Identity in Democracy. By Amy Gutmann. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003. Pp. 246. $27.95, cloth.

Who are you? If the answer includes a religion, culture, or voluntary association, you may be undermining democracy. As Amy Gutmann effectively explains, identity groups have profound implications for democratic principles. On one hand, the cohesion and mutual support that these groups encourage can be used to empower people who alone would be ineffective at asserting their rights. Yet they can be destructive as well, subjugating the rights of others for the benefit of the group’s ideals or goals. Should democracies be supportive of identity groups in general, not at all, or only certain groups? If a country permits boy scouts, must they also allow neo-Nazis? Where does a government draw the line?

Identity in Democracy begins to answer these questions by summarizing four major ways by which people identify themselves: culture, voluntary associations, ascriptive groups, and religion. Often the major issue in each discussion boils down to a seeming conflict between respect for the group and respect for the individual. Gutmann’s analysis, despite being separated by the four categories of identification for explanatory purposes, consistently focuses on the individual’s multiple overlapping identities. We are to a certain degree a product of all our identity groups. Gutmann remarks that an individual’s right to join these groups should not be curtailed in a democratic society; yet, with so many possible permutations of identities, she argues one must be careful not to consider identity groups above individuals or to treat them as representing the united voice of its constituents.

For example, the discussion of cultural identification deals with the supposed tensions between cultural group rights and individual rights. Many times, when a cultural group denies certain freedoms to its members, it can assert that denial as simply part of the “culture,” thus gaining acceptance by a democratic government. When the Pueblo authorities refused Julia Martinez tribal benefits because of marrying outside the tribe, despite the fact that men may intermarry and retain their rights, the Supreme Court of the United States declined to “interfere” with tribal decisions. The Supreme Court arguably denied the constitutional right of equal protection under the law to half of a cultural group because of that culture’s professed values—values that, as Gutmann observes, were written by men. Gutmann argues against this special treatment towards cultural groups. The fact that the Pueblo policy was challenged by someone within that culture undermines the entire notion of a single cultural value for all members and thus undermines the basis of supporting a group to the detriment of fundamental individual rights.

But the other end of the spectrum—placing individual rights over group rights—does not make room for any minority group values at all and may expose one to attacks of unilateralism if the dismissal of “culture” or “religion,” for example, is misapplied. A common criticism of human rights work is that it implicitly imposes Western imperialism and individualistic values upon different groups. Gutmann’s work touches on an important question for human rights supporters around the world: to what extent should one ascribe to relativism? Must one always choose between respecting the group and respecting the individual?

Gutmann, interestingly, does not see a major conflict between identity group rights and human rights. She argues that citizens can knowingly express an identity only when certain fundamental human rights are recognized. Essentially Gutmann’s argument begins with the idea that a democracy must protect certain basic rights, like equal protection under the law. The source of the basic individual freedoms could be a country’s constitution, or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Beyond that, people should be free to identify with whatever group or groups they choose.

If a group does not ascribe to the same democratic principles as the government, then according to Gutmann, the government should not support or help fund the group. A democracy must always defend the human rights of an individual within a group. The group should not be prevented from assembling, nor should a person not be permitted to express an anti-democratic identity. As an example, neo-Nazis in America do not receive any official support or funds from the U.S. government but nonetheless are often allowed to demonstrate their views publicly.

Identity in Democracy, though published over a year ago, continues to be a relevant exploration of democratic values. Recently France passed a controversial law banning all overt religious symbols from its schools, including Muslim hijabs, Jewish yarmulkes, and Sikh turbans. The justification of this law was to promote the ideals of secularism and equality. Gutmann’s book deals directly with the balance between religion and secularism, and as she has consistently done for all types of identities, she treats religious identity from a rights perspective. The author views religion as part of a fundamental right to freedom of belief (whether religious or not) that must be protected, but not to the point where it causes injustice to others. If one accepts Gutmann’s perspective, the French situation, often oversimplified as French religious intolerance, crystallizes into a clearer debate over France’s prioritization of certain individual rights above the freedom of belief and whether these rights are being unjustly violated by wearing religious symbols to school.

This book was not intended to be a comprehensive guide to identity groups in democracies. Rather it was meant to give a more solid structure to ongoing discussions over identity. Thus, one will not find hard conclusions, for example, as to which basic human rights need to be placed above the identity group. Reading the book often feels like peeling back the layers of an onion, only to quickly discover empty space. The questions left unanswered, however, leave the reader free to explore the path started by Gutmann, incorporating one’s particular experience. The argument is thought-provoking, not merely thought-dispensing. For any practitioner of human rights who has struggled with finding the balance between group identities and individual freedom, Identity in Democracy will give an interesting and well-reasoned perspective.

—Jasmine Marwaha

Copyright © 2004 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College
Harvard Human Rights Journal / Vol. 17, Spring 2004