Paper Abstract
40. Scott Duke Kominers & E. Glen Weyl, Concordance Among Holdouts, 08 /2011.
Abstract: Holdout problems prevent decentralized aggregation of complementary goods, as
in the assembly of land or transfer of corporate ownership. Therefore, as Mailath
and Postelwaite (1990) formalized, some coercion is needed to enable the assembly of
complements in large populations. We propose an approximate individual rationality
condition under which individuals are guaranteed to receive as compensation for taking
at least the best estimate of their value possible from others' information. Unlike
strict individual rationality, this constraint is consistent with the bilateral eciency
achieved by a take-it-or-leave-it o er to the aggregate seller community. We propose a
class of Concordance mechanisms which includes the maximally attractive mechanisms
achieving these objectives together with, depending on the implementation considered,
either dominant-strategy incentive compatibility or Bayesian incentive compatibility
and budget balance.