you had one engine going. Well, as we were all getting our chutes
on the co-pilot burst out laughing, and he turned to him and said,
"Boy-oh-boy, have you got a problem!"
Well, we're in this together -- we're in the whole world situation together and this afternoon we're in this together. We've invited the distinguished guest here. Those of us who disagree with his policies on occasion believe that they should be -- please, every interruption is going to give us less chance to get our questions -- I've got some questions I want to ask, I know you have questions you want to ask. There are some people who take a physical approach and those of us who are critical, those of us who believe that ideas should compete with ideas, that we cannot deal in Grenada with locking up people in detention, we cannot prevent ideas with shutting them up physically. This occasion is one for us to hear and ask questions. I'm asking you as one who --- applause ---
Our guest was class of 1938 in the College, class of 1941 in the Law School. He served in the Infantry from private to captain. He went back to California where he practiced law for a number of years, maybe 20, and he was in the State Legislature, head of California's Commission on State Government, the little Hoover Commission. He then came to Washington first as Federal Trade Commission - or Trade Commission - then with the Office of Management and Budget where he became Deputy Director and Director, Secretary of HEW, back to business in California where he was for a few years with Bechtel and since 1981 he has been the Secretary of Defense. I ask you to let the questioners question, let's get the ideas. By shouting -- the only one who will win this afternoon, if you think you can win this thing -- the only one who will win if he's prevented from speaking, are the people who believe that force and violence should decide these questions, not ideas. I ask you to hear our guest.
Secretary Weinberger:
Well good afternoon. The text
that I have says that it is always a great pleasure to be invited back to
Harvard, as indeed it is. Now, you have a message obviously -- you have
a message that you would like me to hear, some of you do, and I have a message
that I would like you to hear, and I think in the time allotted we can get
together and both hear each other's messages and each other's answers.
And the message that I have is that arms reduction -- genuine, deep,
verifiable and equitable arms reduction -- is a cornerstone, a keystone of our
whole administration policy. But what it is that we are seeking are real
results -- not just negotiations, not just noise and not just an agreement
that can be signed -- but we have to be very concerned about its contents
because its contents is the thing.
So what we seek is a genuine, a negotiated --
Professor Fisher:
Most of us here would like to exchange these few
moments. You can protest and demonstrate outside, you can raise signs.
There's a few minutes to hear some ideas, a few minutes to ask questions.
Secretary's speech -- let him say what he wants to say and then let's ask him
questions. That's what Harvard is about.
Secretary
Weinberger:
I used to come here quite
frequently when I was a student to hear the Boston Symphony Orchestra, and
they always sounded, if I may say so, a great deal better that what we're
hearing.
But what we seek is a genuine and negotiated peace. We seek a reduction, an actual reduction, not just a limitation agreement but actual reduction to equal levels and it is essential that we get down to equal levels if we are to reduce the fear and the terror that a great many of these weapons have brought. I think it is worth thinking back to the dawn of the nuclear age -- that at the dawn of the nuclear age the United States found itself with a complete and total monopoly of these weapons. We were at that time with unquestioned military superiority, had it in our power to hold at blackmail if we wished the world and we did not do that, we pursued exactly the opposite course.
What we did was to recognize that there could be no winner in a nuclear war, and we offered to turn over our knowledge of nuclear to an international agency. That was the Baruch plan and it is one of the first of many plans that were offered and proposals that were offered to reduce the impact of these weapons. But it is also a keystone of our policy to try to keep the peace. And we are convinced that the only way in which the peace can be kept -- we are convinced that the only way the peace can be kept is by a twin course of trying to secure genuine and verifiable and sharp arms reduction at the same time that we maintain sufficient strength to encourage the other side to participate in negotiations at that time.
We've recognized that there can be no winners in a nuclear war, and we have recognized that a nuclear war should never be fought, and we have recognized that the twin factors that can produce the peace with freedom, a peace with freedom to say the things that we wish to say, is a posture of deterrence which has both deterrence that is maintenance of sufficient degree of strength so that our position will be always be clear that we can not have a strike made against us without a degree of retaliatory strength that would prevent the first strike from being made, and it is that degree of strength that we have to have that we think can prevent a nuclear confrontation.
We think that if we have that twin policy of maintaining sufficient and modernization deterrent pact, and at the same try to secure that reduction of weapons that can enable us to have the balance of deterrence at much lower levels than at present, that then we will have the very best chance for preserving our peace with freedom. But maintaining that credible deterrent requires us to upgrade our own forces if our adversaries upgrade theirs and even though we have no offensive intentions and even though we have a desire for peace its never going --
Profession Fisher:
May I have your attention, please.
May I remind you -- may I remind those people who are interrupting -- may I
remind you that if you have any values, if you disagree with some issues, the
question I put to you --
Secretary Weinberger:
That's quite enough. Now I
think they'll listen. The point is that maintaining a credible deterrent
requires that you maintain a degree of strength that can in fact deter attack.
And it is essential that we have that if the attack is to be deterred, but is
also essential that you maintain that degree of
deterrent at the lowest possible level and that is what we think is essential.
It's a paradox, actually, of deterrence that the longer the peace, the less
necessary it appears.
You can measure these things quite easily in other areas. The costs of maintaining a strong defense are easily measured but the benefits of doing that are not. When we spend our money on a new car or a new home, you can see a tangible good, you can measure that, but when you spend your money on various things that are necessary to maintain deterrence, you can never really measure how much aggression has been deterred. If the peace is maintained, people tend to feel that it isn't deterrence, it is some other factor that is doing it.
So it is the paradox of deterrence that the more it succeeds, the less necessary it appears. And as the time passes, the maintenance of peace is attributed not to that strong defense you're maintaining but to all manner of other factors such as possibly peaceful intent of the other side or a spirit of detente or something of the kind.
Now as people come to doubt that credible nuclear forces have prevented nuclear war, they also believe then that a nuclear war is inevitable; and when that happens then we have really lost all chance of peace. And so the main thing is to ensure the principle objective or goal then of any policy has to be that you have to achieve real arms reduction at the same time you're maintaining sufficient strength to keep the other side at the table with an incentive for reduction. If they see that the United States has no intention of strengthening or modernizing its forces, there is no incentive for them to reduce. And without reduction, then you do indeed have the arms race that you are trying to avoid. Then it is absolutely essential that we provide that kind of incentive for major reduction.
Now during the seventies we tried a different tact and unfortunately it didn't work. We tried in the seventies to restrict our developments of nuclear weapons so that there would be no conceivable suggestion that the Soviet Union would have any idea that they might be struck with a sudden disarming first strike. We had hoped to encourage similar restraint by the Soviets but unfortunately we did not. Instead of joining us in restraint, what they did was to step up their own strategic modernization program. They developed a whole new generation of ICBM's and they had hardening of their own silos. They spent a lot of money on civil defense and they also developed something that we do not have and have never had, and that is a refiring capability so that the mere count of missiles and warheads becomes increasingly less relevant. Their writings and their doctrine and all of their speeches that they deliver lead to a clear conclusion that they believe a nuclear war can be won and we do not, we think that it is the most dangerous thing in the world if you think it can be won. They also... We pinned high hopes in these arms limitations discussions in SALT.
In 1969 when the Soviet began the discussions with SALT I, they had over fifteen hundred nuclear weapons. In 1972 when SALT I was signed, they had gone up to twenty-three hundred. In 1979, they had fifty-five hundred. Today they have over eight thousand. And with their arsenal now under the SALT treaty -- here is the reason that we opposed a SALT treaty or an arms limitation treaty -- because their eight thousand strategic weapons can actually grow to fifteen thousand under SALT.
And so an arms limitation treaty is not enough, it is an arms reduction treaty that is required and that's why it was so critically important that two weeks ago at Ottawa with the NATO defense ministers we agreed to take out fourteen hundred of these weapons unilaterally, and that was on top of a thousand that we had taken out earlier making a total of twenty-four. So our arsenals have gone steadily down and what we have not done however, what we have not done is -- and on the intermediate range weapons bear in mind that the President's proposal that he made a year and a half ago was still the best and that is for zero. None on either side. And unfortunately the Soviets have declined to discuss that in any way, and then we have tried various other levels to get them down to equality at lower levels than the 351 SS20's that they have now. But unfortunately they have not not yet started to negotiate seriously.
Now the way that we have to modernize has been pointed out quite clearly by the bi-partisan commission, the Scowcroft Commission, who said that the modernization was essential at the same time we continue to press as seriously and as vigorously as we are for arms reduction. Major verifiable equitable arms reduction. The Scowcroft Commission's proposals were that we stay with the modernization program, that we make sure that we get rid of the most destabilizing weapons of all, and that we modernize our triad but at the same time that first we make every effort and that we continue to make every effort to secure major and verifiable reductions.
And the President has said -- and this is important -- I think that this statement that -- the important thing is a statement of the President that I wanted to have before you so you could have it for your thoughtful consideration the rest of the afternoon and that is the United States, said the President, will accept any equitable, any verifiable agreement that stabilizes forces at lower levels than currently exist. We want significant reductions, and that pledge stands.
Now the most recent START initiative that the President has before the negotiators at Geneva is one that provides for a mutual and a guaranteed build-down of both ballistic missiles and the bombers. We have also proposed the establishment of a joint United States-Soviet build-down group. And finally we continue to try to reduce the destructive capability of these weapons -- sometimes called throw-weight -- and bear in mind that the ratio of throw-weight now is something like 5.3 on the Soviet side to 1.9 on the United States side. And so it is essential that we do get these.
The President is perfectly willing to enter into negotiations. He said many times that there will have to be trade-offs and he said that the United States is prepared to make these trade-offs so long as they result in a more stable balance of forces. In the short term, he said, stability requires that the Soviet monopoly on their ability to destroy hardened targets has to be ended; and with the IMF proposals where they have a total monopoly with 351 and more of the 5520's to none on the NATO side, it is essential that we get down to zero if we can if they would zero then down to some much lower level than we have at the moment. And in the cause of the -- in the whole cause of securing peace, we have to bear in mind that deterrence, while it has certain unpopular aspects, as is quite apparent, is the policy -- it is the policy that has helped preserve the peace for nearly forty years between the superpowers.
The other thing, and one of the final points that I want to get before you because I think that it is particularly apt today, is that it is very easy to become discouraged with the bipartisan or the democratic processes that are needed. Bear in mind that there is no public opinion in the Soviet Union that would enable us to have a meeting such as this, and there is no way that they can have a rational or even an irrational debate -- and so it is essential that we bear in mind that the important thing is to decide all these matters within our democratic process that permits this kind of a discussion.
We have spent a lot of time arriving at the positions that our negotiators are presenting at Geneva at both the intermediate range and the long range weapons talks, and that time has been involved in what a lot of people who get discouraged quickly have said is negotiating with ourselves and they say that weakens us and they call attention to the fact that in the Soviet Union there is not only no negotiation with themselves, there is no public opinion. And my own feeling is that negotiating with ourselves is probably a pretty good way of defining democracy.
The development of our strategic arms reduction policy has really been an example of democracy at its best. We have a large number of people participating. We have our defense department, we have the Stowcroft Commission, we have members of both parties in the Congress, and men and women around the country. We have engaged in debates such as this, and some not quite such as this, and all have done their country, I think, a substantial service because we've had an opportunity to have a very wide number of views - not all of which of course can be accepted. But having restored the bipartisan consensus that the Congress has recently exhibited just this week, we must now, I think, have the patience and the will to continue to work together, try to maintain the course on these two parallel paths to peace: Sharp arms reduction and yet the modernization that is necessary to maintain deterrence.
In the longer run, there is perhaps an even better way and the longer run is of course to work very carefully on strategic defenses that can render all of these weapons impotent and no longer a threat to the world. And this is also the path that the President has tried to pursue in calling for weapons not of destruction but weapons of defense. And he has summoned the best of the scientific genius in this country to try to produce the means of protecting our people and not avenging, and in the long run strategic defense offers the greatest hope of removing this shadow from the world. But that is a hope that we can only realize if we can maintain peace with freedom during the time it takes to develop it. And the way to maintain peace with freedom is through continued, patient, resolute efforts to reduce arms at the same time that we engage in the modernization of our weapons so that we can maintain a credible deterrent balance, then try to get that balance at infinitely lower levels.
Now I believe we can succeed, and I think that to succeed we have to justify and show a unity of purpose and our patience and our will and our real belief in a truly democratic process that allows these matters to be debated rationally all over the country because it seems to me that we have to bear in mind that the goal is nothing less than survival and peace with freedom. Thank you very much.
Prof. Fisher:
Would you please sit down and take
your seats?
Secretary Weinberger:
Let's get some questions now, on an
individual basis.
Prof. Fisher:
In view of the noise level, would
you please write out a card? We really -- it is important for the
majority to be able to hear both the questions and the answers. There
are lots of times we can shout -- there are few
times we can have a dialog. Let's take this half hour or so. Your
question, please over here.
Question:
Mr.
Secretary -- In light of today's French air raids on the terrorists in Lebanon
and yesterday's similar raids by Israel, what is the administration doing
about the growing perception in this country and around the world that the
U.S. is an impotent paper tiger in the Middle East and without taking decisive
action against Syria and Lebanon?
Secretary Weinberger:
Perfectly reasonable question, let
me see what we can do with it.
There are two or three different things that can be done. One is straight revenge, one is straight retribution, one is an attempt to continue what we have been trying to do. One is to continue to talk to all the groups at Geneva and to try to secure at Geneva a broadly based Lebanese government which can have the ability to eliminate all of the terrorism that has taken place within its borders for far too many years -- terrorism against Israel, terrorism against France, the United States. So what we need to do is to try to define the most effective way to do that. Now you pointed out two countries have taken that one path: Israel and today France. And they have made strikes against targets from which they firmly believe and which we concur is where a great deal of the terrorism exists. Two nests of terrorism in that country. Our own policy has not yet fully matured -- but what we are doing is looking at all of the possibilities -- but mostly what we would like to do is to get Lebanon back to be a sovereign, unoccupied country so that it can prevent this kind of thing happening in its own borders.
Thank you.
Prof. Fisher:
If
those of us who disagree with the Pentagon policy try to do it who can make
the loudest noise, there's no doubt they got a bigger bang than we can make.
In terms of our ideas are better than their ideas, let's -- Here is a
chance to use ideas and questions. Do we have a question over here?
Question:
Mr. Secretary -- By it's continued
massacre of civilians, the military government of El Salvador has demonstrated
contempt of human rights. President Reagan claims to value human rights
in his policies. Why? And why due to the failure of his foreign
policy to effect a change in El Salvador, has President Reagan failed to
withhold U.S. military equipment which is turned against innocent civilians
without restraint, and in what sense can democracy be said to exist in such a
setting?
Secretary Weinberger:
The weapons which have been
furnished in El Salvador are weapons that are designed to prevent the
construction of another Soviet base such as Cuba within the Central American
area. And the fact that the Salvadorian government does need a very
substantial improvement in every way has to be measured against the
alternative. And the alternative is the kind of government in which
there are no human rights at all and no hope of any improvement. At
least with the El Salvadorian government with all its faults, there is the
hope that we can have the leverage to
improve it. But if it falls to a guerilla Soviet-Cuban inspired force,
then we will have nothing but the kind of continuation of total lack of human
rights that exist in Cuba and exist in Nicaragua. So what we're trying
to do is improve the situation but at the same time make sure that it does not
fall victim to the kind of government that is the negation of human rights.
Question:
Mr. Secretary -- First, I want you
to know that most of us here today believe in free speech and some don't.
Secretary Weinberger:
So do I.
Question, Continued:
Mr. Secretary, do you feel that
United States Naval Forces are being stretched thin around the world lately,
and if so, what should we do about it?
Secretary Weinberger:
Well, we have -- the question
relates to the Naval Forces and how thin they're spread. The problem is
that we have a large number of commitments and they are not conveniently all
in one place. But we do have the plans under way to regain the degree of
naval strength that we need. And I think that right as
of now if nothing further happens that imperils our national security, we
would have a sufficient degree of force with the ones that are being added to
deal with the situation as they exist; but it is essential to bear in mind
that we have commitments in many parts of the world and it is not really
possible for us to give up those commitments without seriously endangering our
national security. And so we are acquiring greater naval strength and by
the end of the decade, we will have the degree of naval strength that we
should have had, that we would not have had if we had lost, so I think we're
all right now, bearing in mind that we still may have to have a lot more
activity that we would not choose, having a defensive philosophy. But I
think that right as of now we are all right so long as we keep
on going.
Prof. Fisher:
All right, Mr. Secretary -- we've
got a lot of questions so keep your answers short.
Question:
First of all, Mr. Weinberger, I'd
like to congratulate you and your administration for being ahead of your time.
You've brought us 1984 one year ahead of time. Mr. Weinberger, I note
that you are a member of the Episcopal Church and active in the Episcopal
Church. My question to you is how can you reconcile your religious
beliefs and how can you live with your conscience knowing that you are
personally responsible for complicity in the genocidal murder of over 50,000
Guatemalan Indians, the murder of hundreds of Nicaraguans at the hands of
CIA-funded counter-revolutionaries, the disappearance, the torture, the rape
and the murder of over 40,000 Salvadorians and the recent, illegal, immoral,
and totally shameful aggression against the people of Grenada?
Secretary Weinberger:
The answer is of course, that I do
have a conscience. It is a personal matter. I have not really
admitted nor can I feel that there is any complicity in
any of the deaths that you recite. As a matter of fact, one of the most
oppressed peoples of the world are the Mosquito Indians in Nicaragua and they
are people whose policy we are trying our best to liberate. So that I
have to tell you that my conscience does not bother me about what we are doing
one bit -- I think it is the right course
to follow.
Question:
I don't mind free speech, I don't
like cheap words but I'll go on anyway. In 1898 the U.S. invaded Cuba.
Since then according to U.S. News and World Report two weeks ago, we've
invaded more than fifty other times. Now, our
legacy in the whole Central America and Carribean area is illiteracy, poverty,
infant mortality, a kind of litany that if it occurred in a country where we
lived, we'd be ashamed of it. And we can put up with it because it's
over there. Now, the only countries
that have changed that legacy are Cuba after 1959 and Nicaragua and Grenada.
I don't know if you've been watching the Vietnam special on T.V. but don't you
know that the entire Third World -- whole UN -- How can this administration
justify in the long-term what it's doing now? It's going down the road
like it did in Vietnam and the sooner the better from my point of view.
Secretary Weinberger:
Let me just answer one part of
that. It is very easy for you to say that the entire Third World feels
this way or that all the Caribbean is in poverty. The two quick answers.
The things we are doing, the Caribbean based initiative and three-quarters of
all of the aid that we seek are for economic improvement to try to reduce the
poverty there but the important thing is the last point that you made.
And if you will talk as I have to over 500 of the students that were rescued
from Grenada, you would find that they feel not the way you do, not the way
you've expressed; they feel enormous gratitude, great appreciation, because
they had the absolute certainty -- those 500 who paid their own way to come to
the White House had the absolute certainty they were going to be taken hostage
and that they were in imminent peril of their lives, and so in direct response
to your question, I feel very proud of what we did.
Prof. Fisher:
I think you will learn more -- you
can come over to shout by yourselves sometime, but your colleagues and I
cannot hear the Secretary very frequently -- we can hear you anytime. One more
question over here, please.
Question:
Mr. Secretary, it is my
understanding that components of the rapid deployment force are also
replacements for NATO in case of trouble in Europe. If the rapid
deployment force is needed elsewhere, what are the contingency plans for
reinforcements in Europe? And before you answer I'd like to say there
are a lot of people here who support the administration's policy.
Secretary Weinberger:
Thank you very much. It is a
very reasonable and responsible question and let's see if we can get an answer
to it. The problem is that there are indeed every one of our divisions,
every one of our units has four or five different missions. Many of them
are so-called "earmarked for NATO." But if particular
contingencies happen in other parts of the world where we have to respond,
such as the British had to respond quickly to the Falkland Islands, then some
of the NATO forces would indeed be drawn down. And what we are
developing in the NATO is the attempt to work out the so-called out of area
contingencies, and we have now a well
developed plan that still requires European consent so that as forces are
moved out perhaps of Europe to go to, for example, the Mid-East or something
of that kind, they will be filled in quickly. This requires, however,
the ability to reinforce across the ocean
and that requires that the sea lanes of communication be kept open. So
all of this is tied together with our plans for an expanded fleet. Thank
you.
Prof. Fisher:
Thank you, we have a question right
here.
Question:
Mr. Secretary, and people here
today, I would like to ask for a moment of silence for all those people who
have lost their lives as a result of the Reagan administration's policy of
military buildup and military interventionism, which you, Mr. Secretary, more
than anybody else, represent. A moment of silence please.
Secretary Weinberger:
Well, it's one way to ... No, I was
just saying, I applauded your idea for a moment of silence but not for the
cause. Let's have a question over here.
Question:
Mr. Secretary even as you deny the
rights of the El Salvadorians and the
Nicaraguans I think it's useful to look at what is claimed is democracy in
Grenada. Martial law has been established on Grenada that provides for arrest
and searches without warrant, press censorship and banning all public
meetings, and a U.S. army psychological warfare unit is on Grenada designing
and putting up propaganda posters. Could you please explain how these
activities are consistent with the supposed U.S. goal of establishing
democracy on Grenada, and why have you
sent an army psychological warfare unit there in the first place?
Secretary Weinberger:
First of all, and I know it will
not be a popular response, we would have to deny that those conditions are
taking place. What is taking place is the establishment of a new
provisional government under Grenadans. There was a total degree of
anarchy in the island and what is establishing now is a condition to restore a
government in which the people can vote on the kind of government they want.
In the process of doing that, it is essential that people who took part in the
active anarchy and chaos that existed before we went in, not be allowed to
disrupt the establishment of a new provisional government. And that is all
that is taking place. We have already said that we would have our troops
out within 60 days, and after that the Grenadans themselves will decide the
kind of government they wish. We are not taking part in any of the
activities that you described, we're trying to establish a provisional
government that can allow the Grenadans to set up the kind of government they
wish.
Question:
Mr. Secretary, I. have a question.
I'd like to ask a question, and to do that I yield to the previous speaker.
Question:
Mr. Secretary, my question is would
you tell us in the name of God, if not out of respect for the American public
opinion, how many Grenadans died and please don't forget to include the number
of bodies you shipped to Cuba whom your troops had mistaken for Cuban troops
and those who died in the mental hospital. Please give us a figure as of
how many Grenadans died as a result of your invasion.
Secretary Weinberger:
I think the actual deaths in the
Grenadan army were about 61 and I think the civilian casualties were much
lower than that, less than 10 on the Cuban side. They have all been
announced and the Cubans have all been returned except for two Cubans who wish
to stay in their embassy to deal with their embassy property.
Question:
What about the hospital?
Secretary Weinberger:
The hospital was not marked with a
red cross, it was used as a strong point by the Grenadan armed forces and the
patients in the hospital had people in the Grenadan army standing next to
their beds firing out the windows. Our soldiers did not know it was a
hospital until it had been actually -- the buildings themselves had been
taken. Had it been marked with the red crosses it would of course never
have been attacked.
Prof. Fisher:
May
I just ask the Secretary the total casualty figures which we had, excuse me,
you said there were about sixty ...
Secretary Weinberger:
61, the best that I remember...
Prof. Fisher:
61 Grenadans, and dozen or so
Cubans ...
Secretary Weinberger:
Oh a few more, not many more than
that, in that range... I can get them for you exactly.
Prof. Fisher:
Next question over here please.
Question:
Before I begin, I'd like to say
that perhaps the people who are interrupting would let him speak because I
think his own words will damn him to the hell he deserves. My question
is on the aftermath of the June 12th, 1982 rally in New York ...
Secretary Weinberger:
I really can't follow you at all
I'm sorry, just a little slower and a little further away from the mike.
Question, Continued;
In the aftermath of the June 12,
1982 rally in New York City in which approximately one million people
attended, you said words to the affect that public opinion and such
demonstrations of it would not affect American foreign and military policy.
Now I would like you to explain yourself as to how you can stand on that
statement and on the statements you made earlier this afternoon about public
opinion being extremely important. I cannot see how they can match.
Secretary Weinberger:
Perfectly good question. We
have a number of very good ways of measuring public opinion, and the best way
is by an election. And all I was saying was --and frequently, you know,
what you read and put back to me as something that I said is not a remark I
actually made. But what was said was that the way in which public
opinion is influenced and the way in which policy
is made in the United States is by elections, by actions of the Congress
assembled. And that no matter how many people you might get walking in
the streets with signs, that is not the way our Constitution provides for the
determination of policy. But I also said that those kinds of
manifestations of public opinion are also
things that help influence public opinion, depending on whether or not the
people vote that way or Congress votes that way. It wasn't that they
were disregarded, it was that you don't add up the number of people marching,
and change our policy the next day. We have our Constitutional ways of
doing that.
Prof. Fisher:
I want to remind you, particularly
the woman with the red shouting so loudly, I do want to remind you that we
have a guest here, who we invited to engage in discussion. And you're entitled
to stand in line, ask your question or
others, but you are depriving most of us from hearing repetitive phrases and
chanting. I myself believe, let me tell you where I stand, I believe
that you will not be convinced by the Secretary's words, and you will be armed
better if you hear what they are. That happens to be my belief.
But don't try and drown them out, let's let some ideas come on, next please.
Question:
Mr. Secretary, the New York
Times and several other sources stated that both the Grenadan and the
Cuban government before the invasion took place, requested that the United
States not invade. Why did the United States invade? And if the
purpose was to get the students out, why did they keep going after the
students had been secured?
Secretary Weinberger:
Well the, there was no Grenadan
government that could request anything. There was total anarchy. The
prime minister who was a Marxist had been murdered, five of his cabinet had
been murdered, there was no designated successor, there was nobody that could
speak for the country in any way. And so what happened was that the
students, over almost 800 American students, were in two different campuses.
And their safety was secured on the second day, but their safety was secured
in the sense that the campuses were liberated. But you can't do just
that, you have to get enough of an area to make sure that they are not
subjected again to the kind of terror and fear that they themselves felt they
were experiencing. And so we went on and completed the objectives and
now the process is there of turning the government over to the government of
the people's own choice, and not the kind of anarchy that prevailed.
Question:
There have been several recent
reports of thousands of Guatemalan and Honduran troops massing on their
borders of El Salvador apparently preparing for a large scale intervention in
support of the Salvadoran military. The Boston Globe, the New York Times
and many other papers have reported that so-called U.S. advisers in El
Salvador are in fact making all major strategic decisions for the Salvadoran
military. Given this I would like to ask, how can justify a possible
invasion of Salvadoran territory by Guatamala and Honduras regimes which have
been described for instance by Guatamala by ... (inaudible) internationals
carrying out a government program of political murder. And how can you
justify U.S. sponsored regionalization of this war which will ultimately
involve U.S. troops being sent there to come home in
body bags?
Secretary Weinberger:
Well there are no American advisers
in Salvador that are making all the decisions. If there were, you would
see a vastly different result than you have now. What we are talking
about in Honduras is we are there at the request of the Honduran government to
help train their troops. We continue to do that, but we are not
participating in any way except to try to get a larger amount of primarily
economic aid for El Salvador to reduce some of the great poverty that is there
now.
Prof. Fisher:
There are people here who have the
right to speak and to listen. It requires a certain amount of tolerance.
Any society that wants to be a democracy entails a certain amount of
toleration. Next question over here please.
Question:
President Reagan has gone on record
as saying that the antinuclear movements in Europe are overly influenced by...
Secretary Weinberger:
I couldn't hear the beginning.
Prof. Fisher:
We couldn't hear the question
because of some of your...
Question:
President Reagan has gone on record
as saying that the antinuclear movements in Europe are overly influenced by
the Soviet Union, I'm wondering is that a perception that extends to
anti-nuclear activists in this country?
Secretary Weinberger:
Try it again.
Question:
Can I repeat the question?
Secretary Weinberger:
I'm sorry I didn't quite pick it
up.
Question:
President Reagan has characterized
the anti-nuclear movements in Europe as overly influenced by the Soviet Union,
and my question is: Is that perception extended to anti-nuclear activists in
this country as well?
Secretary Weinberger:
The question was whether or not the
administration feels that the anti-nuclear demonstrations in Europe are all
Soviet inspired -- and the answer is: No we don't. But what we think is
that it is possible for the Soviets to help work on American or European
public opinion because that opinion is basically free and free to be worked
on. There is no similar public opinion in the Soviet Union.
Prof. Fisher:
Two final questions.
Secretary Weinberger:
That wasn't his question, go ahead.
Question:
I'm just wondering if you feel that
you have evidence that there is Soviet infiltration of American anti-nuclear
activists?
Secretary Weinberger:
The answer is not to any
significant extent.
Prof. Fisher:
Two questions left -- please over
here.
Question:
Mr. Secretary, you spoke of
alternatives, strategic alternatives being used in Europe and you also spoke
of the deployment of missiles...
Secretary Weinberger:
Try it again.
Prof. Fisher:
Will you please be quiet?
Question:
It's really wonderful to see so
many Americans using their freedom of speech rights where considering so many
Americans thought...(inaudible)...die of. As you were saying you made a
couple of points about the deployment of missiles in Europe and also about
NATO and the United States feeling secure enough in Europe to bring the
missiles back home, and I was wondering how you can
feel so secure when only four years ago we saw Russian aggression right there
in Afghanistan.
Secretary Weinberger:
The -- Was your question -- It was
about Afghanistan, but I didn't get quite what the question -- would you
repeat just the end there?
Question:
It was just about, you were saying
that NATO felt secure enough and the United States felt secure enough to
deploy missiles in Europe, correct? In your speech, at least what I
could hear of, you were saying that we were developing strategic alternatives
in Europe to make ourselves feel safe there, correct?
Secretary Weinberger:
Yes.
Question:
O.K. What I was wondering is
how you can feel safe enough in these alternatives when only four years ago
Russia went in and took over Afghanistan? How does NATO -- I don't
understand how they can feel so secure when
their presence is obviously there.
Secretary Weinberger:
I think your question is, Why
didn't we have a more effective response when the Soviets went in to
Afghanistan? Is that it?
Question:
Fine.
Prof. Fisher:
If I got it, Can strategic... Can
strategic weapons in Europe make any difference, if it didn't make a
difference in Afghanistan, how can they make a difference in Europe?
Secretary Weinberger:
Let me say just two things quickly
about that. That's a very reasonable question. The first is the
Soviets went into Afghanistan for two reasons. One was they want access
to the oil fields, its the prize invasion right down to the oil fields.
And the second is, they were convinced that nobody would take any kind of
strong deterrent action against them. And that is one of the things that
happens when you allow deterrents to fail. If you had a strong deterrent, and
they knew that they would face a strong retaliatory action, I'm convinced they
would not have gone in. That's what we're trying to do now. Go
ahead.
Question:
Well, all I wanted to say was those
missiles I mean now they know these missiles are gone. Aren't they going
to have even more reason to be aggressive?
Secretary Weinberger:
No. The missiles are, the only
reason for the missiles, the only reason for the necessity of deploying the
missiles in Europe is to restore the balance. At the moment, the balance
is 361 SS20's to nothing. And it is necessary to restore that balance.
If we can restore that balance, then we can concentrate much more on
conventional warfare and conventional strengthening so that we can deter both
kinds of attacks. The attack on Afghanistan is a conventional attack
brought on because the Soviets feel they have nothing to deter them when they
went in. They wish now they hadn't gone in.
Prof. Fisher:
Final question over here please.
Question:
Can you hear me?
Secretary Weinberger:
Yes, fine.
Question:
The U.S. is involved in hot spots
all over the Globe. If nuclear weapons should get involved in any of
these crisis situations, there could be as little, by defense department
accounts, as little as ten minutes in which to make a decision to launch the
weapons. Too little time for the President alone to efficiently think
through the consequences of such an action. Now are there certain crisis
situations in which the President has pre-delegated the authority to use
nuclear weapons? That is in which the launching of nuclear weapons would
proceed more or less automatically?
Secretary Weinberger:
No. There certainly is
nothing remotely resembling pre-delegation. And if you had sat in on the
meetings as I did, all through the very difficult time as to whether or not we
should take the action necessary to rescue the American students in Grenada,
you would know how difficult these decisions are, and there is nothing
remotely resembling pre-delegation. They are the product of very long
and prayerful and painful consideration of a number of factors and the
President finally makes the decisions by himself, and then we attempt to carry
them out. And that is what we were able to do very successfully in
Grenada, and I'm convinced that in later years you will regard this as a very
proud and proper chapter in American history. Thank you.
Prof. Fisher:
Mr. Secretary, I want to
congratulate you not on the wisdom of all your decisions but on the way in
which you conducted yourself here. I
would say that the ... And may I thank the majority of you, all of you for
your interest and the majority of you for your behavior. Thank you very
much.