The John M. Olin Center

Paper Abstract

1013. Cass R. Sunstein, Rear Visibility and Some Problems for Economic Analysis (with particular reference to experience goods), 08/2019.

Abstract: In 2014, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration finalized its rear visibility regulation, which requires cameras in all new vehicles, with the goal of allowing drivers to see what is behind them and thus reducing backover accidents. In 2018, the Trump administration embraced the regulation. The rear visibility initiative raises numerous puzzles. First: Congress’ grant of authority was essentially standardless—perhaps the most open-ended in all of federal regulatory law. Second: It is not easy to identify a market failure to justify the regulation. Third: The monetized costs of the regulation greatly exceeded the monetized benefits, and yet on welfare grounds, the regulation can plausibly be counted as a significant success. Rearview cameras produce a set of benefits that are hard to quantify, including increased ease of driving, and those benefits might have been made a part of “breakeven analysis,” accompanying standard cost-benefit analysis. In addition, rearview cameras significantly improve the experience of driving, and it is plausible to think that in deciding whether to demand them, many vehicle purchasers did not sufficiently anticipate that improvement. This is a problem of limited foresight; rearview cameras are “experience goods.” A survey conducted in 2019 strongly supports this proposition, finding that about 56 percent of consumers would demand at least $300 to buy a car without a rearview camera, and that fewer than 6 percent would demand $50 or less. Almost all of that 6 percent consists of people who do not own a car with a rearview camera. (The per-person cost is usually under $50.) These conclusions may have general implications for other domains in which regulation has the potential to improve people’s lives, even if it fails standard cost-benefit analysis; the defining category involves situations in which people lack experience with a good whose provision might have significant welfare effects.

1013 PDF