250. M. D. Rosenbaum, The Law And Economics Of Administrative Law And Administratively-Imposed Trade Barriers, 1/99.
Abstract: This paper explores the economics of administrative law for administratively-imposed barriers to trade. Theory and data from OECD countries suggest that administrative procedure's most significant impact on trade-relevant outcomes lies in changing the cost of access to information about administrative decisionmaking. Procedures lowering the cost of access shift power over policymaking from more organized to less organized private interests. Consumer interests in states with private rights to government-held information, public notice and comment, and similar mechanisms therefore have greater influence over trade policy, and these states have lower barriers to imports. Empirical evidence suggests that "adequate consideration" and other doctrines relying on administrative officials to change their positions in the face of additional evidence do not change policy outcomes. Producer interests in states with administrative law limited to these mechanisms therefore have greater power over trade policy, and these states have greater barriers to imports.