For a number of years now, you have had an opportunity to observe how we, as a nation, respond to the actions of the Russians, and how the Russians respond to our responses. Those of you who have watched closely the course of events in the past six months may have been led to conclude that we are headed for an all-out war.  I myself believe that we are, and that our chances of getting through the next ten years without war are slim,

I, personally, find myself in rebellion against the fate that history seems to have in store for us, and I suspect that some of you may be equally rebellious.  The question is, wat can you do?

War seems indeed to be inevitable, unless it is possible somehow to alter the pattern of behavior which America and Russia are exhibiting at present.  You, as Americans, are not in a position to influence the Russian government; it follows that you would have to bring about a change in the attitude of the American Government which, in turn, may bring about a similar change in the attitude of the Russian Government.

It is conceivable that if a dedicated minority were to take effective political action, they could bring about the change in attitude that is needed.  But such a minority can take effective action only if it is possible to formulate a set of political objectives on which it can unite.

I shall try to outline to outline tonight a set of political objectives and you shall be the judges of how satisfactory these objectives may be.

Next, I would like to discuss with you what kind of political action it would take to alter the course of events; cause the present danger of war to recede, and to open the door to a constructive effort to abolish war.

To abolish war is a tall order, and I speak of it therefore with reluctance.  It has been apparent, however, ever since the end of the war, that the bomb would pose a problem to the world for which there is no precedent and which cannot be solved short of abolishing war.

Ever since the end of the war, the policies of the great powers have consistently followed the line of least resistance, and this line leads to an unlimited arms race.

There have been repeated attempts to stop the arms race by negotiating an agreement that would provide for some form of arms control.  So far, all such attempts have failed, and each time they were followed by the continuation of the arms race, with renewed vigor.

Towards the end of the Eisenhower Administration, it was generally expected that the next administration would adopt a new approach to this problem and that a fresh attempt would be made to bring the arms race under control.

I tried to impress upon our Russian colleagues that the Kennedy Administration would make a serious effort to reach an understanding with Russia on the issue of arms control, but that the new Administration would need time--six months and more than six months, perhaps--to find its bearings on this issue and to get organized to deal with it.

When I returned to this country in February, I decided to stay in Washington for a while.

The Cuban invasion took me by surprise.  When I first heard about it, it was not clear, as yet, whether we were going to give air support to the invading Cuban exiles and whether we would, if necessary, send in the Marines also.  My immediate reaction was that of alarm, for I believed that if we did any of these things, we would seriously risk war with Russia.  I did not think that Russia would try to intervene in the Caribbean area.  Nor did I think that the Russians would launch long-range rockets aimed at our cities.  I thought, however, that Russia would make some military move elsewhere, perhaps in the Middle East.

In retrospect, it would seem that I was wrong, for Tom Slick of San Antonio, Texas recently disclosed, apparently on good authority, that, if America had openly intervened in Cuba at that point, Russia would have moved into West Berlin.

I would not venture to appraise just how close we came to an all-out war on the occasion of the Cuban incident.  I am reasonably certain, however, that if our intervention in Cuba had been successful this would have blocked for

many years to come any possibility of reaching an agreement on arms control with Russia.  Failure to reach an accommodation on the Berlin issue might, of course, produce the same result.

I wou1d not entirely exclude the possibility of war over Berlin, but, to me, it seems more probable that this crisis will be resolved by some uneasy compromise, and that it will not lead to an all-out war.  Russia may bring pressure on West Berlin, in order to promote any one of a number of her foreign policy objectives, but, on the larger issue, the issue of Germany, the true interest of America and Russia is the same.  The true interest of both is to have Europe politically as stable as possible.

Neither Russia nor America really knows how to accomplish this goal.  America may favor certain solutions and Russia may favor certain other solutions; still, it would be rather odd if America and Russia went to war with each other over the issue of what is the best solution for securing the peace in Europe.

I am convinced that the Berlin issue could be satisfactorily resolved by negotiations, but this conviction is based on the belief that there is something that the Russians want that we should be willing to give them, and that there is something that we want that the Russians should be willing to give us in return.

There are many people who do not share this belief.  They hold that the Berlin issue was artificially created by Russia for the purpose of humiliating America, for breaking up NATO, and for converting West Germany into a Communist state.

Many people, probably the majority, believe that the Russians are very much like the Nazis; that they have concrete plans for bringing about, one way or another, our total defeat in Europe, and also for subjugating the whole world to their rule.

Many people believe that Russia, by supplying arms on a vast scale to the Chinese Communists, managed to take control of China.  They recollect, further, that when American troops fighting under the flag of the United Nations, crossed the 38th parallel, moved up across North Korea to the Yalu River, and destroyed the hydro-electric power plant which supplied Manchuria with electricity,  all at once--and without any provocation--Chinese Communist hordes crossed the Yalu River and thus frustrated the efforts of the United Nations to unify Korea under free elections.

When I listen to people who hold such views, I sometimes have the feeling that I have lived through all this before and, in a sense, I have.  I was sixteen years old when the first World War broke out, and I lived at that time in Hungary.  From reading the newspapers in Hungary, it would have appeared that, whatever Austria and Germany did was right and whatever England, France,

Russia, or America did was wrong.  A good case could be made out for this general thesis, in almost every single instance.  It would have been difficult for me to prove, in any single instance, that the newspapers were wrong, but somehow, it seemed to me unlikely that the two nations located in the center of Europe should be invariably right, and that all the other nations should be invariably wrong.  History, I reasoned, would hardly operate in such a peculiar fashion, and it didn't take long until I began to hold views which were diametrically opposed to those held by the majority of my schoolmates.

Many of my schoolmates regarded me as something of an oracle because I was able to cope with the mysteries of lower arithmetics which baffled them; some of them asked me one day quite early in the war who would lose the war.  I said that I didn't know who would lose the war, but that I thought that I knew who ought to lose the war, I thought that Austria and Germany, as well

as Russia, ought to lose the war.  Since Austria and Germany fought on one side and Russia on the others side, it was not quite clear how this could happen.  The fact is, of course, that it did happen.

I am not telling you this in order to impress you with how bright I am.  Nobody at sixty can claim to be as bright as he was at sixteen, even though in most cases it is not the intelligence that deteriorates, but the character.  The point I am trying to make is that even in times of war, you can see current events in their historical perspective, provided that your passion for the truth prevails over your bias in favor of your own nation.

I told him that, to my mind, this would not work at all, because if two people behave the same way toward each other, each is bound to think that he is 30 percent more generous than the other.  Clearly, the rule would have to allow for this bias.  Perhaps if we were to stipulate as the rule of conduct, "Be 31 percent more generous to the others than they are to you," such a rule might work.

America and Russia are not following any such rule of conduct.  Moreover, their bias greatly exceeds 30 percent.

The people who have sufficient passion for the truth to give the truth a chance to prevail, if it runs counter to their bias, are in a minority.  How important is this "minority?"  It is difficult to say at this point, for, at the present time their influence on governmental decisions is not perceptible.

If you stay in Washington, you may gain some insight into the manner in which important governmental decisions come about; you may get a feel of what kind of considerations enter into such decisions, and what kind of pressures are at work.

With President Kennedy, new men moved into the Administration.  Many of them fully understand the implications of what is going on and are deeply concerned.  But, they are so busy trying to keep the worst things from happening, on a day-to-day basis, that they have no time to develop a consensus on what the right approach would be, from the long-term point of view.

In Washington, wisdom has no chance to prevail at this point.

Life Magazine printed an article about me in September which said that I was in Washington trying to find out if there was a market for wisdom.  Thereupon, I received a flood of letters from colleges and universities inviting me to give lectures.  Most people get some pleasure out of hearing themselves talk, and so do I, yet I did not see much point in going around the country giving talks, if all I had to say was that there was no market for wisdom.  Therefore, I declined all these invitations; that is, I declined them all, until Brandeis University invited me to attend a Special Convocation and to receive an honorary doctor's degree.  At that point, my vanity got the better of me, and I accepted.  At Brandeis, I spoke at dinner informally to the

I told them at Brandeis that I thought we were in very serious trouble; people asked me what they cou1d do about it, and I had no answer to give.

Is there, indeed, anything that these people--or for that matter I, myself--could do that would make sense?

When I got back to Washington, I started to think about this, and I believe it will be best now if I simply recite to you how my thoughts developed from this point on.

The first thought that came to my mind was that--in cooperation with others--I could try to set up an organization in Washington--a sort of lobby, if you will--which would bring to Washington, from time to time, scholars and

The next thing that occurred to me was that these distinguished scholars and scientists would be heard, but that they would not be listened to, if they were not able to deliver votes.

Would they be listened to if they were able to deliver votes?

Could such a dedicated minority agree not only on the long-term political objectives which need to be pursued in order to attain a livable world but also on the immediate political objectives which must be pursued in the next couple of years in order to make the present danger of war recede to the point where attention can be focused on the task of abolishing war?

I do not propose to say hero much about the long-term objectives, but I want to discuss now a set of immediate political objectives on which a dedicated minority could perhaps unite.  Please keep in mind, however, that this is just a first try.

The issue of bomb tests and the issue of bomb shelters are peripheral issues; they are more the symptoms of the trouble we are in than the causes of the trouble.

I would not want to say that a foolish large-scale shelter program might not also become the cause of serious trouble.  But still I think that political pressure should not be focused on this issue, and the same holds for the issue of bomb tests.

The central issue which will face the Kennedy Administration is, whether America shall try to retain her strategic striking forces as a deterrent, or whether she shall retain them merely as protection.  This issue has been brought into focus by the current Berlin crisis.

Currently, voices are heard demanding that free access to West Berlin shall be defended at all cost.  Spokesmen of the Administration emphasize that, if necessary, we would drop the bomb on Russia.  We are told that our atomic striking forces are far superior to those of Russia, that, at this time, Russia has only 50 long-range rockets and only 150 long-range bomber planes, and that we have many more than that, and many people believe that this threat deters Russia from contesting our rights in Berlin.

If we intend to drop our bombs on Russia in case of war and expect Russia to drop her bombs on us, so that both countries would be wholly devastated, then our threat to drop bombs on Russia is tantamount to a threat of murder and suicide.

The threat of dropping bombs on Russia, in case of war, would be a believable threat however if America's strategic striking forces were able to cripple most, if not all, of Russia's rocket and bomber bases by one sudden single blow, and if it were America's intention to "strike first" in case of war.

Opinions differ on how successful such a first strike against bases would be today, and whether the Russian counterblow would demolish twenty, ten, one, or none of our cities.

Be that as it may, the Administration will have to decide whether the strategic striking forces of America shall be maintained in the long run at a level where they would have an adequate first strike capability, and whether America should adapt a "first strike against bases if necessary" policy.

Let us pause for a moment to examine what such a policy would involve.  It would involve, first of all, a great increase in the projected number of solid fuel long-range rockets, and the development of more powerful hydrogen warheads for these rockets.  This would be necessary because the Russians would, of course, harden their rocket bases.

Secondly, it would involve the manufacture of a large number of rockets that would function as decoys, in order to neutralize the anti-missile missiles, by means of which the Russians may be expected to defend their rocket bases.

Further, since we could not expect to destroy every single Russian base and submarine in a first strike, we wou1d have to embark on a major development program in order to have adequate anti-missile missiles available for the defense of our cities.

And lastly, we would be more or less forced to embark on a shelter program involving an annual expenditure of perhaps $20 billion.  The shelters would have to protect not only against fall-out, but also against heat and blast.  The problem of getting the people into the shelters at the right time would probably offer no major obstacle, since if we plan to strike first, the Government should be in a position to get the people to take shelter at the right time.

Only if such defensive measures were included in the program would the maintenance of a first strike against bases capability permit America to retain the bomb as a deterrent.

To me it seems conceivable that America's strategic striking force could be boosted to the level where, for a limited period of time, they wou1d be capable of an adequate first strike against bases.  It is not likely, however, that they could be maintained indefinitely at such a level.  Presumably periods when America has a first strike capability would alternate with periods when she does not have such a capability.  And if there were a major international crisis during one of the periods when we have a first strike capability, the Government would be under strong pressure to start a preventive war.

The decision to start a preventive war would always be a hard decision for any President to take, particularly since he would never be quite certain just how many of our own cities would be hit.  But in certain circumstances, his hand could be forced by a commander of an overseas strategic base, or a submarine capable of launching rockets.

A "first strike if necessary" policy would mean an atomic arms race, with the sky as the limit.  I do not believe that America could be made secure by trying to keep ahead of in such an arms race, and I would be in favor of resisting the adoption of such a policy, if necessary through vigorous political action.

If America renounces the first strike policy, then the strategic striking forces of America could thereafter function only as protection.  If these forces are arranged in such a manner that a sudden attack on then could not substantially reduce their ability to strike a major counter-blow, then these forces may be looked upon as protection against the possibility that America might be attacked with bombs.

A clear policy decision to the effect that America is going to maintain an invulnerable second strike but would not adopt a "first strike if necessary" policy would leave open the door to an agreement on arms control.  This is important, because an agreement on arms control (providing for far-reaching disarmament) is a necessary first step towards abolishing war.

An agreement on arms control would have to involve, however, not only Russia but also China, and it is not likely that negotiations including China may get under way within the next twelve months.  It might very well be, therefore, that in the immediate future America would have to take unilateral steps in order to reduce the present danger of an all-out war.

Such unilateral steps are not adequate substitutes for negotiated agreements, and they can carry us only part of the way, but still there are some unilateral steps which need to be taken at the present time.  I propose to discuss with you at this point what unilateral steps America could and should take at the present time.

(1)  I believe that America could and should make unilaterally two crucially important policy decisions and that she should proclaim these decisions.

First of all, America should proclaim that she would not resort to any strategic bombing of cities or bases (either by means of atomic bombs or conventional explosives), except if American cities or bases are attacked with bombs, or if there is an unprovoked attack with bombs on cities or bases of one of America's allies.

Further, America should make a second policy decision and should proclaim this decision.  In order to understand the meaning and importance of this second decision, it is necessary to consider the following:

Soon after the war, the Soviet Union proposed that the atomic bomb be outlawed.  This could take the form of a unilateral pledge, given by each atomic power, that it would not resort to the use of atomic bombs either for the purpose of attacking cities or bases or as a tactical weapon to be used against troops in combat.

Recently Sulzberger discussed with Khrushchev the possibility of unilateral pledges, renouncing the use of the bomb.  Khrushchev said on this occasion that if there were a war, and if at first only conventional weapons were used, subsequently the side which is about to lose the war would find it impossible to abide by its pledge and would resort to the use of the bomb.

This brings out, what I believe to be the crux of the issue, that today it might still be possible to resist force with force, but the objective of the use of force can no longer be victory.  The objective can only be to exact a price.

As long as force is used at all, an all-out war which neither side wants, can be avoided only if both sides recognize that the use of force must not be aimed at victory, or anything approaching victory.

Such a pledge would be no less clear than the simple pledge renouncing the use of the bomb, but it would be much easier to keep and therefore it would be a more believable pledge.  And if neither side aims at anything approaching victory, then the pledge would greatly reduce the danger of an all-out war.

When I discussed this issue in Germany three years ago, the people there said that if the ground forces of the allies were pushed back to the Rhine, and America used atomic bombs against troops in combat between the Rhine and the Oder Neisse line, many West German cities might be destroyed by American bombs.  I do not know to what extent West German cities could be spared by a judicious tactical use of atomic bombs by American forces, but I do know that if America were to use bombs beyond the pre-war boundary, West German cities would be destroyed by Russian bombs.

Germany is going to put increasingly strong pressure on the United States Government to turn over such equipment to NATO control, and I would be in favor of counterbalancing any pressure by bringing political pressure to bear on the Government.

(3)  Nothing is gained by America winning meaningless battles in the cold war and a change of attitude in this regard is urgently needed.  Take the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, for instance.  This organization has at present no function whatsoever, and if it is maintained in existence at all, it should be maintained as an exercise in cooperation among the nations.

The first director of this Agency, Sterling Cole, is an American, and his term expired recently.  Since next to America, the Soviet Union is the most important atomic power, we could have proposed that the next director of the Agency be a Russian.  Instead, we proposed a Swede, who was not acceptable to the Russians, and since we had the votes we were able to win a victory in a meaningless battle in the cold war.

This "victory" has reduced the chances of finding some useful function for this Agency, because the Russians resent being pushed around and there is no way for us to force them to play ball in this Agency.

I believe that it would be important for the Government to reach a major policy decision, and for the President to issue an Executive Order against fighting meaningless battles in the Cold War.  Some political action in support of such an Executive Order might be necessary.

(4)  We have a cultural exchange program with the Russians but their State Department and our State Department are playing a game of "if you hit our scientists, we shall hit your scientists."  Accordingly, our State Department imposes senseless travel restrictions on our Russian colleagues who visit this country.  These travel restrictions are not aimed at the safeguarding of any secrets, but are merely one way of hitting back at travel restrictions which the Soviet Government occasionally imposes on American scientists who travel about in Russia.

The Russians have opened up their country to tourist travel to a considerable extent, and if we wish to encourage this development, as we probably ought to, then American tourists should not be given spying assignments.  Tourists make poor spies, and we are losing more than we are gaining by trying to use them as spies.

I believe that representations ought to be made, at as high a level of the Administration is necessary:

(a)  for the Secretary of State to find some other assignment in the State Department for those who have, up till now, handled the East-West Cultural Exchange Program;

(b)  for the President to issue an Executive Order to the CIA directing it to refrain from approaching those who go to Russia as tourists.

I believe that, at the present time, little could be gained by bringing pressure on the Administration to enter into formal negotiations with Russia on the issue of General Disarmament, because--as they say, "You can lead a horse to the water, but you can't make him drink.

I believe that no substantial progress will be made towards disarmament until Americans and Russians first reach a meeting of the minds on the issue of how the peace may be secured in a disarmed world.

American reluctance to seriously contemplate general disarmament is largely due to uncertainty about this point.  If it became clear that a satisfactory solution of this issue is possible, many Americans may come to regard general disarmament as a highly desirable goal.

Khrushchev seems to be very much aware of this.  Therefore, it is possible that if it came to serious negotiations on the issue of disarmament, and if it became manifestly necessary to reach a political settlement in order to permit America to liquidate her military commitments, then the Soviet Union would go a long way towards seeking an accommodation.

The so-called Berlin Crisis, which centers around the commitments which America made to West Berlin, might very well be a case in point.

(6)  General disarmament will, if we are lucky, eliminate war, but it will not end the rivalry between America and Russia.

It is a foregone conclusion that America's efforts to raise the standard of living of underdeveloped nations may be frustrated in those areas where the birth rate is high, infant mortality is high, and there is little arable land left.  Improvement in the standard of living will initially lead to a fall in infant mortality, and if the birth rate remains high, the population will shoot up so rapidly, that economic improvements will not be able to catch up.

Our failure to develop methods of birth control, suitable for the needs of such areas is responsible for this state of affairs.  The development of such methods is not a task which the Government can undertake.  The Government could not create Research Institutes which would attract scientists who are ingenious and resourceful enough to come up with an adequate solution.  The amount of money which would be involved is not much and a major private group could and should tackle this problem.

If it should turn out that it is possible to formulate a set of political objectives on which reasonable people could generally agree, and if these objectives could count on the all-out support of a sizable minority--admittedly a very big "if"--then I should be inclined to go further, and I would go further along the following lines:

I would ask seven to twelve distinguished scientists to form a Council, which might be called the Council for Abolishing War or perhaps better, Council for a Liveable World.  This Council would, first of all, assemble a panel of political advisers, whose identity would be public knowledge and formulate in close consultations with those advisers two sets of objectives.  To the first set belong those objectives which cannot be attained at the present time through political action because it would take further inquiry, and perhaps even research, to know, in concrete terms, what needs to be done.  To the second set belong those objectives which can be pursued through political action, because it is clear what needs to be done.

The members of the Council would set up a Research Organization aimed at the pursuit of the first set of objectives, and they would serve as the Trustees of that organization.

The members of the Council would also set up a political organization aimed at the pursuit of the second set of objectives, and they would serve as the Board of Directors for that organization.  Because one of the functions of the second organization would be to pursue political objectives we may refer to it for our purposes here as "The Lobby".

It seems to me that there is no need to create a membership organization and to enlist those who are interested as members of such an organization.  What one needs to create is not a membership organization, but a Movement.

The Board of the Lobby would hold hearings, perhaps once every four months, and would subsequently proclaim in detail the immediate political objectives it proposes to support.  It would communicate these objectives perhaps in the form of a series of pamphlets, to all those who are believed to be seriously interested.  Those who regularly receive the communications of the Board would be regarded as members of the Movement, if they agree with the general aims pursued by the Board, and if they are willing actively to support at least one of the several specific objectives proclaimed by the Board.

One of the main functions of the Lobby would be to help the members of the Movement clarify their own minds on the political objectives they wish actively to support and to help arrange appointments for those members who come to Washington to see Congressmen, Senators and certain members of the Administration.

The members of the Movement would be regarded as pledged to vote in the primaries as well as in the elections.  As far as federal elections are concerned, they would be pledged to cast their vote, disregarding domestic issues, solely on the issue of war and peace.  The members of the Movement would be further regarded as pledged annually to spend 2 per cent of their income on political contributions.

So that each member of the Movement may know where his contribution should go in order to be most effective in furthering the political objectives which he has chosen to pursue, the Lobby will keep in touch with each member.  The Lobby would keep the members informed not only in general about the particular contests for seats in Congress which are of interest to the Movement, but it may advise one member to take an interest in one of these contests and another member to take an interest in another of these contests.

This would not mean that the Lobby would explicitly endorse anyone running for office.  It may be assumed that if the importance of a given contest is brought to the attention of a member, the member will have no difficulty figuring out for himself which of the two opposite candidates for office he would want to support.

For covering the operating expenses of the Lobby and the Research Organization (which would be maintained independently and operated parallel to the Lobby), one would look to the members of the Movement.  Each year a certain group of the members would be asked by the Board of the Lobby or the Trustees of the Research Organization to contribute for 2 per cent of their income to them, rather than to spend it for political contributions.  One year this group might be composed of those whose name starts with the letter "P" and another year it might be composed of those whose name starts with the letter "C", etc. etc.

The influence of the Movement would be greatly enhanced if the lobby were able to say not only how many votes it represents, in toto, but also how many votes it represents in each state and in each congressional district.  So that the Lobby may not make false representations, concerning the votes it may be able to deliver, the Board shall from time to time ask all those who regularly receive its communications, to say which of the political objectives proclaimed by the Board they propose to support and if they intend to perform with respect to those objectives as members of the Movement are expected to perform.

There are many intelligent men in Congress who have insight into what goes on.  The Movement could help these men to have the courage of their convictions.  There are others in Congress who are not capable of such insight.  The only thing to do with them is not to return them to Congress, and to replace them with better men.  This may make it necessary to persuade better men to run in the primaries and to stand for election.  To find such better men, must be one of the tasks of the Movement, and the Lobby must be prepared to help the members of the Movement perform this task.

I did not come here to enlist any of you in such a Movement or to launch such a Movement.  I came here to invite you to participate in an experiment that ought to show whether such a movement could be successfully launched.

First of all, I ask each of you to look into your own heart and try to discover whether you yourself would want to participate in a political movement of the kind described, provided the objectives -- as formulated from time to time appealed to you and you thought that the movement could be effective.

I would appreciate your writing me in about four to six weeks to how many people you have talked and how many of these and who of these (name and address), you think, could be counted upon.

Those to whom you talk in your home community should not go and recruit still others. They may, however, put you into contact with others who might be interested, and you will be then in the position to evaluate their interest and to report back.

This experiment is meant to be based on the communities centered on Harvard University, Swarthmore College, Western Reserve University, the University of Chicago, Stanford University, the University of California at Berkeley, Reed College, and the University of Oregon.

If enough of you collaborate in this experiment, with luck we might be in a position to know within two months whether a movement of the kind I have described could get off the ground.

Those of you who participate in this experiment may need to have a copy of this speech, and we can discuss later on just haw I can get a copy to you.