home subscription, submission, contact ... current staff current issue: articles, bookreviews ... archive: articles, bookreviews ... conference submissions links search
      archive by issue archive by article archive of books reviewed
      Volume table of content staff for this volume

harvard human rights journal logo Issue 15



 

Book Notes


Of Centaurs and Doves: Guatemala’s Peace Process. By Susanne Jonas. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2000. Pp. 299. $25.00, paper.

The peace process in Guatemala is a necessary response to that nation’s thirty-six-year civil war, a war that claimed the lives of an estimated 200,000 civilians and transformed Guatemala into a counterinsurgency state. The seeds of the conflict were sown in 1954, when democratically elected President Jacobo Arbenz was overthrown in a CIA-sponsored coup and succeeded by a series of military dictators. Peasants launched an armed insurgency in the 1960s in response to increasingly extreme inequalities in income and resource distribution, and a political regime that prohibited calls for reform; Latin America’s longest and bloodiest civil war ensued. Not until 1990 did the first serious discussions about ending the conflict begin. Six years later a final peace accord officially ended Guatemala’s civil war, but the peace process is by no means complete, and the extent to which its gains will be consolidated remains uncertain. For this reason, no tidy ending exists for Of Centaurs and Doves: Guatemala’s Peace Process; to her credit, author Susanne Jonas does not attempt to write one. Jonas’s book displays a deep engagement with the topic, serving as both a record of the peace process so far and as a case study for post-war societies undergoing democratic transitions. Her analysis is calculated and fair throughout and in the end asks as many interesting questions as it answers.

Guatemalans met the 1996 final peace accord with great ceremony and hope; it implemented agreements on issues such as democratization, human rights, the establishment of a truth commission, the identity and rights of indigenous peoples, socioeconomic and agrarian conditions, and the role of the armed forces. These accords, though certainly not perfect, represented more than a mere cease-fire; all sides made significant contributions and concessions in re-conceptualizing Guatemala as a civilian-ruled, multiethnic democracy. The consensus behind this vision (if one ever really existed) soon unraveled, however, and the movement for peace suffered two serious setbacks. First, the Guatemalan government failed to put into place the progressive tax system upon which the receipt of international aid (critical to implementation of the peace accords) was predicated. Second, in a 55%-45% vote on May 16, 1999, the proposed constitutional reforms that were the linchpin of the peace process were defeated in a national referendum. A voter turnout of just nineteen percent reflected widespread frustration, disorganization, and misinformation. The 1999 referendum condemned peace in Guatemala to a state of limbo. A return to armed conflict seems unlikely, but


*** Top of Page 330 ***

speedy progress toward a de-militarized, multiethnic democracy appears equally improbable. The future is uncertain, but a minimalist peace looks most likely.

Jonas identifies demilitarization and the construction of citizenship as essential issues that must be addressed if Guatemala is to revitalize and realize the vision articulated in the peace accords. In addressing the latter, she argues that democratization in Guatemala must be defined broadly as active participation by all societal sectors, rather than simply as the absence of fraudulent elections. In a nation that has been as exclusionary toward Indians, women, and the poor as South Africa was toward non-whites, anything less would result in electoral democracy within the context of de facto apartheid. Namely, a comprehensive, multiethnic notion of citizenship is required, allowing true democracy to be consolidated desde abajo—from below. The success of such an effort depends in large part on social reconciliation between Mayans and Ladinos, as well as truth-telling about regarding wartime atrocities.

Regarding demilitarization, Jonas argues that the army high command never really accepted the peace project and the changes it implies—most significantly, civilian control and reduction of the army’s autonomy. As in other Latin American countries, dismantling the traditional power and influ-ence of the army in Guatemala appears an arduous but necessary task. Rather ominously, in response to a rise in common crime as well as U.S. requests for assistance in the drug war, some have already begun to argue that the army should re-assert itself as guarantor of Guatemala’s internal security. Jonas contends that both the Guatemalan public and international actors must respond to such calls by insisting that the government create a strong and professional police force and give it exclusive domain over internal security matters.

While she stops short of declaring that peace in Guatemala cannot be achieved without an improvement in socioeconomic conditions, Jonas does raise serious questions about the sustainability of democratization amid widespread social inequity. Specifically, she asks whether the “structural causes” that gave rise to the revolutionary movements of the 1960s–1980s are being addressed by the peace settlements. If they are not, the disenfranchised may observe that “nothing has changed” and become frustrated with the peace process. There is evidence that this sense of frustration has already set in, and that it is partly to blame for the weakness of the peace movement and the failed constitutional reform referendum. Jonas asks whether accords on human rights, democratization, and multiethnicity are doomed to fail if unaccompanied by socioeconomic gains. Disappointingly, she fails to approach a conclusion on this point. Furthermore, while criticizing the neoliberal world order imposed by the international financial institutions (IFIs) as an obstacle to improving the lot of Guatemala’s poor, the author does not suggest a meaningful alternative. Her sentimental musings about the unfortunate absence of a socialist bloc to provide moral support for land and tax reform à la Arbenz are interesting but unrealistic. In the end, the question Jonas asks—can the peace project survive neoliberalism?—remains unresolved; perhaps Guatemala will provide an answer.


*** Top of Page 331 ***

Sir Marrack Goulding’s foreword to Of Centaurs and Doves accurately describes Jonas as having written the first four acts of a five-act drama. Jonas must conclude, though the peace process has not. On one level this is highly unsatisfying. Nonetheless, the author succeeds in deconstructing what has happened so far and identifying the issues of import as the process approaches its denouement. The project in Guatemala—building a stable and inclusive democracy while grappling with the legacy of decades of war—is likely to provide a useful precedent if and when similar efforts take place in Afghanistan, Colombia, the Middle East, and beyond. Whether or not the peace process in Guatemala is ultimately successful, Of Centaurs and Doves will prove a valuable tool in assessing where the endeavor went right and where it went wrong.

—Michael J. Camilleri

 

home subscription, submission, contact ... current staff current issue: articles, bookreviews ... archive: articles, bookreviews ... conference submissions links search
      archive by issue archive by article archive of books reviewed
      Volume table of content staff for this volume

HLSHRJ@law.harvard.edu
This file was last modified: Wednesday, 30-Apr-2003 12:39:28 EDT