Book Notes

International Human Rights and Authoritarian Rule in Chile. By Darren G. Hawkins. Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 2002. Pp. 261. $45.00, cloth.

Darren G. Hawkins’s International Human Rights and Authoritarian Rule in Chile analyzes the influence of the international human rights movement in shaping the human rights policies of General Augusto Pinochet’s military regime, as well as the contribution of international human rights pressure to the downfall of Pinochet’s regime and the reinstitution of democracy in Chile. Hawkins posits that international human rights pressure combined with a unique set of domestic conditions within Chile to propel the downfall of military rule in Chile and the reestablishment of democracy in the late 1980s.

Hawkins’s argument opens by recognizing the growth and concomitant globalization of the human rights movement over the past few decades. Nongovernmental and multilateral institutions have aggressively monitored the human rights policies of states and exposed governmental human rights abuses over the past thirty years. Even governments have acknowledged the increased internationalization and strength of the human rights movement by adopting human rights platforms and signing international conventions respecting human rights. Hawkins contends that all governments—including authoritarian regimes—crave legitimacy both within domestic society and on the international scene. In turn, repressive governments have been forced to address criticism of human rights abuses leveled by other governments and international human rights monitors in order to secure both domestic and international political legitimacy.

After acknowledging the potential of the international human rights movement to force governments to acknowledge (and ultimately abandon) repressive human rights policies, Hawkins then outlines a theoretical framework in which he assesses the ability of international human rights pressures to orient domestic human rights policy formulation in a pro-human rights

direction. Hawkins contends that four specific domestic political conditions must exist in order for international human rights pressures to force governments seeking political legitimacy to abandon repressive human rights policies. First, although states with vibrant civil societies not dominated by a political elite enjoy more access to transnational human rights networks, the ability of transnational human rights networks to pressure policymakers and the extent of policy change in fractured polities are likely to be minimal. Second, where international human rights norms mirror domestic cultural understandings, states will be more responsive to international human rights pressures. Third, states that face serious economic or political crises are less responsive to international human rights pressures than are states facing relatively minimal security or economic problems. Fourth, the presence within the government of “rule-oriented actors”—government actors who wish to rule by consent, not coercion, and who strive to establish legal principles legitimizing authoritarian decision making—increases the likelihood that international human rights pressures will influence domestic human rights policy. The interaction of these specific domestic political conditions with international human rights pressures, in turn, can force an authoritarian government to jettison repressive human rights practices in order to achieve internal and international political legitimacy.

Hawkins applies this theoretical framework to the case of Pinochet’s Chile, contending that Pinochet’s quest to secure legitimacy for his regime, coupled with the interplay of domestic and international political forces, led to the demise of military rule in Chile and the reemergence of democracy. Hawkins’s analysis of the impact of international human rights pressures on Pinochet’s Chile begins with an examination of the onset of authoritarian rule. He asserts that international and domestic human rights pressures forced the Pinochet regime to seek international political legitimacy during the government’s early years even while committing human rights abuses. In particular, international human rights pressures during the first several years of the Pinochet regime forced the government to adopt a discourse on human rights and abandon its most repressive human rights practices. The domestic resonance of international human rights norms, coupled with the influence of “rule-oriented” actors eager to secure international legitimacy, also drove Pinochet to announce a plan for the end of military rule and to develop a new constitutional framework for a “protected democracy.” Throughout the 1980s, domestic and international human rights opposition to ongoing Chilean government repression led the Pinochet regime to prioritize its quest for legitimacy through the implementation of the constitutionally mandated plebiscite of 1988. As the plebiscite ended Pinochet’s rule, Hawkins contends that this demonstrates how the Pinochet regime ultimately sacrificed its control of the government in the quest for political legitimacy. Hawkins concludes his analysis by undertaking a comparative study of government responses to international human rights pressures in other contexts.

Hawkins presents an interesting explanation for Chile’s return to democracy after almost two decades of military rule under Pinochet. However, attributing Chile’s re-democratization principally to the influence of international human rights pressures does not completely explain Chile’s transition to democracy. While international human rights pressures certainly influenced Pinochet’s decision to curb humanitarian abuses and permit increased political openness, he still sanctioned one of history’s most egregious and notorious campaigns of crimes against humanity.

The enormity of the tyranny undertaken by the Pinochet regime even while it adopted public relations measures to secure international legitimacy during the regime’s early years demonstrates that the international human rights movement did not greatly influence Pinochet. Furthermore, international actors did not overwhelmingly condemn the human rights abuses that occurred during the early years of Pinochet’s regime. As Hawkins acknowledges, Chile suffered only marginally from economic penalties imposed in response to the coup; moreover, international capital generously poured into the country during the early years of the Pinochet regime. Although Pinochet certainly abandoned his most repressive tactics in the mid-1970s, this policy shift arguably constituted a response to the installation of the Carter Administration in the United States, which opposed Pinochet’s repression with much greater ferocity than had the preceding administrationn that had applauded Allende’s overthrow.

International human rights pressures only constituted one of several influences propelling Chile’s return to democracy in the late 1980s. While democratization certainly gained momentum from international human rights forces, international economic pressures for open markets, global democratization trends, and Chile’s desire for domestic economic stability and integration with global capital markets chiefly led to Chile’s return to democracy. Unlike many other Latin American countries, Chile also enjoyed a proud history of democratic rule, suggesting that military rule could never have been an acceptable permanent form of governance, but constituted an extreme—yet temporary—response to Allende’s unsuccessful socialist democratic policies. Chile’s long democratic tradition arguably also facilitated the socio-cultural democratic transition. Finally, the military’s continued strength in post-Pinochet democratic Chile indicates the limited success of the international human rights movement in influencing the Chilean democratic process.

While Hawkins presents an interesting analysis of the impact of international human rights on the Chilean re-democratization process of the late 1980s, international human rights pressure was not necessarily the dominant reason behind Chile’s renunciation of Pinochet and restitution of democratic rule.

—Charu A. Chandrasekhar

Copyright © 2003 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College
Harvard Human Rights Journal / Vol. 16, Spring 2003