Book Notes

Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria. By Rotimi N. Suberu. Washington, D.C.: Institute of Peace Press, 2001. Pp. 206. $14.95, paper.

At times Rotimi N. Suberu’s Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria gives the impression that Africa’s most populous nation is not unlike a clattering

jalopy. Held together by proverbial duct-tape and bubble gum, its occupants labor to steer while struggling to keep the doors on. Automotive metaphors aside, Suberu’s clear and thorough work examines Nigeria’s attempts to manage divisive ethno-regional struggles and argues that a strengthened federalist system is the best hope for peace and flourishing in the fledgling democracy. While evaluating the structure of a nation’s political institutions may appear a rarified task, in Nigeria’s case it is one of crucial practical import. Given the nation’s size, resources and unresolved internal tensions, state failure in Nigeria could be disastrous for the country and the continent. Suberu’s work reveals the importance of not only examining a government’s discrete actions or a particular minority group’s status, but also grappling with a nation’s broader political structures and the significance of their impact on the promotion of human rights and dignity.

The work first reminds the reader that Nigeria’s present federalist system is a useful despite its imperfections. The structure of thirty-six sub-federal states helps contain local ethnic disputes, diffuses the power of the three major Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba ethnic groups and prevents absolute domination of the nation’s smaller minorities. Not only does it sometimes create a state-based identity to compete with ethnic affiliation; multi-state federalism provides a functional framework for economic distribution that avoids the unitary excesses of other African multiethnic states. Still, Suberu’s work reveals how flawed governing structures can exacerbate ethno-regional (and, increasingly, religious) conflict and create a divisive “cake sharing” fixation where states and groups are more keen on grabbing a larger slice of federal disbursements than expanding the size of the nation’s output.

The “federal character” principles in the Nigerian constitution also serve as a Rorschach test for the national family’s dysfunction. The principles are interpreted as a mandate for the central government to represent and aid all groups. However laudable and necessary the principles are for a multi-ethnic nation, Suberu observes how efforts to implement them have cultivated resentment between winners and losers competing for slots in governmental institutions. Because national political parties must meet minimum membership requirements across the nation for certification, federal character policies may also create structures hostile to legitimate ethnic grievances and regional agendas. Consequently, a federal character interpreted as such, can close, rather than create opportunities for flexible and constructive approaches to minority or regional needs, leaving grievances simmering below a lid of constitutional language championing pluralism.

The thrust of Suberu’s argument is that strengthening the federalist system of divided powers can provide healing solutions for a wounded Nigerian union. At the heart of his critique of the current system is distaste for an overweening central government. Whether by creating debilitating state dependence on federally distributed revenue or enhancing ethno-regional power struggles, over-centralization plays the part of principle villain in the narrative’s drama of political and economic ills.

The author recommends that the federal center cede power to strengthened state and local governments on non-national matters, limiting itself primarily to defense, trade, external affairs, interstate commerce and assisting general macro-economic development. To combat the cake sharing mentality, he argues for creating incentives for states to produce revenue by having the federal government cede them greater taxation powers, reward increased economic production with larger shares of centrally distributed revenue and allow states to keep more of the revenue derived from their lands. While conceding the necessity of maintaining a system of central redistribution to states on basic equity grounds, Suberu argues needed adjustments would encourage regional self-reliance, improve governance, reduce oil dependence, and strengthen the economy. Moreover, reducing the power of the central government would lower the ethno-regional intensity at the national level, as groups would have to focus more on managing their region rather than competing with others for federal largesse or central control.

Suberu rejects proposed executive power-sharing reforms such as a presidency rotated on a regional basis or a federal collegiate council, arguing these proposals to manage internal tension ignore the complexity of a nation with 250 ethno-linguistic groups and would benefit elites within the largest ethnic groups. Beyond the fear that such regulations would place strictures on the democratic choice of leaders, Suberu argues the proposals distract from what he sees as the critical problem of a “massive, oppressive, divisive, and destructive hegemony” of the central government and an executive that unjustly controls other independent branches and functions of government at the state and federal level. Suberu asserts that limits on government power through a reasonable market economy and rule of law are just as crucial as power sharing. In that same vein, he calls for liberalization of laws restricting formation of national parties.

Finally, Suberu confronts the oft-discussed proposal to reconstruct Nigerian political organization by collapsing the states into six to ten ethnic regions united in a looser confederation. Letting loose a quiver of arrows at this proposal, he argues that because it has no support in the Northern half of the country, such a reformation would only excite regional tensions. Beyond reversing the benefits of better representation, conflict-containment and power diffusion that the large number of states bring, the boundaries confederation proponents offer do not bode well for stability and justice, as they are “culturally artificial and . . . politically controversial.” In contrast, Suberu counsels for the more “ethnically flexible” approach of a federal union.

This last topic brings a nervous sidelong glance at the phantom lurking in the work’s shadows: the nightmarish, although not inevitable, prospect of the collapse of the union. Given the fuzzy and overlapping lines of culture and ethnicity, shared history, economic interdependence and vast, heterogeneously located resources of the nation, it is hard to imagine dissolution without inter-group bloodshed. For this reason, Suberu’s proposals for strengthening the viability of a united Nigeria deserve the attention of policy makers

and human rights advocates alike. The work is not flawless. Although strengthened federalism seems to provide the greatest promise for conflict management and local development, Suberu’s accounts of the national ethnic and regional struggles recapitulating themselves at local levels dampens its immediate promise. And current accounts of the harsh application of the Shari’a laws in northern localities give the potential delegator pause. He also gives scant mention of the chances of bringing his recommendations from paper to practice or any accompanying strategy to do so. The book, however, gives a solid introduction to Nigeria’s recent political history and present dilemmas and provides plausible solutions. And from a human rights perspective, when considered in light of what is at stake in the debates about Nigeria’s stability and viability, it reminds the reader how constructive concern for the forest encourages the protection and flourishing of the trees.

—Jeffrey A. Pojanowski

Copyright © 2002 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College
Harvard Human Rights Journal / Vol. 15, Spring 2002