Book Notes

Destructive Messages: How Hate Speech Paves the Way for Harmful Social Movements. By Alexander Tsesis. New York: NYU Press, 2002. Pp. 250. $40.00, cloth.

Destructive Messages examines the connections between “misethnic” speech and societal acceptance of discriminatory attitudes against “outgroups”—propaganda that may ultimately yield a violent political mandate. Exploring the means by which prejudiced attitudes become systematically imbedded into social consciousness, and the power of public (mis)conceptions to preclude individual rights, Alexander Tsesis describes the psychological need of a society to project, displace, and justify its fears by scapegoating marginal groups. Both subconscious and overt, these socialized meanings become so deeply embedded in the cultural psyche that the targeting of outgroups becomes essential to the validation of the power of the “ingroup.” Tracing patterns of systematic marginalization historically rooted in divisive speech, Tsesis theorizes that stereotypes based on religious or ethnic difference emerge from the public subconscious and become dangerous mechanisms for demagogues seeking to enhance existing power structures.

Tsesis documents the evolution of hate speech into violence within several familiar socio-historical contexts. In late nineteenth-century Germany, for example, the foundations of the Holocaust were already beginning to emerge from long-established anti-Jewish sentiment. Traditional stereotypes based on religious differences developed into more deeply rooted, academically endorsed racial stereotypes, as evidenced by the linguistic shift from “anti-Judaism” to “anti-Semitism” (coined in the 1870s by Wilhelm Marr). Pseudoscientific studies establishing Aryan superiority became fodder for members of the intellectual elite seeking a scapegoat for an economic downturn. Anti-Semitic attitudes leapt from academic to political rhetoric, grew latent around the turn of the century, then reemerged full-throttle in a pamphlet entitled Protocols of the Elders of Zion during Germany’s post–World War I decline. Protocols, which was exposed as a forgery a year after its 1920 publication, nevertheless maintained momentum well into the 1930s as evidence of a Jewish conspiracy for world domination. Reaffirming ideas previously planted within the social consciousness, Nazis seized upon a new wave of sensationalist propaganda, gaining widespread support not for discrimination, but for destruction of the Jewish race.

Tsesis also discusses parallels in United States history. Noting that the roots of slavery in America were fixed in the race-neutral institution of indentured servitude, which later merged with a popular conception of Africans as heathens, Tsesis attributes religious propaganda as the justification for bringing Africans to America as slaves. Over time, “biological” arguments emerged, legitimizing inhumane treatment of slaves because they were understood to be soulless or subhuman. The forced removal of Native Americans, and collateral violence, was based upon similar mythologies of savagery, humanitarian pretenses, and ignorance of aboriginal ownership customs. By the mid-nineteenth century, utilitarian arguments provided ethical justifications—sacrificing of the rights of a subgroup was deemed necessary to establishing equality and happiness among the majority—resulting in the acute political expediency of hate speech messages.

The only non-Western example cited in detail by Tsesis is in the context of contemporary issues: the hereditary slavery of black Africans by Arab/Berbers of various social classes in Mauritania. An institution since the twelfth century, the practices and justifications of this ongoing, religious and race-based servitude mirror those described in the context of the American colonies. Again, subordinating language denotes the superiority of one race over another, and teachings of providence lead even the enslaved to believe that theirs is a legitimate position within the social hierarchy, and that the only manifestation of virtue is obedience to their masters. So embedded are these cultural norms that an attempt to outlaw slavery in 1981 was basically ineffective.

The diffusion of socialized hatred has continued in recent times via the anonymous and cost-effective Internet, through hate-based political organizations, general public desensitization to the tragic consequences of past bigotry, and calls for racial war. Given the long-term potential for mere speech evolving into socially accepted violence, Tsesis endorses the enactment of narrowly tailored laws limiting constitutional protections of hate speech. In an analysis centered upon United States First Amendment jurisprudence, Tsesis challenges the application of the principles underlying constitutional language. The Supreme Court applies a balancing test that permits the restriction of speech only when such action is necessary to advance a compelling government interest. Set against Holmes’s “marketplace of ideas” doctrine, this test leads to questions of true democracy. Working through case law leading to the most recent decision of R.A.V. v. St. Paul[1] (a 1992 cross-burning case holding that legislation targeting specific content is unconstitutional), Tsesis describes a judicial tendency to rest too heavily upon the requirement of an immediate threat and a naïve presumption that people spreading hate messages would be content with mere speech without action.

He suggests that judges should consider history, rather than discreet instances of defamation, and demonstrate a preference for inclusive speech.

Ultimately, Tsesis calls for increased judicial and legislative attention to the protection of individual rights. Suggesting that the United States is an anomaly in its extreme protection of free speech, he notes that Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Cyprus, England, France, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, and Switzerland are among those countries more willing to draw a clear line where unregulated speech may impose upon the rights of others. Additionally, he cites various international treaties addressing the elimination of hate crimes and limiting misethnic speech, to some of which the United States is a signatory (albeit with reservations).

Tsesis’s theoretical arguments are compelling, but the potential for legal analysis is overwhelmed by reasonably familiar historical and sociological observations. Without delving into the nuances of causality, he teases the reader with a legal analysis, concluding by proposing a set of policy considerations (which include historical persecution, foreseeable violence and persecution, intent, and the balancing of individual and social benefits) and a model statute. Perhaps these would have proven more satisfying as an introduction to a more in-depth analysis of the contemporary threats posed by hate speech, its international implications, and of the viability of his proposals within the context of current United States doctrine. Tsesis’s discussion is nevertheless a thought-provoking one, reflecting upon individual rights and freedoms in the context of a salient contemporary issue.

—Jennifer M. Pendleton

[1]. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).

Copyright © 2003 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College
Harvard Human Rights Journal / Vol. 16, Spring 2003